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Abstract 
Following the recent scandals, the provision and regulation of healthcare is currently in a 
state of flux, which makes it an ideal time to re-examine the law in this area. In this thesis 
I analyse the concept of consent to medical treatment. I explore its ethical basis in 
autonomy and examine how other principles and ethical approaches might interact with 
the rules derived from autonomy. I then situate the relevant ethical obligations within the 
context of the healthcare professional-patient relationship which subsequently allows me 
to develop a textured model of consent. 
The model is predicated on the theory that consent is a secondary right, derivative on the 
underlying right which it controls. By giving or withholding consent, the autonomous 
person determines who may justifiably infringe the primary right. Importantly, however, 
the context of the professional-patient relationship highlights the relevance of consent, 
not just as permission, but also as agreement. This aspect of consent to medical treatment 
requires both the patient and the professional to engage in the dialogue of negotiation, 
with both parties being mutually open to persuasion. 
I subsequently utilise the model of consent to analyse the current law, which is found to 
be deficient in a number of ways. Amongst other things I explore the conceptual 
difficulties of the split regulation between the torts of battery and negligence. I examine 
the current standard of disclosure and conclude that while it seems to be moving towards 
the more autonomy respecting prudent patient standard, the courts may still be affording 
expert witnesses too much say in determining which risks should be disclosed. Most 
importantly I expose the thin and unsatisfactory conception of autonomy that appears to 
ground the current legal approach. 
Some of the common law's deficiencies lie in tort law's focus on the outcome rather than 
the process of the interaction between the healthcare professional and the patient. This is 
exacerbated by association of outcome responsibility with consent and the need for 
physical or psychiatric damage to occur before the legal wrong is acknowledged. There 
are three responses to these deficiencies. The common law could be allowed to continue 
its piecemeal development. The deficiencies of the common law could be patched up by 
developing professional regulation, or new legislation could be drafted to deal 
specifically with consent to medical treatment. If there is a genuine commitment to 
patient autonomy and patient centred care then I submit that legislation is justified. 
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Introduction 
The patient who is armed with information, who wants to ask 
questions, sometimes difficult and awkward questions, should be seen 
as an asset in the process of care and not an impediment to it. 
- Sir Liam Donaldson, the Chief Medical Officer (CMO). ' 
In recent years the healthcare professions have been rocked by a number of high profile 
scandals including the murderous activities of Harold Shipman and Beverly Allift, the 
issue of organ retention, and the problems of paediatric cardiac surgery at the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary (BRI). 2 In addition to these, the cost of clinical negligence litigation, and 
adverse events in general, has further focused the Government's attention on healthcare 
practice. 3 Part of the remit of the BRI Inquiry was to: `make recommendations which 
could help to secure high quality care across the NHS'. 4 One of the principles that formed 
the basis for the Inquiry's recommendations was that: 
Patients must be at the centre of the NHS, and thus the patient's 
perspective must be included in the policy, planning and delivery of 
services at every level. ' 
A crucial part of developing a patient-centred service was the need to `[encompass] the 
notions of respect for and honesty towards patients'. 6 Thus, not only was it important to 
focus on the mechanics of healthcare but also on the attitudes of the healthcare 
' Speaking at the 2°d National Service Delivery and Organisation Conference (2003). Available at: 
http: //www. dh. gov. uk/AboutUs/MinistersAndDepartmentLeaders/ChiefMedicalOfficer/WhatsNe 
w/QuoteUnquote/QuoteUnquoteArticle/fs/en? CONTENT_ID=4102557&chk=mb0poa, last 
accessed 31St July 2006. 
2 Kennedy, I. Learning from Bristol: the report of the public inquiry into children's heart surgery 
at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984 -1995 (2001) Cm 5207. 3 See: CMO. An Organisation with a Memory (2000) London: Department of Health; in 2001, the 
National Audit Office (NAO) reported a seven-fold increase in costs since 1995-1996: NAO, 
Handling Clinical Negligence Claims in England (2001) HC 403 Session 2000-2001,1. 
' Op cit n. 2, Chapter 21 [1]. 
s Ibid., Chapter 21 [9]. 
6Ibid., Chapter 21 [14]. 
professionals (HCP). For the inquiry the way forward was to encourage a partnership 
between the professionals and the patients. 7 The Inquiry noted that, while HCPs were in 
general dedicated to the good of the patient there was a persistent and entrenched culture 
of paternalism that: 
[D]iscourage[s] patients from asking questions, and lead[s] to their 
being given only limited access to information, thereby preventing 
patients from participating fully in their care. 8 
A whole chapter of the final report was devoted to developing a culture of respect and 
honesty. It began with a summary of the problems encountered at the BRI, which 
included a closed culture of paternalism, with patient communication `too often left by 
senior clinicians to nurses or junior doctors'. 9 The Inquiry emphasised: 
that the [professional-patient] relationship needs to be based on 
partnership rather than on outmoded paternalism, and we stress the 
importance of involving patients, wherever possible, in decisions 
about their treatment and care. We suggest that much greater attention 
must be given to patients' needs for information and for support for 
them and their families. 'o 
This approach to respect, information and partnership was something that the 
Government had already committed to. 11 Furthermore, in submissions to the Inquiry, 
professional bodies, such as the Royal College of Surgeons and the Royal College of 
Nursing, also acknowledged the importance of partnership. 12 The Inquiry's concern for 
involving patients in treatment decisions gave rise to four key principles regarding 
information disclosure: 
' Ibid., Chapter 21 [23]. 
8 Ibid., Chapter 22 [17]. 
9 Ibid., Chapter 23. 
'0 Ibid., Chapter 23 [2]. 
" DH. Patient and Public Involvement in the New NHS, (1999) London: DH. (Health Service 
Circular: HSC (99) 210). 
12 Op cit n. 2, Chapter 23 [14]. 
1) 
First, trust can only be sustained by openness. Secondly, openness 
means that information be given freely, honestly and regularly. 
Thirdly, it is of fundamental importance to be honest about the twin 
concerns of risk and uncertainty. Lastly, informing patients and in the 
case of young children their parents must be regarded as a process and 
not a one-off event. 13 
The Inquiry further found that information was often of poor quality, being out of date or 
designed to ensure compliance rather than enable rational decision-making. 14 However, it 
was also recognised that time was an important constraint on effective communication 
and the Inquiry recommended that the National Health Service (NHS) ensure appropriate 
working arrangements. 15 Finally, the Inquiry noted the predominance of a functional 
approach to consent. It argued that: 
The real task is a process which involves explaining what is to take 
place; setting out what is known about the risks, uncertainties, and 
possible negative consequences, about the specific performance of the 
trust, of the specialty and of the consultant unit (as that information 
becomes available), about any alternatives and about the likely 
outcome; considering and explaining how the patient will be affected; 
and seeking and answering questions. Such a process is the only 
proper way to gain the patient's informed authority to proceed. 
16 
The Inquiry suggested that rather than seeing consent as a discrete event, it should be 
integrated more fully into the process of providing healthcare. It concluded: `What we are 
emphasising is the primacy of the patient's choice; the right of patients to be asked if they 
13 Ibid., Chapter 23 [18]. 
Ibid., Chapter 23 [23]. 
15 Ibid., Chapter 23 [29]. 
16 Ibid., Chapter 23 [43]. 
3 
wish to undergo the procedure, to be informed about the procedure and to be asked to 
agree'. 
17 
The Department of Health (DH) responded by acknowledging a commitment to `develop 
an NHS where there is a culture of openness and honesty ... and where patients and staff 
work in genuine partnership'. 18 Emphasising the importance of patient-centred care, the 
DH stated: 
We want to develop a culture of openness, honesty and trust; to ensure 
that patients have the information they need to make informed 
choices; and to enable patients to become equal partners with health 
care professionals in making decisions about treatment and care. 19 
The DH included in their reform programme `a consent process which engages patients 
2° fully in decisions about their care'. 
In fact, as the DH noted, it had already set up the Good Practice in Consent Initiative, as 
part of the implementation of the 2000 NHS Plan. 2' This involved establishing an 
advisory group and publishing guidance documents and model consent form. 
22 In addition 
to its symbolic importance, the document provides helpful guidance on what is currently 
required by the law. For certain specific areas, such as consent to anaesthesia, the 
guidance is particularly helpful in clarifying who has responsibility. Unfortunately, 
however, the guidance does not venture far beyond that already required by the law. 
Nevertheless, it does serve to emphasise the importance of consent and it reinforces the 
commitment in the NHS Plan. 
"Ibid., Chapter 23 [45]. 
18 DH. Learning from Bristol: The Department of Health's Response to the Report of the Public 
Inquiry in to children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995 (2002) Cm 5363 
London: The Stationery Office, Executive Summary [2]; see also para 1.4. 
19 Ibid., Executive Summary [12]. 
20 Ibid., Executive Summary [13]; 
21 See: http: //www. dh. gov. uk/PolicyAndGuidance/HealthAndSocialCareTopics/Consent/fs/en, last 
accessed 31st July 2006. 
22 DH. Good practice in consent implementation guide: consent to examination or treatment 
(2001) London: DH. 
4 
The commitment to patient-centred care is reinforced by the recent publication Creating a 
Patient-led NHS, which again indicates an intention to provide greater choice and 
information. 23 Other policies, such as the Expert Patient Programme, 24 the Patient Advice 
and Liaison Service , 
25 the National Knowledge Service, 26 and the development of 
information technologies such as HealthSpace (which will allow each patient internet 
space to record their care preferences), cement the Government's intention to empower 
patients. 27 In June 2004, the Secretary of State for Health stated: 
Patients' desire for high-quality personalised care will drive the new 
system. Giving people greater personal choice will give them control over 
these issues, allowing patients to call the shots about the time and place of 
their care, and empowering them to personalise their care to ensure the 
quality and convenience that they want. 28 
However, without suitable legal protection, these political intentions may provide less 
29 than they promise. 
23 DH. Creating a Patient-led NHS - Delivering the NHS Improvement Plan (2005) London: DH, 
Chapter 1. 
24 Although this programme has a consequentialist motive, see: Melanie Johnson MP `The Expert 
Patient Programme' (2004). Available at: 
http: //www. dh. gov. uk/NewsHome/Speeches/SpeechesList/SpeechesArticle/fs/en? CONTENT_ID= 
4082345&chk=G3KO7Q, last accessed 31St July 2006. 
25 Op cit n. 18, para 2.12. See also, the DH PALS website: 
http: //www. dh. gov. uk/PolicyAndGuidance/OrganisationPolicy/PatientAndPubliclnvolvement/Pati 
entAdviceAnd L iaisonServices/PatientAdviceAndLiaisonServicesArticle/fs/en? CONTENT_ID=40 
81305&chk=e%2BtVxu, last accessed 24th July 2006. 
26 Op cit n. 18, para 2.11; See also the dedicated web site: www. nks. nhs. uk. 
27 DH. NHS Improvement Plan 2004: Putting People at the Heart of Public Services (2004) Cm 
6268 London: DH, Executive Summary [12]. 
28 The Rt Hon. John Reid MP. `Building on the Best - An NHS for the Future' (2004). Available 
at: 
http: //www. dh. gov. uk/NewsHome/Speeches/SpeechesList/SpeechesArticle/fs/en? CONTENT_ID= 
4087161&chk=T%2ByGgO, last accessed 24`h July 2006. 
29 See: Coulter, A. `Whatever happened to shared decision-making? ' (2002) 5 Health Expectations 
185; Sang, B. `Choice, participation and accountability: assessing the potential impact of 
legislation promoting patient and public involvement in health in the UK' (2004) 7 Health 
Expectations 187,190; Sillender, M. `Can patients be sure they are fully informed when 
representatives of surgical equipment manufacturers attend their operations? ' (2006) 32 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 395. 
5 
All healthcare interventions take place in the context of professional-patient contact 
making the professional-patient relationship - however fleeting -a core feature of 
healthcare provision. If patient-centred healthcare is to mean anything beyond shallow 
consumerism and political spin the focus must be on the interactions between the 
professionals and the patients they are caring for. If consent is necessary for the 
justification of healthcare interventions then, provided it is given a sufficiently textured 
interpretation, consent - and the communicative processes that envelop it - should be 
seen as integral to creation of a patient-centred system of healthcare. In the recent Report 
examining the professional regulation of doctors, it was noted that: 
the public wants the assessment of doctors to go beyond technical 
skills to address the doctor's communication skills ... whether the 
doctor involves patients in treatment decisions and whether the doctor 
affords their patients dignity and respect. " 
It therefore seems an appropriate to juncture to go back to square one and re-examine the 
law and ethics of consent to healthcare and the competent adult. 
In the first part of the thesis I examine the moral basis of consent. I consider the meaning 
and importance of autonomy. Despite some recent challenges to the association between 
autonomy and consent, 31 if autonomy is seen as the right of moral agents to make self- 
regarding decisions the connection is clear. The requirement for consent protects patients 
from paternalistic or other unjust actions that infringe their rights. While the rules 
implementing the requirement for consent may be criticised for failing to be sufficiently 
sensitive to a thick conception of autonomy, 
32 this does not undermine the essential 
relationship between autonomy and consent. However, the HCP's obligation to respect 
the patient's autonomy should not be examined in isolation of the professional's other 
30 CMO. Good doctors, safer patients (2006) London: DH, xi. 
31 See, for example, Taylor, J. S. `Autonomy and Informed Consent: A Much Misunderstood 
Relationship' (2004) 38 The Journal of Value Inquiry 383,383. 
32 O'Neill, O. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (2002) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
37-48. 
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duties. In chapter two I consider some of the other moral principles and approaches that 
may help to shape the extent of the HCP's duty to respect the patient's autonomy. Then. 
in chapter three, I situate the debate within the context of the professional-patient 
relationship. In the final chapter of Part One of the thesis I explore the concept of consent. 
In light of the earlier discussion, and bearing in mind the context of the professional- 
patient patient relationship, I develop a model of consent to healthcare interventions. 
In Part Two, I examine the law's approach to consent. In chapter five, I consider the legal 
regulation of consent in battery and negligence. As far as possible, I explicate the rules 
that the courts have developed, particularly those in relation to risk disclosure and the 
communicative aspects of consent. This then allows me, in chapter six, to compare the 
legal model of consent against the model I developed in part one of the thesis. I end by 
briefly considering whether the common law could develop sufficiently to meet the 
criticisms of the current legal regulation, whether professional regulation could paper 
over the deficiencies or whether legislation is the most appropriate response. 
7 
PART ONE: ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHY 
Chapter 1: Autonomy 
In the introduction I suggested that consent is predicated on autonomy and if one 
considers the role consent plays, which I will discuss in more detail in chapter four, the 
connection with autonomy is apparent. Starting with the etymological derivation of 
autonomy, which comes from the Greek and means self rule, both senses of consent - as 
a waiver of a right and as a negotiated agreement - depend on the patient's autonomy. 
Consent raises issues of liberty, power and control all of which are also relevant to the 
importance of autonomy. 33 Because of this connection, it is essential to explore autonomy 
in some detail. This will allow the attributes of consent to be given more substance, which 
is a necessary part of determining the moral and legal duties that consent imposes on the 
doctor. To explicate autonomy and its influence on consent I will explore four questions: 
What is autonomy? 
2. Why is autonomy valued? 
What are the limits of autonomy? 
4. What are the competing considerations and how do they impact on autonomy and 
consent? 
The Nature of Autonomy 
Various senses and conceptions of autonomy have been expounded. 
34 If there are real 
differences between these views of autonomy then the conception adopted may affect the 
obligations arising from the patient's right of consent. Dworkin provided a long list of the 
33 See e. g. Lehrer, K `Reason and Autonomy' (2003) 20(3) Social Philosophy and Policy 177. 
34 Bergsma, J. Thomasma, T. Autonomy and Clinical Medicine. Renewing the Health Professional 
Relation with the Patient (2000) Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers at xiii-xiv; Beauchamp, 
T. L. Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics (50' ed., 2001) New York: Oxford University 
Press, 58; O'Neill. O. Op cit n. 32,21-22; Dworkin, G. The Theory' and Practice of Autonom Y 
(1988) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5. 
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various ways in which autonomy has been used which include autonomy as liberty or 
freedom to act; as dignity; as `freedom of the will'; as `independence'; and as 'critical 
reflection'. 35 The list may be expanded to include: `self-mastery, choosing freely, 
choosing one's own moral position and accepting responsibility for one's choice', 36 and 
`self-control' and `self-determination'. 37 Although Dworkin suggested that there is 
`unlikely' to be a `core meaning' of autonomy, since he then went on to explicate the 
nature of autonomy' and develop `a concept of autonomy' it is presumably possible to 
describe a useful concept of autonomy. Furthermore, he later suggested that it is likely 
`that there is no single conception of autonomy but that we have one concept and many 
conceptions'. 
38 
It is arguable that the list of uses of autonomy noted earlier, rather than simply listing 
alternative senses of autonomy, reflects an amalgam of various aspects and senses of 
autonomy. Approached in this way, it may be possible, in the context of health care, to 
determine a core concept with a choice of conceptions, especially as `there is probably 
more agreement about ... 
[autonomy] in contemporary bioethics than elsewhere'. 39 
Gillon defined autonomy as: `the capacity to think, decide and act on the basis of such 
thought and decision freely and independently and without... let or hindrance'. 
40 He 
argued that there are three senses of autonomy; of thought, of will (or intention); and of 
action. 41 Mappes and Zembaty suggested that `autonomy is typically defined as self- 
governance or self-determination'. They distinguished between autonomy as `liberty of 
35 Dworkin, G. The Theory and Practice ofAutonomy (1988) Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 6. 
36 Faden. R. Beauchamp, T. L. The History and Theory of Informed Consent (1986) New York: 
Oxford University Press, 7. 
37 Op cit n. 32,22. 
38 Op cit n. 35,9. 
39 Op cit n. 32,23. 
40 Gillon, R. Philosophical Medical 
Ibid., 61. 
Ethics (1985) Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 60. 
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action'; as `freedom of choice' and as `effective deliberation'. 42 In his essay on the 
autonomous man, John Benson suggested that such a man must exercise `independence in 
his thinking and his decisions about practical affairs'. 43 He also noted that an important 
form of autonomy is `the ability and willingness to undertake for oneself the ordinary 
tasks of daily life'. 44 He further argued that autonomy may be seen as an essential virtue. 
Thus: `To be autonomous is to trust one's own powers and to have a disposition to use 
them, to be able to resist the fear of failure, ridicule or disapproval that threatens to drive 
one into reliance on the guidance of others'. 45 Young suggested two views of autonomy. 
The `minimalist view ... 
is 
... 
being one's own man or woman' and, more globally, 
autonomy may be seen as `the unified ordering of the autonomous person's life'. 46 
What these views of autonomy mean is that, as far as the individual is concerned, it may 
be worthwhile distinguishing the autonomous person, the autonomous life and the 
autonomous act. For present purposes, the most important of these distinctions is between 
the autonomous person and the autonomous act. 47 This is because whether a life is 
autonomous is derivative on the other two concepts. Autonomous persons will not always 
act autonomously and, where they do not, the act may be contrary to their long-term 
autonomy or other interests. This raises the question of whether it is more harmful to 
interfere with a present non-autonomous act or to allow that person to harm his or her 
autonomous life or future autonomy. I will consider these issues in more detail later. 
Finally, the choice between protecting any decision of an autonomous person and only 
those decisions that are themselves autonomous has implications for the law since the 
latter position would justify a greater degree of interference. 
42 Mappes, T. A. Zembaty, J. S. `Biomedical Ethics', in: Mappes, T. A. Zembaty, J. S. (eds) 
Biomedical Ethics (3`d ed., 1991) New York: McGraw-Hill Inc. 1,25-26. 
Benson, J. `Who is the autonomous man? ' (1983) 58 Philosophy 5,6. 
as Ibid., 8-9. 
45 Ibid., 9. 
46 Young, R. `Autonomy and the "Inner Self", in: Christman, J. (ed) The Inner Citadel (1989) 
New York: Oxford University Press 77,78. 
47 Op cit n. 36,235. 
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If autonomy is equated with freedom of action then the relevance of any distinction 
between an autonomous person and an autonomous act disappears since every act of the 
autonomous person will, by definition, be autonomous. This particularly thin view of 
autonomy makes no demands for rationality nor does it require the actor to act morally, or 
even be capable of acting morally. At its most extreme, all that is necessary is the absence 
of external constraint and the capacity to make (and act on) a decision. Unless individuals 
are capable of making a rational decision they will be unable to determine the rightness or 
wrongness of their decisions and will not be responsible members of the moral 
community. As such, at least one of the reasons to value autonomy vanishes (see below) 
and, since respect for individuals includes both respecting their autonomy and caring 
about their welfare, 48 it is justifiable to interfere with the individual's self-determination 
to protect him or her from random and dangerous decisions. As J. S. Mill noted: `Those 
who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against 
their own actions as well as against external injury'. 49 Because autonomy as self- 
determination is of less value than conceptions of autonomy that require the capacity to 
engage with the rationality and consistency necessary for a moral life, and because it is 
readily overridden, it is perhaps better to rely on a thicker view of autonomy. 
Beyond simple self-determination, it may be argued that autonomy requires at least some 
capacity for rationality, which has the consequence of creating a real distinction between 
an autonomous act and the acts of an autonomous person, not all of which will be 
rational. For Dworkin, 
autonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to 
reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and 
48 See e. g. Dworkin, G. Op cit n. 35,32. 
`i9 Mill J. S. `On Liberty', in: Gray, J. (ed. ) On Liberty and Other Essays (1991) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 5-128,14. I will consider paternalism and its possible justification in more detail 
later. 
so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light 
of higher-order preferences and values. By exercising such a capacity, 
persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, 
and take responsibility for the kind of person they are. 5° 
Beauchamp and Childress criticised Dworkin's theory on two grounds. First they argued 
that: `Acceptance or repudiation of a desire can be motivated by an overriding [higher- 
order] desire that is simply stronger, not more rational or autonomous'. Second: `Few 
choosers, and also few choices, would be autonomous if held to the standards of higher- 
order reflection in this theory, which presents an aspirational ideal of autonomy'. 5' 
Instead, Beauchamp and Childress focused on whether the act is autonomous. They 
stated: 'We analyze autonomous action in terms of normal choosers who act (1) 
intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences that 
determine their action'. 52 
Ignoring the implications of judging the act rather than the actor - which I will consider 
later - Beauchamp and Childress' approach may be criticised for at least two reasons. 
First, the requirement of understanding may be construed as a rational technical ability to 
make sense of the information. Understanding a splenectomy, for example, might be 
satisfied by the knowledge that this requires an abdominal operation with the attendant 
risks and sequelae such as post operative pain, a scar, the loss of the spleen and the need 
for injections to counter the increased risk of infection. However, although I might know 
the implications of the operation I may still fail to appreciate how they will affect my life 
50 Op cit n. 35,20. The idea of second order desires and, more appropriately, second order 
volitions, was first proposed as a way of distinguishing persons from non-persons by Frankfurt, H. 
`Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person' reprinted in: Kane, R. (ed. ) Free Will (2002) 
Blackwell Publishers: Malden (Mass) 127. See also: Richards, D. A. J. `Rights and Autonomy' 
(1981) 92(1) Ethics 3,13. Ronald Dworkin argues for something similar to this in his preferred 
`integrity' view of autonomy: Dworkin, R. Life's Dominion (1993) London: Harper Collins, 224. 
51 Beauchamp, T. L. Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics (5`t' ed. 2001) New York: 
Oxford University Press, 59. 
52 Ibid., 59. 
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- to associate my life with the consequences. 53 While it may not be possible to truly 
appreciate all the implications unless one has experiential knowledge, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that I ought to be able to exercise some degree of rational reflection on how the 
operation will affect my goals and the other things I value. As Beauchamp and Childress 
themselves explained: 
many patients confronted with various forms of surgery understand 
that they will suffer postoperative pain. Nevertheless, their projected 
expectations of the pain are often inadequate. Many patients cannot, in 
advance, adequately appreciate the nature of the pain ... 
In one 
respect, these patients correctly understand basic facts about 
procedures that involve pain but, in other respects, their understanding 
is inadequate. 54 
Discarding a thin view of understanding, this argument perhaps suggests that the two 
views of autonomy are different only by degree and, unless Dworkin was arguing for 
ideal rationality, this difference may be less than Beauchamp and Childress believed. 
The second problem arises from the requirement of an absence of controlling influences. 
One group of controlling influences are the internal constraints of phobias and 
compulsions. The point to note about these constraints is that they impact on the actor's 
utilisation, rather than on his or her understanding, of information. In Dworkin's model 
they remove the capacity to reflect critically on first order desires. In Re MB, for example, 
the plaintiff made it clear she wanted the caesarean section but was unable to use this 
second order desire to overcome her first order fear of needles. " Thus, if Beauchamp and 
Childress are to take these kinds of constraints into account they must incorporate some 
53 Elliott, C. Bioethics, Culture and Identity: A Philosophical Disease (1999) New York: 
Routledge, 91-102. 
54 Op cit n. 51,89. 
55 Re MB (An Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541, CA. 
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ability - even if imperfect - to rationalise desires and reject those that do not comport 
with the actor's more long term goals. 
Another type of constraint arises from our relational existence. This is something that 
Beauchamp and Childress acknowledged when they stated: 
To restrict adequate decision-making by patients and research subjects 
to the ideal of fully or completely autonomous decision-making strips 
their act of any meaningful place in the practical world, where 
people's actions are rarely, if ever, fully autonomous . 
56 
The importance of the relational context of our existence is recognised by Dworkin who 
argued that: 
the conception of autonomy that insists upon substantive 
independence is not one that has a claim to our respect as an ideal ... 
it makes autonomy inconsistent with loyalty, objectivity, commitment, 
benevolence and love. 57 
It is arguable that any valuable or useful conception of autonomy grounded in moral 
personhood and respect for that personhood - both for the actor and for others - must 
allow and co-exist with influences, constraints and obligations arising from the network 
of relationships that envelops us. 58 Reducing individuals to isolated atomistic existences 
undermines the concept of autonomy, which provides another reason to reject the 
particularly thin view of autonomy as self-determination. In the absence of relationships 
autonomy becomes meaningless and unnecessary. Additionally, it is only through and by 
relationships that individuals can fully develop and express their autonomy. 59 As 
56 Op cit n. 51,59. 
57 Op cit n. 35,21. 
58 Berg, J. W. Appelbaum, P. S. Lidz, C. W. Parker, L. S. Informed Consent. Legal Theory and 
Clinical Practice (2"d ed., 2001) New York: Oxford university Press, 33. See also, Gauthier, C. C. 
`Moral Responsibility and Respect for Autonomy: Meeting the Communitarian Challenge' (2000) 
10(4) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 337. 
59 See Richards, D. A. J. `Rights and Autonomy' (1981) 92(1) Ethics 3,12: `Autonomy may be 
perceived, not as asocial isolation, but in terms of a supportive environment of critical dialogue 
and reciprocity'. 
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Nedelsky argued: `The collective is not simply a potential threat to individuals, but is 
constitutive of them, and thus is a source of their autonomy as well as a danger to it'. 60 
Growing up in this world of relationships means that our identities and characters are 
strongly influenced by other people and the things that happen to us. An extreme 
determinist view of these influences denies us the possibility of shaping our own lives or 
claiming authorship of our identity. Without the possibility of critical self-reflection this 
determinism collapses into a fatalist position that everything is beyond our control and we 
are responsible for nothing. If we are to deny both fatalism and meaningless atomism we 
must conceive of a third possibility. In her cogent critique of poststructuralist feminism's 
response to the masculine `transcendental self-constitution' Patricia Huntington argued 
for a concept of what she termed `dialectical autonomy'. 61 This dialectical autonomy 
requires subjects to shape their identity by forward-looking 
critical self-reflection and mediation of historical and social 
circumstance ... the self-constituting subject 
is 
... not a perfect master 
of her intentional, desiring, unconscious lives; however, she achieves 
increasing coherence in thought ... and constancy 
in behavior in part 
by becoming aware of her lack of full control over her motives, 
desires and drives. 62 
It follows from this that, if autonomy is to mean anything more than simple freedom 
(from external constraints) of action then it must include some notion of critical self- 
reflection. 
63 
60 Nedelsky, J. `Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources Thoughts and Possibilities' (1989) 1 Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism 7,21. 
61 Huntington, P. `Toward a dialectical concept of autonomy' (1995) 21(1) Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 37. 
62 Ibid., 50. 
6; Berofsky, B. `Identification, the Self and Autonomy' (2003) 20(2) Social Philosophy and Policy 
199,203. 
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Critical self-reflection, while a form of rationality, differs from the more particular skill 
of being able to determine that one's choices will in fact further one's goals. 64 The 
capacity for both forms of rationality is necessary for the person to be considered 
autonomous. I have deliberately restricted the requirement to capacity since it is the 
capacity rather than the use of the ability that grounds responsibility and authorship. 
Furthermore, critical self-reflection, and perhaps self-regarding rational decision-making 
should be seen as virtues; character ideals that form the basis for moral aspiration rather 
than moral duty. 65 It should also be noted that, by distinguishing the autonomous act from 
the act of an autonomous person, I am not committed to limiting protection to those 
decisions that are rational. This will be considered in more detail later. 
I have argued that, if it is useful to distinguish the autonomous act from the non- 
autonomous act of an autonomous person, then autonomy must include some requirement 
for rational reflection. The capacity for rationality is also necessary for autonomy to 
achieve its full value (see below) and to avoid the more extreme consequences of 
determinism: that we have no control over who we are and what we believe. All of these 
reasons suggest that bare self-determination is a less useful conception of autonomy than 
those views that incorporate rationality. However, even when conceived as the capacity 
for rational, critically reflective self-governance, autonomy lacks internal moral content. 
For example, it may be just as autonomous to act cruelly as to act the Good Samaritan. 
66 
This view of autonomy, which may be sufficient for a consumerist free-market 
competitive ethic, 67 fails to provide moral justification for action in those areas of life that 
require cooperation rather than competition. Feinberg, who constructed the autonomous 
64 Noggle, R. `The Public Conception of Autonomy and Critical Self-reflection' (1997) XXXV 
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 495,506. 
65 See the argument in Noggle, R. Ibid.; Fuller, L. L. The Morality of Law (2"d ed. 1969) New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 5. 
66 Feinberg, J. `Autonomy', in: Christman, J. (ed) The Inner Citadel (1989) New York: Oxford 
University Press 27,43. 
67 Op cit n. 32,47. 
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person as someone with the capacity for rationality, 68 the ability to be self-reliant «: hen 
necessary69 and the `right to decide how to live... [his] life''70 argued that this rational 
consumerist autonomy is properly constrained by external influences. He stated: `The 
ideal of the autonomous person is that of an authentic individual whose self- 
determination is as complete as is consistent with the requirement that he is, of course, a 
member of the community'. 71 However, some commentators - most notably Kant - 
conceptualised autonomy as possessing internal moral content. 
In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant developed and justified his thesis 
that the only categorical imperative is: `act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law'. 72 This imperative 
applies to all rational beings whose rationality presupposes freedom of the will. Kant 
argued that humans are rational beings but imperfect ones whose rationality is always 
subject to inclinations and desires. This rational will belongs to the noumenal world of 
understanding while our non-rational, sensory and emotional self belongs to the 
phenomenal world. But, it is the will that has intrinsic goodness because if welfare were 
our proper end we would be governed by instinct rather than reason. Thus, the rational 
will is an end in itself and, as such, all rational beings should be treated as ends in 
themselves, `never merely as means'. 73 This practical imperative is, for Kant, `the 
supreme limiting condition of the freedom of action of every human being'. 
74 Because 
rational wills are ends in themselves the rational being has an obligation to treat those 
wills as ends in themselves. 
68 Feinberg, J. Harm to Self (1986) New York: Oxford University Press, 28. 
69 Ibid., 42. 
70 Ibid., 54. 
71 Op cit n. 66,45. 
72 Kant, I. (Gregor, M. Transl. ) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1998) Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 31 (4: 421). 
73 Ibid., 38 (4: 429). 
71 Ibid., 39 (4: 431). 
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The role of the will is to provide laws that guide our actions. Since conditional laws are 
undermined when the condition ceases to exist it is important to establish an 
unconditional law, which is Kant's categorical imperative. Because laws influenced by 
anything other than pure reason are conditional any law must come from the rational 
being's own will. This grounds Kant's view of autonomy as the `sole principle of 
morals': 
Autonomy of the will is the property of the will by which it is a law to 
itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition). The 
principle of autonomy is, therefore: to choose only in such a way that 
the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the 
same volition. 75 
Kant's view of autonomy makes it a necessary characteristic of a rational being that 
underpins all moral duty by requiring the actor to be guided by laws that could be willed 
as universal, which means that, in practice, all rational beings must be treated as ends in 
themselves. Thus, Kant envisaged autonomy as essentially relational76 and as the moral 
characteristic of a free, rational will. This `principle-directed' view of autonomy provides 
the third conception of autonomy that I have considered in this thesis. " To summarise, 
the other two views are autonomy as freedom of action/choice and autonomy as the 
capacity for rational/reflective choice. However, I have also argued that, if it is to retain 
its value, autonomy must include some requirement for rationality and so autonomy as 
freedom of action is rejected. I have also distinguished the autonomous act from the 
autonomous person and the autonomous life. These distinctions are important because 
they justify different degrees of intervention and it is therefore important to determine 
which type of autonomy the law should protect. Before I can undertake that task I must 
75 Ibid., 47 (4: 440). 
76 Secker, B. The Appearance of Kant's Deontology in Contemporary Kantianism: Concepts of 
Patient Autonomy in Bioethics' (1999) 24 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43,48. 
77 Engelhardt Jr., H. T. `The Many Faces of Autonomy' (2001) 9 Health Care Anah'sis 283,287. 
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address the other questions posed at the beginning of this chapter. I turn, then, to why 
autonomy is valued. 
The Value of Autonomy 
Autonomy has both intrinsic and instrumental value. 78 The intrinsic value of autonomy 
arises from its relationship with rationality and its necessity for moral personhood and the 
ascription of moral responsibility. 79 As O'Neill suggested: `ethics can be addressed only 
to those who can reason, deliberate and act; ... [such] 
debates must take agency ... 
seriously'. 80 If I am to be held responsible, for both the good and bad things I do, then I 
must have sufficient agency to be counted as the author of those acts. To be counted as 
the author of an act requires that I have chosen to do the act for my own reasons, 
irrespective of the existence of possible alternatives. 81 This in turn requires that I am an 
autonomous individual. If I shot someone because a more physically powerful person 
forced the gun in my hand and squeezed my finger on the trigger I would not be held 
responsible for the death. Similarly, if I had been brainwashed or hypnotised into 
shooting someone I would not be held responsible. Thus, as Levi stated: `Autonomy's 
value derives from its place within the matrix of our conception of what it is to be an 
interacting, responsible, principled, responsive human being'. 82 
Hurka argued that: `The ideal of agency is one of causal efficacy, of making a causal 
impact on the world and determining facts about it. And the autonomous agent, just in 
virtue of her autonomy, more fully realizes this ideal'. 83 The more choices I make the 
more I influence the world and that influence is more valuable if based on deliberated 
78 See: Hurka, T. `Why Value Autonomy? ' (1987) 13(3) Social Theory and Practice 361. 
79 Gauthier, C. C. Op cit n. 58; Haworth, L. Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and 
Ethics (1986) New Haven: Yale University Press, 44-49; Engelhardt Op cit n. 77,286. 
80 Op cit n. 32,7. 
8! Frankfurt, H. `What we are morally responsible for', in: Fischer, J. M. Ravizza, M. (eds) 
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (1993) Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press 286,286. 
82 Levi, B. H. Respecting Patient Autonomy (1999) Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 64. 
83 Op cit n. 78,366. 
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reason rather than on simple freedom of choice. Although some autonomous acts are 
more valuable than others - choosing a career is more important than choosing what fork 
to use - Hurka's argument is essentially that autonomy is intrinsically valuable because it 
is a necessary characteristic of agency. 84 This argument, however, simply shifts the 
debate to the importance of agency. The importance of agency is that agents have at least 
a degree of control. While it does not stop us from being acted upon it does allow us to 
shape and affect the world and our own lives within it. The alternative to agency is that 
we are only capable of reaction rather than action; that the environment and our 
instinctive responses to that environment wholly shape our lives. In such a world praise 
and blame would be tools of `manipulation or training' and we would have no reason to 
retain `reactive attitudes' such as gratitude and admiration. 85 This would undermine ideas 
of responsibility, personhood and a sense of sel£86 As Wolf commented: 
A world in which human relationships are restricted to those that can 
be formed and supported in the absence of the reactive attitude is a 
world of human isolation so cold and dreary that any but the most 
cynical must shudder at the idea of it. 87 
Thus, if we are to see ourselves as rational agents, and we must if we wish to hold on to 
reactive attitudes to each other, autonomy is essential. 88 Furthermore, far from being 
isolationist, autonomy is crucial to developing social relations that have any meaning 
beyond purely instinctive behaviour. 
Further support may be gained, for this argument that autonomy is intrinsically valuable, 
from the similarities between the characteristics of personhood that give the individual 
84 See also: Harris, J. Keywood, K. `Ignorance , Information and 
Autonomy' (2001) 22 Theoretical 
Medicine 415,420. 
85 Wolf, S. `The importance of free will', in: Fischer, J. M. Ravizza, M. (eds) Perspectives on 
Moral Responsibility (1993) Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press 101,104-106. 
86Ibid., 113-114. 
87 Ibid,, 106. 
88 Gauthier, C. C. Op cit n. 58,344. 
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intrinsic moral value and the nature of autonomy. The types of features that constitute 
personhood include: 89 
1. consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in 
particular the capacity to feel pain; 
2. reasoning; 
3. self-motivated activity (relatively independent of either genetic or direct external 
control); 
4. the capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of 
type, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on 
indefinitely many possible topics; 
5. the presence of self-concepts and self-awareness. 90 
Consider two recent views of autonomy. Levi characterised the capacity for autonomy as: 
`continuity of self ... 
[the acceptance of] an intersubjectively accepted set of goods, and 
some threshold for procedural rationality'. 91 Rössler argued that: 
a person is autonomous if she reflects upon how she wishes to live, 
upon the person she wants to be, and then both lives and is allowed to 
live in that self-chosen way, such that she as an individual is able 
authentically to identify with her own goals and projects, as well as 
being actually able to pursue them. 92 
Both of these conceptions require a rational being that is consciously self-aware and 
hence would count as a person. If personhood is seen as intrinsically valuable then so 
89 See: Maclean, A. R. A Critical Examination of Rv Collins and the Pregnant Woman's Right to 
Refuse Treatment (1999) Unpublished M. Jur. Thesis, 143. 
90 Warren, MA. `On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', in: Gruen, L. Panichas, GE. (eds. ) 
Sex, Morality and the Lm, ' (1997) London: Routledge, 302. 
91 Op cit n. 82,37. 
92 Rössler, B. `Problems with Autonomy' (2002) 17 Hypatia 143,146-147. 
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must autonomy. As Richards suggested: `The development of ... 
[autonomy] is, from the 
earliest life of the infant, the central developmental task of the becoming of a person'. 93 
What this means is that morality is contingent on the existence of autonomy, which is the 
central characteristic of personhood that allows us to be treated as equal members of the 
moral community, be held responsible for our actions and be capable of relationships 
based on reactive attitudes. The primary argument against the intrinsic value of autonomy 
is based on a determinist position that attacks the very possibility of autonomy. However, 
if autonomy is not wholly undermined and some degree of self-determination is possible 
then the argument that autonomy is intrinsically valuable holds fast. 
Determinism holds that all of our decisions and actions result from the interaction 
between our genetically controlled characteristics and the environment (including other 
beings). Every thought I have is a consequence of the interaction between the 
environment and the physical architecture of the cognitive part of my brain. I am acted 
upon by external factors and I react to them in a way that would be entirely predictable if 
only we knew enough about the laws of nature. I am not capable of self-reflection or 
rationality and the appearance of, and belief in, such behaviour is an illusion caused by 
chemical reactions that result from the interactions mentioned earlier. 
There is insufficient evidence to know whether this extreme form of determinism is true. 
However, even assuming it is, we behave as if it is not and for some people the belief that 
one has some control over one's own life is psychologically valuable. Irrespective of 
whether autonomy is an illusion, those people with a strong internal locus of control are 
adversely affected if their autonomy is obstructed by, for example, the withholding of 
93 Op cit n. 59,7. 
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information. 94 It is also arguable that treating people as if they have autonomy is valuable 
because it may mean that that those `determined' to respond to moral obligations xi ill do 
so if such moral obligations exist. Thus, treating people as if they are autonomous may 
result in behaviour that is beneficial both to themselves and to others within the 
community. Similarly, behaving as if people have autonomy allows us to retain reactive 
attitudes towards them making the world less `cold and dreary' than it might be in their 
absence. 95 Finally, it is also arguable that the very idea of scholarship and argument about 
autonomy suggests that we implicitly believe that we have some degree of autonomy. 
Rössler stated that: 
The failure to lead, or at least the difficulty of leading, an autonomous 
life is something we are able to comprehend as such, in its very 
recalcitrance, only because and insofar as we both do and want to 
understand ourselves always already as being autonomous ... 
Otherwise the possibility of that failure would not always be our 
irritating and disquieting companion. 96 
This point, that our very concern with autonomy betrays our desire to be autonomous, 
may be taken one step further. If extreme determinism is true, and it is important to `live 
in accordance with the facts' then it is important to accept that we have no free will. This 
acceptance requires us to adopt a particular reactive attitude towards ourselves; that we 
are blameless for our lives and our conduct. However, extreme determinism precludes 
reactive attitudes. As Susan Wolf notes: 
94 Waller, B. M. The Psychological Structure of Patient Autonomy' (2002) 11 Cambridge 
9cuarterly 
of Healthcare Ethics 257. 
See above, n. 85. 
96 Op cit n. 92,157. 
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In taking any attitude towards ourselves, including the attitude that we 
are not free or responsible beings, we would be asserting ourselves as 
free and responsible beings. 97 
This means that living in accordance with extreme determinism would prevent us from 
adopting any attitude towards ourselves, including that, as beings lacking autonomy, we 
are blameless. Thus, it is paradoxically illogical to argue that we should behave as if 
extreme determinism were true. Furthermore, even if extreme determinism is true, it is 
arguable that - illusion or not - `Freedom is something we value' and `autonomous 
freedom [is] the noblest form of freedom'. 98 
Apart from its intrinsic value autonomy is also important for its instrumental value. Two 
instrumental values have already been mentioned. First, for people with an internal locus 
of control, respecting autonomy is beneficial to their well-being. 99 Even when the 
researchers do not take account of the differing needs of patients with an external locus of 
control, there are many studies that suggest that the provision of information, which is 
one aspect of respecting autonomy, is clinically efficacious. 100 It may further be the case 
that helping those with an external locus of control to become more autonomous may be a 
valuable long-term strategy providing it is done sympathetically and supportively. '°' 
Second, treating people as autonomous may encourage some to take responsibility, accept 
their obligations and so act in a morally good way, which may be beneficial both to 
themselves and to the community in general. 
Another instrumental argument is Ladenson's suggestion, following Dewy, that through 
reason a person will be better, and more consistently, able to attain goods. 102 This 
97 Op cit n. 85,113. 
98 Op cit n. 33. 
99 Op cit n. 94. 
ioo See n. 469. 
101 Op cit n. 94,263. 
102 Ladenson, R. F. `A Theory of Personal Autonomy' (1975) 86 Ethics 30,43. 
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subsequently allowed him to argue that the relationship between autonomy and reason 
means that the more autonomous a person the better. He stated: 
Other things being equal, the more autonomous an individual, the 
greater his ability to attain goods and avoid evils. Consequently the 
achievement of a high degree of personal autonomy is itself one of the 
most important goods. 103 
J. S. Mill argued that since each person's self knowledge is usually better than other 
regarding knowledge, and since the person who cares most for someone is usually him or 
herself - and this is especially so when considering society's interests in its members - 
competent persons should be allowed the liberty to decide for themselves on matters that 
affect their own lives. '04 This argument supports the principle of autonomy in general, but 
leaves individual irrationally self-harming decisions open to interference. This is because 
there will certainly be occasions when others can see more clearly than I and are able to 
make a better decision for me than I would be able to make. Mill's argument did, 
however, predict a major criticism of medical paternalism that doctors are only competent 
to know the best clinical choice but, because patients are the experts concerning all other 
aspects of their lives, the final decision regarding treatment should rest with them. 105 This 
is particularly so given that, while it may be an end in itself, health's greatest value is 
instrumental; being healthy allows us to follow our life plans and achieve our goals. 
Conceived in this way it is self-fulfilment rather than health or welfare per se that is, in a 
secular world, of fundamental importance. Furthermore, as Feinberg noted: 
if choice and reasoned decision are components of self-fulfillment, 
then one must embrace the conclusion that the right to the 
103 Ibid., 46. 
104 Op cit n. 49, esp. 75-85. It should be noted that Mill does not use the term `autonomy' but the 
concept is implicit in a lot of what he argues (see especially p. 17). Even if it is not, freedom of 
action and decision making is an important aspect of autonomy. 
105 For example see: Berg et al, op cit n. 58,18-19,22-24. 
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unhampered exercise of choice is an indispensable means to one's 
own good. 106 
It may be argued that, while we may know ourselves better than others do, we still make 
mistakes and that others should be allowed to prevent us from making or acting on such 
bad decisions. Excluding decisions based on wrong or inadequate information, the 
problem from a developmental perspective is that the capacity for rational decision- 
making may be stunted unless the individual is required to exercise his self-determination 
and making mistakes is an important part of learning. Thus, self-determination should be 
encouraged and practised so as to improve on one's autonomous capacity, which is 
important if rationality is seen as a good thing. "' It may, of course, be countered that 
allowing someone to make mistakes is all very well but is self-defeating if the mistake is 
such that the person's future autonomy or his life will be lost. It should, therefore, at least 
be justifiable to coercively prevent someone making such an extremely harmful mistake. I 
will consider this in more detail later but for now it is enough to note that even if that 
argument is accepted it only requires that we not treat autonomy as an absolute right. 
Importantly, autonomy acts as a protection against the `tyranny' of the state and its 
institutions, 108 and, as Levi argued: `one's autonomous status is important for 
demarcating certain political boundaries between persons'. 109 It is, therefore, essential for 
a democratic state. 1° Furthermore, allowing people the important liberties of freedom of 
thought and speech is essential for the advancement of knowledge and understanding. 
Without that liberty, established views would go unchallenged and knowledge would 
106 Op cif n. 68,58. 
107 Op cit n. 49,65; Levi, B. H. Op cit n. 82,17. On both this point and the preceding one, see also: 
Hurka, T. Op cit n. 78,363. 
108 Op cit n. 49,8-9. 
109 Op cit n. 82,24. 
110 Oshana, M. `How Much Should we Value Autonomy' (2003) 20(2) Social Philosophy and 
Polich 99,107. 
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remain static. "' Finally, autonomy may also be instrumentally valuable as a means for 
fostering the development of character. It is arguable that character is, at least partiallti, 
reflected in and affected by the choices we make. Thus, as Hurka suggests: 
A person who has autonomy can use it to develop her own values ... 
But someone with no opportunity for choice cannot develop the same 
way. His acts only reflect his momentary concerns, without the 
integration through time that makes for genuine personality. 112 
The Limits of Autonomy 
If autonomy were to be seen as an absolute right to decide for oneself the consequence 
would be the risk of chaos with the vulnerable left to the mercy of the strong. In fact, if 
conceived as a right then it is logically impossible for it to be absolute. If A decided to 
exercise his or her autonomy by locking B inside his dungeon B would no longer be able 
to exercise his or her autonomy and thus B could not be said to have a right to autonomy 
unless A is restrained from exercising his right in this way. Thus, ignoring the problem of 
ability, any right to autonomy cannot be the freedom to do what one wants. 
That trite example suggests that any right to autonomy must be limited by having regard 
to the autonomy of others. It might be suggested that A has the right to do what he or she 
wants providing it does not prevent B from doing what he or she wants. This formulation, 
however, would be overly restrictive and would paralyse much of our life. It may be 
reasonable if resources were plentiful and we lived completely independent lives. But, in 
a world in which we must compete for scarce goods and interact with others, autonomy 
would lose much of its value if A cannot do something simply because it would prevent B 
from doing it. Imagine if A wants to build his house on a particular spot next to the sea 
with good access to fresh water and a supply of food. If no one else wants to build there 
111 Op cit n. 49, esp. 22-41. 
112 Op cit n. 78,364. 
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then he or she is free to do so. But, if B also wants to build there then there is a problem. 
Neither A nor B may exercise his or her autonomy if it prevents the other from doing so. 
This means that A can only build there if B does not want to and vice versa. However, if 
both want to build there then neither can and the plot must remain unused. This means 
that they must each select other plots but the same problem may recur ad infinitum 
meaning that neither can build anywhere. This would be a ridiculous state of affairs and 
so a middle ground `capable of public justification' must be found, ' 13 which suggests that 
any limitation must conform with the `morality of duty' rather than the more 
individualistic ideal `morality of aspiration'. 114 
The Harm Principle 
Perhaps the least contentious ground for limiting autonomy is to prevent harm to others. 
Mill explicated the most famous version of this principle in his essay On Liberty. 115 He 
argued that: 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
members of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it 
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, 
because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even 
right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning 
with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling 
him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. 116 
1 13 Op cit n. 64,500. 
114 Fuller, L. L. The Morality of Law (2"d ed 
115 Op cit n. 49. 
16Opcitn. 49,14. 
1969) New Haven: Yale University Press, 5. 
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This limitation of course depends on what is meant by `harm'. Since limiting autonomy 
may itself be seen as harmful, the outcomes that might justify limiting autonomy should 
be more than temporary or trivial upsets. ' 7 The limitation must also require that the harm 
be wrongfully inflicted. One possible way of defining harm is to characterise it as a 
setback to someone's interests. "8 The problem with this is that, as a justification for 
limiting autonomy, such a definition would be overly restrictive. Returning to my earlier 
example of choosing a plot of land to build one's house on, allowing A to build on the 
most desirable plot would certainly be a setback to B's interests if building on that plot 
was one of B's autonomous goals. Thus, it would constitute a harm and we could justify 
limiting A's autonomy to prevent harm to B. However, as I have shown, this would result 
in neither being able to build and both would be harmed. This explains why `harm' as a 
justification for limiting autonomy, must incorporate both damage (setback to interests) 
and the notion of a wrong. ' 19 The notion of a wrong is something that must be defined 
independently of autonomy and a full exploration is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Suffice it to suggest that someone is wronged if they have a justifiable claim obstructed 
and that our justifiable claims are defined by the rules determined by the society in which 
we live. 120 
One difficulty in determining the limits of autonomy is that most, if not all, decisions 
made by any individual will have an impact on other people. This is true even if the 
decision seems to be essentially self-regarding. For example, imagine that A is a vegan 
with strongly held views that humans should not use other animals solely for their own 
benefit. A has developed a condition that will leave him severely disabled unless he 
accepts a transplant of tissue taken from a pig. Such a decision would contravene A's 
117 Feinberg, J. Harm to Others (1984) New York: Oxford University Press, 12. 
118 Op cit n. 68,10. 
119 Ibid., 10-11. A stronger version of the setback to interests definition of harm, limits the interests 
to `vital ones': Hayry, H. The Limits of Medical Paternalism (1991) London: Routledge, 21. 
120 Feinberg grounds such claims on welfare interests and directly invadable ulterior interests: Op 
cit n. 117,112. 
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deeply held autonomous views about the relationship between humans and animals but 
his decision to refuse treatment that will leave him severely disabled will harm his 
wife. 121 It will also affect others who have a relationship with A and will place an 
additional burden on the community's resources. It is arguable that A ought to consider 
the effect of his decisions on others and he should take them into account when making a 
decision. If possible A ought to make decisions that will be good for all concerned. It 
would be especially good of A to make decisions that put others' interests ahead of his 
own. However, if morality and the meaningfulness of individual existence are to survive 
state coercion then A should not be prevented from exercising his autonomy unless the 
affected other has a justified claim that would be obstructed by his choice. 
It might be argued that A's wife does have quite a strong claim - arising out of their 
relationship - requiring that A accepts the necessary treatment to prevent the disability. 
However, for state coercion to be justified it would need to be clearly established that 
such a claim would be created when entering into such a relationship. In other words, A 
would need to consent in advance and this would mean that unless he could predict the 
need to compromise his principles his consent would not be normatively effective in 
relation to the pig organ transplant. If his views are deeply held it is unlikely that he 
would enter such an agreement voluntarily. Being able to define our own relationships, 
and that includes the obligations that arise from them, is an important part of what it 
means to be a person. State interference is only warranted where it is not possible for one 
of the parties to autonomously negotiate the nature of the relationship. 
As indicated earlier, choices that are essentially self-regarding may burden the 
community. If the cost to the community is too high then it may be justif iable to limit 
individual autonomy. Feinberg used the garrison model to explain this: in a situation 
when the community's very existence is under threat then the selfish decision of a single 
121 Unless, perhaps, she has a pre-existing autonomous interest in being a carer for A. 
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person may tip the balance. Under those circumstances the community may be justified in 
seeking to preserve itself by overriding an autonomous choice. 122 This justification, 
however, is simply the harm principle applied to the community rather than to individual 
others. It depends on seeing the destruction of the community as harm and on the 
existence of a minimal obligation towards the community that would be breached by 
failing to assist the community in such times of need. While it is theoretically possible 
that this model may be relevant in the context of individual medical treatment it does not 
pertain in present day Britain nor is it foreseeable in the near future. However, it may also 
be justifiable under the harm principle to limit an individual's autonomy to prevent lesser 
levels of community harm. 
Certain interests may be considered as public interests if they are sufficiently widely held. 
These interests may be raised as justifiable limits on autonomy either when the specific 
interests of a sufficiently large number of individuals are harmed or when a "common" 
interest is harmed. 123 Public health threats, such as the risk of transmitting an infectious 
disease, may justify coercion. Similarly, threats to the environment may be coercively 
prevented even though it may not be possible to identify an individual directly harmed. 
The protection of these community interests is simply an extension of the harm principle 
to cover those harms where the victims are the indeterminate members of the community. 
Other Limiting Principles 
Hayry suggested that, apart from the harm principle, there are four principles that might 
justify limiting an individual's autonomy: 
0 Prudence; 
Offence to others; 
Self harm; and 
''`` Op cit n. 68,22. 
123 Op cit n. 1 17,222-3. 
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Morality. 124 
Although allowing that actions offending good manners or decency may be prohibited if 
done in public, 125 Mill generally rejected all of these possible constraints as interfering 
with the general development of people's ability to decide their own lives and to actually 
decide for themselves how their life should go, which is what gives life its personal 
value. 126 These judgments justify argument, persuasion and remonstration but not 
coercion. Certainly if, when it matters, our autonomy is restricted to making decisions 
that others see as wise it would be fatally undermined as a concept. Apart from the impact 
such a strategy would have on our ability to identify with any of our choices when we 
know we could not have chosen otherwise, it also threatens the principle that all moral 
persons are equal. Dominant views of rationality would hold sway and subjugate the 
`incomprehensible' minority. 
It might be argued that if autonomy requires rationality then an irrational action is not 
autonomous and does not, therefore, need to be protected. 12' Thus, the US President's 
Commission suggested that: `A second limitation on self-determination arises where a 
person's decisionmaking is so defective or mistaken that the decision fails to promote the 
person's own values or goals'. 128 This constraint protects the overtly autonomous act but 
not the other acts of an autonomous person. One problem with this approach is that acts 
may be autonomous but not obviously so. An example of when this might happen is 
where actors autonomously choose to act in a way that does not appear to coincide with 
their goals or interests. Related to this is the problem of incomprehensibility that arises 
because observers are unable to understand the actor's goals. This follows from a 
124 Hayry, H. The Limits of Medical Paternalism (1991) London: Routledge, 25. 
125 Op cit n. 49,108,109. 
126 Op cit n. 49,14. 
127 Op cit n. 124,36. 
128 The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research. Making Health Care Decisions: The Ethical and Legal Implications of 
Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship, Volume One: Report (1982) 
Washington (DC), 49. 
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difference in the conception of the `good life' and what goals a person ought to aim for. 129 
It is also likely, as Mill claimed, that - subconscious influences notwithstanding - we 
know ourselves better than others do. While I may not always be able to explain my 
actions, my own knowledge of my interests and goals and my own understanding of what 
life means for me will almost certainly be better than some other person's appreciation of 
those crucial decision-making factors. Thus, an external judge of rationality may easily be 
mistaken about the logic of my decision. 
It may further be argued that we learn best by being allowed to make mistakes. If I am 
only allowed to make rational decisions I will not be allowed to make mistakes and my 
ability to reason will improve less quickly. This argument can only apply to those 
mistakes that will not cause permanent and significant harm to my ability to be 
autonomous. It would be self-defeating to argue that I should be allowed to make 
mistakes so that I can learn better how to make decisions if, as a result, I am unable to 
exercise that rationality. Related to this argument is perhaps the stronger point that since 
no one is infallible and I am the person who will have to live with the consequences I 
should be the one who makes the decision. If, because you profess an expertise, I choose 
to rely on your judgment I am responsible for the decision and should accept the 
consequences with equanimity. Certainly, I have no justifiable reason to blame you for 
my misfortune. However, if you force a choice on me against my will and I am harmed 
as a consequence that harm will be amplified precisely because you chose to act against 
my will. Just as stifling free speech suggests infallibility, 130 so too does preventing free 
choice. Such an unwarranted profession of infallibility makes a bad outcome seem all the 
worse especially as it is I rather than you who will have to live with the consequences. 
129 Op cit n. 64,505. 
130 Op cit n. 49,22. 
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Apart from when the harm principle is invoked, limiting autonomy on the basis of 
morality is problematic. The reality of moral relativity and the existence of a pluralistic 
society make it difficult to base rules on particular moral principles. Again the problem of 
a dominant view is raised and allowing such moral judgments to justify coercive law 
hints at an arrogant intolerance. As Hayry noted: `there are an infinite variety of 
interpretations of what is moral, and to a person defending any one of them, its opponents 
will always appear more or less irrational' . 
131 If a particular view of morality is enforced 
this implies that the followers of a different morality are somehow less equal. If living by 
a particular code is not harmful to others then the value of such a code can only be 
coercively denied by a society that sees those individuals as less worthy of respect. Since 
moral equality is one of the assumptions behind this thesis, harmless moral (or `immoral') 
beliefs/actions cannot justify limiting autonomy. 
It is arguable that offensive actions fall within the purview of the law. It may be 
legitimate, as Mill argued (see above), to restrict offensive activities by banning them 
from public display. In general, however, it would be a greater invasion of liberty and 
autonomy to coercively prevent an action seen by some as offensive. What counts as 
offensive is, to a large extent, simply a matter of opinion. Categorising something as 
offensive is an appeal to individual sensibilities and is not subject to reason but to feelings 
and, as such, it is less objective than the more legitimate harm principle. Although it is 
arguable that someone may have an interest in not being offended, `by falling short of 
harm to the interests the law ascribes to the standard person, they are deemed to be less 
serious harms than those that would come from restricting the liberty of others'. 132 To 
infringe one person's autonomy because another finds the idea of it offensive is to treat 
the actor as less equal because it subjugates his autonomy to the irrational emotions of the 
other; it becomes a conflict between two different wants. 
131 Op cit n. 124,126. 
132 Op cit n. 117,51. 
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Even though it may be rational to have an interest in not being offended, the content of 
that interest is populated by feelings. If the offensive actions solely further the actor's 
interest in being offensive, then there is a conflict of equal interests. Other autonomous 
interests, however, will usually be weightier than the interest in not being offended and 
setbacks to those other interests may be more permanent than the relatively temporary 
impact of offensiveness. The interest in not being offended may be infringed by offensive 
behaviour but the offence will not persist beyond the incident. The setback caused to 
others by banning the `offensive' activity may, however, have a much more permanent 
and total impact. In the context of medical care this argument is particularly apt. The 
types of treatment that may be seen as offensive include operations like abortion and sex 
change. 133 The impact of preventing an abortion because such operations offend a section 
of society would be huge, both for the individual woman and for society. History 
demonstrates the misery and harm caused to women through having to deal with 
unwanted pregnancy when abortion is unlawful. 
The Protection of Future Autonomy 
I will consider the issue of paternalism and the restriction of autonomy to prevent harm to 
self in more detail in the next chapter following a discussion of the principle of 
beneficence. For the time being I will confine the present debate to an examination of 
whether it is legitimate to restrict present autonomy in order to protect the autonomy of 
the future self. One argument that would support restricting present autonomy in order to 
protect future autonomy relies on a utilitarian position that if autonomy is a good thing 
then it should be maximised and what really matters is not how much autonomy I can 
exercise now but how much I am able to exercise over my whole life. This may mean that 
present autonomy should not be respected if it would undermine my future autonomy. 
133 Of course, if the fetus is seen as a person then the harm principle may be raised as an argument 
against allowing abortion. Also, abortion may be criticised on moral grounds. 
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Levi noted a similar argument, which is simply that `one's future capacity for autonomy 
should be maximised at the expense of one's present exercise of autonomy' . 
134 Parfit's 
reductionist argument, based on the relative unimportance of personal identity, that `we 
ought not to do to our future selves what it would be wrong to do to other people', forms 
the basis for the third argument. 135 If the harm principle justifies restricting autonomy to 
protect others from harm then, if my psychological connectedness to my future self is no 
greater than it is to current third parties, just as my autonomy may be justifiably restricted 
to prevent harm to others so it may be constrained to protect my future self. 
As I noted earlier, for autonomy to be constrained the harm principle requires the act to 
be wrongful. What this implies is that for harm to future autonomy to count as a 
justifiable limit I must owe myself a duty not to cause such a setback to my autonomy. 
This is problematic not least because if I owe myself the duty there is no good reason why 
I cannot waive it and that undermines any such duty. This consequence may be avoided if 
I am held to be the subject of the duty but the duty is owed to the community (or state). 
However, for such a duty to be justifiable, the harm caused by infringing my present 
autonomy must be less than the harm that would otherwise be caused to my future 
autonomy. Furthermore, any claim that I owe a duty to protect my future autonomy must 
survive the following arguments. 
The starting point is that many choices restrict my future choices. To use Parfit's railway 
analogy, if I chose the right - rather than the middle or left - track I lose all of the 
opportunities associated with the middle and left track. In this way, every time I exercise 
my autonomy I restrict my future autonomy. Avoiding making choices cannot solve this 
problem because it would wholly undermine the value of autonomy and, since many 
choices are lost by inaction, it would not guarantee protection of future autonomy. Thus, 
134 Op cit n. 82,84. 
135 Parf it, D. Reasons and Persons (1984) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 320. 
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if present autonomy is to be restricted, as Levi argued (see above), it must be to protect 
future capacity for autonomy. 
Levi based his objection to restricting present autonomy on `John Dewey's claim that to 
sacrifice the present for the future is to empty the present of all meaning'. 136 This sacrifice 
is one that `involves uncoupling ends and means in such a way that one's present 
activities no longer reflect the principles that ground one's values, upon which one's 
priorities, and in that sense "meaning", are based'. 137 A classic example of this would be 
ignoring the Jehovah's Witness' refusal of blood in order to prevent her suffering 
permanent harm or death from major blood loss. 
One important implication of Levi's argument is that it appears to address only those 
instances in which the exercise of autonomy concerns one's values, goals or life plans. If 
autonomy is conceived of as simple self-determination, then Levi's argument only applies 
to the most important decisions and then only if they are rational choices. This accords 
with Levi's conception of autonomy138 but does mean that his argument would justify 
non-interference only where the decision itself was autonomous rather than respecting all 
the primarily self-regarding decisions of an autonomous person. Because his argument 
protects only autonomous decisions it fails to justify non-interference where the actor 
decides irrationally or simply makes a mistake. It may be argued that there is no good 
reason to protect such decisions if they will damage the actor's future autonomy. 
However, being self-determining is, as I discussed earlier, an intrinsically important 
aspect of authorship, responsibility and moral personhood. It is our actions as 
autonomous persons rather than our autonomous actions that ground these crucial parts of 
136 Op cit n. 82,84. The argument depends on accepting that valuing the capacity for autonomy 
requires us also to value being able to exercise that autonomy. Just as having money but no 
opportunity to spend it seems pointless, so too is having an unusable capacity for autonomy. 
137 Ibid., 85. 
138 Ibid., 35-37. 
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who we are. This means that not only should others respect our autonomous choices but 
also our non-autonomous choices. 
It may be argued that, since the capacity for autonomy is so important, only autonomous 
choices should be respected, as these will - if truly autonomous and hence rational - take 
account of the effect on future capacity. However, it is an empty respect for someone to 
say that his decisions will be respected but only if they are objectively right. If taken to an 
extreme these objective judgments would be applied not just to our decisions but also to 
our goals and life plans and would be the moral equivalent of Henry Ford's famous 
restriction that the customer could choose whatever colour he liked as long as it was 
black. In fact, it may be psychologically worse as alternatives may be apparently 
available only to be whisked from under our noses if we make the mistake of opting for 
the `wrong' one. The argument that non-autonomous decisions should be respected is 
given further support by recourse to one of Mill's justifications for liberty (see earlier). 
This is that we know ourselves better than others know us, which makes us the expert 
regarding our own lives. While others may inform us of the likely effect of a chosen 
action, it is for us to determine the relative importance of that consequence. It is perhaps 
worth noting that Mill's argument that we should be allowed to make mistakes because it 
is the best way to learn would not apply where the consequence was catastrophic. There 
seems little point in learning a lesson if the consequence of that lesson is to so undermine 
autonomy that the actor is unable to utilise any new knowledge. 
In concluding his argument, Levi stated that: `There is no sense in which I can be acting 
out of respect for your exercise of autonomy and at the same time undermining your 
present exercise of autonomy ... 
There is no larger frame of reference for my respect 
beyond your exercise of autonomy right there and then'. 139 1 would go further than this 
and suggest that a respect for autonomy requires respect for both autonomous choices and 
i39 Ibid., 87-88. 
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the non-autonomous decisions of autonomous persons. This position, however, is still 
vulnerable to Parfit's arguments regarding the protection of future selves, which I will 
now briefly address. 
Future Selves 
Parfit argued that identity is important only in so far as it is constituted by psychological 
continuity and connectedness. The importance of these latter two factors he persuasively 
established by considering scenarios involving split brains. 140 Thus, he argued that when 
his brain is split into two parts (left and right) and each half is placed in a new body the 
question of his existence is irrelevant. The more important one is whether he shares a 
psychological connectedness with Lefty and Righty. Since, in a normal life, 
connectedness decreases over time (I share a greater psychological connection with my 
30 year old self than with my 10 year old self) it is not irrational to act for instant pleasure 
even if that would cause harm to my future self. However, as the connectedness decreases 
so my future self becomes less like me and more and more like someone else. As such it 
makes little sense to deny my future self the protection afforded to others who may be 
wrongly harmed by my actions. This would suggest, amongst other things, that my 
present autonomy might be constrained to protect my future self's autonomy. 
Levi, offered five reasons why Parfit's view should not be followed. 141 First he suggested 
the familiar point that the present self is the one best placed to be considered expert about 
the best interests of the future self. As I noted earlier, this will not always be the case and 
at best it only provides a conditional argument in favour of respecting present autonomy. 
Levi's second argument was that for the vast majority of our decisions the person most 
directly affected is sufficiently psychologically connected to the decision-maker to be 
considered the same self. This is perhaps the most telling counter-argument in the context 
140 See Part III of Paz-fit, D. Op cit n. 135,199-345. 
141 Op cit n. 82,88-91. 
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of contemporaneous decision making. For some, adopting a narrative view of human life 
provides the necessary connection. 142 Dworkin, for example, argued that the best 
justification for autonomy is that it is through the exercise of personal choice that we 
construct our own identity. On this `integrity' view, autonomy is causally necessary for 
authorship and the development of a unique character. '43 The narrative thread that 
connects the individual stages of the human being's life creates the necessary unity of 
identity, which means that any duty owed to the future self is a duty owed to myself and 
may thus be waived. 
Korsgaard constructed a similar argument against Parfit's view. She persuasively argued 
that the entity that unifies a human life is the `Agent', which may be broadly equivalent to 
Kant's `Will'. In Platonic terms, the agent unifies the three parts of the soul: appetite, 
reason and spirit. '44 Thus: 
When you deliberate about what to do and then do it, what you are 
doing is organizing your appetite, reason, and spirit, into the unified 
system that yields an action that can be attributed to you as a person 
Whatever else you are doing when you choose a deliberative 
action, you are also unifying yourself into a person. 145 
Agency `is important because our conception of what a person is depends in a deep way 
on our conception of ourselves as agents'. 146 Thus, Korsgaard suggested that any choice 
authored by the Agent has a special significance. Furthermore: 
142 Quante, M. `Precedent Autonomy and Personal Identity' (1999) 9(4) Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal 365,372; Rich, B. A. `Personhood, Patienthood, And Clinical Practice: Reassessing 
Advance Directives' (1998) 4 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 610,614. 
143 Dworkin, R. Life's Dominion (1993) London: Harper Collins, 223-224. 
14' Korsgaard, C. M. `Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant (1998) 3 The Journal of 
Ethics 1,7. 
145 Ibid., 22. 
146 Korsgaard, C. M. 'Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit' 
(1989) 18(2) Philosophy and Public Affairs 101,103. 
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the extent that you regulate your choices by identifying yourself as the 
one who is implementing something like a particular plan of life, you 
need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even 
now. When the person is viewed as an agent, no clear content can be 
given to the idea of a merely present self. 147 
It is, therefore arguable that the qualitative changes in our person resulting from our 
Agent-authored choices do not affect the identity of that person, which is only fragmented 
by external influences. Thus, barring some radical discontinuity, I remain the same person 
throughout my autonomous life and any duty I owe to myself is waivable. Korsgaard's 
argument has the further consequence of limiting external interference, since major 
interference with the Agent will fracture the person's unity. 
Levi's third argument was that, any protection of future selves should apply across the 
board and not just to medical decision-making. Thus, `major life decisions, such as 
having children, going into massive debt for a purchase, undergoing plastic surgery, or 
becoming a professional boxer' - and many other decisions, including everyday ones - 
should be subject to the test of great imprudence. 148 This raises the issues of who would 
be qualified to make such decisions and whether anyone could ever make such decisions. 
This point has particular force in light of Korsgaard's argument about agency as it would 
seriously undermine an individual's integrity if every major decision in life was subject to 
the constraint of `objective' rationality. 
Levi's fourth argument was that, any future self is likely to share values, interests and 
goals with the present self as these will have evolved from those possessed by the present 
self. This argument may apply to the future selves that develop gradually, especially those 
unified by the 'Agent', but will be far less relevant where the future self is created by a 
147 Ibid., 113-114 
148 Op cif n. 82,89. 
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devastating event (i. e. where psychological continuity is disrupted by, for example, head 
trauma). Finally, he noted that such restrictions would be far more extreme than those 
placed on parents with respect to self-regarding decisions that affect their children. This, 
he suggested, `is at the very least counterintuitive to think that we should place 
restrictions on our future selves that we would not place on parents out of concern for 
wholly distinct human beings'. 149 
Hetta Hayry made an even more direct criticism and argued that Parfit's view, while it 
may not be refutable, remains intellectually unconvincing. '50 She added further criticism 
to any suggestion that, even if the reductionist view would lead to a more prudent and 
altruistic community, obligations to future selves should not be legally coerced as our 
deeply held beliefs about our individuality would be `likely to counteract any legislative 
and socio-political attempts towards regulating behaviour which people see as self- 
regarding' 
1 51 
All of these arguments suggest we should be allowed to make our own choices even if 
they are irrational. As per Mill, others may be allowed - or even have a duty - to advise, 
persuade, and remonstrate, but if autonomy is the guiding principle then the final decision 
should remain with the individual. However, autonomy is not the sole principle and 
others need to be considered in the final balance. Before tackling the relevance of other 
moral principles and approaches, because I have argued that it is essential to a sufficiently 
textured conception of autonomy, it is necessary to consider rationality in more depth. 
149 Ibid., 91. 
150 Op cit n. 124,131-136. 
's' Ibid., 137. 
42 
Which Rationality? 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines rationality as: `The quality of possessing reason; 
the power of being able to exercise one's reason'. 152 This begs the question of what 
counts as reason. O'Neill suggested that there are perhaps two points that would be 
widely accepted, even by those sceptical of the possibility of reason. These are: `that 
anything that could count as reasoned would make no arbitrary moves'; and `anything 
reasoned ... 
[has] a certain authority in guiding thinking and acting, which is quite 
generally discernible, and so does not presuppose any views - or prejudices - which are 
not, or might not be, generally shared'. 153 Nagel provided a similar explication: `The 
essential characteristic of reasoning is its generality. If I have reasons to conclude or to 
believe or to want or to do something, they cannot be reasons just for me - they would 
have to justify anyone else doing the same in my place'. 154 
There are two aspects of decision-making that raise issues of rationality: the choice of 
ends and the means of achieving those ends. Both of these decisional elements are things 
that the law might be concerned with and there are broadly two possible approaches. 
First, the law could adopt what Gaut called the `recognitional model'. For Gaut, the 
general authority for rational action is that the agent `represents the action as good'. In the 
recognitional model, the `good' is determined independently of the agent's actions. '55 The 
second possibility is the `constructivist' approach in which `the good simply is 
constituted as the object of rational choice'. 156 
If the law were to adopt the recognitional model then there must be some objective and 
non-arbitrary justification of `the good' that provides the necessary authority and gives 
152 Oxford English Dictionary 2004, available at: http: //dictionary. oed. com/. 
153 O'Neill, O. Bounds of Justice (2000) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 12. 
154 Nagel, T. The Last Word (1997) New York: Oxford University Press, 5 (emphasis added). 
iss Gaut, B. `The Structure of Practical Reason', in: Cullity, G. Gaut, B. (eds. ) Ethics and Practical 
Reason (1997) Oxford: Clarendon Press 161,161-162. 
1561bid., 162. 
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the rational actor a motivational reason to adopt that good as an end. As Gaut suggested, 
`we can construe practical reason as the capacity to recognize and be motivated by what 
has objective value'. 157 However, given the problem of recursion, it seems unlikely that 
the good life is something that can be `intrinsically reasoned or reasonable'. 158 Gaut 
attempted to do this by drawing a connection between the good life and our biology. 
According to her argument, `value is a teleological, biological category', 159 and it is 
therefore plausible to objectively determine the `goodness' of an end based on its 
biological function. The `good life' can thus be discovered `by experiencing which lives 
go well and badly, drawing on individual experience and the accumulated wisdom of the 
past, and by deliberating individually and collectively in the light of this experience'. 160 
This is fine, as far as it goes, but it only provides a very limited view of the good life, 
which is that part `determined by her [the agent's] nature: by her capacities, tendencies 
and needs'. 161 Unless the good life is to be determined solely in terms of biological 
function, and even that may be open to a degree of interpretation, then we still need some 
way of choosing between competing philosophies, which problematically tends to 
`involve begging the question regarding the ranking of values and/or of right making 
principles'. 162 
An alternative is the constructivist model, which may take one of two forms. In the neo- 
Humean form the agent's motivation comes from internal states that are neither rational 
nor irrational and are `at least partly constituted by ... 
desire'. 163 The question of 
rationality is then purely instrumental: whether the act will satisfy the desire. Unlike 
Hume, the neo-Humeans add the normative requirement that the desire itself must be 
'57 Ibid., 183. 
158 Op cit n. 153,14. 
159 Op cit n. 155,184. 
160 Ibid., 187. 
161 Ibid., 185. 
162 Op cit n. 77,292. 
163 Cullity, G. Gaut, B. `Introduction', in 
(1997) Oxford: Clarendon Press 1,4. 
Cullity, G. Gaut, B. (eds. ) Ethics and Practical Reason 
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reflected on in a rational and knowledgeable way to determine one's ultimate desire. 
Acting to promote this ultimate desire is rational even though the ultimate desire itself is 
not amenable to analysis on the basis of rationality. ' 64 This effectively allows individuals 
to determine the `good' for themselves, provided they have reflected on that end. This 
approach is found in Frankfurt's and Dworkin's division of desires into first and second 
order with rationality judged on the basis of consistency with the second order desire. 161 
This model of rationality, which would accord with a liberal ethic, is not without its 
detractors. 166 
Perhaps the major criticism is that, while this view of rationality allows for value 
judgments it remains self-referential: whether the means is rational is determined entirely 
against the subjective end chosen by the actors themselves. Kennett argued that 
moral requirements must be shown to be a species of reasons for 
actions that are available and applicable to all of us: not in virtue, 
simply, of our individual aims and interests and allegiances, but in 
virtue, first, of our shared rational capacities for critical reflection and, 
second, of our capacities for action in accordance with the outcome of 
such reflection even when it conflicts with our individual desires and 
interests. 167 
This means that, if she is correct, morality in this model is irrelevant to the question of 
rationality. 
The second constructivist approach is the Kantian model. 168 In this approach, morality is 
rational and to fail to act morally is to act irrationally. 169 For Kant, the autonomous will is 
164 Ibid., 7-8. 
165 Op cit n. 35,20. Frankfurt, H. Op cit n. 50. 
166 See, e. g. Kennett, J. Agency and Responsibility: A common-sense moral psychology (2001) 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 64-71. 
167 Ibid., 99-100. 
168 Op cit n. 163,3-5. 
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rational and, as a consequence of rational deliberation, any self-willed autonomous law 
must obey the categorical imperative and be willed as universal. 10 Working from Kant's 
approach, Korsgaard argued, contra Hume, that there is a distinction between actual 
desires and rational desires and that we ought to pursue our rational desires rather than 
just our actual desires. "" This distinction requires that we have some way of 
distinguishing what is rational, i. e. what we ought to do, from simply what we desire to 
do and, if this is the case, there must be `normative principles directing the adoption of 
ends' . 
172 According to Kant, the normative principle is that any self-legislation must also 
be capable of being willed as universal. Although Kant provided two helpful 
reformulations of this imperative - treat people as an end in themselves and not merely as 
a means, 173 and `every rational being should be regarded as an autonomous legislator in a 
kingdom of ends'174 - this approach to grounding the authority of morality in rationality 
may be accused of being `a contingent psychological matter' and empty of any 
substance. 
171 
Each of the three approaches to rationality has its supporters and its detractors. The 
choice between the first two perhaps comes down to whether one sees the good as prior to 
the right or vice versa. 176 The difficulty with giving primacy to the good arises from the 
question of why a particular view of the good should be authoritative, "' and it may lead 
169 Op cit n. 166,98. 
10 Op cit n. 72,39 (4: 431). 
17' Korsgaard, C. M. `The Normativity of Instrumental Reason', in: Cullity, G. Gaut, B. (eds. ) 
Ethics and Practical Reason (1997) Oxford: Clarendon Press 215,230. 
172 Ibid., 231. 
13 Op cit n. 72,39 (4: 429). (see, Brink, D. O. `Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and 
Supremacy', in: Cullity, G. Gaut, B. (eds. ) Ethics and Practical Reason (1997) Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 255,268). 
14 Op cit n. 72,39 (4: 431-3). 
175 Brink, D. O. Op cit n. 173,272. 
176 See, Sandel, M. J. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (2°d ed., 1998) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, xi. 
177 It may be argued that the objective ends view of rationality completely undermines the whole 
idea of autonomy. This is not necessarily the case, but space does not permit a discussion of this 
issue. For a defence of the view that the two are compatible see: Varelius, J. `Autonomy, Subject- 
Relativity, and Subjective and Objective Theories of Well-being in Bioethics' (2003) 24 
Theoretical Medicine 363. 
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to `intolerance and the suppression of opinions' with autonomy valued as a means to 
achieve a societally imposed view of `self-perfection' rather than for its autobiographical 
role in determining character and identity. 178 The problem with seeing individuals as 
having the right to determine their own good is that it allows a moral vacuum and 
underplays the importance of a person's social relationships within the context of a 
community. We are all dependent on others, to a greater or lesser extent, throughout our 
life. Without the nurturing and support from others we would be free but that freedom 
would be relatively impotent. As Gauthier noted: `No one can attain even ... 
[the] 
minimal human goods alone. They require families and communities that protect, nurture, 
and support individual well-being and provide for these needs, when necessary' . 
19 Given 
that we could achieve nothing without the support of others we must rely on those others 
for their help. If others are to provide assistance then they must have some reason for 
doing so and this means that the claim must at least be accepted as reasonable. 
The third view of rationality, that links morality and rationality through the constraint of 
universalisability, has the necessary sensitivity to others to recognise the socially 
embedded nature of rationality and autonomy. As such, it is, I submit, the preferable view 
provided it can be given more substance than exists in Kant's formal imperative. Kant's 
imperative forms the basis for O'Neill's argument that the individual's ability to reason 
must be judged against ends, norms or commitments that it is `possible for others to 
follow'. 180 Thus, `Reasoning is defective when reasoners misjudge or misrepresent what 
others can follow'. 181 This model perhaps lies somewhere in between the objective-ends 
and the subjective-ends models of rationality. While it allows individuals to determine the 
good for themselves, this is open to scrutiny and is only deserving of respect if the ends 
are accessible to others. This means that the end does not need to be one that the judge 
178 Op cit n. 110,119; Op cit n. 143,224. 
179 Gauthier, C. C. The Virtue of Moral Responsibility in Healthcare Decisionmaking' (2002) 11 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 273,277. 
180 Op cit n. 153,24. 
181 O'Neill, O. Towards Justice and Virtues (1996) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 58. 
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would accept, but it does need to be one that he could accept. The identity of those others 
will depend on context, but could be anyone asked for assistance to enable reasoners to 
achieve their goals. Whether a particular end is accessible may be influenced by what 
Gadamer has termed the `sensus communis', which is `the sense that founds 
community'. 182 In this way, the model is sensitive to the objective ends view of 
rationality. However, because it focuses on what could be acceptable, it is also tolerant of 
more subjective ends. 
The final question regarding rationality that I will consider in this chapter is: how much 
rationality should be expected? If too high a level is required then few people will be 
capable of autonomy, but if the level is set too low then people will be required to make 
decisions when they lack the capacity to make them wisely. One possible approach would 
be to require what Hurley calls loose reason-responsiveness (being weak-willed). 183 The 
gist of this is that the person is capable of responding to "all-things-considered" reasons, 
but will often respond to specific reasons to act that are not strong enough to outweigh the 
reasons not to act. This means that there must be a reasonable pattern of responsiveness to 
"all-things-considered" reasons even though the person would not always act on those 
reasons. It is a matter of judgment to decide exactly how often a person must act on "all- 
things-considered" reasons to be deemed competent, but it would not be unreasonable to 
suggest that they should make such decisions more often than not. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I explored the nature, the value and the limits of autonomy. I noted that 
there are broadly three conceptions of personal autonomy: self-determination; rational 
self-determination; and moral rational self-determination. I suggested that it was also 
important to distinguish between the autonomous person, the autonomous act and the 
182 Gadamer, H-G. Truth and Method (2nd ed., 1975) London: Sheed & Ward, 21. 
183 Hurley, S. L Justice, Luck, and Knowledge (2003) Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press, 
55-57. 
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autonomous life. Because simple self-determination obscures these distinctions, and 
because it fails to engage the justification that autonomy enables moral responsibility, I 
rejected it. Furthermore, since autonomy must take into account its relational nature any 
useful conception must acknowledge the need for rational self-reflection. This leaves 
autonomy as rational-self-determination or as moral rational self-determination. I 
declined to make a final choice between these two conceptions at this point, although I 
recognised that the choice may need to be made. I will address this issue in chapter three, 
when I explore the relevance of the HCP-patient relationship. 
I suggested that autonomy has both intrinsic and instrumental value. The intrinsic value 
arises primarily because of the necessity of autonomy for the ascription of moral 
personhood and responsible agency. It follows from this that autonomy is intrinsically 
valuable because it allows us to adopt the reactive attitudes that instil life with the warmth 
of humanity. The instrumental values of autonomy are that it is beneficial to the well 
being of those with an internal locus of control. It is also important because respecting 
autonomy allows people to get better at attaining goods and to learn from their mistakes. 
Furthermore it allows people to develop their character and to shape their lives and 
identities. Finally, it serves as a layer of protection against the tyranny of the state. 
Although autonomy is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, it is not protected 
absolutely. The main limit on personal autonomy is to prevent harm to others. Other 
potentially limiting factors, such as offence to others and moralism, are insufficient - at 
least in the context of healthcare provision - to justify restricting individual autonomy. 
Imprudence and the possibility of self-harm only justify the use of remonstration, 
pleading and rational persuasion. The most difficult situation is where the choice risks 
harm that is catastrophic for the individual's future autonomy, but even here I suggested 
that any interference should fall short of force or coercion. Furthermore, this protection 
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for autonomy extends to both autonomous and non-autonomous acts provided the person 
has the capacity for autonomy. 
Finally, I briefly considered the question of which version of rationality should inform the 
concept of autonomy. I noted that both the constructivist and the recognitional models of 
rationality have their strengths but also their weaknesses. Because of this, I suggested that 
the law should follow the third approach as developed by O'Neill, which holds that 
individual rationality should be judged against ends, norms and commitments that are 
accessible to others. Furthermore, I suggested that there should be a moderate 
requirement for rationality that expects only a loose responsiveness to reasons. 
In this first chapter, I have examined the concept of autonomy and discussed its nature, 
value and limits to come to some limited conclusions, which I will develop further in 
subsequent chapters. I have not yet considered the internal and external constraints on 
autonomy that arise in the particular context of healthcare. These include the patient's 
illness, psychological differences that affect an individual's capacity for autonomy, 184 the 
power imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship and perhaps the institutional discourse 
of healthcare. These important constraints have implications for the way doctors and 
patients interact, 185 which I will address in chapter three. In the next chapter I will explore 
some of the other relevant moral principles and approaches that may interact with 
autonomy. This will include consideration of beneficence and paternalism, which will 
allow further discussion of the problematic issue of autonomy and self-harm. I will then 
go on to explore the relevance of justice. This will particularly focus on the relevance of 
autonomy to the individual's responsibility for outcome. Finally, I will also consider the 
importance of character and virtue ethics and the relevance of consequences. 
184 Waller, B. M. Op cit n. 94; Bergsma, J. `Cancer and autonomy' (2002) 47 Patient Education and 
Counseling 205,206. 
185 See: Secker, B. Op cit n. 76. 
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Chapter Two: The Relevance of Beneficence, Justice and Virtue 
In chapter one I considered the concept of autonomy, which may be seen as the driving 
force of consent. In this chapter, I will examine some other moral principles and 
approaches that may be relevant to determining how the law should regulate consent to 
medical treatment. I will be focusing on the relevance of beneficence, justice and virtue. 
In this chapter I do not attempt to provide a complete model of how these different 
concerns interact. That is something I will address in chapters three and four. Instead, my 
aim is to provide sufficient background to enable the subsequent development of a more 
textured model. 
I have little to say about the principle of non-maleficence, the essence of which is to do 
no harm. As Szasz noted, this is - if taken too literally - `an absurd' prescription. 
186 Much 
of what the professional does necessarily risks or causes harm and the obligation is, if 
interpreted literally, an impossible one. On this view, it is only if the obligation is 
considered in tandem with the obligation of beneficence that it makes any real sense. An 
alternative approach is to use a normative concept of harm that, following Feinberg, 
requires the act, which causes the set-back to the victim's interests, to be wrongful. 
'87 
Most of the specific duties that arise from this, such as `do not kill ... 
[or] cause pain ... 
[or] incapacitate', 188 are relevant only in so far as consent provides the necessary 
justification to prevent the act being wrongful. Thus, other than reinforcing the general 
duty to respect the other's autonomy, it adds little to the consent debate and will not be 
considered further. 
186 Szasz, T. `The Moral Physician', in: The Theology of Medicine (1977) Syracuse (NY): 
Syracuse University Press 1. 
187 Op cit n. 68,10-11. 
'88Opcitn. 51,117. 
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It will be noted that I am saying nothing explicitly about the role of consequences. This is 
because, as far as consent is concerned, the discussion in chapter one on the limits of 
autonomy and the concepts of beneficence and paternalism largely exhaust the issue. 
Consequences do have an additional relevance, which is the resource implication of any 
particular approach to consent. The more demanding the approach, the greater the 
resources required to meet those demands and the fewer resources there will be available 
for other purposes. Since respect for patient autonomy is only one of many competing 
goods it is important to bear in mind the effects on those goods of any diversion of 
resources necessary to enhance patient autonomy. This is a difficult political question that 
I will return to later. For now, I will begin by discussing the role of beneficence, the issue 
of paternalism and the relationship between beneficence, paternalism and autonomy. 
Beneficence 
The principle of beneficence, which `refers to a moral obligation to act for the benefit of 
others', 189 has a long and close association with medical practice. The duty forms part of 
the Hippocratic Oath and, as the British Medical Association (BMA) noted: `Doctors are 
trained to recognise that they have a duty to benefit others and to avoid the risk of harm 
unless this is outweighed by potential benefit to the patient'. 190 This duty, of acting to 
benefit the patient, appears to be an important and reasonable duty that makes the HCP- 
patient relationship a caring one and demands that the professional's role is more than 
just salesman or technician. Although the duty to benefit the patient seems an intuitively 
good thing, it is important to determine the limits of the duty and consider how it interacts 
with the obligation to respect autonomy. Importantly, does the HCP's duty of beneficence 
affect the patient's right to autonomy, or does the patient's right to autonomy define the 
extent of the professional's duty of beneficence? 
189 Ibid., 166. 
190 BMA. Medical Ethics Today: Its Practice and Philosophy (1998,1993) London: BMJ 
Publishing, 154. 
,ý 
For Beauchamp and Childress, the duty of beneficence includes the follo« ing general 
rules: '91 
1. Protect and defend the rights of others. 
2. Prevent harm from occurring to others. 
3. Remove conditions that will cause harm to others. 
4. Help persons with disabilities. 
Rescue persons in danger. 
The first thing to note about these rules is that the first two arguably reflect an interaction 
between beneficence and autonomy. If the patient has a right to autonomy then the first 
rule requires the HCP to protect and defend that right, which certainly includes an 
imperative not to infringe the right. This requires the professional to act in a way that not 
just respects the patient's formal right to consent but also reflects the spirit behind that 
requirement. The second rule requires that the professional acts to prevent harm from 
occurring to the patient. The effect of this rule depends on how harm is defined. If harm is 
defined, as was discussed in chapter one, to mean a wrongful setback to interests, then it 
is arguable that breach of the patient's autonomy constitutes harm. This means that the 
HCP's duty of beneficence incorporates an obligation to avoid or to prevent an 
infringement of the patient's autonomy. 192 However, this has not always been the way in 
which the duty of beneficence has been conceived. 
The traditional goals of medicine are to preserve, protect and/or restore the patient's 
health. 193 This perhaps makes it understandable that the emphasis of the duty may be 
focused on benefits to the patient's health as objectively determined by the healthcare 
profession. Sometimes this clinical view will coincide with the patient's, or else the 
patient will defer to the professional's expertise. At other times, however, it may conflict 
191 Op cit n. 51,167. 
192 See Gillon, R. `Ethics needs principles - four can encompass the rest - and respect for 
autonomy should be "first among equals"' (2003) 29 Journal of Medical Ethics 307,310. 
193 See the Declaration of Geneva 1948 (as amended 1983). 
53 
with the patient's belief of what constitutes a benefit. This apparent conflict, between 
HCPs' approach to their duty of beneficence and patient autonomy arises because of the 
focus on health and life as the primary object of the professional's duty. The problem 
with this approach is that it fails to respect the patient as an holistic person since it 
concentrates on just one aspect of that person's life. 194 It fails to distinguish between `the 
health of an individual qua organism and the health of an individual qua person'. 195 Thus, 
the conflict is `apparent' because it arises not from beneficence per se but from 
beneficence seen through a `clinical gaze'. 196 Within an institutional discourse that 
defines beneficence by reference solely to medical effects on health the patient is 
disempowered and `stripped of social identity, and reinscribed ... with the passive role of 
being just a body ready for bio-medical processing'. "' 
As Brock noted, health is just one aspect of well-being, ' 98 it is of instrumental rather than 
intrinsic value, 199 it is not wholly objective and may often be adequately achieved by 
more than one route. 200 Since well-being arguably involves the person's sense of self and 
constraints on, or a lack of respect for, that person's autonomy may adversely affect this 
by creating a feeling of powerlessness, a duty of beneficence ought to require respect for 
the individual's autonomy. 201 Well-being may also be affected by both the effect of 
treatment choices and the consequential effects of disempowerment on the patient's goals 
and life plan. Furthermore, the physician's duty of beneficence should not be allowed to 
194 Byrne, P. `Divergence on Consent: A Philosophical Assay', in: Dunstan G. R. Seller, M. J. (eds) 
Consent in Medicine: Convergence and divergence in tradition (1983) London: King Edward's 
Hospital Fund 45,51. 
195 Richman, K. A. Ethics and the Metaphysics of Medicine: Reflections on Health and Beneficence 
(2004) Cambridge (Mass): The MIT Press, 28. The term `health' as applied to the person rather 
than the organism is roughly equivalent to Brock's use of `well-being'. 
196 Foucault, M. The Birth of the Clinic (1973) New York: Vintage Books, 145. 
197 McGrath, P. `Autonomy, Discourse, and Power: A Postmodern Reflection on Principalism and 
Bioethics' (1998) 23(5) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 516,521. 
198 See also: Draper, K. `The Personal and Impersonal Dimensions of Benevolence' (2001) 36(2) 
Nous 201,219. 
199 See also: Richman, K. A. Op cit n. 195,20. 
200 Brock, D. W. Life and Death (1993) New York: Cambridge University Press, 25-26. 
201 The idea of `beneficence in trust': Pellegrino, E. D. Thomasma, D. C. The l irtues in Medical 
Practice (1993) New York: Oxford University Press, 53. 
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override his duty of ordinary humanity and part of this duty is to respect the other as an 
equal moral person. 202 As Kant wrote: `I cannot do good to anyone according to my 
conception of happiness (except to young children and the insane), but only according to 
that of the one I intend to benefit'. 203 Thus, the duty of beneficence is one that should take 
account of and perhaps be defined by the patient's autonomy. 204 
Paternalism 
Brock argued that: `The physician's ultimate responsibility is to use his or her medical 
skills to serve patients' overall well-being in this broad sense, to facilitate patients' 
pursuit of their plans of life'. 205 If this is the case, it raises the question of whether the 
HCP is justified in overriding a competent patient's decision when that decision appears 
to conflict with the patient's long term goals or life plan. This is where the distinction 
between an autonomous decision and a self-determining decision of an autonomous 
person becomes particularly important. If a decision is autonomous, it will, by definition, 
accord with the patient's life plan. If it is merely self-determining then it may not. 
Although Rothman suggested that beneficence was redefined as paternalism during the 
rise of rights-based movements in the 1960s and 1970s, this is to misrepresent the 
relationship between the two concepts. 206 Beneficence and paternalism overlap, in that 
both involve acting for another's benefit, but beneficence is constrained by the 
beneficiary's will, while paternalism is not. An act of morally problematic paternalism 
may be defined as one that incorporates the following two elements: 207 
202 This of course assumes the capacity for autonomy. 
203 Kant, I. The Doctrine of Virtue. - Part Two of the Metaphysics of Morals vi 453 (1964) New 
York: Harper & Row, 122. 
204 1 am saying nothing here about the duty of beneficence to those who lack sufficient capacity, 
which is important but not relevant to the present thesis. 
205 Op cit n. 200,27. 
206 Rothman, D. J. `The Origins and Consequences of Patient Autonomy: A 25-Year Retrospective' 
(2001) 9 Health Care Analysis 255,257. 
207 These elements are gleaned or adapted from: Arneson, R. J. `Mill versus Paternalism' (1980) 
90(4) Ethics 470; Dworkin, G. Op cit n. 35,121-129; Levi, B. H. Op cit n. 82,16; Feinberg, J. Op 
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it is for the benefit of the another person; and 
2. it is done contrary to the other's will in such a way as to undermine that other 
person's self-determination either by: 
a. overriding; or 
b. circumventing that person's self-determination by withholding 
information or deliberately providing misinformation. 
The act may - but does not have to - interfere with the other person's liberty and it does 
not necessarily have to involve an infringement of a right, as shown by Dworkin's 
example of the husband who hides his sleeping pills from his suicidal wife. 208 In this 
context, however, I am concerned with those acts that do infringe the other person's right 
to self-determination. I am not here concerned with those acts of `soft' paternalism, which 
do not violate autonomy because the other person lacks capacity and is therefore not 
competent to make the decision. 209 Nor am I concerned with the type of paternalism that 
Hayry terms strong, hard paternalism due to `moral prudentialism' rather than a concern 
for the best interests of the person per se. 210 1 believe that the arguments presented in the 
previous chapter about the value of autonomy are sufficient to show that such extreme 
paternalism is unjustified. The question I seek to answer here is whether professional 
paternalism (using Hayry's nomenclature; weak, hard paternalism) can be justified when 
the competent patient makes a harmful and irrational decision. 211 
One objection to paternalism is that professionals are not infallible and may be mistaken 
in their judgment that a patient's decision is irrational. In this respect it is important to 
emphasise the distinction between a decision that is difficult to comprehend and one that 
is truly irrational. Procedures may be established to reduce the risk but even the use of 
ethical committee oversight, for example, will be unlikely to eliminate this problem. One 
208 Op cit n. 35,122. 
209 Op cit n. 51,181; Op cit n. 124,64. 
210 Ibid., 76. 
211 Culver, C. M. and Gert, B. argue that a decision is only irrational if it causes self-harm: 
Philosophj' in Medicine (1982) New York: Oxford University Press, 20-41. 
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of the dangers that such an approach has is that it risks subjugating minority beliefs and 
values to the dominant majority. As Hayry argued, judgments about other person's best 
interests often collapse into moralism. 212 Apart from raising questions of moral equality, 
this creates problems because: `there are an infinite variety of interpretations of what is 
moral, and to a person defending any one of them, its opponents will always appear more 
or less irrational'. 213 Regarding others as irrational because they do not share the same 
view of the morally good life may predispose to paternalism. 214 
The second problem arising from the professional's fallibility is that it will be the patient 
who is left to live with the consequences of a bad decision. Although compensation can 
alleviate some of the consequences, in most cases it is a poor substitute for a good 
outcome. Where a paternalistic decision goes wrong this may be more likely to lead to 
disappointment, disillusionment and resentment. 215 If there is a risk of a decision being 
harmfully wrong then it should be the person who has to live with the consequences who 
makes the decision. Again, the risk of mistake can be reduced through procedural 
requirements but it is unlikely to be completely eliminated and thus, the HCP should 
avoid paternalistically interfering with the patient's self-determination. Even if patients' 
irrational decisions are correctly identified their impulsiveness may be a central part of 
their characters and, if patients are to be held responsible then they should be allowed to 
make their own decisions. 216 As Arneson suggested, patients can always choose to place 
the decision in someone else's hands if they are worried that his impulsiveness or 
irrationality will be harmful . 
21 Even if someone regrets their impulsiveness it remains 
rational to prefer to live with the consequences of one's irrational choices rather than 
212Opcitn. 124,13-15. 
213 Ibid., 126. 
214 Op cit n. 77,285. 
215 Coulter, A. The Autonomous Patient: Ending paternalism in medical care (2002) London: The 
Stationery Office, 107. 
216 Lavin, D. `Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error' (2004) 114 Ethics 424,425. 
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have other people impose their opinion of what might be good for them. 218 For the sake of 
further argument, however, assume that the HCP is correct, both in his or her judgment 
that the patient's decision is irrational and in his or her clinical decision regarding the best 
treatment choice. 219 
Hayry suggested that, under the liberal position, paternalistic intervention is potentially 
justifiable: `1ff an apparently autonomous decision does not really match the person's true 
wishes'. 220 She went on to argue that, only soft paternalism - which does not infringe 
autonomy - and `weak hard paternalism', which involves `persons whose decisions are 
seriously vitiated', are justifiable. However, the danger is that the decision to override the 
individual's will falls under the category of strong hard paternalism that, as Haryry 
argued, is never justified. 221 As she insightfully noted, in these cases concern for the other 
person's best interests tends to collapse into moralism (see above). Offence, hurt or 
irritation is never enough, unless indicative of underlying harm, to justify infringing 
another's autonomy. Her persuasive approach was based on the intrinsic value of 
autonomy to human happiness, which allowed her to argue that `the best interests of the 
recipients cannot in the long run be served by `strong' paternalistic measures'. '"' 
It might be argued that Hayry's view is fine as far as defining the general position but that 
hard paternalism may still be justifiable in the short term to prevent irrational harm if 
such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis. The problem with this argument is that 
it is impossible to isolate cases in this way. As soon as such cases occur they begin to 
create a more general position and it becomes natural to use each case as a precedent for a 
new situation with slightly different circumstances so that such a casuistic approach soon 
218 Scoccia, D. `Paternalism and Autonomy' (1990) 100 Ethics 318,323. 
219 It may be argued, alternatively, that the probability of patient mistake and the likelihood of 
physician correctness are such that we may behave as if the physician is correct and the patient is 
wrong. 
220 Op cit n. 124,68. 
221 Ibid., 71 
222 Ibid., 77. 
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starts to resemble a general principle. This may not completely defeat the casuistic, 
consequentialist approach if sufficient safeguards can be established to prevent the 
slippery slide into a general principle. However, overriding a person's decision may 
undermine their confidence in the security of their autonomy. Once one's decision- 
making has been overridden it implies that the same could happen again, which is 
problematic - especially when it is a decision that actually matters and the stakes are high 
- since it threatens to undermine the whole value of autonomy. As Arneson noted, in 
interpreting Mill's arguments, `[t]he consequences of coming to rely on the dispensation 
of paternalistic aid are mischievous, as are the consequences of dispensing paternalistic 
aid and the consequences of observing paternalistic aid dispensed to others'. 223 
A further point supporting a non-paternalist position arises from the risk of bad luck. 
With the best will in the world things sometimes go badly. Most, if not all, medical 
interventions carry some risk, often of quite serious consequences. Since the patient will 
have to live with those consequences it should be the patient who controls whether or not 
the treatment is undergone. Requiring that control of the decision rests with the patient 
does not affect the position that it is possible, and perfectly reasonable, for the patient to 
abdicate from making the decision and leave it almost entirely up to the physician. 
" ' 
It may be argued, by a non-paternalist, that overriding a competent person's decision 
shows a lack of respect for that person because personhood is grounded in the capacity to 
be autonomous. However, it is equally possible to argue that caring about the other 
person's welfare demonstrates a respect for that person and, since welfare includes both 
autonomy and health balancing one value against the other does show respect for that 
person. If one value is balanced against the other then both are given respect. This 
is 
perhaps especially the case where the preservation of health protects the individual's 
22 Op cit n. 217,481. 
224 Such abdication, if voluntary, has no effect on responsibility, which remains with the patient. 
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capacity for autonomy. 225 It is only if one believes that it is moral personhood - rather 
than the individual as a whole - that deserves respect that the health of the individual 
becomes a matter for that person alone to control. In other words, whether paternalism is 
justified when a person makes an irrational choice depends on the value one places on 
autonomy. As Husak noted: `It seems beyond doubt that many paternalistic interferences 
promote the good or welfare of the agent who is coerced'. 226 Thus, if weak hard 
paternalism is to be condemned it ultimately must be on deontological rather than 
teleological grounds: `the essence of the best general objection to paternalism is that such 
interferences treat persons as less than fully autonomous agents'. 227 
The higher the value given to autonomy the less the individual's health can be taken into 
account and the less justifiable paternalism becomes. Since autonomy has intrinsic value 
and is of fundamental importance for ascribing moral personhood and responsibility it is 
certainly a defensible position that it should take precedence when in conflict with 
welfare. At this point, the paternalist may argue that an irrational decision is not 
autonomous and therefore does not need to be respected. However, as l have already 
noted, since it is the patient who must live with the physical consequences of the choice 
he or she ought to be allowed control over the decision. Furthermore, if one is to respect 
the autonomous individual, rather than autonomy as an abstract concept, then it is 
arguable that even the non-autonomous decisions of an autonomous person should be 
respected. 228 If this last point is accepted, then the same arguments apply regardless of 
whether autonomy is seen as rational self-determination or moral rational self- 
determination. It is only where the question of respect is focused on the decision itself 
rather than on the person making the decision that the distinction is relevant. Thus, contra 
225 Husak, D. N. `Paternalism and Autonomy' (1981) 10(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 27.29. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid., 28. 
228 Op cit n. 217,488-489. 
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Husak, it is unnecessary to `inquire into the content of morality', 229 since it is enough that 
the person is capable of engaging with the moral issues. 
Although one should respect the choices of an autonomous person this does not mean that 
the precedence for autonomy requires others to abandon the individual to their 
decision. 230 Rather, they should seek to foster and support the other's autonomy, 
especially where there is a special obligation to the other party. Ulrich even suggested 
that this `may be one of the most important roles of the healthcare professional'. 231 1 will 
discuss this in more detail in chapter three. However, for now it is sufficient to suggest 
that a respect for autonomy, far from preventing value judgments - even if it is possible 
to do so - arguably requires the HCP to attempt to persuade the patient that their choice is 
mistaken. Provided that professionals treat their patients as moral equals, stick to using 
rational argument and avoid autonomy undermining techniques such as withholding 
information then they will be respecting their patients' autonomy far more than if they 
simply accept the patient's initial decision regardless of how good or bad it is. If the 
patient's decision is truly autonomous then he or she will resist the professional's 
reasonable efforts to persuade him. HCPs must obviously be sympathetic to the condition 
of their patients as their ability to resist persuasion may be undermined by illness. But, if 
HCPs are sensitive to this, they can, by what Savulescu referred to as `non-interventional 
paternalism', improve their patient's exercise of autonomy and do all that is justified 
towards protecting their patient's health. As Savulescu concluded: 
We ought not to compel competent people to do what is best even if 
what they desire is substantially less than the best. However, allowing 
competent people to act on their judgment of what is best for their 
own lives does not imply that doctors should not form for themselves 
229 Op cit n. 225,38-39. 
230 Hayry, M. `Prescribing cannabis: freedom autonomy and values' (2004) 30 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 333,335. 
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judgments about what is best. Nor does it imply that doctors should 
not try to convince their patients by rational argument that what they 
are advocating is the best course. Indeed a doctor ought to form such 
judgments for his own sake as a moral agent and for his patient's sake 
as an autonomous agent. 232 
Beauchamp and Childress suggested that controlling the timing of disclosure of 
information is a further situation in which paternalism may be justified. It might be 
argued that autonomy requires the HCP to disclose personal information, such as test 
results, at the earliest practical opportunity. However, where such disclosure may 
overburden or unduly distress a patient, it is arguable that professionals should use their 
discretion to decide on the best time and kindest way to inform their patients. This limited 
form of paternalism is arguably justified233 provided the professional intends to and does 
disclose the information before it becomes relevant to any decision the patient might need 
to make. However, there is an obvious danger here, which is exemplified by Beauchamp 
and Childress' discussion. They suggested that the paternalism is justified if the 
information is disclosed prior to surgery, 234 but medical decisions are not the only ones 
that the information may be relevant to. For this reason, if this type of paternalism is to be 
justified, it needs to be tightly constrained so that the professional discloses the 
information at the earliest practical opportunity when any distress may be minimised. 
Beauchamp and Childress' actual example involved inconclusive test results that hint at a 
dangerous pathology. 235 It is, however, arguable that this is not a case of paternalism at 
all. In the situation they describe the professional should honestly disclose his 
uncertainty, which is arguably necessary as part of seeking the patient's consent for the 
232 Savulescu, J. `Rational non-interventional paternalism: why doctors ought to make judgments 
of what is best for their patients' (1995) 21 Journal of Medical Ethics 327,330-331. 
233 Op cit n. 5 1,186. 
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necessary repeat test. Since the first test has not provided sufficient certainty regarding 
the possible pathology it would be perfectly truthful, and respecting of the patient's 
autonomy, to simply inform the patient that the results were inconclusive and another test 
needs to be performed. There is no need to disclose the possible pathology unless it is 
sufficiently likely that a repeat test is unnecessary. If there is still sufficient doubt in the 
professional's mind that the pathology exists then it is both unkind and unnecessary to 
mention the possibility. It may, of course, become necessary if the patient refuses consent 
to the second test, but if the patient is willing to undergo the second test on the basis of an 
inconclusive first test then the failure to disclose the suspicion has not infringed the 
patient's autonomy since it was unnecessary for the decision. Such an approach would 
not be paternalistic. 
The Role of Justice 
Justice is relevant in any situation where conflict may not be resolved through the 
cooperative relationship of care or love. In something as impersonal as the state, Justice is 
essential. As Ryan argued, `The legitimacy of a state rests upon its claim to do justice . -236 
Although justice may be said to be concerned with fairness there are both different senses 
of justice and different conceptions of what it means to be fair. 237 Ulrich, for example, 
defined the principle of justice as requiring that: 
One should give to persons what they are owed, what they deserve, or 
what they can legitimately claim, treating equals equally unless there 
is a morally relevant difference requiring persons to be treated 
unequally; consideration must often be given to a proper allocation of 
benefits and burdens within the social context. 238 
236 Ryan, A. `Introduction', in: Ryan, A. (ed. ) Justice (1993) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1. 
237 Nathan suggests that, The range of conceivable principles of justice is terrifyingly vast': The 
Concept of Justice (1971) London: McMillan Press, 29. 
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This basic approach derives from Aristotle who noted that: `Justice is considered to mean 
equality. It does mean equality - but equality for those who are equals, and not for all. 
Again, inequality is considered to be just; and indeed it is - but only for those who are 
unequal, and not for all'. 239 Similarly, Beauchamp and Childress suggested that the 
Formal Principle of Justice is that `Equals must be treated equally, and unequals must be 
treated unequally'. 240 
One of the assumptions that grounds this thesis is that all members of the relevant 
community should be treated as prima facie equals, which means that any different 
treatment of individuals must be justifiable on the basis of a morally relevant difference 
between those individuals. 24' This also means that individuals should not be treated 
differently on the basis of morally irrelevant factors. This view of justice still leaves the 
work of determining what counts as morally relevant. As Stone noted, `Recognition of ... 
human equality ... 
is 
... a necessary step toward raising the questions of 
justice, towards 
asking when persons shall be treated unequally or equally according to their badges of 
entitlement'. 242 This is what Beauchamp and Childress referred to as the `Material 
Principles of Justice', which include many different outcome measures that might justify 
different treatment: e. g. need; effort; merit; contribution and free market 
competitiveness. 243 Furthermore, since treatment may be different in kind or in degree, it 
is not enough to simply point to a morally relevant difference. There also needs to be 
some way of evaluating the value of the difference between individuals so that the effect 
of treating that person differently is proportionate to that value. 244 1 am not, however, 
concerned with constructing a particular theory of justice, which would constitute a thesis 
in itself. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have at least a working definition of justice in 
239 Aristotle, Politics III (1998) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 103 (1280a7). 
240 Op cit n. 51,227. 
241 Op cit n. 231,156. 
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order to determine how the principle of justice interacts with autonomy and consent. The 
approach briefly outlined above forms the starting point for my discussion of how justice 
is relevant to consent to medical treatment. 
`Justice 
... presupposes conflict''24' and it is most pressing when the conflict is between 
claims of comparable value. There are three points at which justice must interact with 
autonomy and consent to resolve any discord. First, justice is relevant to the question of 
whose autonomy should be respected as well as the degree and limits of that respect. 
Second, justice is relevant to the availability of resources that might be necessary to 
support the individual's autonomy. Third, justice is important when considering the 
question of responsibility for outcome. Before I can outline these three interactions it is 
necessary to determine to whom this duty of justice applies. As I noted above, it certainly 
applies to the state and to the institutions and agents that comprise the state and allow it to 
function as a machine to support and promote social co-operation. However, it is arguable 
that it also applies to individuals as much as it does to the state, 246 which is reflected in 
the idea of justice as a virtue (see below). Although one of the functions of the state is to 
achieve the collective justice that would otherwise be impracticable, this does not reduce 
the duty of individuals simply to pay their taxes and abide by the state's laws. If it is the 
individual's obligation to act justly that justifies at least some state intervention then why 
should the state intervention wholly relieve them of any further duty of justice? As 
Murphy suggested: `once we accept that the principles that govern the ideal design of 
ideal institutions essentially describes a means to an end, the oddness of thinking that 
justice is concerned with some means to that end but not others becomes rather 
evident'. 
247 
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The demands that the principle of justice makes of particular individuals or institutions 
depend on the context in which those individuals and institutions are interacting. This is 
not to suggest that context necessarily alters what counts as just, merely that in order to 
determine whether two cases are, in a morally relevant way, the same or different, the 
cases must be seen in context. As Kamenka argued, `Justice requires the ability to 
generalize though not without the complexity of the concrete'. 248 In the discussion that 
follows I will set out what justice might require in regulating autonomy and consent. I 
will then consider the more particular demands of justice and autonomy in the context of 
the HCP-patient relationship in chapter three. 
Justice and Respect for Autonomy 
Since autonomy, as I argued earlier, is essential for moral responsibility and, through this 
and its association with moral personhood, is intrinsically valuable, then it would be 
unjust to deny any autonomous individual the same respect for his or her decisions as we 
allow other autonomous persons. As Tsanoff suggested, `A just social order ... 
is one 
which safeguards duly the individual in the possession of what is his own, his property 
and other rights'. 249 If autonomy is judged worthy of legal protection, which it currently 
is, 250 then the principle that the different treatment of certain individuals or groups must 
be justifiable means that, prima facie, each person deserves an equal respect for their 
autonomy. This raises the question of what counts as a sufficient reason to respect a 
person's autonomy less. Since the right to (respect for) autonomy is predicated on the 
ability of the individual to be at least rationally self-determining, it is arguable that where 
that ability is impaired then it is just to treat the individual differently. In fact, it may be 
unjust not to treat them differently because it would require them to be responsible when 
they lack the necessary capacity. However, where individuals have the necessary ability 
248 Op cit n. 245,13. 
249 Tsanoff, R. A. `Social Morality and the Principle of Justice' (1956) 67(1) Ethics 12. 
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to be rational and are capable of making autonomous choices then it would be unjust not 
to allow them to do so. It is, of course, for society to determine the level of capacity 
required and how that capacity should be tested, but those important concerns are beyond 
the scope of this thesis, which is limited to an examination of the rules that apply to those 
persons deemed legally competent. 
One of the arguments sometimes raised against the current emphasis on patient autonomy 
is that, because of their illness, patients are incapable of exercising their autonomy. 251 If 
the patient's ability to be autonomous has genuinely been diminished to the point at 
which they lack the capacity to make a rational decision then it is just to treat them 
differently from the patient who has retained sufficient capacity. 252 However, not all 
patients will suffer from such a reduction in autonomy that they cannot be supported and 
empowered to make a reasoned decision. Where patients still retain sufficient capacity to 
make rational decisions then it would be unjust to treat them differently, unless there is 
some other reason that would justify different treatment. This brings the argument back to 
the question of whether paternalism is ever just. 
As I have already argued, it may be just to act paternalistically where the individual's 
capacity for autonomy is sufficiently diminished to make it reasonable to protect them 
against their own inability to make rational decisions. However, where the person has 
sufficient capacity - even where it may be diminished by illness - it would be to treat 
them as an inferior, and hence to act unjustly towards them, to override a decision except 
where it falls within the penumbra of the harm principle. Husak suggested that not all 
paternalistic acts imply inferiority. However, he was only able to do this by arguing that 
one can be paternalistic towards oneself. 
253 Unless one accepts Parfit's argument 
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regarding the present and future selves, this is an idiosyncratic approach to paternalism, 
which is concerned with how one may treat, or be treated, by others. As I noted earlier, 
paternalism requires the act to be against another person's will and thus, by definition, 
one cannot act paternalistically towards oneself: Odysseus was acting prudently and 
autonomously, not paternalistically, when he instructed his sailors to bind him to his 
ship's mast so that he could listen to the sirens' song. 254 
I suggested earlier that, where the individual is capable of achieving the degree of 
autonomy necessary for moral responsibility, the ordinary duty of beneficence is 
generally constrained by the individual's autonomy. I further argued that, while it may be 
just to (temporarily) infringe a person's liberty, it is not justifiable to infringe autonomy 
in order to protect the individual from a potentially catastrophic choice. These arguments 
support the fact that in ordinary life we are largely allowed the freedom to take risks that 
could lead to permanent harm or death. This holds even where that choice will impact on 
others and defeat our obligations to them. Thus, the mother or father of a young family 
remains free to climb dangerous mountains, parachute out of planes or join the army. The 
question that remains is whether the context of healthcare provision provides a good 
reason to make an exception to this freedom to make self-determining decisions. I will 
return to this question in chapter three. 
There is one final point to make here, which is that it is also a matter of justice what 
sanctions the law provides when an individual has been treated unjustly whether by 
another individual or by an institution. 255 There are two issues that fall to be justly 
determined: the reparation that should be made to the victim; and the penalty that should 
be imposed on the individual or institution that has transgressed the victim's rights. Both 
of these are highly context dependent since: `justice is disclosed as the principle of 
254 Op cit n. 35,14-15 
255 Op cit n. 249. 
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thorough and balanced recognition of all the factors and values involved in a complex 
personal situation, as opposed to any abstractly rigid or one sided adjudication'. 256 This 
explains why it is necessary to situate consent within the context of the HCP-patient 
relationship rather than simply importing the rules that govern consent in other areas of 
social life. 
Justice, Resources and Support for Autonomy 
The capacity for autonomy depends both on the liberty to make decisions and on the 
resources and support necessary to enable decisions. This reflects the negative and 
positive aspects of the right to autonomy. 257 The positive right to autonomy may be 
further split into two aspects: the support necessary to enable a decision and the resources 
required to make a decision meaningful. Because a rational decision is based on reason it 
requires access to understandable information. This creates an onus to provide the 
information and the support to enable people to understand it and so make possible a 
rational decision. Given that different people have different abilities it is arguable that 
justice requires those that are less able are given more support. This is so whether the 
lesser ability is innate or due to other influences, such as illness, stress, disempowerment, 
a lack of confidence or a lack of education. Since justice requires us to act so as to benefit 
the disadvantaged then it arguably requires the provision of necessary support to foster 
and improve the ability of the less able to be autonomous. If autonomy is necessary for 
moral community and responsibility then autonomy is the trigger for prima facie equality. 
If equality is to mean anything then it must at least require that the community supports 
and fosters each individual's ability to be autonomous - to enable them to exercise their 
innate capacity - and hence to be an equal member of the moral community. 
256 Ibid., 16. 
257 Berlin, I. Four Essays on Liberty (1969) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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This need to support at least reasonable autonomy is further supported by the arguments 
for behaviour-based systems of distributive justice. If resources are to be distributed on 
the basis of desert, 258 merit, or the competitive free market then it would be unjust to 
significantly disadvantage a section of the community in order to further disadvantage 
them by rewarding those who were better placed to succeed because they started with a 
greater ability to be autonomous. 259 Since we cannot return to a starting point for 
distribution, the best we can do is to respond to the needs of those whose autonomy is 
constrained by factors that may be relieved by additional Support. 2'0 This obviously has 
implications for the ability of patients to be autonomous and for the duty of healthcare 
professionals to further that end (see chapter three). 
Apart from the requirement to support the ability to make decisions, justice is also 
relevant to the issue of resource allocation. Without the choices available to the individual 
the right and the capacity to make decisions are empty. The relevance of this is that there 
is a clear distinction between the obligations to protect the freedom to be autonomous and 
the obligation to provide the individual with meaningful choices. The freedom to be 
autonomous is instantiated through the protective rights, such as the right to bodily 
integrity, and the derivative right to control those protections through the device of 
consent. As I will discuss in chapter four, consent is primarily a device of negative not 
positive autonomy. As I argued above, there is a positive obligation on the community to 
empower individuals to exercise that consent, and the driving force for this positive 
obligation is formal justice combined with the right to negative autonomy, which is the 
minimum liberty necessary for moral responsibility. However, justice and positive 
autonomy rather than negative autonomy drives the right to choice through the 
availability of scarce resources. The relevance of this will become apparent in chapter 
258 Which some writers insist is the purest notion of justice: see e. g. Slote, M. A. `Desert. Consent, 
and Justice' (1973) 4(2) Philosophy and Public Affairs 323,327; Campbell, T. D. `Humanity 
before Justice' (1974) 4 (1) British Journal of Political Science 1. 
259 Op cit n. 237,32-36. 
260 Campbell, T. D. Op cit n. 258,12-13. 
70 
four when I discuss the concept of consent in detail. For now it is sufficient to note that 
there are many different outcomes that may be used to determine a just distribution of 
these resources. These include welfare need and the capacity to benefit, both of which 
engage the healthcare professional's duty of beneficence. 
Justice and Responsibility for Outcome 
This final interaction between justice, autonomy and consent is perhaps the most 
complex: it engages issues of agency, luck, responsibility, corrective and distributive 
justice. Whenever an agent acts to cause a change in the world that change may be for the 
better or worse and may affect only the agent or it may also impact on others. Sometimes 
the change will be exactly as the agent intended, sometimes things will end badly because 
the agent has been careless, and sometimes the outcome will depend on good or bad luck. 
The question is who should carry the responsibility for the outcome and, particularly for 
the purposes of this thesis, what effect does consent have on that responsibility? 
As I noted earlier, autonomy is a prerequisite for moral responsibility and if that 
responsibility is to mean anything then it means that autonomous agents should accept 
responsibility for the consequences of their actions. This is a reasonable starting point: if 
we want to be treated as responsible then we should accept responsibility. However, as I 
suggested above, sometimes things happen that are outside the control of an autonomous 
agent and these accidents of good or bad luck may alter the outcome. Since the agent is 
not responsible for the luck should they be held responsible for the outcome? 
The situation is further complicated when a second agent acts by giving consent to the 
first agent. Who should be responsible for the outcome of the act when both agents have 
exercised their autonomy? I have indicated that the two relevant forms of justice are 
distributive and corrective. Distributive justice is concerned with the proportionate 
distribution of benefits and burdens, and freedoms and responsibilities. Corrective 
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(rectificatory, commutative) justice is concerned with 'equalising' losses and gains 
caused by an unfair or wrongful transaction. 261 Although these two forms of justice are 
traditionally seen as distinct types, as Komenka commented, `in ... 
[the law's] operations 
262 commutative and distributive justice cannot be sharply distinguished'. This connection 
was also recently noted by Lord Steyn who claimed, in McFarlane v Tayside HB, that tort 
law was `a mosaic in which the principles of corrective justice and distributive justice are 
interwoven'. 263 
I have argued elsewhere that distributive justice and corrective justice are more closely 
linked than other commentators have previously acknowledged. 264 My argument follows 
Honore who argued that distributive justice is as concerned with the fair distribution of 
responsibility for outcome as it is with a fair distribution of resources, rights or 
freedoms. 265 If society is seen as an animated structure, which acknowledges the 
possibility of future interactions between members of the society then the losses and gains 
that result from those interactions may be allocated on the basis of distributive justice 
principles. When regarded in this way, it is arguable that corrective justice is simply one 
way of sharing responsibility for outcome. It does this by associating responsibility for 
outcome with agency and moral accountability. Under a system of corrective justice the 
agent is allowed to keep the benefits of any action but the loss lies where it falls unless 
the agent is morally blameworthy. 266 This is a type of distributive justice based on desert, 
but it is a particular approach to desert to that favours the actor over any other person that 
may be affected by the act. There are other, less one-sided, approaches to desert and other 
261 Aristotle. Ethics, V. ii-iii 1130b-1132a (Thomson, J. A. K. transi. ), (London 1976), 176-180. 
262 Op cit n. 245,4. 
263 McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59,83. 
264 Maclean, A. R. `Distributing the Burden of A Blessing' I (2004) Journal of Obligation and 
Remedies 23. 
265 T. Honore, `The Morality of Tort Law - Questions and Answers', in: Responsibility and Fault 
(2002) Oxford: Hart Publishing 67,79. 
266 It may be noted that tort/delict are imperfect systems of corrective justice because the element 
of fault inherent in those branches of law is based on objective rather than subjective criteria. 
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material principles of justice, such as need, that might be relevant to determining a fair 
allocation of responsibility for outcome. 
The relevance for this thesis of concluding that corrective justice is simply a species of 
distributive justice is that it questions the current association of consent to medical 
treatment and responsibility for outcome. However, consent and responsibility for 
outcome are not inherently linked. The association is one of convention dependent on 
assumptions about agency and responsibility that rely on the more atomistic Liberal 
conception of autonomy. Once the relevance of luck267 (both to moral and non-moral 
issues)268 and the interdependent nature of socially situated individuals are acknowledged 
the issue of outcome responsibility is more complex than a simple direct causal 
association with agency. This is not to deny the importance of agency and autonomy but 
merely to suggest that, when luck269 and the relational nature of autonomy are 
acknowledged, autonomy is insufficient justification to necessarily transfer all 
responsibility with consent. 
Dickenson suggested that the problem of `moral luck 270 may be overcome by transferring 
responsibility for outcome with consent. It is necessary to restrict the health care 
professional's responsibility in this way because, where the procedure has been 
competently performed, a bad outcome is simply bad luck. `Thus', she concluded, an 
absolutist interpretation of consent protects both doctor and patient: the doctor from 
moral luck, and the patient from invasion of autonomy'. 271 But why is it, simply because 
the health care professional has not acted in a way that is morally blameworthy, that they 
267 Op cit n. 183,1. 
268 Dickenson, D. Risk and Luck in Medical Ethics (2003) Cambridge: Polity Press, 1-23. 
269 1 refer here to a `thick' conception of luck. Hurley argues that `thin' luck is simply that for 
which we are not responsible. She also suggests that luck is simply confusing and it is better to 
talk in terms of `choice', `control', `alternate sequences' and `regression': Op cit n. 183,106-117. 
270 A term coined by Bernard Williams to reflect the paradox that morality requires us to be 
responsible for our actions but luck is a pervasive causal influence on all outcomes, which appears 
to undermine the possibility of moral responsibility: Williams. B. `Moral Luck', in: Moral Luck 
(1981) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 20. 
271 Op cit n. 268,85. 
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should be shielded from all responsibility for outcome? The patient has also acted in a 
way that is morally blameless, but we are expected to accept that not only should they 
suffer the physical consequences of the harm, they should also bear the financial 
responsibility. There is a distinction here between responsibility for outcome and moral 
responsibility and consent cannot be made to bear the full weight of determining both 
issues. Rather, it is a determination that should engage not just consent, but also agency 
and justice. 
Consider the situation if you were to ask to borrow my brand new bicycle and I consent to 
you using it. While you are riding the bicycle one of the tyres is punctured. This may be 
seen as largely a matter of bad luck because, while you had control over the bicycle and 
choice as to when and were to ride it, you lacked the knowledge to enable you to predict 
where the nail was that would cause the puncture. 272 However, I also had some control 
over the situation because it was my bicycle and I could have refused you permission to 
use it. Who then should bear the expense and inconvenience of mending the puncture? 
Certainly, if you had taken my bicycle without asking then, barring some humanitarian 
emergency that might excuse your conduct, many people would, I suspect, agree that you 
should make right any damage. This is because only your agency is engaged and you 
have wrongfully caused a loss. You alone are morally responsible for the fact that the 
bicycle was in a position to get the puncture, and under the principle of corrective justice 
you deserve to bear the cost of that loss. But, where you have my consent you have not 
acted wrongly and so the principle of corrective justice is no help. If responsibility for 
outcome automatically transfers with consent then no other facts will be relevant and it 
should be left for me to deal with the puncture. However, just because no one has acted 
wrongly does not necessarily mean that there are no factors that might influence the 
answer to the question and I suspect that people's responses to the question of 
272 This is not to suggest that the possibility of a puncture was unforeseeable. 
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responsibility for outcome would be more mixed than for the example where you took the 
bicycle without consent. 
Perhaps the most relevant factor would be your purpose in borrowing the bicycle. 
Consider the following possibilities. In the first variation you are a courier and you 
borrowed my bicycle so that you could make a delivery and carry on earning while your 
own bicycle was being repaired. In the second case I have asked you to deliver some food 
to my elderly mother. In the third case you have borrowed the bicycle to help you in your 
work as a volunteer at the local children's home where you were supposed to be taking 
the children out for the day for a bicycle ride into the country. In the final variation, I am 
a sixteen-year-old schoolboy with a Saturday job while you are earning £50,000 a year 
and, instead of a puncture, the wheel was buckled. 
In the first case it seems reasonable to suggest that since you stood to benefit then you 
should be responsible for the puncture. In the second situation, since you are benefiting 
me by fulfilling one of my obligations to my mother, it likewise seems fair that I should 
deal with the puncture. The third case is more difficult since you are acting to benefit a 
third party. In this case, one might argue that because your act is charitable then you 
should not suffer the added burden of dealing with the puncture. However, because 
charity is supererogatory it does not seem fair that I should necessarily be left with the 
cost of the puncture. Since the children's home is gaining considerably from your help 
and my loan of the bicycle, perhaps the home should take responsibility for the loss. 
Alternatively, the burden could be shared. 273 The final variation is of a different type. In 
this case there is a huge difference in the resources that the two parties have and it seems 
reasonable to suggest that since you have a greater capacity to bear the cost that it would 
be fair for you to pay to have the buckled wheel replaced. It may still be relevant to ask 
273 The idea of sharing the cost of a bicycle puncture may strike one as faintly ridiculous but it is 
really the principle that I am arguing here. We could equally well be talking about a more 
expensive loss. 
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who stood to benefit from the bicycle loan, but the important point is that the fact I gave 
consent does not appear to be determinative in all of these situations. This is not to 
suggest that autonomy and consent are irrelevant: merely that consent simply determines 
whether the act was wrong and it is really principles of justice that do the work. I will 
consider the particular relevance of this for consent to medical treatment in chapter four. 
The Relevance of Virtue 
In contrast to deontology and teleology, which are concerned with the right kind of 
action, virtue ethics are concerned with character: with `determining what sort of person 
one should strive to be', 274 and this is necessarily dependent on an account of the good 
life that provides a goal or telos for `any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity'. 275 While these different approaches are often 
presented as an either-or choice, there is a third option, which is to recognise the 
importance of both character traits and right action. 276 Since action is to at least some 
extent controlled by the actor's character and the way we judge character is by observing 
a person's behaviour, 277 the two seem mutually interdependent and it makes sense to be 
concerned with both. This thesis is primarily concerned with the regulation of consent, 
which is essentially a set of rules governing behaviour rather than character. This is 
because the law tends to operate through rules that create rights and obligations, the stock 
in trade of action rather than character. Because the law is concerned with adjudicating 
between individuals when one is affected by the other's behaviour it must be more 
concerned with action than with character. However, simply because behaviour is the 
primary focus of the law this does not mean that character should be ignored. In criminal 
law, for example, the convicted person's character may influence the punishment. Thus, 
274 Paul, E. F. Miller, F. D. Paul, J. `Introduction' in: Paul, E. F. Miller, F. D. Paul, J. (eds) Virtue and 
Vice (1998) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press vii. 
275 Maclntyre, A. After Virtue (2"d ed., 1985) London: Duckworth, 184-186. 
276 Sher, G. `Ethics, Character and Action', in: Paul, E. F. Miller, F. D. Paul, J. (eds) Virtue and 
Vice (1998) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1. 
277 Ibid., 4-7. 
76 
the focus in this brief discussion will be on how attention to the actor's character may be 
relevant to consent. 
A feature of principles and rules is that they underdetermine action and require that the 
actor interpret them appropriately. As Loughlin noted: `There is an inherent vagueness in 
the ordinary use of language and, because of this, rules - even if we accept that they have 
a core settled meaning - are often surrounded by a penumbra of uncertainty'. "' In one 
sense this may be an advantage since there is often more than one acceptable approach. 
However, the problem is that this indeterminacy, while it gives scope for individuality, 
also means that it is possible to wrongly interpret the rule. Rules of behaviour are rarely 
so precise that they avoid the need for judgment. 279 Judgment is not something that can be 
legislated for as it depends on the presence of virtues such as prudence, wisdom, 
temperance, justice, courage, 280 and - at least in healthcare - compassion, empathy and 
caring for - and about - others. 
281 Smith and Newton argued that: `Ethical behavior is not 
.. a 
function of a willingness to find and apply rules, but of mature judgment and a finely 
tuned moral character, which ultimately must be intuitively recognized rather than 
exhaustively defined'. 282 Even staunch defenders of the principles approach acknowledge 
that virtues `are needed ... 
for moral obligations to be instantiated and sustained in the 
moral life of real people'. 283 
Oakley suggested that `reference to character is essential in the justification of right 
action'. Thus, `An action is right if and only if it is what an agent with a virtuous 
278 Loughlin, M. Sword & Scales: An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and Politics 
(2000) Oxford: Hart Publishing, 84. 
279 Op cit n. 153,123-124; Op cit n. 201, xi. 
280 Foot, P. Virtues and Vices (2002) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1-18. 
281 Clement, G. Care, Autonomy, and Justice: Feminism and the Ethic of Care (1998) Boulder 
(Col. ): Westview Press. Clement argued for caring as a universal ethic, in combination with 
justice. Loewy argued for a less prominent role for caring, but still suggested that it is necessary to 
temper the harshness of pure reason: Loewy, E. H. Moral Strangers, Moral Acquaintance, and 
Moral Friends: Connectedness and its Conditions (1997) Albany (NY): State university of New 
York Press, 121-125. 
282 Smith, D. G. Newton, L. H. `Physician and Patient'(1984) 5 Theoretical Medicine 43,56. 
283 Op cit n. 192,309. 
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character would do in the circumstances', 284 In the approach adopted here, this would 
translate as "the interpretation of the rule is that which would be made in the 
circumstances by an agent with a virtuous character". Another feature of virtue ethics is 
that the good is prior to the right. Deontology, however, prioritises the right. In this 
combined approach, I submit that it is neither necessary nor possible (as is evidenced by 
the lack of consensus on the issue) to definitively prioritise either. Rather the good and 
the right might be seen as iteratively and symbiotically related to each other: the good 
informs the right which in turn informs the good. 
Oakley also suggested that `The virtues are objectively good'. 285 While this claim may be 
problematic in relation to persons in general, because it requires somebody with the 
authority to say that subjective opinion is irrelevant, it is less problematic when applied to 
someone in their professional role where the professional community is defined, at least 
in part, by its goal (or set of goals). 286 Where that professional community has been given 
a social mandate to operate then it is arguable that the society granting the mandate has 
the authority to determine the professional virtues. Where a person voluntarily enters such 
a profession then they take on the ethical obligations of that community. As Maclntyre 
contended: `To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards ... It 
is to 
subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently 
and partially define the practice'. 287 
The importance of the virtuous professional was recognised by the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary Inquiry, which emphasised: `the values of caring, of comforting, of supporting 
and of truthfulness and honesty'. 288 However, because people may not be, and cannot be 
284 Oakley, J. `A virtue ethics approach', in: Kuhse, H. Singer, P. (eds) A Companion to Bioethics 
(1998) Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 86,88. 
285 Ibid., 90. 
286 Op cit n. 201, xiii, 13,21; Op cit n. 268,25. 
287 Op cit n. 275,190. 
288 Op cit n. 2, Chapter 23 [36]. 
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relied on to be, perfectly virtuous, 289 rules of behaviour are needed. But the rules require 
interpretation and so exist symbiotically with the need for judgment and hence a virtuous 
disposition. In other words, while neither deontological rules nor virtuous dispositions are 
sufficient by themselves, iteratively combining the two approaches may resolve the 
weaknesses of both. As Pellegrino and Thomasma argued: `Virtue-based ethics link 
principles and obligations as abstract entities to the circumstances of our personal lives 
through the virtue of prudence'. 29° By highlighting the relevance and need for virtue, the 
law can at least add symbolic importance to the development of, and emphasis on, the 
dispositions as an aspect of the professionalism of medicine. 
As I will discuss in subsequent chapters, the essence of consent to medical treatment is 
that patients give their permission for HCPs to perform the relevant intervention. This 
function of consent naturally lends itself to regulation through a number of rules that 
require certain behaviour from the professional. However, as I have argued above, 
implementation of these rules requires interpretation, which is where the professional's 
character becomes relevant because character inclines or motivates an individual to act in 
a particular way. 291 HCPs could, for example, adopt a formalistic approach to the rules 
and do the minimum required in order to satisfy the obligation without any thought as to 
how well such an approach suits the individual patient. Alternatively, they might adopt a 
paternalist approach and use the indeterminacy of the rules to allow them to manipulate 
the patient's decision. For example, the obligation to inform patients would be met by 
disclosing the relevant risks, but the mode and order of presentation of those risks are 
likely to influence the patient's decision. Risks can be underplayed by using descriptors 
such as 'only' or `less than', while they might be overplayed by the use of terms such as 
289 For example, the use of "hello" nurses to satisfy the waiting time standard required by the 
Patient's Charter: Op cit n. 215,92. 
290 Op cit n. 201,23-24. 
"'' Slote, M. `The Justice of Caring', in: Paul, E. F. Miller, F. D. Paul, J. (eds) Virtue and rice 
(1998) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 171,173. 
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`more than' or `as many as'. However, if the patient's autonomy is to be truly respected 
then the HCP should adopt an ethically sensitive purposive approach to the rule. 
Getting the HCP to approach the rule in an ethically sensitive way cannot be achieved by 
refining the rules. Furthermore, a highly regulated approach may lead to an overly 
restricted relationship where the rules replace rather than support trust and encourage 
formalism rather than empathy. Allowing a reasonable amount of professional autonomy 
in applying the rules may be more conducive to a caring relationship than a more 
restrictive approach. However, if professionals are to be afforded that degree of latitude 
then it is important to encourage them to develop the relevant virtues that will incline 
them to interpret the rules appropriately so as to determine292 the HCP-patient relationship 
as one that fits both the caring practice of medicine and the respectful practice of the 
wider community. Engaging with the virtues will allow the law to support the 
professionalism of HCPs, which may avoid treating the patient as a consumer and may 
encourage a more nuanced interaction between two autonomous persons. 293 The 
interaction between autonomy and virtue may be more symbiotic than Engelhardt claimed 
when he suggested that, `Understandings of autonomy are integral to accounts of human 
flourishing or virtue ... 
Autonomy as determination by what is most truly oneself is 
integral to self-realization. Such self-realization allows one to act fully in accord with 
one's self and the good one affirms'. 294 I return to this in chapter three, where I discuss 
the professional-patient relationship. 
Virtues may also be relevant to the patient's role in the clinical encounter. Although 
patients are not required to interpret rules, it would be helpful if they had the inclination 
to act in certain ways. It is easy to imagine how the tendency to honesty, openness, 
empathy, courage and prudence may be valuable in the discursive process leading up to 
292 Op cit n. 275,192. 
293 Op cit n. 284,87. 
294 Op cit n. 77,290. 
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the consent decision. If patients have obligations arising out of the professional-patient 
relationship, as I will argue in chapter three, then there is no theoretical reason why the 
law should not also be concerned with encouraging them to be virtuous, or at least to act 
in a way that would be consistent with what might be expected of the virtuous patient. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored the ethical issues that interact with autonomy and consent 
to medical treatment. I have focused on beneficence, paternalism, justice and virtue and 
suggested that beneficence is best seen as a duty constrained by the patient's autonomy. 
In this way, paternalism towards the competent patient is unjustified except in the limited 
sense of intervening to ensure that the patient is acting as autonomously as possible. This 
would allow, and might perhaps require, the healthcare professional to challenge an 
apparently irrational decision and to try to persuade the patient to decide otherwise if the 
likely outcome will be significantly harmful. It may also justify the healthcare 
professional controlling the timing of any disclosure, provided that the delay does not 
undermine any significant decisions that the patient must make. 
I suggested that justice is relevant in three ways. First it is engaged when deciding whose 
autonomy should be respected. Second, it is relevant to the provision of resources to 
support autonomy, both in a negative and a positive sense. Third, it is germane to the 
question of responsibility for outcome. In this last regard, I suggested that responsibility 
for outcome, as distinct from moral accountability and responsibility, is determined by 
the principle of justice rather than by autonomy and consent, although consent is 
necessary as a qualifying requirement that enters the individual into the distributive 
equation. 
Finally, I also discussed the relevance of virtue. I argued that attention to individual virtue 
is necessary because of the indeterminacy of rules. I suggested that virtues and 
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deontological rules exist in an iterative and symbiotic relationship, where both are 
important to the morality of individual acts. The relevant virtues are determined by the 
telos or goal of the community, which is less problematic for a professional community 
that has been given a social mandate to exist and practice predicated on certain societally 
determined goals. 
In the next chapter I will situate these ethical issues within the context of the healthcare 
professional relationship. This will provide sufficient texture for a more sensitively 
nuanced approach to the concept of consent, which will be addressed in chapter four. 
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Chapter Three: The Healthcare Professional-Patient Relationship: Setting 
the Context for Consent 
A model must incorporate respect for the personhood and self- 
determination of the patient and should enhance dialogue between the 
two parties of the relationship. 295 
Consent is not unique to healthcare and, while it may serve parallel functions in different 
contexts, it is arguable that the regulation of consent should be sensitive to the setting. For 
example, the requirements for a valid consent in the context of sexual relationships are 
influenced by the necessary absence of formality, 296 which is not the case for consent to 
health care interventions. Furthermore, because consent must always involve at least two 
agents it is not a free-floating device that can exist in the absence of a relationship. The 
way HCPs approach consent indicates their attitude towards their patients, which should 
reflect a moral sensitivity to the issues discussed in the first two chapters, and is central to 
the relationship between them and their patients. 29' Thus, it is important to situate consent 
within the context of the relationship between the patient and the HCP. 298 
Positing consent as central to the professional-patient relationship emphasises its 
communal aspect. Micah Hester argued that community may be seen as a functional 
process of participation and interaction, 299 and it is notable that consent derives from the 
295 Op cit n. 282,55. 
296 Excluding commercial sex. 
2970p cit n. 128,32. See also: Messer, N. G. `Professional-patient relationships and informed 
consent' (2004) 80 Postgraduate Medical Journal 277,278; Montgomery, J. `Time for a Paradigm 
Shift? Medical Law in Transition' (2000) 53 Current Legal Problems 363,387; Kaufen, J. M. 
O'Neil, J. D. `Biomedical Rituals and Informed Consent: Native Canadians and the Negotiation of 
Clinical Trust' in: Weisz, G. (ed. ) Social Science Perspectives on Medical Ethics (1990) 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 41. 
'98 Op cit n. 201,54; Hermeren, G. `Informed Consent from an Ethical Point of View' in: 
Westerhall, L. Phillips, C. (eds. ) Patient's Rights - Informed Consent, Access and Equality (1994) 
Stockholm: Nerenius & Santerus Publishers, 39,46. 
299 Micah Hester, D. `What Must we Mean by "Community"? A Processive Account' (2004) 25 
Theoretical Medicine 423,433. 
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Latin con sentire (feel together), suggesting an element of communion between the 
parties. The idea of community is further emphasised if communication is seen as an 
important part of consent. Thus consent, or at least the process leading up to consent, may 
be seen as a community interaction. Although Micah Hester suggested that: `A turn to 
processive community demands that participation, and not consent, be the primary 
concern of physicians and patients alike' , 
300 this is to isolate the final act of permission 
(see chapter four) from the other elements of consent. If consent is seen as requiring both 
the communication of permission and a preliminary agreement, then it more readily may 
be seen as a communal act requiring the participation of both parties. Even the final event 
of seeking permission may be seen as a communal enterprise since it reflects mutuality 
through a respect for the equal status of the other. 
The importance of setting consent within the context of a relationship is that the 
relationship itself is a source of obligations and responsibilities. Given that autonomy and 
beneficence are meaningless in the absence of a social context and that the social context 
centres on the relationship between the relevant parties, it is essential to explore the 
relationship between the patient and the HCP. It is through this examination that the 
rights and obligations of the two parties can be resolved. This is important because it 
allows a more sensitive approach to determining consent and the rules required to 
regulate consent in this context. 
The Professional-Patient Relationship 
The most important contact of people as patients is with the professionals providing their 
care. 301 Although they may only need to enter into a single relationship - for example, 
where their GP can provide the necessary treatment - on many occasions they will be 
cared for by a number of professionals. Sometimes their care will progress vertically, by 
300 Ibid.. 
30' Stirrat, G. M. Gill, R. `Autonomy in medical ethics after O'Neill' (2005) 31 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 127,128. 
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referral from one professional to another, but at other times there may be a more 
horizontal progression with many professionals being involved cooperatively in caring 
for the patient. It may, therefore, be a simplification to discuss the professional-patient 
relationship as if it exists in isolation as a discrete relationship. Nevertheless, since every 
interaction is conducted within the context of such a relationship, it provides a focus for 
discussion. 
Montgomery argued that paradigms of regulating consent should move away from `a 
relationship between individuals ... [and] move towards models recognizing the 
importance of institutions'. 302 Sensitivity to the relevance of the institution is essential 
since the organisation of the institution inevitably influences the professional-patient 
relationship through time and resource constraints imposed on the professional. 303 
However, this does not mean that the process and regulation of consent can ignore the 
importance of individual professional-patient relationships. To do so would be to ignore 
the human side of healthcare. Individual relationships, even where short-lived or where 
responsibility for the patient is shared, are both desirable and unavoidable. Care, 
compassion and empathy are characteristics of humans not institutions and it has been 
found that the professional-patient relationship is one of the dominant concerns of the 
patient, 304 and has been recognised as an `essential' element of medical 
communication. 30' Thus, the professional-patient relationship remains the most 
appropriate context for defining the procedural and regulatory approach to consent, 
provided that approach is sensitive to the institutional and political constraints. 
302 See: Montgomery, J. Op cit n. 297,395. 
303 Potter, S. J. McKinlay, J. B. `From a relationship to encounter: an examination of longitudinal 
and lateral dimensions in the doctor-patient relationship' (2005) 61 Social Science and Medicine 
465; Provis, C. Stack, S. `Caring Work, Personal Obligation and Collective Responsibility' (2004) 
1 1(1) Nursing Ethics 5. 
304 Burkitt Wright, E. Holcombe, C. Salmon, P. `Doctors' communication of trust, care, and 
respect in breast cancer: qualitative study' (2004) 328 British Medical Journal 864,866-867. 
305 Makoul, G. 'Essential Elements of Communication in Medical Encounters: The Kalamazoo 
Consensus Statement' (2001) 76(4) Academic Medicine 390. 
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Although a number of models have already been used to represent the moral relationship 
between the doctor and his patient, 306 they reflect the end products of the authors' 
attempts to balance the various values that are thought to be relevant to the relationship. 
Furthermore, the doctor-patient relationship is usually presented as analogous to other 
relationships such as priest-parishioner or seller-consumer. However, there is no reason 
why it should be defined in these terms. It is a unique relationship that may involve 
aspects - but is unlikely to share all the features - of any one of these models. As such, it 
may be better to simply identify the interests, values and obligations that form the basis 
for the relationship. 
By definition, a relationship involves at least two parties. It is possible to be in a 
relationship where the other party is not of equivalent moral status, for example, the 
parent and young child or baby, or the carer and a mentally incapable person. These 
relationships are one sided and the imbalance between the two parties justifies the 
dominant party treating the weaker party paternalistically. The origin of the term derives 
from the paradigm of the caring father and his child. However, as the child gradually 
develops the ability to be autonomous so the relationship between the parent and the child 
changes, eventually reaching one where the two parties are of equal moral status. The 
House of Lords in Gillick v W. Norfolk and Wisbech AHA acknowledged this change of 
moral status in recognising `that parental rights are derived from parental duty and exist 
only so long as they are needed for the protection of ... the child'. 
307 
As the child matures and develops an increasing capacity to be autonomous so the nature 
of the relationship between the parent and the child should change. If the parent and child 
are to have a relationship, rather than simply be in a relationship, each must recognise the 
306 The reference here to the doctor-patient relationship, as opposed to the professional-patient 
relationship, reflects the focus of the literature. Only one of the models - the educational model - 
takes into account the relevance of other healthcare professionals. See, e. g. Veatch, R. M. `Models 
for Ethical Medicine in a Revolutionary Age' (June 1972) 2 Hastings Center Report, 5. 
307 Gillick v U'. Norfolk and i1'isbech AHA [19861 AC 112,184, per Lord Scarman, HL. 
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other as an autonomous agent: the parent as fully autonomous, the child as a person with 
developing autonomy, eventually becoming fully autonomous. An essential aspect of 
moral agency is that the person is responsible for his or her actions. To gain a sense of 
responsibility, that allows him or her to exercise moral agency, a person's capacity for 
autonomy must be recognised by the other agents that exist in relationships with that 
person. 308 But, part of being autonomous in a moral or relational sense is the recognition 
of the other as a moral agent and the acknowledgement and acceptance of the moral 
obligations that arise out of the relationship. Through this mutual recognition, which is an 
important influence on the individual's sense of dignity and agency, 3o9 each party allows 
the other to fully participate in the relationship, which is necessary for the parties to have 
a relationship. 
The point of approaching consent through the professional-patient relationship is to 
emphasise the importance of social dependency and obligations but equally to recognise 
that any relationship involves individuals. As Tauber suggested: 
"autonomy" 
... must 
find its place in the flux of social demands and 
claims that balance the needs of individuals and their society in a 
complex dynamic relationship. Neither atomistic autonomy nor the 
ethics of responsibility can claim hegemony, for they are mutually 
interdependent and a complete account of the moral axis in patient 
care requires that they be integrated. 310 
This recognition that autonomy involves both individuals and relationships emphasises 
the distinction between being in a relationship and having a relationship. When one of the 
parties to the relationship is not respected as a moral agent then that person may be in the 
308 Benson, P. `Feeling Crazy: Self-Worth and the Social Character of Responsibility' in: 
Mackenzie, C. Stoljar, N. (eds. ) Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, 
Agency and the Social Self (2000) New York: Oxford University Press 72,78-88. 
30 This may be particularly important for the less dominant party to the relationship: Werner. A. 
Malterud, K. `It is hard work behaving as a credible patient: encounters between women with 
chronic pain and their doctors' (2003) 57 Social Science and Medicine 1409,1415. 
310Tauber, A. 1. `Sick Autonomy' (2003) 46(4) Perspectives in Biology and A! edicine 484,490. 
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relationship but he or she does not have a relationship, which requires mutual recognition 
of the other's agency and hence allows mutual participation. In the context of the patient- 
professional relationship, this is important because it requires both parties to recognise the 
moral agency of the other. Thus it empowers the patient to be autonomous and it 
maximises the outcome of that autonomy because, through the patient's respect, the 
professional is empowered to exercise his or her expertise to further the patient's goals. 
Thus, where the patient and professional have a relationship this is likely to improve the 
outcome and, because the two parties will be working together, it should also lead to 
greater satisfaction for both parties. There is evidence to support both of these claims. 311 
Furthermore, patients place a high value on a good relationship with their HCP, 312 and, as 
Scheffler noted, `we would be hard pressed to find any type of relationship to which 
people have attached value or significance but which has never been seen as generating 
[special] responsibilities'. 313 Since it requires both parties to recognise and respect the 
moral agency and expertise of the other party, 314 it is arguable that having a relationship is 
morally better than simply being in a relationship. Finally, if patients expect professionals 
to care and to engage with them in anything more than a purely functional manner then it 
is reasonable to expect the patient, as a moral agent, to accept the reciprocal obligations 
that flow from having such a caring relationship. 
Since it is only those relationships that one has reason to value that generate special 
obligations, the patient may decide that he or she does not value the relationship. 315 This 
relieves the patient of the special obligations that are examined in more detail below. The 
professional, however, does not have the same degree of freedom. As I will discuss later, 
316 Op cit n. 303,476-477. Speeding, E. J. Rose, D. N. `Building an effective doctor-patient 
relationship: From patient satisfaction to patient participation' (1985) 21(2) Social Science and 
Medicine 115. 
312 Op cit n. 304,866-867. 
313 Scheffler, S. `Relationships and Responsibilities' (1997) 26(3) Philosophy and Public Affairs 
189,190. 
314 Provis, C. Stack, S. Op cit n. 303,8. 
315 Op cit n. 313.205. 
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by voluntarily entering the profession, the professional's autonomy is constrained by the 
values of the profession. As long as the profession values the professional-patient 
relationship then so must the professional. 316 
Perhaps the two things that characterise any relationship are that relationships are based 
on 'need', 317 and they create bilateral obligations. 318 In the absence of obligation any 
relationship between individuals is purely formal and has no substance: there may be a 
relationship but they do not have a relationship. 319 In a survey of cohabiting or married 
couples, Eekelaar and Maclean found that the formality of marriage was seen as neither 
`necessarily, or even characteristically ... a significant source of personal obligations'. 
320 
Rather, the situation of having a relationship grounded the perceived obligations to the 
other. For a relationship to be `good' - or, in other words, mutual - certain other 
characteristics are important. First, is the need for trust. 321 While this need not be absolute 
or equal, it would be a poor relationship in which trust was wholly lacking and, as 
McCullough has suggested, `trust ... should 
be understood as a foundation for the 
physician-patient relationship'. 322 Similarly, both parties should respect the other, which 
is - in turn - necessary for maintaining the trust essential to a good relationship. 
323 
Putting these elements together, the third characteristic is the need for each party to feel, 
316 The caveat to this is that where a patient chooses not to value the relationship then this gives the 
professional a good reason to end the relationship and transfer the patient's care to another 
professional. 
317 Cassell, E. J. The Healer's Art (1985) Cambridge (Mass): MIT Press, 195. 
318 Pellegrino, E. D. `Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the 
Physician-Patient Relationship' (1994) 10 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 47, 
51. 
319 See the non-reductionist view of relationships, which posits that the intrinsic value of a 
relationship is what generates the special obligations - rather than any more instrumental 
justification: Op cit n. 313. 
320 Eekelaar, J. Maclean, M. `Marriage and the Moral Bases of Personal Relationships' (2004) 
31(4) Journal of Law and Society 510,536. 
3210p cit n. 310,491; Op cit n. 301,128; Hall, M. A. `Law, Medicine and Trust' (2002) 55 Stanford 
Law Review 463,470; Clark, C. C. `Trust in Medicine' (2002) 27(1) Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 11,14; Byrne. P. `What May a Patient Properly Expect of his Doctor? ' in, Dunstan 
G. R. Seller, M. J. (eds) Consent in Medicine: Convergence and divergence in tradition (1983) 
London: King Edward's Hospital Fund 26,31. 
322 McCullough, L. B. `Trust, Moral Responsibility, The Self, and Well-Ordered Societies: The 
Importance of Basic Philosophical Concepts for Clinical Ethics' (2002) 27(1) Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 3,5. I will return to trust again later. 
323 Mechanic, D. `In my chosen doctor I trust' (2004) 329 British Medical Journal 1418,1419. 
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and be, (at least) morally responsible to the other. 324 A fourth characteristic of a mutual 
relationship is empathy. 325 A final characteristic of a good relationship is care, 326 which 
may be for the other party, for the relationship itself or for both the relationship and the 
other party. 
While the most central relationship is that of professional and patient, both parties exist in 
their own network of relationships and so each brings a complex system of obligation, 
responsibility and dependence. When the potential demands and benefits of the 
professional-patient relationship are added to this system it is clear that situating 
autonomy is not straightforward and whatever solution is reached it will only be capable 
of limited justification and is unlikely to receive unanimous approval. Nevertheless, any 
attempt to construct an institutional regulation of consent should recognise the relevance 
of the professional-patient relationship and its context within the web of both professional 
and social relationships that surround it. The aim is to acknowledge, embrace and take 
advantage of the benefits offered by the various social relationships that support the 
patient. However, as well as supporting the dependent patient, relationships that are not 
wholly one sided also bring obligations and responsibilities. 
If patients are to rely on the support of others, as they must, then it is fair to expect them 
to meet at least some reasonable obligations in return, and hence to have, not just be, in a 
relationship with the HCP. Any obligations must take account of the patient's ability to 
meet them and must also be sensitive to the danger that the patient's autonomy might be 
rendered impotent if the duty is too onerous. 327 Thus, the rules of consent should situate 
respect for individuals, their autonomy and their self-determined choices within the 
3240p cit n. 179. 
325Quist, N. `The Paradox of Questions and Answers: Possibilities for a Doctor-Patient 
Relationship' (2003) 14 (1/2) The Journal of Clinical Ethics 79,81 
326Ibid., 81. 
327 Cohen, J. `Patient Autonomy and Social Fairness' (2000) 9 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics 391,396. 
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context of their community-based social relationships. In this way, the concerns of the 
individual, those in close relationship and the wider community can be balanced without 
sacrificing the individual, his or her dependants or the community. 328 
The Professional's Obligations Within the Professional-Patient Relationship 
The first thing to note is the trite caution that professionals are `only human'. The limits 
of `human capacity to cope with others' distress' and `our inability to process more than a 
small portion of the data we encounter' should be incorporated into any determination of 
what may be expected from healthcare professionals. 329 These limits may make it 
difficult, and perhaps impossible for some, to develop excellence in both the technical 
and the empathic aspects of medical care. Thus, as Gregg Bloche and Quinn suggested, 
`Were we to treat empathic, holistic connection with patients as the lodestar of clinical 
effectiveness, we would need to strike some compromises as regards our expectations of 
technical efficacy'. 330 This means that, in constructing the rules of consent, and the 
consequential obligations, care must be taken not to make the demands on professionals 
so great that it undermines their ability to satisfy the required technical demands. 
Professional obligations arise from two sources. First, they have obligations that fall 
equally on all moral agents, which derive from the recognition that all agents equally are 
ends in themselves. Second, professionals have obligations that derive from their role and 
relationship with the patient. 331 Perhaps the most important general duty is to respect the 
other person's autonomy, which provides a reason to trust those persons and give prima 
facie respect to their decisions. 332 Furthermore, any interference with an autonomous 
328 Micah Hester, D. `Narrative as Bioethics: The "Fact" of Social Selves and the Function of 
Consensus' (2002) 11 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 17,20-21. 
329 Gregg Bloche, M. Quinn, K. P. `Professionalism and Personhood' in Thomasma, D. C. 
Weisstub, D. N. Herve, C. (eds. ) Personhood and Health Care (2001) Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 347,351-352. 
330 Ibid., 350. 
33' Op cit n. 313,200. 
332 Rogers, W. A. `Is there a moral duty for doctors to trust patients? ' (2002) 28 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 77,77-78. 
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person's decision must be justified. The need for justification is strongest where the 
decision is clearly autonomous. However, even where the decision appears to be non- 
autonomous, humility (the acknowledgement of fallibility) requires that any interference 
is proportionate and justified. 
The obligation to respect the patient's decision is a negative duty, but a respect for 
autonomy may also entail positive duties. 333 Although the libertarian may reject the 
existence of positive duties they are widely acknowledged both in principle134 and 
practice. 335 In any case, it is arguable that this positive obligation arises not from 
professionals' general moral duty, but rather from their role as healer in the context of the 
professional-patient relationship. 
Realising one's autonomy requires at least minimal choice and the resources necessary to 
act on that choice. 336 Within the professional-patient relationship it is professionals who 
control the resources necessary for patients to exercise their autonomy, 337 including 
availability of treatment choices, 338 access to other professionals, and the information 
necessary to make a rational decision. While an ever-increasing amount of information is 
readily available, through technologies such as the Internet, without assistance to process 
it patients may end up overwhelmed and unable to use it. Paradoxically, although 
autonomous decisions should be informed, more is not necessarily better and too much 
333 Op cit n. 318,49. 
334 Op cit n. 51,63. 
335 See, eg Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245. 
336 Op clt n. I 10,104. Although autonomy is theoretically possible in the absence of choice, this is 
only the case where the agent was unaware of the lack of choice and would have chosen the 
available option in any case. 
337 The professional's access to some of these resources - the tangible goods - is restricted by the 
chain of health care management that exists above him. 
338 For example, certain drugs are only available on prescription. 
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information - especially if unfiltered - may undermine autonomy. 
339 On the other hand, it 
has been shown that, where information is desired it can be empowering. 340 
Within the professional-patient relationship both parties should possess the power 
required to exercise their roles. 341 Professional power comes from a number of sources, 
including their knowledge base, their control of the treatment options and their social role 
as healer. 342 While this power is necessary it may have a profound effect, 343 and it should 
be used in a way that respects patients and empowers them to exercise their autonomy in 
arriving at a mutually acceptable treatment plan. 344 The implication for consent is that the 
professional, who possesses the expertise and information necessary to the treatment 
decision, is the dominant party in the relationship. 
Since communicative acts, or processes, are `to some degree at least, cooperative 
efforts', 345 both parties have responsibilities, but - as the dominant party - it behoves the 
professional to facilitate the patient's involvement. 346 As Pellegrino suggested, `It is the 
physician's obligation to enhance, empower and enrich the patient's capacity to be 
autonomous'. 347 Where HCPs are supportive of patient autonomy this has been shown to 
increase the patient's willingness to be self-determining, which may improve that 
patient's co-operation with a treatment regime and hence improve the clinical outcome. "' 
In a survey of 410 patients McKinstry found that: `Patients' preferences for shared or 
339 Grice, H. P. `Logic and Conversation'. In Hamish, R. M. (ed) (1994) Basic Topics in the 
Philosophy of Language. Harvester Wheatsheaf: New York 57,61. 
340 Krupat, E. Fancey, M. Cleary, P. D. `Information and its impact on satisfaction among surgical 
patients' (2000) 51 Social Science & Medicine 1817,1824. 
3aß Goodyear-Smith, F. Buetow, S. `Power Issues in the Doctor-Patient Relationship' (2001) 9 
Health Care Analysis 449,459. 
342 Brody, H. The Healer's Power (1992) New Haven: Yale University Press, 16-17. 
343 Osuch, J. R. `The Power of the Doctor, The Vulnerability of the Patient, and Informed Consent' 
(2004) 61 Surgical Neurology 494. 
344 Op cit n. 309,1417. 
aas Op cit n. 339,60. 
346 Wear, S. `Patient Autonomy, Paternalism, and the Conscientious Physician' (1983) 4 
Theoretical Medicine 253,255. 
3" Op cit n. 318,51. 
348 Valimaki, M. et al. `Self-determination in Surgical Patients in Five European Countries' (2004) 
34(4) Journal of Nursing Scholarship 305,309. 
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directed versions of scenarios were significantly associated with ... their perception of 
their own doctor as one who shared or directed [decision-making]' . 
3a9 A supportive 
approach recognises that, as a capacity, `Autonomy does not just spring into existence, 
but rather must be practiced and wilfully maintained'. 350 Thus, patients must be supported 
and encouraged if they are to exercise their autonomy effectively. 351 
Autonomy does not require patients to make every decision themselves and, since HCPs 
are experts, it may be reasonable for patients to defer to their judgment because they 
reasonably believe HCPs have greater capacity to make the decision. 352 In such a case, 
professionals should ensure that patients understand the implications of ceding the 
decision and should also enquire whether there is any information the patient desires. 
There are two reasons for this. First, consent is not the sole reason for needing 
information. Knowing, for example, how long it will take to recover or when they will be 
able to return to work is necessary to allow patients to organise their life or to know what 
to expect. 
Second, patients may defer decisions not because they see themselves as unable to make 
them, but because it is more efficient and expedient to do so. In this case, they may 
require authoritative reasons why they should accept the professional's decision. This 
`dialogic authority' differs from persuasion in that reasons are provided to explain the 
decision rather than to convince the other that one choice is better than another. 353 
Professionals do not need to bring the patient round to their way of thinking; they simply 
need to justify the patient `suspending judgment'. 354 Even where `dialogic authority' is 
349 McKinstry, B. `Do patients wish to be involved in decision making in the consultation? A cross 
sectional survey with video vignettes' (2000) 321 British Medical Journal 867,868. 
350 Meyers, C. `Cruel Choices: Autonomy and Critical Care Decision-Making (2004) 18(2) 
Bioethics 104,108. 
351 Ibid., 116-119. 
352 Cunliffe, J. Reeve, A. `Dialogic Authority' (1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 453, 
458. 
353 Ibid., 459-463. 
354 Ibid., 462. 
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rejected and patients choose to make their own decision, this does not reduce HCPs to 
technical advisers as their clinical autonomy, their duty to respect patient autonomy and 
their duty of beneficence all require them to try and persuade patients to accept their 
preferred treatment choice (see chapters one and two). This is particularly so where the 
patient's decision appears irrational and risks irremediable harm to the patient's future 
autonomy. In these circumstances, it may be more respectful to at least question if not 
override the decision than abandon the patient to his or her fate. 355 
In chapter two I argued against allowing HCPs the authority to override an irrational 
decision. Further to that argument, the knowledge that one's self-determination might be 
overridden may undermine the trust necessary to sustain the professional-patient 
relationship and risks causing patients to avoid seeking healthcare. In the US, for 
example, compulsory drug testing or compelling pregnant women to undergo non- 
consensual treatment caused some to go into hiding or give birth at home. 356 However, 
just because people should ultimately be free to be wrong and make irrational decisions 
this does not mean that they should be abandoned. As Mill noted: 
It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it 
is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings ... 
should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well being of 
one another ... 
Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish 
the better from the worse and encouragement to choose the former and 
avoid the latter. 357 
355 Op cit n. 230,335. 
356 Chavkin, W. Allen, M. H. Oberman, M. `Drug Abuse and Pregnancy: Some Questions on 
Public Policy, Clinical Management, and Maternal and Fetal Rights' (1991) 18 Birth 107,111; 
Rhoden, N. K. `The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans' 
(1986) 74 California Law Review 1951,2028. See also: Beck, J. C. `When the Patient Threatens 
Violence: An Empirical Study of Clinical Practice after Tarasofr (1982) 10(3) Bulletin of the 
A, -1 PL 189, in which psychiatric patients accepted the disclosure of confidential information where 
it was justified and discussed with them in advance. 
357 Op cit n. 49,84. 
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An alternative approach would be to challenge decisions, ensure that patients are not 
making decisions on the basis of misinformation or a misunderstanding, 358 and attempt to 
persuade them that their reasoning is flawed or their goal or belief is unjustified. 359 This 
may be seen as a compromise that tries to balance a respect for autonomy with a respect 
for the individual's welfare and his or her potential for future autonomy. 360 However, it is 
also arguable that it is more respectful to autonomy than simply allowing the individual to 
risk a catastrophic choice. 
In Rochdale Healthcare NHS Trust v C, 361 C refused a caesarean section because she 
would rather die than go through another one after a previous caesarean left her with a 
painful scar and a bad back. Even though it may be reasonable to value the avoidance of 
pain it seems irrational, unless the pain is unbearable, to give that goal a greater weight 
than continued life. It is only by challenging such a decision that the HCP can be sure that 
the patient has reflected on, or at least had the opportunity and resources to reflect on, the 
values and goals that guided his or her decision. Furthermore, requiring patients to 
explain their goals may cause them to reconsider their beliefs and perhaps change their 
decisions. Alternatively, their explanation may satisfy the observer that the decision was 
autonomous. 
It may be objected that the professional, lacks the authority to interfere with a competent 
patient's decision. 362 However, to fully respect another individual's autonomy arguably 
requires positive obligations - especially when in a caring relationship - as well as the 
simple negative duty not to obstruct the decision. In this context there may be a balance 
358 Beste, J. `Instilling Hope and Respecting Patient Autonomy: Reconciling Apparently 
Conflicting Duties' (2005) 19(3) Bioethics 215,221. 
359 This accords with the `justified-belief standard [, which] captures the common-sense conception 
of reasonable': Op cit n. 36,254. 
360 Respect for the person is arguably a wider duty than simply respecting that person's autonomy. 
See, Lysaught, M. T. `Respect: Or, How Respect for Persons Became Respect for Autonomy' 
(2004) 29(6) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 665. 
361 Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust vC [1997] 1 FCR 274. 
362 See: McLean, S. A. M. A Patient's Right to Know: Information disclosure, the doctor and the 
law (1989) Aldershot: Dartmouth, 22. 
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between the two duties as there is a certain amount of conflict between non-interference, 
which protects the liberty aspect of autonomy, and the interference necessary to ensure 
that individuals possess the resources, and have the opportunity, to exercise their 
autonomy. 363 Care must be taken to ensure that the interference does not become 
obstructive, but - while professionals should be sensitive to the circumstances (the 
potential consequence of the decision, the power imbalance, patient vulnerability and the 
fragile nature of a sick person's autonomy) - it seems reasonable to suggest that they 
should question an apparently irrational decision. 
This argument is premised on the presumptions that most patients want to make 
reasonable decisions, that they do not see the professional-patient relationship as 
antagonistic and that they are willing to engage in a discussion of the decision and 
attempt to reach a `mutually acceptable agreement'. 364 All of these presumptions may be 
normatively justified as features of a trusting relationship between autonomous - and 
hence responsible - moral agents. 
Persuasion, which is the use of reason to convince the other to accept the correctness of 
one's position, is a form of influence that may be justified by either of two arguments. 365 
The `negative strategy' argues that the professional's influence is allowed because it is 
important to combat the negative effect of the patient's sickness on his or her 
autonomy. 366 The `positive strategy', which is the primary approach I have adopted, is 
based on the argument that a true respect for autonomy requires more than simply 
abandoning patients to whatever choice they make. 36' As Barilan and Weintraub argued: 
363 Quill, T. E. Brody, H. `Physician Recommendations and Patient Autonomy: Finding a Balance 
between Physician Power and Patient Choice' (1996) 125(9) Annals of Internal Medicine 763. 
364 Philipp, E. E. Johnson, E. S. `Considerations Governing A Doctor's Advice to his Patient' in, 
Dunstan G. R. Seller, M. J. (eds) Consent in Medicine: Convergence and divergence in tradition 
(1983) London: King Edward's Hospital Fund 89. 
365 Tomlinson, T. The Physician's Influence on Patients' Choices' (1986) 7 Theoretical Medicine 
105,109. 
366 Op cit n. 346,263-264. 
367 Ibid., 262. 
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`Abiding by unexplored expressed wishes does not necessarily amount to respect for 
persons, since respect for persons, is much more than submission to social boundaries'. 368 
Through the use of dialogue and persuasion the tension between the individual and the 
community369 may be resolved without undermining the individual's autonomy. 
Cassell suggested: `What patients believe to be in their own best interests may well 
require the active participation of the physician to discover'. 370 This is not an argument 
for professionals to substitute their own views for those of their patients as the patients' 
goals, and hence their best interests, `can almost never be known without the patient's 
knowledgeable participation'. 371 But, where patients have not formalised their thoughts 
concerning their second order desires or long term goals, they may need both support and 
facilitation to determine the most appropriate decision. Similarly, intervention, such as 
pointing out logical inconsistencies or irrational reasoning, 372 may also be necessary 
where patients have formalised their goals but are mistaken in how best to achieve them. 
Thus, not only is persuasion morally permissible it is also the physician's duty. However, 
the limits of persuasion may blur with those of manipulation, at which point patient 
autonomy is undermined rather than enhanced. 
The ultimate aim of the manipulator is to `motivate' the other person to do something that 
will serve the manipulator's goal rather than respecting the other person's right `to choose 
his own operative goals and purposes'. 373 This may also be the aim of rational persuasion, 
368 Barilan, Y. M. Weintraub, M. `Persuasion as Respect for Autonomy: An Alternative View of 
Autonomy and the Limits of Discourse' (2001) 26(1) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13,20. 
369 Op cit n. 63,202. 
370 Cassell, E. J. The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine (1991) New York: Oxford 
University Press, 77. See also: Schneider, C. Farrell, M. `The Limits of Informed Consent', in: 
Freeman, M. Lewis, A. (eds. ) Law and Medicine: Current Legal Issues Volume 3 (2000) Oxford: 
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which might be directed at either the means of achieving a particular goal or at the 
reasonableness of the goal itself. However, perhaps what distinguishes manipulation from 
persuasion is that the manipulator seeks to avoid the open use of honest reasons to 
convince the other. Instead, `there is something unsavoury about it ... 
it is often self- 
serving and involves deception'. 374 (In the present context, it is important to note that 
manipulation does not have to be self-serving and could be motivated by feelings of 
beneficence towards the other. 375) In addition to deception, which includes both lying and 
withholding information, the manipulator's tools include playing on the other person's 
fears, inducing a feeling of guilt, taking advantage of the other's good nature and the offer 
of exploitative inducements. All of these avoid the use of reason and, by utilising the 
patient's weaknesses, undermine autonomy. 376 Furthermore, especially when done for 
"beneficent" reasons, withholding or manipulating information demonstrates a lack of 
trust in the patient, which may fatally undermine a therapeutic relationship. 377 
On the other hand, rational decision making may reasonably take fear, guilt, good will 
and inducements into account and it is not always easy to distinguish between, for an 
example, an appropriate appeal to patients' obligations to others and the manipulative use 
of the guilt they will feel should they fail those others. One example of where the use of 
an inappropriate sense of guilt may occur is where patients decline to ask questions, or 
engage in further dialogue, for the expressed reason that they do not want to bother the 
busy physician. If patient autonomy is valued then it is part of the professional's duty to 
spend a reasonable length of time in dialogue and allowing patients to cut short any 
discussion because they feel guilty about taking up the professional's time is exploitative 
and may be used as a tool of manipulation. 
374 Kligman, M. Culver, C. M. Ibid., 175. 
375 Rudinow, J. Op cit n. 373,344. 
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Another difficulty arises because what may be offered as honest information may still 
mislead. As Tomlinson argued: `Given the complexity of the beliefs, attitudes, anxieties, 
and expectations that will lie in the background of any listener, it may be virtually 
impossible to transmit information in a form that carries no potentially misleading 
reverberations'. 378 Knowing this, professionals could adopt one of two strategies. They 
could either disclose what they honestly believe to be the truth even where they suspect 
that the patient will misinterpret it. Alternatively, they could present the information in a 
way that will cause the patient to achieve a more reasonable picture. Both strategies could 
be justified as respecting the patient's autonomy and the situation is complicated because, 
unless one discloses all information in a neutral fashion, which is arguably impossible, it 
will always be necessary to make judgments about what to disclose and how to disclose 
it. Thus, the boundary between the two approaches is blurred, which makes it difficult to 
draft a rule explicitly permitting one while preventing the other. 
Although both strategies arguably respect autonomy, there are problems with the second 
approach. First, it shows a lack of trust in the patient's openness to rational persuasion 
and hence reflects a diminished respect for that person's autonomy. Second, it relies on 
the assumption that the HCP can reliably predict that the patient will misinterpret the 
information. Third, if the patient does interpret the information differently, it assumes that 
the HCP's interpretation is the correct one. Where there is reasonable doubt it may be 
more respectful to trust the patient and provide a more open disclosure. However, 
provided the information is merely non-specific rather than a lie, the rationally 
autonomous patient will be astute enough to notice the lack of specificity and ask for 
more detail. Giving non-specific information may be a more sensitive approach because it 
allows the patient, provided sufficiently empowered, to determine the detail of the 
378 Op cit n. 365,116. 
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information required. 379 This approach may be acceptable provided it satisfies certain 
constraints. 
First, any exceptions would need to be well publicised so as to ensure that all patients are 
aware that seeking certain types of information is their responsibility. Second, because of 
the power dynamics of the professional-patient relationship and, in many cases, the 
patient's vulnerability, healthcare providers and professionals would need to be sensitive 
to their patients' disadvantage and facilitate the exercise of their responsibility. 
Acknowledging this duty further supports the suggestion that this is a more sensitive 
means of communication rather than deception or a lack of candour. Third, if the 
manoeuvre is to respect patient autonomy, and arguably their welfare, then any lack of 
candour should be intended to advance patients' ends and not those of the professionals. 
Fourth, creating rules to delimit those circumstances when a lack of candour would be 
acceptable raises all the usual problems of how those rules might be open to 
interpretation. 
As O'Neill noted: `Rule-following ... provides no criterion of 
"right" continuation: all 
rules are incomplete, and to "follow" them is to interpret them in a certain way. No rule 
can have written into it a determination of what it would be to follow it. Rules do not lay 
down complete answers'. 380 While rules may be drafted to prohibit lying, deception and 
other forms of manipulation, they will inevitably be open to interpretation and will rely 
on the physician's character, in the form of virtues with concomitant imperfect duties, to 
implement those rules within the spirit of the justification that underlies them. This 
acknowledges that there may be, for example, occasions where the professionals' duty of 
beneficence and their personal knowledge are enough to justify the `manipulation' of 
their patients' prejudices in order to instil a true belief about the decisional relevance of 
379 See also, Jackson, J. Truth, Trust and Medicine (2001) London: Routledge. 
380 Op cit n. 181,79. 
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the proposition. The law can formulate precise duties regarding the more overt forms of 
pejorative manipulation and can guide HCPs toward the appropriate dispositions and 
interpretation but, because manipulation is `generally relatively sophisticated' and relies 
on insight into the history and context of the situation, 381 there will always be difficult 
cases that depend on the professional's character. As Wear, following Ingelfinger, has 
suggested: `the only "real protection" for patients is the conscientious and compassionate 
physician'. 
382 
In addition to the ordinary duty to respect the patient as a person, HCPs have role specific 
obligations arising from their privileged position and the professional-patient 
relationship. 383 Perhaps the most widely accepted specific duties are those of beneficence 
and non-maleficence. In chapter two I argued that the duty of non-maleficence only made 
sense when incorporated into the duty of beneficence, which is constrained by the duty to 
respect autonomy. The duty of beneficence requires professionals to act for the benefit of 
the patient, 384 which is a vague and general obligation requiring further explication. In 
chapter two I suggested that beneficence should be directed holistically at the patient as a 
person rather than solely at the patient's health. An additional constraint is that the benefit 
of the intervention should be balanced against its costs, both to the individual patient and 
to the wider community. 385 Thus, even if a particular treatment would benefit the patient, 
HCPs are under no duty to provide it if the costs outweigh the benefit. This, caveat of 
`utility' has obvious implications for the post-modern consumer clamour for choice and 
justifies the role played by bodies like the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence which determine the use of treatments on just such a basis. 
381 Rudinow, J. Op cit n. 373,346. 
382 Op cit n. 346,254; Ingelfinger, F. J. `Informed (but uneducated) consent' (1972) 287 New 
England Journal of Medicine 465,466. 
383 Op cit n. 313,200. 
384 Op cit n. 51,166. 
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The interaction between the professional's duties of beneficence and respect for the 
patient's autonomy requires professionals to act in a way that not just respects the 
patient's formal right to consent but also reflects the spirit behind that requirement. If 
harm is seen as a wrongful set-back to the other person's interests, the duty again requires 
that professionals are concerned to justify any intervention by gaining the competent 
patient's consent. In addition to this, they should pay heed to the patient's other interests. 
The most basic interests of health and life should be protected, but not necessarily at the 
expense of the patient's other interests. Going beyond the sphere of medical goods takes 
professionals outside their area of expertise and their lack of knowledge regarding the 
patient's values, goals and interests means that they must engage the patient co- 
operatively in the decision-making process or provide the patient with the necessary 
information and cede the decision. 386 
Although both respect for autonomy and the duty of beneficence require HCPs to involve 
patients in decisions that affect them this does not mean that patients should be 
abandoned to their decision. Both duties also require HCPs to try and persuade them to 
change their decision if it appears unwise; 387 in particular, the rules of beneficence require 
that HCPs act to prevent harm and to rescue patients from danger. 388 As discussed earlier, 
the duty of beneficence does not justify the professional in absolutely overriding the 
patient's autonomy, nor does it justify coercion or dishonest manipulation of the patient's 
will. It does, however, support the same kinds of interference required by a respect for 
patients' autonomy to ensure that: patients are competent; have an adequate 
understanding of the facts and potential consequences (both to themselves and relevant 
others); and have given the matter appropriate consideration. The obligation to challenge 
an apparently unwise decision, required by both the principles of beneficence and respect 
386 Veatch, R. M. `Doctor Does not Know Best: Why in the New Century Physicians Must Stop 
Trying to Benefit Patients' (2000) 25(6) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 701,703-705. 
387 See also: Barilan, Y. M. Weintraub, M. Op cit n. 368,19. The caveat is that the doctor should, in 
determining the best course of action, take the patient's goals and values into account. 
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for autonomy, is further supported by the virtue of care. As Smith and Pettegrew asked 
rhetorically: `[c]an a caring doctor, fully committed to a relationship with the patient, fail 
to argue with the patient for a wiser choice? '. 389 
The rules of beneficence that require HCPs to 'remove conditions that cause harm to 
others' and `help persons with disabilities' also support the HCPs' duty to respect their 
patients by empowering them to exercise their autonomy or by helping them return to an 
autonomous state. 390 For many patients their desire and ability to be autonomous will be 
affected by their illness. 391 One study even found that when doctors become patients they 
also prefer the treating physician to take the primary role in decision-making, and this 
tendency increased with the severity of the sickness. 392 This is compounded by the power 
imbalance between professional and patient, the alien environment of the hospital and the 
individual's social conditioning, 393 which may all diminish the competent patient's ability 
to exercise his or her autonomy by encouraging heuristic decision-making that often 
relies on intuition and `folk-wisdom' and precluding the rational reflection ideally 
required by autonomy. 394 
While the effects of illness may completely undermine the autonomy of some patients, 
other patients will be less severely compromised. As Barilan and Weintraub pointed out, 
illness has not prevented those afflicted from producing great works of literature and 
philosophy. 395 Furthermore, even where patients' autonomy is diminished it may be 
389 Smith, D. H. Pettegrew, L. S. `Mutual Persuasion as a Model for Doctor-Patient 
Communication' (1986) 7(2) Theoretical Medicine 127,137-138. 
390 See chapter two. Op cit n. 51,167. 
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Doctors, and Medical Decisions (1998) New York: Oxford University Press, 75-87. 
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possible to encourage, support or facilitate their autonomy. In fact, it is arguable that one 
of the most important functions of medicine is to restore the patient's autonomy. 396 This 
does not mean that patients should be forced to exercise autonomy, especially where it is 
undermined by illness. However, where at least some of these effects may be countered, 
the professional's duty of beneficence and role within the professional-patient 
relationship require him or her to enhance the patient's autonomy by creating a 
sympathetic environment, encouraging the patient to participate and providing the support 
and time necessary to enable that participation. 39' This is important because it is the 
patients who will necessarily bear the physical and psychological consequences that 
follow any healthcare decisions. 398 
Cassell argued that the doctor's primary role is `the care of the sick'. 399 Because the 
unifying consequence of sickness is the loss of control that patients experience, this 
translates into an obligation to `return control to his patient'. 400 Where a quick and 
effective cure is available then perhaps the best way to do this is simply to treat the 
patient. In other cases, however, the doctor must educate patients and teach them how to 
regain as much control as possible in the face of their sickness. 401 Since autonomy and 
control are intrinsically connected, Cassell's beneficence-based argument adds further 
weight to the autonomy-based arguments that professionals should be honest with 
patients. 402 Deception and manipulation are arguably wrong because they undermine 
autonomy and trust. However, if discovered they also undermine the patient's sense of 
control. Thus, if professionals are to help their patients exercise maximal control over 
their sick bodies, honesty is crucial. 
396 Cassell, E. The function of medicine (1977) 7 Hasting Center Report 16. 
397 Doyal. L. `The Moral Foundation of the Clinical Duties of Care: Needs, Duties and Human 
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Interacting with the patient is complicated by the fact that not all patients want to exercise 
their autonomy. The desire to act autonomously is affected by a number of demographic 
variables such as age, sex, and culture. 403 These differences may be explicable on the 
basis of two psychological variables: the locus of control and self-efficacy. 404 The locus 
of control is a sense of how much influence individuals have over their lives: those with 
an external locus of control see their lives much more as the subject of fate and largely 
outside their own control, while those with an internal locus of control see their lives as 
primarily shaped by themselves. 405 This has a number of consequences. 
First, persons with an external locus of control may be reluctant to engage in autonomous 
decision-making, especially in the fragile state of sickness, with its attendant loss of 
control, 406 and the intimidating environment of the hospital. Second, they may find it 
hard, even in ideal circumstances, to make autonomous decisions. Third, persons with an 
internal locus of control may find it more difficult and stressful to deal with the loss of 
control caused by their sickness. Consequently, it may be psychologically beneficial to 
support their autonomy as far as possible. Also following from this, it may be both more 
distressing and more harmful to those with an internal locus of control if insensitively 
paternalistic professionals undermine what autonomous capacity they do have. 407 On the 
other hand, it may be equally harmful or distressing to unduly pressure or compel patients 
with an external locus of control to exercise their autonomy. 
The issue is more complicated because people do not fall neatly into one of these two 
types. While individuals may in general tend towards one or other of these types, this 
403 Leino-Kilpi, H. et al. Op cit 391,64. 
404 Op cit n. 94. 
405 Bergsma, J. Op cit n. 184; Op cit n. 94. 
406 Op cit n. 317,44. 
407 I suggest it may be harmful in the sense that someone with an internal locus of control may see 
paternalism as a greater set-back to his interests than might someone with an external locus of 
control. 
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tendency may be affected by surrounding circumstances. 408 Waller noted that, in addition 
to having an internal locus of control, autonomy requires that individuals have a `sense of 
effective control' or `self-efficacy', which is their `sense of having the ability to 
successfully carry out a task'. 409 A negative self-efficacy may undermine the positive 
effect on autonomy of an internal locus of control and may cause stress and a feeling of 
helplessness. However, patients' self-efficacy may be influenced by the surrounding 
circumstances and by the attitude and behaviour of healthcare professionals. For example, 
the patient's desire for information or to engage in the decision-making process may be 
underestimated. 410 
Waller suggested: `Rather than assuming that the patient does not want to exercise 
control, we must first help the patient become comfortable in her (initially alien) 
surroundings, inform ... and empower the patient with sufficient 
knowledge to exercise 
confident (self-efficacious) control' . 
41 This may be more difficult where the patient tends 
towards an external locus of control in which case professionals would need to be 
sensitive to the patient's psychological disposition and vary their support and 
involvement accordingly as some may be overwhelmed if given control and deserted. 412 
Nonetheless, since psychological traits are not static, and are tendencies rather than 
absolutes, 413 it may be worthwhile supporting and enabling patients to be as autonomous 
408 Bergsma, J. Op cit n. 184,206,209. 
409 Op cit n. 94,258. 
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as possible. As such, any rules or guidelines regulating consent should be sensitive to 
these two psychological characteristics. 
The professional-patient relationship, as a caring relationship, can benefit the patient's 
health. 414 To be effective in this, the relationship at least needs to be cooperative and 
requires mutual trust if it is to be most effective. The need for patients to trust 
professionals, which encourages shared decision-making, 415 and is essential to the whole 
process of care, 416 obliges the professional to act in a trustworthy way. 417 As Rhodes 
suggested: `all reasonably farsighted physicians must recognize that in order to practice 
medicine, they must seek trust and deserve it'. 418 Because patients in many circumstances 
must trust professionals by virtue of the professional's role and their own vulnerability, 419 
the obligation to be trustworthy is owed not just to their patients, but also to present and 
future colleagues. This reinforces the professionals' duty to be open, honest, 420 non- 
manipulative, proficient, and concerned for their patients. 421 
A caveat to the professionals' duty to be trustworthy is that, while they should avoid 
deception, their duty of beneficence may justify controlling the timing of disclosure, 
particularly of distressing information. 422 This does not mean that professionals can 
withhold the information but it would allow them to decide when and how to disclose. 
Any such decision, if it is to respect the patient's autonomy, should arguably involve 
414 Adler, H. M. `The Sociophysiology of Caring in the Doctor-Patient Relationship' (2002) 17 
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negotiation, placing a degree of responsibility on the patient to request further 
information when the professional makes a tentative offer. 
As a final point, a recent study has suggested that patients' most important concern 
appears to be the need to trust their doctor. 423 In a qualitative study of 39 breast cancer 
patients, Burkitt Wright et al found that the patient's desire for information primarily 
related to maintaining trust and hope, rather than as a tool to enable them to be the 
decision-maker. Trust was undermined where the patients felt they had been misled and, 
conversely, trust was enhanced where the doctor was perceived as being open. For this 
subset of patients: `what patients sought diverged from the current emphasis on providing 
information. It was a function not of amount of information but of the nature of 
information and manner of presentation'. 424 Although this study provides helpful insights 
into the needs and desires of patients it may be that some of the patients' concerns are 
influenced by their underlying pathology. Thus, the results may not be applicable to non- 
cancer sufferers. Nevertheless, the study does emphasise the central importance of trust 
and respect. 
The Patient's Obligations Within the Professional-Patient Relationship 
While patient autonomy generates obligations for healthcare professionals, accepting the 
role of moral agent also imposes obligations on the patient. These arise because of the 
socially situated nature of autonomy and from the more specific context of the 
professional-patient relationship. 425 As suggested earlier, relationships create bilateral 
obligations and the professional-patient relationship is no different. 
426 Furthermore, a 
non-reciprocal relationship is more likely to fail the parties and thus lose the benefits that 
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justify the relationship's existence. 427 It might be argued that the patient's vulnerability 
relieves him or her of at least some of the obligations that would normally arise in a 
relationship and - because of the imbalance of knowledge and power -justifies an 
asymmetry of responsibility in the HCP-patient relationship; 428 however, it is insufficient 
to always justify a denial of the consequential duties. 429 
Vulnerability makes someone susceptible to exploitation and it would be reasonable for 
the law to protect them from that eventuality, but, as Draper and Sorrell argued, 
vulnerability per se does not make someone incapable of wrongdoing, nor does it 
`insulate them from responsibility'. 430 Although the balance of power may lie with the 
professional, patients are not completely impotent and may, for example, manipulate the 
professional or abuse the provision of state-funded healthcare . 
43 1 Furthermore, the 
patient's power may be bolstered by the rise in self-help groups, the increased 
involvement of lawyers and the scrutiny of medicine by the media. 432 Just as the 
healthcare professional's power within the relationship demands responsibility, so does 
the patient's. 
Perhaps the primary obligation arising from autonomy is the duty to respect others as 
persons433 or ends in themselves, which is necessary to allow others a fair opportunity to 
exercise autonomy. It requires patients to give due concern to the impact of their 
427 Op cit n. 414,885-886. 
428 Kelley, M. `Limits on Patient Responsibility' (2005) 30(2) The Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 189. 
429 Illness may make patients incapable of fulfilling their obligations and any formal obligations 
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behaviour on others. 434 More specifically, because they have entered into a personal 
relationship, they should treat the professional with respect. Just as competent patients 
come to the professional-patient relationship as autonomous persons, so do the 
professionals. 435 
Three types of autonomy are relevant. 436 First, the professionals' personal autonomy 
means that they come to the relationship with their own values, interests and goals. 
Second, the values and goals of the autonomous profession influence and constrain their 
personal autonomy, 437 which results in, third, the restricted "clinical autonomy", 438 which 
provides the professional with both the power and the responsibility `to act according to 
the shared standards of that profession'. 439 The relevance of the professionals' personal 
autonomy is that, within the constraints of the general duty to respect others, their 
profession, the contractual obligations of their employment, and the duties arising by 
virtue of their roles as healer, they should be allowed to bring those personal values and 
goals to the decisional process. It would, perhaps, be impossible for professionals to 
prevent their deeply held values from affecting their interpretative judgment. However, 
the importance of these constraints requires them to be alive to that possibility. It is also 
434 Such a duty may also be justified by arguing that each person owes an obligation to other 
members of the community to act in a morally responsible way: Gauthier, C. C. `The Virtue of 
Moral Responsibility' (2005) 30(2) The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 153. 
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436 Op cit n. 318,52. 
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threat resulting in a shift to more patient-centred care, and while unregulated professional 
autonomy may be undesirable, it remains important to allow professionals a degree of autonomy. 
This clinical autonomy is necessary to provide professionals with the power to fulfil their roles as 
healers and respond to the individual variation that limits the value of over regulated, protocol 
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one reason why their behaviour should be supported and guided by reasonably specific 
principles and rules. Ideally, perhaps, they should also be encouraged to become virtuous 
professionals. 440 
The professionals' personal autonomy may cause them to see the patient's decision as 
unwise or even morally wrong and, excluding the emergency situation, it may justify 
them refusing to provide the requested treatment. As May suggested: 'In protecting a 
patient's rights to treatment options, we must be careful not to hold the health care 
professional hostage to the patient's values by forcing the provision of services that 
would not otherwise be offered, simply because the patient holds certain beliefs or 
values' . 
441 This mirrors the patient's right to refuse treatment and, just as professionals 
should respect that decision, so patients should respect the professionals' stance. 
However, while it may justify a refusal to treat this does not absolve them of their 
professional duty to care for their patients, 442 which at least requires the professional to 
support their patients and help them find another professional who may be willing to 
provide the treatment. 
Given the imbalance in power, it may not be fair to allow the professional, who has 
voluntarily entered the profession, absolute rights of conscience. May argued that the 
balance between the doctor's and the patient's autonomy should be grounded in allowing 
doctors the right to refuse to participate in a type of treatment they find morally offensive. 
While this does not allow them to refuse treatment simply because they believe it to be a 
riskier or less beneficial alternative, 443 it does not require HCPs to provide treatment that 
is not "medically indicated", 444 and it remains the professionals' prerogative to prioritise 
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treatments on medical grounds and to advise patients accordingly. However, where 
treatments are "medically indicated" then the HCP may not refuse to provide them simply 
because they are not "medically optimal". 445 An alternative approach that may avoid 
conflict is to negotiate with the patient to see if a compromise can be reached. 446 This 
may need persuasion, but also requires the professional, in turn, to be open to 
persuasion. 44' This mutual openness to persuasion means that if patients choose not to 
accept the professional's recommended treatment then it is reasonable to expect them at 
least to explain why. 448 
This openness to mutual persuasion, which is essential to truly shared decision-making, 449 
is reflected in Meyer's more specific `minimal' duties, which are: a duty to communicate 
openly with the professional; to `make responsible decisions about his own self-care'; `to 
cooperate on mutually agreed-upon goals (or to negotiate an adjustment of those goals)'; 
`to avoid regarding the health care professional as infallible'; `to avoid being a patient', 
which means not `adopting a sick role solely as a way to shirk the difficult responsibilities 
of his life'; and to actively participate in the professional-patient relationship and their 
own care. 450 Draper and Sorell argued for more general duties of being responsible for 
one's own health and behaving as a reasonable citizen in taking sensible precautions to 
avoid harming one's health and not abusing the health services. 45' Beyond that, they 
suggest that the voluntary and beneficial nature of the professional-patient relationship 
requires patients to `listen seriously' to the professional's advice and, if they agree with 
the advice, to follow it, 
452 
aas Op cit n. 441,118-119. Although the doctor's personal or clinical autonomy may not justify 
refusing treatment, the profession or the community may restrict some options on, for example, 
economic grounds. 
446 Lelie, A. Verweij, M. `Futility Without a Dichotomy: Towards an Ideal Physician-Patient 
Relationship' (2003) 17(1) Bioethics 21,27. 
447 Op cit n. 368,21-22. 
448 Op cit n. 446,27. 
449 Op cit n. 389. 
450 Meyer, M. J. Op cit n. 425,550-553. 
451 Op cit n. 430,341-345. 
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Beyond this, the very point of seeking medical assistance perhaps justifies an obligation 
on patients to allow the professional to confront apparently irrational decisions. If 
someone is asked for assistance it seems reasonable for that person to require the other to 
explain why an apparently irrational course of action deserves assistance. Even though 
acceding to the patient's request that turns out badly may not directly harm them, 
professionals may still have feelings of guilt and regret as a consequence because, unless 
HCPs are to act purely as technicians (without independent agency), then they share 
responsibility for a bad outcome. The duty to allow apparently irrational decisions to be 
challenged may also follow from the argument that each of us owes other members of the 
community a duty to behave in a morally responsible way, which includes considering 
the impact of one's decisions on others. 453 
A respect for professionals as beneficent and caring experts may require patients to 
explain their decisions and provide the motivating reasons allowing the HCP to 
understand the decision or to spot any factual or logical errors. Although consent is 
primarily predicated on respect for the patient it would be an unjustly one-sided 
relationship if professionals could not also claim some respect for their role from patients 
who have requested their assistance. However, if professionals are to justify such respect, 
they should be sensitive to the different narratives that professionals and patients bring to 
the encounter. This is particularly important where the decision is intimately connected to 
the patient's conception of self, life-plan or future goals. 454 This means that where 
patients' decisions seem unintelligible, while it is appropriate for professionals to 
question them, they should try to understand the decision from within the patient's 
453 Op cit n. 434,161. 
454 Hallenbeck, J. L. `What's the Story - How Patients Make Medical Decisions' (2002) 113 The 
, 4inerican Journal of Medicine 73,73-74. 
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narrative. As Hallenbeck cautioned: `what doesn't make sense from the outside may 
make sense from the inside'. 455 
An important feature of the professional-patient relationship, as far as patients are 
concerned, is the professional's trust. 456 This is important because professionals cannot be 
certain: 457 that patients have been open and honest; that patients will behave responsibly 
in using the information they have disclosed; and, that the apparently cooperative patient 
will follow their advice. Since HCPs lack complete control over their patients they have 
little choice but to trust their patients to some extent. However, they do have scope to act 
in a way that minimises their need to trust their patients. For example, they could 
deliberately withhold information or emphasise certain risks to manipulate their patients 
because they do not trust them to make the "right" decision. These consequences of 
distrust undermine patient autonomy and threaten the mutuality of the relationship and 
thus, it is arguable that professionals ought to trust their patients beyond the minimum 
level of unavoidable trust. 458 Although the law could regulate professional conduct to 
limit these undesirable consequences it seems reasonable to suggest that, because patients 
potentially benefit from the professional's trust, 459 patients should also support that trust 
by acting in a trustworthy manner, 460 which at least requires open and honest 
communication. 
461 
It is sometimes argued patients have an obligation to be autonomous. Schneider 
considered, and dismissed, four arguments in favour of mandatory autonomy: 
462 
The prophylaxis argument 
ass Ibid., 74. 
456 Op cit n. 362,2-3. 
457 Op cit n. 32,13. 
ass Op cit n. 332. 
459 White, S. M. `Consent for anaesthesia' (2003) 30 Journal of Medical Ethics 286,289. 
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The therapeutic argument 
The "false-consciousness" argument 
The moral argument. 
The prophylaxis argument `reasons that patients need to be encouraged to make their own 
decisions to prevent physicians from abusing their power'. 463 While professionals do 
indeed posses power they will not all seek to abuse their position and patients are not 
completely powerless and unsupported. 464 The very idea that patients are autonomous 
suggests they ought to be capable of dealing effectively with professionals. 465 However, 
this implies an all or nothing approach to autonomy while, as a capacity, it is a variable 
ability that may be modulated by the more powerful partner in a relationship. Although 
the professional is in a position to exploit the patient, this risk may be managed without 
needing to mandate autonomy. The organisation of the institution of healthcare, or - more 
locally - the hospital or surgery, may include checks and balances to minimise the risk of 
abuse. These arrangements can be supported by legal rules and by regulation that is 
sensitive to the possibility. It is perhaps telling that Schneider used the word `encourage' 
in his initial description of the problem, as it is one thing to encourage autonomy and 
something else to require it. 
The therapeutic argument `holds that patients should make their own ... 
decisions 
because they will benefit medically from doing so'. 466 Schneider criticised the view that 
greater control maximises health outcome because of the problems patients have in 
assimilating information and using it rationally. 467 However there is evidence to suggest 
that, if given appropriate information and decisional support, reasonably rational 
463 Ibid., 139. 
aha Ibid., 139-142; Nessa, J. `Autonomy and Dialogue: About the Patient-Doctor Relationship' in 
Thomasma, D. C. Weisstub, D. N. Herve, C. (eds. ) Personhood and Health Care (2001) Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers 355,360. 
465 Op cit n. 412,140. 
466 Ibid., 143. 
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decision-making is possible. 468 Furthermore, there is also empirical evidence 
demonstrating the beneficial effect of informing the patient and involving them in their 
care. 469 It is also true that too much information, especially in an unsupportive 
environment or in situations where the patient does not have the time to process it, may 
be at least as detrimental as too little information. 470 However, given the different 
psychology of patients even if information and control may be beneficial for some it will 
not be for all. Again, it may be better to encourage the patient to be autonomous rather 
than require it. 
The "false consciousness" arguments hold that patients who are reluctant to make their 
own treatment decisions would lose their reticence if they could be `freed from some 
enslaving delusion': 471 if they had not been conditioned into this way of thinking they 
would want to be autonomous. However, as Schneider noted, some of the reasons patients 
have for ceding the decision are `deep-seated', and may be difficult to shift without 
adopting coercive strategies that may cause more distress and harm than good. Some 
patients may be so profoundly conditioned that, in the limited time available in the 
healthcare setting, it may be impossible to ensure that a decision is autonomous. And, 
what could be done with the obstinate patient who steadfastly refuses to autonomously 
engage with the decision? Furthermore, it is paradoxical to suggest that someone should 
be coerced or forced to be autonomous. This problem is best tackled in the wider 
community by encouraging autonomy through education. In the healthcare context, 
patients might be encouraged to be autonomous and supported in their efforts but 
mandating autonomy is neither likely to be effective nor just. 
468 Hembroff, L. A. Holmes-Rovner, M. Wills, C. E. `Treatment decision-making and the form of 
risk communication: results of a factorial survey' (2004) 4 BMC Medical Informatics and 
Decision Making 20; Op cit n. 348,309. 
469 See, e. g. Valimaki, M. et al. Op cit n. 348; Williams, G. C. Rodin, G. C. Ryan, R. M. Grolnick, 
W. S. Deci, E. L. `Autonomous regulation and long-term medication adherence in adult outpatients' 
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The moral argument is that the essential connection between autonomy and identity 
creates a non-delegable duty to be self-determining. 472 Thus, all `life-defining' decisions, 
including medical ones, should be made autonomously. 473 However, as I argue below, it 
is possible to act autonomously but still cede certain decisions to those who, by virtue of 
their authority or expertise, are better placed to make a wise decision. This autonomously 
chosen dependence may be a necessary response to debilitating sickness and it may allow 
individuals to avoid decisions that would permanently damage their future autonomy. 
Furthermore, provided the decision to delegate is procedurally autonomous, responsibility 
is not transferred with the decision and individuals remain instrumental in constructing 
their identity. Finally, given the nature of our social existence and our relational inter- 
dependence, it is unlikely that we can completely avoid some form of dependency. The 
question then becomes whom we should depend on and not whether we should depend on 
anyone at all and avoiding dependence on the healthcare professional may unduly burden 
friends and relatives. 474 
The final argument might be termed the `logical' argument: mandatory autonomy 
requires patients to make their own decisions, which means they must listen to the 
rationally necessary information. Under the most extreme view, this must be 
communicated without recommendation or attempt to direct the patient, such as the non- 
directive counselling practised by some geneticists. 475 
I suggested, in chapter one, that there is a distinction between the right to waive 
information and the right to waive consent and that it might be rational, and hence 
472 Op cit n. 341,459. 
473 Op cit n. 412,151. 
474 Schneider recounts salutary tale of Ellen MacFarlane who, in seeking to be independent and in 
control heaped costly, emotional and time-consuming burdens on her family while refusing to 
allow them to make any suggestions about her treatment plan: Ibid., 178-179. 
475 Dworkin, R. B. `Getting What we should from Doctors: Rethinking Patient Autonomy and the 
Doctor-Patient Relationship' (2003) 13 Health Matrix 235,265. 
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reasonable, for patients to trust their HCP - as an expert - to make medical decisions for 
them. This means that there is no need for those patients to be provided with the 
background information required to make that decision. However, they cannot, in effect, 
waive their right to consent: because consent itself is a waiver, in order to waive their 
right to consent they must consent to not consenting. Because this is a recursive 
argument, the nature of consent means that it is inalienable, but only in the sense that the 
patient must make a decision - even if that decision is simply to allow someone else to 
make the actual treatment decision. Thus, an attempt to avoid any decision at all is 
impossible and that very limited aspect of autonomy is an obligation. However, it is a 
minimal obligation and does not require any medical information. It is enough that 
patients are aware that while they are not obliged to make the treatment decision they 
must make the decision not to decide, which carries the same legal and ethical 
responsibility as if they had made the treatment decision. 
The distinction between the two decisions reflects that between procedural and 
substantive dependence. For individuals to be autonomous, it is only necessary that they 
are procedurally independent. On this view, if the reasons for being substantively 
dependent are one's own then an individual may autonomously choose to be 
dependent. 476 A classic example of this is when Odysseus asks his sailors to tie him to his 
mast in order to avoid succumbing to the sirens' song and making the (non-autonomous) 
decision to sail towards them. In the same way, patients may recognise their decision- $'7 
making limitations and allow the professional to make the treatment decision for them. 
By ensuring that patients understand the ethico-legal implications of their decision, the 
professional ensures that they have sufficient knowledge to make an autonomous waiver 
and thus the idea of mandatory autonomy is severely constrained: patients are allowed to 
cede the treatment decision and professionals are permitted to recommend a treatment 
476 Haworth, L. Autonom}': An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics (1986) New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 20. 
477 Op cit 11.35,14-15. 
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choice, directively advise patients or try to persuade them to adopt the professional's 
preferred choice. 
Although the focus is usually on the professional's duties, I have argued that patients also 
have obligations to the professional. These obligations are justified on the basis of the 
patient's autonomy, the mutuality of the professional-patient relationship and the need to 
support the professional's trust. In the present context, perhaps the most relevant of these 
duties are, the duty to communicate openly, the duty to actively participate in the 
relationship, the duty to `listen seriously' to the professional's advice and the duty to 
make responsible decisions. These serve to facilitate autonomous decision-making and, if 
patients expect HCPs to respect and foster their autonomy, then it follows that they ought 
to act in a way that allows HCPs to fulfil their obligation. In moral terms these duties 
seem reasonable to expect of patients, especially as they themselves will usually benefit 
by fulfilling them. 478 However, there is no obligation on the patient to actually make all 
self-regarding decisions themselves and it is reasonable to rely on the professional's 
advice. All that autonomy requires of patients is that they decide whether to cede the 
treatment decision-making, share it or retain it. 
The Virtuous Patient 
In the subsequent section I will argue that the professionals should be encouraged to be 
virtuous. This also applies to patients. Virtues, such as wisdom, judgment, and autonomy 
increase the likelihood of acting autonomously. Other-regarding virtues, such as charity, 
justice, beneficence and `moral responsibility in the exercise of self-determination' favour 
a more relational or socially sensitive autonomy. This last virtue includes such 
dispositions as honesty, a willingness to actively engage in self-regarding decisions and a 
disposition to consider the impact of one's decisions on others. 479 
478 Meyer, M. J. Op cit n. 425,542. 
479 Op cif n. 179, at 278. 
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While the law is not well placed to affect these character traits it may facilitate the 
expression of virtuous dispositions and hinder the expression of vices. One approach 
would be to construct an ideal `virtuous patient' and then design the regulation of consent 
in a way that would encourage or require real patients to act similarly. By attending to the 
patient's character in this way, the principles and rules of law (and morality) could be 
supplemented. 480 Such a law would need to be drafted carefully as it would be easy to 
forget that the model is an ideal and requiring too much of real patients may significantly 
constrain their liberty. If, however, it is autonomy, rather than bare liberty, that is 
intrinsically valuable this concern need not be prohibitive . 
48 1 Because of the unbridgeable 
gap between the real and ideal patient the law should focus on facilitating - rather than 
requiring - expression of the relevant virtues. Similarly, it may be better to discourage 
rather than wholly prohibit expression of the vices. Nevertheless, the law may justifiably 
prohibit particular instances that express a vice. 
The Virtue of Professionalism and the Professional Virtues482 
MacDonald noted that: `The ability to do the things that physicians do depends crucially 
on a whole range of social relations and social institutions'. 
483 In other words, 
professional autonomy is mandated by the society that supports it. 
484 This means that 
professional autonomy is a privilege carrying with it certain obligations that require 
professionals to behave in concordance with the privilege. 
485 Thus, it is just for society to 
expect the profession to encourage its members to develop what might be called the 
virtue of professionalism. Furthermore, there is something more distinctly human, and 
480 Op cit n. 201,194. 
481 Op cit n. 476,13 1. 
482 This discussion is not intended to be comprehensive. Space only permits the briefest of 
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hence more appealing, about someone who is disposed to act well as a matter of character 
rather than someone who simply follows rules. 486 
The virtue of professionalism requires the professional to be inclined to develop the ideal 
characteristics of the virtuous professional, which may be derived from the professional's 
duties of care as determined by healthcare's goal or telos ('to cure illness and disease or, 
when this is not possible, to care for and help the patient to live with residual pain, 
discomfort, or disability')487 and from the recognition that the patient is a vulnerable 
moral agent. 488 This latter concern means that medicine must be about more than just the 
technical mastery of pathology. Furthermore, the inevitable necessity for the patient to 
trust the professional adds weight to the need for the professional to be disposed to act in 
a way that fulfils the spirit of the professional's obligations. 489 The virtuous professional 
is more likely to act in a way that preserves rather than destroys the patient's trust, both in 
the individual professional and the institution of healthcare as a whole. 
Doyal suggested that HCPs have three broad duties: `protect the life and health of their 
patients'; `respect the autonomy of their patients'; and `do both of these things in a fair 
and just way'. 49° The first duty points to the virtues of caring, compassion, 
conscientiousness, and benevolence. As a virtue, caring for someone is to be concerned 
with helping another to `achieve authenticity' by supporting or restoring that person's 
autonomy . 
491 Thus, the virtue of caring disposes the professional to pay due heed to the 
patient's autonomy. The danger is that care may become oppressive and controlling 
where the subject of care is dominated by the carer. 492 But a similar danger threatens 
486 Griffin, J. 'Virtue Ethics and Environs' in: Paul, E. F. Miller, F. D. Paul, J. (eds) Virtue and Vice 
(1998) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 56,58. 
487 Op cit n. 201,52-53. 
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49 ' Kultgen, J. Autonomy and Intervention. - Parentalism in the Caring Life (1995) New York: 
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many other virtues unless moderated by prudence. For Pellegrino and Thomasma 
compassion `is an essential virtue of medicine', 493 and requires professionals to identify 
with the patient's suffering so as to assist `the patient to balance her assessment of what is 
good with the good that medicine can offer'. 494 Benevolence is the virtue that predisposes 
professionals to place the `good of the patient above the preferences the professional 
espouses'. 
495 
The second duty requires virtuous professionals to be open, honest, empathetic, and to 
have integrity. Integrity as a virtue refers to the idea of `moral wholeness' or the 
willingness and sensitivity necessary to respect others as moral agents. 496 It disposes 
virtuous persons to act in a morally sensitive and consistent way. Temperance and 
humility may also have a role to play in countering any tendency in professionals to over- 
confidence in their competence and knowledge, and their ability to know what is best for 
their patients. 497 Tolerance may also be a relevant virtue. Ulrich suggested that the 
tolerant person will be predisposed to negotiate rather than ride roughshod over people 
whose values appear to conflict with their own. 498 This is clearly relevant if the 
professional-patient relationship is to be co-operative and caring. 
The third duty can only be fulfilled if HCPs have the virtues of justice and prudence (or 
practical wisdom). 499 Justice is concerned with ensuring each person is given their due, 
including due respect, 50° and is engaged in knowing how to act fairly when patient 
autonomy threatens harm to other parties. 50' The virtue of justice also concerns the 
disposition to treat each patient equitably and, given that healthcare is essentially 
493 Op cit n. 201,79. 
494 Op cit n. 201,8 1. 
495 Op cit n. 23 1,110. 
496 Op cit n. 201,132. 
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beneficent, it is arguable that equity should be determined by reference to need and 
capacity to benefit. Furthermore, given the beneficent telos of medicine, and the altruism 
inherent in any profession, the virtue of justice, along with the virtue of self-effacement, 
would also dispose professionals to act in their patient's interest rather than in self- 
interest. 502 Prudence is an essential virtue because it disposes virtuous professionals to 
grasp the goal of any interaction and to make appropriate use of reason to guide their 
actions towards that end. so3 In doing this prudence moderates the expression of the 
person's other virtues. 504 
In addition to these three duties, Pellegrino and Thomasma argued that because trust is 
crucial to the professional-patient relationship, professionals have an obligation of 
`fidelity to trust', which has a corresponding virtue and is necessary for them to be 
trustworthy. 505 This `fidelity to trust' requires HCPs to try to understand the patient as a 
person, to avoid manipulation and deception, and to be sensitive to the patient's 
vulnerabilities. It both supports and provides a backdrop for the professional's substantive 
obligations and thus it `intersects' with other virtues. sob In this it is supported by the virtue 
of fortitude, 507 which counters any temptation to take the path of least resistance in the 
face of a moral challenge and so encourages consistency and reliability, both of which are 
important to trust. 
External Factors 
Although the professional-patient relationship provides the contextual setting for the 
regulation of consent the relationship cannot be considered in isolation from the external 
factors that affect it. These include the interaction between the patient and important 
502 Ibid., 105,144. 
503 Op cit n. 231,107. 
504 Op cit n. 201,85. 
505 Ibid., 75. See also: Gardiner, P. 'A virtue ethics approach to moral dilemmas in medicine' 
(2003) 29 Journal of Medical Ethics 297,299. 
506 Op cif n. 201,76. 
507 Ibid.. 114. 
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others; the relevance of a team approach to healthcare; the organisation and behaviour of 
the institution; the politics of healthcare and the regulation of consent. Other important 
constraints are the impact of social conditioning and education, the effects of which may 
explain why older patients and those from a lower social class are more likely to prefer 
their interactions to be directed by the healthcare professional. 508 Since the whole thesis 
deals with regulating consent my focus here is on the other factors. 
It is important for the law to take into account the relevance of third parties to the 
relationship. Patients may be empowered by the support of relevant others who can help 
them understand the information, facilitate decision-making and provide emotional 
support. 509 However, just as third parties can be supportive they can also undermine the 
patient's autonomy by placing unfair emotional pressure on the patient or trying to 
manipulate the patient's decision to suit their own ends. 510 
The healthcare institution may influence patient autonomy in two ways. The first is its 
attitude towards patient autonomy and consent. If little value is given to consent then that 
approach will filter down and it may become a low priority for the healthcare 
professionals working directly with the patient. 51' While this may have been the usual 
attitude 20-30 years ago the increasing burden of litigation512 and the recent high profile 
incidents, such as the Shipman case, and the Bristol heart surgery and organ retention 
scandals, have perhaps made healthcare providers place more value on consent. However, 
508 Op cit n. 349,868. 
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place for a lawyer is on the operating table': Department of Health Press Release, 29 th April 1998. 
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this value has become defensive as evidenced by the rise of risk management, which 
makes the avoidance of litigation a prominent - if not the primary - value of consent. 
513 
Recent guidance from the Medical Defence Union, the Association of Anaesthetists and 
the Department of Health reflects this defensive approach to consent by focusing 
primarily on the minimal requirements of the law and the legal and professional 
consequences of failing to gain an adequate consent. 514 While this bias is understandable 
it encourages an undesirable adversarial tone. 
The second way in which the healthcare provider may influence patient autonomy is in 
the actual delivery of care. This includes a restriction of choices available to the patient 
and the practical organisation of healthcare delivery. Consider, for example, the provision 
of day surgery. Unless anaesthetists are given sufficient opportunity to see patients before 
the operation they may be unable to adequately counsel them, make them aware of the 
available choices and obtain an adequate consent. While this could be amalgamated with 
the consent for the surgical procedure, the surgeon is unlikely to be able to properly 
discuss the options available, which may be restricted either because of the patient's 
health or the experience of the anaesthetist. In the absence of a pre-admission clinic, the 
anaesthetist's only contact with the patient may be on the day of the operation. This may 
only allow a hurried chat in the anaesthetic room while the operating department 
practitioner is applying the monitoring equipment, which is hardly conducive to an 
autonomous decision. While it would be both impractical and presumptuous for the law 
to dictate such practical arrangements, it might, through the use of a code of practice, and 
a regulatory/advisory body encourage the development of systems that are more sensitive 
to and facilitative of patient autonomy and consent. 
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511 This example also highlights the relevance of a team approach to healthcare, which 
adds a level of complexity to the preceding discussion for two reasons. First, it may mean 
that many of the relationships are short lived, which perhaps makes a relationship of trust 
more difficult to establish unless the trust predates the relationship. Second, if different 
professionals, each of whom is independently responsible, carry out different elements of 
the patient's care then this raises questions about their responsibilities for seeking the 
patient's consent. 
Individual HCPs may not be sufficiently conversant with the different interventions to 
inform and advise the patient. For example, should surgeons with little formal training in 
anaesthetics counsel the patient about the pros and cons of different options, assuming 
that they are even aware that those options exist? But, if anaesthetists are to take that 
responsibility then there needs to be appropriate practical arrangements that allow 
patients sufficient time to reflect on the available choices. Furthermore, consideration 
needs to be given to whether these elements of care require separate consents or are 
subsumed by a more general consent to the care plan as a whole. 
Finally, patients may see their care holistically and raise questions about an aspect of care 
that the professional currently counselling them will not be providing. By answering the 
question HCPs may step on their colleagues' toes and may not give the same answer that 
their colleague would have given. This could cause misunderstanding and confusion. 
Furthermore, it is important for patients to know who is responsible for each aspect of 
their care so that they know who to approach for advice and who to contact if there is a 
problem. Essentially, all of these issues create problems of coordination and 
communication, which means that it is not enough for the Individual professional to 
515 Black, C. Craft, A. 'The competent doctor: a paper for discussion' (2004) 4 Clinical Medicine 
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behave well. It is equally important to ensure that an appropriate system is in place and 
that someone is responsible for that system. 516 
Finally, it is important to recognise the necessary relationship between politics and 
consent. "' For example, if healthcare is provided within a true market system, patients 
may be treated as consumers and their legal protection based on the libertarian conception 
of autonomy with greater demands for independent patient choice and decision-making. 
In such a system, responsibility for outcome might be more tightly linked to consent but 
the principle of caveat emptor may be more relevant, tilting the balance from the 
professional's duty to disclose to the patient's responsibility to ask questions. 
Furthermore, the emphasis would more likely focus on rights rather than obligations and 
this may increase the possibility of litigation and introduce an adversarial element into 
what perhaps ought to be a cooperative encounter. Exacerbating this, a market approach 
will encourage a commodification of healthcare with practice driven by financial 
concerns rather than the community's health needs. In the market environment there is a 
risk that a 'factory model of care' will pay more attention to a high throughput of patients 
than to the psychosocial or ethical interests. 518 
On the other hand, if the healthcare system is provided by the state and based on a social 
ethic then autonomy may be seen in a more relational sense, with the focus on obligations 
rather than rights. Responsibility for outcome may be more readily divorced from the 
patient's consent. Taking this to a more extreme communitarian system, utility becomes 
more important, the issue of individual consent becomes less relevant and responsibility 
for outcome is borne by the community as whole rather than any single patient. It is, of 
course, possible for the state to pragmatically adopt a mixed approach rather than commit 
to a purer political vision. However, this can still only be achieved if it is clear what is 
516 Ibid., 530. 
517 Maclean, A. R. 'Consent and Sensibility' (2005) 4 International Journal of Ethics 3 1. 
518 Op cif n. 44 1. 
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wanted from the healthcare system. For example, is it more important to maximise patient 
throughput or should the emphasis be on how those patients are treated as persons? Is 
choice more important than quality or equity? "' How much money are we willing to 
spend on health and do external financial constraints justify withholding treatment that 
the patient wants? 520 What the community, wants from its healthcare system - and what it 
is prepared to pay for - inevitably affects the approach to consent as much as it affects the 
provision of any of the more tangible resources. "' 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined the professional-patient relationship as a context for regulating 
consent. I argued that a good relationship requires mutual trust and mutual respect. Both 
parties come to the relationship as autonomous persons. However, the professionals' 
autonomy is constrained by the ethics of their profession. Perhaps the most important 
consequence of the relationship is that it generates obligations for both parties. While 
HCPs should respect and support their patients' autonomy they should not abandon them 
to unwise and harmful decisions. Although they do not have the authority to override a 
competent patient's decision, HCPs have a duty to use rational persuasion to guide the 
patient towards a mutually acceptable outcome. In order to facilitate this process, patients 
should also be open and honest with their HCPs, they should be prepared to explain their 
decisions and be willing to listen to their HCPs' advice. The mutual trust and respect 
needed for this process means that both HCPs and their patients should behave in a 
trustworthy way. However, because of the difficulties of encapsulating these obligations 
in rules, attention must be directed to the HCP's character. In order to apply the rules of 
consent in practice, HCPs should be encouraged to develop the virtue of professionalism. 
5 19 Appleby, J. Harrison, A. Devlin, N. What is the Real Cost of More Patient Choice? (2003) 
London: King's Fund, 1-4,32-35. 
520 Pollock argues that the present Government's policies are already driving the NHS towards this 
approach: Pollock, A. M. NHSplc. - The Privatisation of Our Health Care (2004) London: Verso. 
The reference to the 'factory model' is on p. 20 1. 
521 See the discussion in: White, S. M. Op cit n. 459,289-290. 
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The institution of healthcare must be organised to facilitate the practice of these 
obligations. However, as a final caveat, it is acknowledged that the conception of consent 
and its implementation are ultimately political and depend on what the community wants 
from its healthcare system and how much it is prepared to pay. 
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Chapter Four: The Concept of Consent - what it is and what it isn't 
In the first three chapters of the thesis I discussed the ethical basis and practical context of 
consent to medical treatment. I argued that the primary justification for consent is the 
patient's autonomy but that the context of the professional-patient relationship constrains 
the implications of that autonomy. On entering the relationship both the professional and 
the patient acquire certain obligations towards the other party that shape how the patient's 
autonomy is given effect. In this chapter I will explore the concept of consent itself 
bearing in mind the arguments and conclusions of the earlier chapters. 
This chapter is a necessary part of the thesis because, as Larry Alexander noted: 'consent 
is woefully underanalyzed in the legal and philosophical literature'. 522 It is essential to 
understand consent for four reasons. First, without an insight into consent any attempt to 
determine the regulation of consent will be flawed. Second, arguments advanced about 
consent may in fact be about a primary underlying claim right rather than about consent 
per se. This type of argument will remain hidden and inadequately dealt with unless it is 
exposed and to do this requires recognition of both the meaning and extent of consent. 
Third, an understanding of consent and its requirements is necessary to predict the 
interaction between consent and the provision of healthcare. Fourth, elucidation of 
consent will then allow a critique of the current law. 
A preliminary definition 
The Oxford English Dictionary lists consent as both a verb and a noun. As a verb, it has 
two senses. The first sense is 'to agree together ... to come to agreement upon a matter or 
as to a course of action'. The second sense is 'to agree to a proposal, request etc 
voluntarily to accede to or acquiesce in what another proposes or desires'. Etymologically 
522 Alexander, L. 'Introduction to Issues 2 and 3: Symposium on Consent in Sexual Relations' 
(1996) 2 Legal Theory 87. 
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the word derives from the Latin conjunction of con, meaning 'together' with sentire, 
meaning 'to feel, think orjudge'. Thus, it is the first sense of the word that is closest to 
the original meaning of the term. As a noun, the only current use is as: 'voluntary 
agreement to or acquiescence in what another proposes or desires; compliance, 
concurrence, permission', which is closest in meaning to the second sense of the verb 
consent. 
It is interesting that the earliest use of the word refers to shared decision-making while the 
later use refers to a proposal and voluntary acceptance of that proposal. In its role as a 
check on physician autonomy this etymological development is reversed. Thus, the 
traditional use of the word is to refer to the patient voluntarily agreeing to undergo the 
treatment proposed by the doctor. With the early attacks on paternalism this meaning of 
consent was championed as a shield for patient rights. When this shield was swapped for 
a sword and the requirements of individual autonomy taken to an extreme some 
commentators felt that both doctors and patients suffered, which led to a move away from 
perceiving consent as two parties negotiating a 'contract' at arms length. Instead, these 
writers championed the cause of shared decision-making and called for a 'therapeutic 
alliance'. 523 
In the previous chapters I argued that the patient's autonomy grounds the right to give or 
withhold consent but that this right must be framed by the mutual obligations arising from 
the professional-patient relationship. A reasonable conception of consent ought to take 
both of these factors into account. Thus, it is arguable that both senses of consent are 
relevant: while the patient must give or withhold consent this decision is not free-floating 
but is made as part of an ongoing relationship. 
523 Teff, H. 'Consent to Medical Procedures: Paternalism, Self-determination or Therapeutic 
Alliance' (1985) 101 The Lmv Quarterly Review 432. 
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In both senses of the word it initially appears that an agreement lies at the very heart of 
the concept of consent. Gillon noted that the simple idea of an agreement is only one of 
two possible meanings of consent. However, consent as a simple agreement 'is not 
relevant to medical interventions'. 524 For him: 
consent means a voluntary, uncoerced decision, made by a sufficiently 
competent or autonomous person on the basis of adequate information 
and deliberation, to accept rather than reject some proposed course of 
action that will affect him or her. 525 
Meisel and Kuczewiski, however, preferred to see consent as a 'sharedprocess of 
decision making'. 526 For them, this was important because: 'conceived as a process of 
shared decision making, informed consent can accommodate both patient autonomy and 
the physician's responsibility for the well-being of the patient'. 527 In the context of 
consent to research, Horton noted the danger of consent being seen as an adversarial 
procedure. He suggested, that the patient's consent should be seen as the 'outcome' of 'an 
528 
extended consent process [that] would bind both patient and doctor closer together'. 
This perhaps combines both senses of consent into an open ended and iterative process. 
At this stage, I will propose two primitive definitions of consent: 
Consent 1: An agreement, by the patient, to undergo an intervention offered by the 
HCP. 
Consent 2. - A mutually arrived at agreement to an intervention that the patient will 
undergo. 
524 Op cit n. 40,113. 
125 Ibid., 113. 
526 Meisel, A. Kuczewiski, M. 'Legal and Ethical Myths About Informed Consent' (1996) 156 
Archives of Internal Medicine 2521,2522. 
527 Ibid., 2522. 
S28 Horton, R. 'The context of consent' (1994) 344 Lancet 211,212. 
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There is a problem with both of these primitive definitions since, as Gilbert argued: 'an 
agreement is, in effect, ajoint decision'. Such ajoint decision entails 'Joint acceptance' of 
the agreed action(s), which, in turn, 'requires ... a "joint commitment"' . 
129 For Gilbert 
both parties possess a mutual obligation to honour the agreement, which means that 
neither party may withdraw unilaterally . 
53' The difficulty here is that it is accepted that 
persons giving a consent to a breach of bodily integrity may withdraw their consent and 
with it the permission that justifies action. If Gilbert is correct about an agreement then 
this may make unacceptable a unilateral withdrawal of consent. 
In one sense, consent operates to create mutual obligations and properly constitutes 
'agreement'. This is the situation when contracts are created, and is also the sense of 
consent when the HCP agrees to provide treatment. In the current context, however, 
because our bodies are so fundamentally important to our self-identity and autonomy, it 
seems inequitable to hold a patient to his consent. This means that consent to medical 
treatment is either not an agreement or it is a particular kind of agreement that does not 
impose a binding Obligation on the consenter. The difficulty with this latter position is 
that it threatens to undermine fatally the social and normative meaning of 'agreement'. 
This suggests that perhaps it is better to conceptuallse consent in this context as 
something other than, or in addition to, an agreement. 
As noted earlier, consent has two senses and both seem relevant to an exercise of the 
patient's autonomy within the context of the professional -patient relationship. The 
mutuality of the relationship suggests the relevance of both parties' involvement and 
agreement, while respect for the patient's autonomy is reflected through the control 
allowed by consent as permission. Thus, it may be appropriate to acknowledge that 
529 Gilbert, M. 'Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation' (1993) 103 (4) Ethics 679,691. 
530 Ibid., 693. 
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patient decision-making involves both consent as an agreement (consentA) and consent as 
permission (consentp). The agreements between professionals and their patients arise at 
an earlier stage of the encounters and are precursors to consentp. While consentA creates 
obligations, consentp acts by waiving the obligation of non- interference with the patient ,s 
body. 
One potential problem with 'permission' is its connection with *permit'. Where someone 
permits an act this may imply an active grant of a power to act that, like consentp, 
removes the moral and legal prohibition on acting, assuming the person giving permission 
has the right to do so. Alternatively, permit may mean a passive submission or failure to 
resist. Although submission may follow - and, in certain circumstances, imply - consentp 
there are other reasons for failing to resist including violence, force and coercion. Such a 
submission would not affect the moral or legal status of the act and would not, therefore 
amount to consentp. 53 1 As Coleridge J stated: 'Every consent to an act involves a 
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submission-, but it by no means follows that a mere submission involves consent'. 
Thus, a distinction must be made between passively 'permitting something' and actively 
`giving permission'. 
The primitive definitions might be revised as follows: 
Consent 1: Permission given by the patient for the HCP to undertake the intervention 
on offer. 
Consent 2. - Permission given by the patient for the HCP to undertake the intervention 
previously determined by a mutually arrived at agreement. 
531 See, e. g. St George's Healthcare NHS Trust vS[ 1998] 3 WLR 936,949. 
532 Rv Day (1841) 173 ER 1026. 
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Attribute A: Effect: 
Value: Removes the HCP's obligation of non- interference 
The Nature and Function of Consent to Medical Treatment 
There appear to be three broad views of the nature of consent. 533 First, it may be a mental 
state. For Hurd, 'consent must essentially constitute an act of will -a subjective ... [and] 
purposive mental state possessed of propositional content'. 534 Similarly, Alexander stated 
that: 'consent ... must be the exercise of the will and, thus, a subjective mental state 
[and] ... that it is an "intentional" mental state ... not equivalent to states of belief or 
535 136 desire'. And for O'Neill, 'consent is apropositional attitude'. Second, consent may 
be seen as an intentional act. Wertheimer, for example, suggested that 'consent is 
537 
performative rather than attitudinal'. Others, for pragmatic reasons, have suggested that 
538 
consent is both a state of mind and a signifying act. Thus, Sherwin argued that consent 
is a 'social act', but one whose 'object is to express a particular mental act'. 539 
The categorisation of consent as a mental state or as an intentional act perhaps reflects the 
distinction between law and morality. As McGregor noted: 'consent would not make 
legal sense as a demarcation if it was merely a function of a person's mental attitudes, 
140 
with no epistemological access necessary, or even possible, for its presence'. If consent 
were simply a mental state and was not communicated, it would be impossible for an 
actor to know whether or not the other party was consenting to the act. In the absence of 
such knowledge it would be wrong to act and the actor may be considered legally 
533 Op cit n. 522; Wertheimer, A. 'What is Consent? And Is It Important? ' (2000) 3 Buffalo 
Criminal Law Review 557,566. 
534 Hurd, H. M. 'The Moral Magic of Consent' (1996) 2 Legal Theory 121. 
535 Alexander, L 'The Moral Magic of Consent (11)' (1996) 2 Legal Theory 165. 
536 Op cit n. 32,43. 
537 Wertheimer, A. 'Consent and Sexual Relations' (1996) 2 Legal Theory 89,94. 
538 Malm, H. H. 'The Ontological Status of Consent and its Implications for the Law on Rape' 
(1996) 2 Legal Theory 147. 
539 Sherwin, E. 'Infelicitous Sex' (1996) 2 Legal Theory 209,209,217. 
540 McGregor, J. 'Why When She Says No She Doesn't Mean Maybe and Doesn't Mean Yes: A 
Critical Reconstruction of Consent, Sex, and the Law' (1996) 2 Legal Theory 175,193. 
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culpable. A consideration of the act, which would only make sense from a moral 
perspective, would find that it was not morally wrong. From the legal perspective, 
however, the actor must have some reason for believing that the other party is consenting. 
This is true whether the actor's belief is tested objectively or subjectively. 
An examination of the work expected of consent may indicate whether it is best seen as a 
mental state, intentional act or a combination. Traditionally, consent either legitimates an 
otherwise forbidden act and/or it creates new obligations. As a creator of obligations, 
consent is crucial to an agreement (or contract). 541 Consent's other role is to provide a 
rights-bearer with control of that right, which it does by transforming an illegitimate act 
into a permitted one. As Alexander stated: 'consent functions as a "moral transformative" 
by altering the obligations and permissions that determine the rightness of others' 
actions'. 542 Hurd went further than this and argued that: 'when we give consent, we create 
143 
rights for others'. This claim, while it may be true for consentA. is over inclusive. For 
consentp, it is perhaps more accurate to view consent as generating permissions rather 
144 
than rights per se. Although some of those permissions may also grant rights this will 
not be universally so. For example, consider the consentp given to a surgeon to perform 
an operation. This does not give the surgeon a right to operate since the patient still 
retains sufficient control of his or her right to bodily integrity to withdraw permission, In 
this context consentp operates as a fonn of waiver rather than as a transfer of a right. 
545 
In her discussion of consentp in the context of rape law, Hurd suggested that it alters the 
morality of another's actions in two ways. First, she posited that 'consent can ftinction to 
transform the morality of another's conduct - to make an action right when it would 
511 Young, P. W. The Law of Consent (1986) The Law Book Co Ltd: North Ryde (NSW), 3. 
542 Op cit n. 535. 
543 Op cit n. 534. 
544 McConnell, T. Inalienable Rights: The Limits of Consent in Medicine and the Law (2000) New 
York: Oxford University Press, 8. 
515 Ibid. See also: Sherwin, E. Op cit n. 539,217. 
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otherwise be wrong', Second, she claimed that: 'consent can generate a permission that 
allows another to do a wrong act ... [This] does not morally transform a wrong act into a 
right act, but it grants another a right to do a wrong'. 546 Both claims are problematic. 
Hurd's first suggestion is flawed because she assumes that since doing a non-permitted 
act would be wrong it must be right to perform a permitted act. This is wrong because it 
places the whole normative judgment at consent's door. This ascribes consent too much 
power, Consent simply prevents an act being a wrong against the consenter. This does not 
affect the rightness or wrongness of the act more generally. Thus, if it is wrong to kill for 
reasons other than simply infringing bodily integrity, the 'victim's' consent does not alter 
the wrongness of the act. For a couple not wanting children, consent to unprotected sex 
does not make it 'right'. It arguably remains morally wrong for being an irresponsible act. 
If the act is not inherently wrong but is only forbidden because it affects something over 
which I have the right of control, then consent makes the act morally permissible. Even 
here, however, consent is unable to alter the inherent value of an act. Giving consent does 
not make an inherently bad act - nor even a morally neutral act - good. All it does is give 
permission for the act. The same is true in relation to the legal function of consent. As 
West notes: '[consent] converts the illegal act into a legal one, but doesn't convert the 
illegal one into something of value'. 
547 
Hurd's second mechanism is similarly flawed. As an example, Hurd utilised the 'wrong' 
of abortion as a form of contraception. 548 While the woman's consent pen-nits the doctor 
to perform an abortion it is only by virtue of the fact the woman herself is permitted to act 
'wrongly' that she may give another permission to assist her in that act. However, where 
546 Op cit n. 534,123. 
547 West, R. 'A Comment on Consent, Sex, and Rape' (1996) 2 Legal Theory 233,250. This 
statement is equally valid if 'illegal' and 'legal' are replaced by immoral and moral. 
548 Op cit n. 534,123-124. 
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the consenter has no right to do something then his or her consent is ineffective in 
granting the actor permission. For example, if my car has no road tax my consent cannot 
give you permission to drive it on a public road . 
549Furthermore, even when persons are 
permitted to do a particular act, it is not always the case that they can transfer that 
permission to another. I may be permitted to cut off my own leg. However, without 
external justification (such as the leg is gangrenous and you are a surgeon) I cannot give 
you a legally effective permission to perform the amputation. 550 
Hurd's explanation of how consent works is too broad because it ignores the fact that 
consent is insufficient as a normative too] to justify all acts. Some acts are justified 
irrespective of the person's consent, such as treatment for infectious diseases that are a 
public health hazard; 'sectioning' the dangerously mentally ill; and incarcerating 
convicted criminals. Other acts - such as routine therapeutic medical procedures - will be 
justified only if consensual. "' Finally, there are acts that consent cannotjustify. From a 
legal perspective, these include consent to be killed or maimed. While this third group 
may be larger from a legal rather than a moral perspective, it is also arguable that there 
are morally wrong acts that cannot be justified or excused by the 'victim's' consent. 
Consider someone who consents to be killed. If that person is healthy, with obligations 
towards a partner and young children, then it is wrong to kill him or herself Even if that 
person consents to being killed by another, it would be wrong of that other to kill him or 
her. While consent may give actors permission it cannot relieve them of their duty to 
make - and take responsibility for - an independent moral judgment. A valid consent does 
mean that the consenters have no right to complain if they are harmed by the act: consent 
affects the wrongness of an act within the context of the relationship between actor and 
549 Although this is a legal argument the same example would support a moral argument since, if 
you have never driven before you will place yourself, and perhaps others, at risk. My consent 
cannot make it right for you to risk anyone's health. This is especially true where third parties are 
placed at risk. 
550 Consider, for example, the moral dilemma, irrespective of their ability to give a competent 
consent, raised by patients with body dysmorphic syndrome who request such an amputation. "' I am only discussing the competent adult here. 
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consenter. It does not, however, affect the wrongness of an act if that wrongness is 
external to the relationship. 
It is apparent then, that consent acts to transforrn the status of an act between the actor 
and the consenter. It removes the consenter's right to complain about the act. For some 
acts consent provides the necessary justification and where those acts are beneficial in 
nature consent transforrns the act into a morally good one. Consent, however, is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to make an act 'good'. 552 Where a person is unable to consent the 
act is still justified if it is in the person's 'best interests'. 553 Where an act is 'wrong' then 
consent is unable to make it right or even justify the act. Where the act is seen as a serious 
wrong, such as killing a person for whom life is not seen as harmful, then consent is 
wholly ineffective and both the act and the actor are condemned. Where an act is seen as 
a less serious harm the act remains wrong but the person's consent may excuse the actor 
from moral blame. Thus, while consent may be sufficient to alter the rights and 
obligations between the actor and the consenter, it is insufficient to make a wrong act 
right. 
Too much may be demanded of consent if it is treated as a primary right, equivalent in 
nature to the right to life or the right to bodily integrity. To discuss consent in this way is 
mistaken. "' Consent is not a right in the same sense as these other rights. It is not 
something possessed equally by all persons within the rights-holding community. Persons 
wlio are incapable of giving or withholding consent still possess the right to bodily 
integrity but it is not necessary to gain their consent before, for example, subjecting them 
to an operation. Allowing others to provide proxy consent goes someway to creating the 
552 Op cit n. 537,90. 
553 The 'best interests' test is not without its problems but this is not the place to discuss those 
problems. Sometimes an act may also be justified on utilitarian grounds e. g. the treatment and 
isolation of a person suffering from a highly contagious disease. 554 Brownsword, R. 'The Cult of Consent: Fixation and Fallacy' (2004) 15 King's College Law 
Journal 223,225. 
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trapression that the right may be more similar to the primary rIght than it actually IS. 155 
Consent, however, is a derivative or secondary right. In the absence of a right to bodil, -,., 
integrity, consent would not be required to give someone permission to interfere xN ith our 
bodies. Thus, unlike these other rights, consent is contingent. Furthermore, unlike the 
other rights it is dependent on the person's ability or their status. In this way, consent is 
perhaps best seen as an aspect of all other rights that arises because it is inherent to the 
concept of a right that someone, usually the right-holder, has control over it. This is 
important because it means that no one can consent to something unless they have a right 
that may be waived or alienated. In this context, consent reflects the negative aspect of 
liberty. 
Apart from operating either to legitimate an action or to create an obligation, consent may 
also affect responsibility for the outcome of the action. 556 It might be thought that 
responsibility necessarily travels with consent, "' but there is no reason why this should 
be the case, If I give you consent to use my bicycle, there is no prima facie reason why I 
should be responsible for any damage you might cause to my bicycle. However, it is 
certainly arguable that I should be responsible for the 'wear and tear' that is the natural 
558 
and foreseeable consequence of use . For consequences that 
do not necessarily follow 
from the act consented to it is arguable that the actor should bear responsibility where he 
is morally or legally culpable. If you damage my bike because you ride at night without 
lights then you should be responsible for the damage that results. This is because, whether 
or not you act negligently is - at least partly -a consequence of your agency and not a 
... It is arguable that, because consent is derivative on a right, that proxy consent is a misnomer 
that is more akin to authorisation than consent. See: Final Report of the Independent Review 
Group on Retention of Organs at Post-Mortem (200 1) Edinburgh: Scottish Executive Health 
Department, 16. 
556 See for example: Schuck, P. H. 'Informed Consent in the U. S.: Perspectives from Tort Law', in: 
Westerhall, L. Phillips, C. (eds. ) Patient's Rights -Informed consent, access and equality (1994) 
Stockholm: Nerenius & Santerus Publishers 3833,391, where it is argued that the person giving 
consent assumes responsibility for risk. 
557 Epstein, M. 'Why effective consent presupposes autonomous authorisation: a counterorthodox 
argument' (2006) 32 Journal of Medical Ethics 342,344. 
558 It is open to the parties to negotiate other arrangements should they wish. 
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necessary consequence of my own agency, in the shape of my consent. The 'wear and 
tear' damage is different since it is entailed by your exercise of the permission I have 
granted. 
159 A third type of consequence results from luck. Certain things that happen do so outside 
of anyone's control or influence and may be put down to good or bad luck. '60 If it 
happens that you ride over a nail, puncturing one of the tyres on my bicycle, who should 
be responsible for repairing the damage? Certainly, if you have taken my bike without 
consent, it would be your responsibility. However, does my consent cause that 
responsibility to shift to me? The answer to this is that it perhaps depends more on 
convention and political stance than on any underlying moral argument. Both parties have 
exercised agency and the damage is nobody's fault. It might seem unfair that either party 
should be held responsible but, by default, if responsibility is allowed to lie where it falls 
it will be me, the bicycle owner, who will be shouldered with the cost of the repair. One 
option is to argue that it might depend on who benefits most from the act, or alternatively, 
who would gain from good luck. 
561 
Consider a person who consents to a non-therapeutic research intervention. In this case, 
the person giving consent does not stand to gain from the act in any direct sense . 
562 It is 
both society and the researcher who gain. Society gains by the advancement in medical 
science while the researcher gains prestige and improves his potential for career 
advancement. Under these circumstances, it might be thought unfair to allow the research 
subject to bear the responsibility for injury caused by bad luck. Instead, he should be 
compensated either by society or the researcher, since it is those parties that stand to gain 
most from the research. It is perhaps for this reason that the Declaration of Helsinki 
559 Honoi-6, T. 'Responsibility and Luck' (1988) 104 LQR 530. 
560 Op cit. n. 270. 
56 1 Nagel, T. 'Moral Luck', in: Mortal Questions (1979) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
24; Op cit n. 559; Cane, P. Responsibility in Law and Morality (2002) Oxford: Hart Publishing, 76. 
562 Ignoring the speculative psychological benefits accruing from an altruistic act. 
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states: 'the responsibility for the human subject must always rest with a medically 
qualified person and never rest on the subject of the research, even though the subject has 
given consent'. 563 However, where consent is to conventional medical treatment, it is the 
patient who stands to benefit and thus it is the patient who accepts responsibility for the 
outcome caused by bad luck. 
164 
Although consent is neither necessary nor sufficient to shift responsibility for outcome 
from the actors, where they require the other party's consent to legitimise their action 
then consent is necessary to allow that party to be included in the apportionment of 
responsibility. Once a valid consent is given, responsibility for outcome is determined by 
principles of justice. This, of course, is not to say that pragmatic arguments could not 
affect legal responsibility for the outcome. For example, it might be argued that, in order 
to reduce the costs and inefficiencies of the legal system, a no-fault compensation system 
should be established. Whatever approach is taken to outcome responsibility, it is 
important to recognise that any harm consequential to the intervention is distinct from the 
harm to the patient's autonomy caused by an infringement of the right to consent. This 
separation will become relevant when I consider the way the law has developed to 
regulate risk disclosure through the tort of negligence. 
I now return to the fundamental nature of consent. As noted earlier, there are three 
competing views of consent: that it is a state of mind, a signifying act or a state of mind 
evidenced by an appropriate act. It may be thought that since consent is predicated on 
autonoMY, 565 which in turn requires free will, it must at least be a state of mind . 
566Where 
563 Principle 15, Declaration of Helsinki 1964 (as amended, Edinburgh 2000). 
564 Dickenson, D. Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics (199 1) Avebury: Aldershot, 
99. This may be dependent on awareness of risk. See: Agell, A. 'The Conceptual Relationship 
between Medical Malpractice and the Lack of Informed Consent', in: Westerhall, L. Phillips, C. 
(eds. ) Patients'Rights -Informed consent, access and equality (1994) Stockholm: Nerenius & 
Santerus Publishers 85,94. 
565 See: Bogart, J. H. 'Commodi fi cation and Phenomenology: Evading Consent in Theory C) 
Regarding Rape' (1996) 2 Legal Theory 253,262. 4: 1 566 Op cit n. 534,125. 
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the actor is not to be held responsible, and the post-act beliefs and evidence of the person 
accurately reflect his or her state of mind at the time of the act, then that person's state of 
mind would be sufficient to constitute a valid consent (or refusal). However, where the 
actor is held responsible for the act unless legitimised by consent, given the problems of 
hindsight, then some tangible evidence of consent is required. At the very least, this 
would require some communication from the person to the actor that the person is 
consenting. It might even be argued that until communication of consent has occurred the 
act remains illegitimate. An uncommunicated consent, while still consent, may be 
ineffective as far as granting the actor permission to act. 
From a moral perspective, it is arguable that providing the person has formed the relevant 
state of mind, communication to the actor is irrelevant and the act is morally legitimate. 567 
Whatever the actor believes, the act has been permitted and the act is therefore not wrong 
for lack of consent. On the other hand, if 'respect for others and their rights lie at the heart 
of the issue of consent', 568 it is arguable that the actor's state of mind is of equal 
569 
importance. Without any form of communication of the person's state of mind, the 
actor will be unable to form any rational belief about the existence of consent. Any act 
would then be performed without believing it was pennitted and this would fail to respect 
the person irrespective of whether he or she had the requisite state of mind. As such, the 
act would be morally wrong. 
In the previous chapter I suggested that consent must be placed in the context of the 
professional -patient relationship and that the approach to consent helps to define that 
relationship. A good relationship requires mutual trust and respect, which includes an 
obligation to respect the other's autonomy. This mutual respect requires open and honest 
communication allowing both parties to play their role within the relationship. If HCPs 
567 Op cif n. 535. 
568 Op cit n. 190,7. 
569 Op cit n. 540,19 1. 
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are to respect their patients' autonomy, they must believe that the patient is consentiiiu 
before they act. This belief can only be reliably achieved by communication of the 
consent. 
Pragmatically, communication of consent is necessary to allow the law to apportion 
responsibility for outcome or to hold the actor legally culpable in the absence of consent. 
In a very real sense, it is impossible to avoid the issue since the two parties xý ill draw 
inferences from both verbal and non-verbal signals. Irrespective of wliether the person 
has formed the relevant state of mind, if he or she behaves in such a way as to cause the 
actor reasonably to be] leve that he or she is consenting, it would be unjust to hold that the 
act was unlawful. 
Given the arguments above, and the fact that it would be impossible for two persons to 
interact without some degree of communication, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
consent exists but is ineffective in the absence of communication, "O which means that 
communication of consent is not part of the core theory but is an attribute of consent, 
albeit one that is necessary in the context of this enquiry. Consent as a state of mind, 
however, seems to be essential to the core theory. 
At this point it is worthwhile modifying the primitive definitions of consent. 
Consent ]a: A state of mind of the patient formed with the intention of permitting an 
intervention offered by the HCP. 
Consent 2a. - A state of mind of the patient with the Intention of pen-nitting an 
intervention formed as the result of a mutually arrived at agreement. 
570 The issue then becomes: what is the appropriate test for communication that \vould allow the 
law to determine culpability and apportion outcome responsibility. 
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Attribute A: The communication of the patlent's state of mind to the HCP. 
Attribute B: Effect: 
Values: 
1. Alters obligations for: 
a) The HCP, by removing the obligation of non- 
interference 
b) Both the patient and HCP by negotiation to establish new 
obligations of cooperation and treatment; 
2. Justifies intervention through moral/legal transformation; 
3. Permits apportionment of outcome responsibility 
As discussed earlier, as a derivative right, consent would be meaningless in the absence 
of the relevant substantive right. If there were no right to bodily integrity then we would 
be unable to use consent to waive that right. It might be argued, however, that a pre- 
existing right is unnecessary to the individual's agreement to an intervention, which may 
be given irrespective of whether he or she has control over the variable affected by the 
act. But, without the necessary control the agreement would be unable to legitimise the 
act. The law would have to look elsewhere to determine if the act was permissible. 
Furthermore, should the actor intervene without the individual's agreement, the law 
would not treat this any differently from the case where the individual has agreed. 
It might then be argued that acting without the individual's consent is in itself a breach of 
a right and so the existence of an underlying right is unnecessary. This, however, raises 
the question of. consent to what? The answer cannot be to everything since the world 
would grind to a complete halt if that -, vere the case. It would be a practical impossibility 
to seek, let alone obtain, everyone's agreement before acting. In order to alloNv societN to 
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function the limits of consent must be defined and as soon as this happens the things over 
which we have the power of consent become our 'right'. If society allows that you may 
only legitimately disclose my medical information with my consent then it becomes a 
'wrong' for you to disclose it in the absence of consent. Ipsofacto, I have a 'r1ght' to 
confidentiality. If consent is to have any moral or legal force, it must be derivative on an 
underlying right. This underlying right is one of the necessary attributes of consent and, 
in the present context, the right is that right to bodily integrity. "' Thus, consent must have 
a third attribute, Attribute C, is the primary right and for consentp this has the value: 
bodily integrity. 572 For consentA. the primary right is autonomy itself. 
Consent as a Process 
Some commentators suggest that consent should be seen as a process. 573 Meisel and 
Kuczewski, for example, argued that a rights-based approach to consent is too restrictive 
and often inapplicable to the clinical realities. Instead of a model characterising 
physicians as technical experts advising their patients who then make decisions based on 
their own beliefs and values, they see consent as a 'shared process of decision-making 5.574 
The problem with this is that it conflates consent with the process of enabling patients to 
give a valid consent to the intervention on offer. If consent is a state of mind then it only 
serves to confuse matters to argue that it is also a process. Rather, consent should be 
preceded by a process of information disclosure, expert advice from the physician and 
"' More expansively, it might be argued that the relevant right is privacy. 
572 For this to be comprehensive, bodily integrity would have to be interpreted broadly to include 
those interventions that do not involve contact. 
573 Usher, K. J. Arthur, D. 'Process consent: a model for enhancing informed consent in mental 
health nursing' (1998) 27 Journal ofA dvanced Nursing 692; Dyer, A. R. Bloch, S. 'Informed 
consent and the psychiatric patient' (1987) 13 Journal of Medical Ethics 12; Kay, R. Siriwardena, 
A. K. 'The process of informed consent for urgent abdominal surgery' (2001) 27 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 157; Op cit n. 526,2522; Aveyard, H. 'The requirement for informed consent prior 
to nursing care procedures' (2002) 37(3) Journal ofAdvanced Nursing 243,248; Op cit n. 398, 
354. 
574 Op cit n. 526,2522. 
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negotiation, 5 75 which means that the idea of a process does not fon-n part of the central 
theory of consent. However, because negotiation/shared decision making (see below) 
recognises the professional-patient relationship and allows patients greater involvement 
and control without abandoning them to their own devices, it is important to include the 
process of consent as an attribute with two values: negotiation and patient's decision. 
This is modelled below. 
I Treatment C 
Treatment A 
Pathology 
Goals and values 
Offered 
Treatment 
Information disclosure 
Values 
Patient and advice 
Professional 
Consent as 
permission 
Final Treatm nt Consent as 
offer agreement 
Figure 1: The Process Leading to Consent 
The professional, who controls the treatments available, has offered the patient a choice 
of two treatments (A and B). In other cases, the professional may only offer one treatment 
to the patient. Whether or not this is legitimate is independent of the patient's right to 
bodily integrity and hence is independent of consent as permission, Consentp is a device 
for controlling negative liberty rights. The exercise of positive liberty rights comes in the 
form of a demand or request rather than a waiver and may be served to some extent by 
575 McLean, S. A. M. 'Talking to Patients - Information Disclosure as "Good" Medical Practice', 
in: Westerhall, L. Phillips, C. (eds. ) Patients'Rights - Informed consent, access and equalitY 
(1994) Stockholm: Nerenius & Santerus Publishers 171,174. 
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the requirement of consentA. This re-connects with the first sense of consent to engage 
both parties in negotiation to determine the final management decision. 
At this point of the process patient autonomy meets clinical autonomy. Patients may 
choose to waive their right to be involved in the decisional process, leaving the treatment 
choice at the professionals' discretion. However, insofar as professionals are legally 
obliged to offer a choice of effective treatments, patients' positive claim rights may 
impinge on the professionals' clinical autonomy. Patients' claim right to treatment, while 
it may engage their autonomy, is determined prior to their consent and is a matter of 
distributive justice, 576 which is beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be further 
considered. 
This model of consent is rights-based, but does not reduce the professional's role to one 
of technician. All it does is recognise that professionals may not legitimately treat 
competent adult patients without their consent. They must still act as advisors and the 
treatment options open to the patient remain under their control. Finally, it should be 
remembered that consent is a state of mind, which may change over time. As such, even 
when patients have communicated their consent, professionals have a duty to ensure that 
their patient is still consenting at the time of the intervention. 
Time Course of Consent 
The time course (duration) of consent constitutes an additional attribute and depends on 
whether consent is purely a state of mind or whether communication is an integral 
component. As a state of mind, consent persists for as long as the individual maintains 
that partiCLIlar state of mind. This is problematic where the patient is to be anaesthetised 
since the requisite state of mind will be lost while unconscious, which again emphasises 
the importance of communication. When communication is taken into account, consent 
576 R (Burke) v GMC [2005] EWCA 1003, [3 1 ]. 
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may be seen as having a continuing effect until a withdrawal is communicated. GiN, en the 
professionals' role within the profess i onal -patient relationship, this need for consent to be 
terminated by withdrawal underscores the professionals' duty to determine ýN hether the 
patient is still consenting at the relevant time. 
Consent as a Choice 
In aI Imited sense consent is always associated with the choice of whether to give or 
withhold consent. In the present context, this equates to accepting or rejecting the 
proffered treatment. Some commentators go further and argue that consent also requires, 
where available, a range of treatment options. "' Austoker, for example, explicitly 
discussed consent as 'choice' and noted that: 'tension may exist between the aims of 
promoting effective forms of healthcare and promoting patient choice'. 578 Caplan, while 
recognising the need to gain consent for specific procedures, "' argued that: 'competent 
patients must be given the opportunity to control the provision of medical care even if 
180 death or disability may result'. 
The push to extend the role of consent to protect positive autonomy is reflected in the 
development of 'infon-ned consent' and arguments for 'shared decision-making'. Thus, 
the Emanuels noted the 'call for greater patient autonomy ... conceived as patient choice 
and control over medical decisions'. 581 In Canterbury v Spence, a leading US case on 
informed consent, Robinson CJ stated: 'True consent to what happens to one's self is the 
informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably 
577 Op cit n. 412,7-9. 
578 Austoker, J. 'Gaining informed consent for screening' (1999) 3 19 BMJ 722. See also: 
Worthington, R. 'Clinical issues on consent: some philosophical concerns' (2002) 28 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 377,378. 
579 Caplan, A. L 'Informed Consent and Provider-patient Relationships in Rehabilitation Medicine' 
( 19 8 8) 69 A rch. Phys. Med. Rehabil. 3 12,3 16. 
580 Ibid. 
58 1 Emanuel, E. J. Emanuel, L. L. 'Four Models of the Physic ian-Patient Relationship' (1992) 267 
JAMA 2221,2223. 
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582 the options available' . And Stirrat and Gill suggested that: 'The term "informed 
583 choice" is often to be preferred over "informed consent"'. Although the moN, e to 
enhancing patient choice recognises that the patient must still consent to the intervention 
agreed upon, by viewing consent as a process and arguing for shared decision-making, 
this 'consumer rights' approach seeks to make consent a weapon for positive 
autonomy. 584 Thus, Charles et al noted that 'the principle of "Informed choice" i. e. 
disclosure of treatment alternatives rather than merely informed consent has been 
endorsed at several government levels in Canada and the United States'. 585 For Capron: 
'An analysis of informed consent that goes beyond the legal formulae themselves must 
inquire into the functions served by the doctrine, not in bringing about "better" results but 
in promoting choices made by persons for themselves and for which they can take 
responsibility'. 586 Thus, 'The thrust of informed consent ... 
is to make the patient ... an 
active and informed participant in the decisions which must be made'. "' 
It might be argued that consent merely requires information about alternative options 
rather than that those options are made available. However, if an option is not available 
then knowledge about it is irrelevant to consent. In order to give valid consent patients 
must appreciate the implications of their decision. This includes understanding that by 
consenting to treatment A they will be excluding non-treatment and alternative treatment 
options. However, if treatment C is unavailable they will not be excluding the 
implications of C by consenting to A. Thus, it would be nonsensical to require they be 
informed about treatment C. It is not consent, at least as a waiver, but the professional's 
582 Canterbury v Spence 464 F2d 772,780 (1972). 
583 Op cit n. 301,129. 
584 Charles, C. Gafni, A. Whelan, T. 'Shared Decision-Making in the Medical Encounter: What 
Does it Mean? (Or it Takes at Least Two to Tango)' (1997) 44 Social Science and Medicine 68 1, 
681-682. The more recent push for shared decision-making aims to make the patient a 'responsible 
partner', and so blunt the earlier consumerist approach (see above). 
585 Ibid. 
586 Capron, A. M. 'Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment' (1974) 123 
University of Pennsylvania Lmt, Review 340,349. 
587 Ibid., 353. 
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118 duty of care that drives the treatment options on offer. The power to determine the 
treatments that should be offered, while constrained by the patient's consent, lies ýN ith the 
professional. 
589 
It appears that consent is unable, without a significant reconceptualisation, to require 
options other than the right to say "yes" or "no" to an intervention on offer. Consent in 
this context is permissive and the patient's consent carries no power to oblige 
professionals in any way. "' However, there are two arguments that suggest this view of 
consent is too narrow. First, if patients' right to withhold consent acts as a veto then 
treatments refused cease to be options. Professionals still owe a duty to act in their 
patients' best interests and if a treatment exists that would be better than none at all then 
they must either offer that alternative or refer the patient to a colleague. In this way, even 
if HCPs are unwilling to offer a treatment option, their patients' right to withhold consent 
may oblige them to offer it. "' As such, it is perhaps preferable, at least from an autonomy 
perspective, to make patients aware of the options even before any refusal. While 
professionals arguably should advise their patients as to their preferred choice the patients 
would then be in a position to weigh up the pros and cons of all beneficial treatment 
options. 
The second argument arises from the sense of consent as an agreement. While an 
agreement per se cannot force either party to do something they are unwilling to offer up 
for agreement, it Is also arguable that any reasonable conception of a negotiation requires 
more than simply a 'take it or leave it choice'. If consent is to operate in this way then 
professionals' obligations and their own right of consent (in the sense of creating 
588 Op cit n. 576, [32]. 
589 Habiba, M. W. 'Examining consent within the patient-doctor relationship' (2000) 26 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 183,185. 
590 Doyal, L. 'Good clinical practice and informed consent are inseparable' (2002) 87(2) Heart, 
103. 
591 It should be noted that this is driven by the patient's right to sue in negligence rather than any 
claim right to a particular treatment (see below). 
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obligations rather than in the sense of a waiver) must be considered. However. the 
concept of negotiation still requires that there are options to negotiate. Thus, it is arguable 
that consent requires more choice than a simple acceptance or refusal of a single 
treatment option. 
Although consent as a waiver can, if the offered treatment is refused, require alternative 
treatments to be offered, the case for disclosure of alternatives is strengthened if consent 
is also approached in the sense of an agreement. The argument for consent as choice is 
suggestive of the type of negotiated consent seen in contractual negations where the 
consent is mutual and establishes bilateral obligations. Since consent as a waiver is 
necessary to justify medical treatment, consent as a choice appears to be a hybrid of its 
two senses; agreement and permission. 
Consent and Non-treatment 
Following from this is the suggestion that consent should also be necessary for non- 
treatment decisions. Biegler, for example, argued that, if consent is predicated on respect 
for autonomy and autonomy has positive as well as negative aspects then patients would 
593 
'be justified in requesting treatments that are in their best interests' , He discussed this 
in the context of 'do not resuscitate' orders and concluded that 'consent ought to be 
required to withhold treatment that is in a patient's best interests to receivC. 
594 It appears 
that he was arguing for a claim right to those treatments that are in the patient's best 
interests and that the patient's consent is necessary to waive that right and permit the 
professional to withhold it. The difficulty with this is that it has implications for resource 
allocation and for professional autonomy. Furthermore, it should be noted that consent 
does not do the initial work here: to make consent relevant an initial right must exist that 
592 This is exactiv what negligence law does in requiring disclosure of alternatives (see chapter 
five). 
593 Biegler, P. 'Should patient consent be required to write a do not resuscitate order? ' (2003) 29 
Journal of'Medical Ethics 359,360. 
594 Ibid., 363. 
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may then be waived. Thus, before consent becomes relevant the claim right to particular 
treatments must bejustified on grounds of distributive justice. 
A second way in which consent may be relevant here engages the other sense of consent. 
Where there is no pre-existing right to treatment then, because non-treatment does not 
breach the patient's bodily integrity, consentp is irrelevant. The duty to treat is regulated 
by the law of negligence and, providing HCPs act reasonably, they will fulfil their 
obligation and avoid liability. The professional's duty in negligence does not create a 
consequential right to treatment: the associated right is the right to sue for damages. 
However, Article 8, Schedule I of the Human Rights Act 1998 allows the right to a 
private and family life, which subsumes autonomy and, as far as the family is concerned, 
has allowed that parents have a right to be involved in decisions about their children even 
where they have been taken into care. '9' This suggests, by analogy, that patients should 
be involved in decisions concerning non-treatment, and consentA, rather than consentp, 
might be an appropriate mechanism for regulating this involvement. At the very least, 
patients may be able to claim a right to know that such a decision has been made even if 
they have no claim right to require treatment. 596 In this context, consent can only be 
relevant in the sense of an agreement because the primary right of bodily integrity is not 
engaged by a decision not to treat. 
Using consent in the context of non-treatment raises certain issues regarding the 
consequences of patients refusing to give their consent to the withholding of treatment but 
this is not the place to discuss those issues. Strictly speaking this thesis is concerned with 
consent to medical treatment, which - if narrowly interpreted - does not include non- 
treatment decisions. However, deciding not to provide a particular treatment, or any 
treatment at all is an important aspect of medical decision-making and arguably involves 
595 Wv UK (1988) 10 EHRR 29,50. 
596 Feldman, D. Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2 nd ed., 2002) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 515. 
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consentA even if it does not engage consentp. Because of this relationship between 
treatment and non-treatment decisions, both of which engage the patient's autonomy, it 
may be worthwhile considering the legal regulation of non-treatment decisions at the 
same time as I consider consent to treatment. This would acknowledge the sibling 
relationship between the two types of consent, which might then be categorised under a 
more general heading of consent to a medical management plan. 
Consent and Shared Decis ion-Making 
Beauchamp and Childress note that: 'Some commentators attempt to reduce the idea of 
informed consent to shared decision-making between doctor and patient, so that informed 
597 
consent and mutual decision-making are synonymous' . 
Meisel and Kuczewski, for 
example, argue: 'Conceived as a process of shared decision making, informed consent 
can accommodate both patient autonomy and the physician's responsibility for the well- 
being of the patient' . 
598 Beauchamp and Childress dismiss shared decision-making as 
worthy ideal in medicine' but one that 'neither defines nor displaces informed 
consent' . 
599This 
argument is valid but perhaps misleading as to the role of shared 
decision-making, 
For many commentators, shared decision-making is not so much an alternative model but 
a way of achieving a more meaningful consent. 600 In this sense, the patient's consent is 
still necessary but, instead of disclosing the relevant information and abandoning patients 
597 Op cit n. 51,77. 
598 Op cit n. 526,2522; Giesen, D. 'From Paternalism to Self-Determination to Shared Decision 
Making in the Field of Medical Law and Ethics', in: Westerhall, L. Phillips, C (eds) Patient's 
Rights - Informed consent, access and equality (1994) 
Stockholm: Nerenius & Santerus Publishers 
19,37. 
599 Op cit n. 51,78. 
600 Gutheil, T. G. Bursztajn, H. Brodsky, A. 'Malpractice prevention through the sharing of 
uncertainty: Informed consent and the therapeutic alliance' (1984) 311 New EnglandJournal of 
Medicine 49,50; Brody, D. S. 'The Patient's Role in Clinical Decision Making' (1980) 93 Annals 
of Internal Medicine 718; Teff, H. Reasonable Care (1994) Oxford: Clarendon Press, particularly 
chapter 3; Op cit n. 584; Marta, J. 'Whose Consent is it anyway? A Poststructuralist Framing of the 
Person in Medical Decision-making'(1998) 19 Theoretical Medicine andBioethics 353,354; Katz, 
J. The Silent 11'orld of Doctor and Patient (1984,2002) Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
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to their decisions, professionals work through them with their patients. 601 Once they 
arrive at a mutually acceptable treatment option the patient's state of mind will be one of 
consent and the professional should be aware of this. Once the procedural requirements of 
consent are satisfied, the intervention would be morally and legally justified. This view of 
shared decision-making reflects the relevance of the professional-patient relationship 
explored in chapter three. 
The U. S. President's Commission saw shared decision-making as an ethical ideal : 602 
the patient and physician will arrive at ajoint decision in which the 
physician agrees to care for the patient and the patient agrees to be 
treated ... The resiliency of the relationship will depend importantly 
on the extent of trust and confidence exchanged between patient and 
pro essiona . 
603 
This does not, however, mean that this vision was meant to replace the law's doctrine of 
informed consent. Rather, it was to supplement the physician's legal obligation. The 
Commission's approach also included the idea of patient choice, although a choice 
constrained by accepted medical values and others' claims on scarce resources. This 
reinforces the suggestion above that consent is seen as a hybrid involving both consentA 
and consentp. It is, however, important to recognise that the consentp is essential while 
consentA is desirable but, because it is fundamentally dependent on the political questions 
of clinical autonomy and distributive justice, it is perhaps better treated as a possible 
attribute rather than a central part of the theory. This is particularly so since some 
601 See: Bridson, J. Hammond, C. Leach, A. Hester, M. R. 'Making consent patient centred' (2003) 
27 British Medical Journal 1159. 
602 President's Commission. Making Health Care Decisions: The Ethical and Legal Implications 
of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship, volume I (1982) Washington (DC), 
6. 
603 Ibid., 37. 
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decisions are so clinically certain and of relatively low importance to the patient that there 
104 
may be little need or desire for negotiation. 
Consent and Refusal: Two Sides of the Same Coin? 
It is reasonable to suggest that the right to give consent necessarily implies the right to 
refuse consent. Since 'right' carries with it the idea of 'control' there can be no right 
where the individual (or lawful proxy) has no control. If one has no option but to exercise 
the 'right' then that option is not really a right but a duty. This argument explains why 
consent as a waiver of a primary right even exists. However, the very justification for 
consent also defines its limitations. Although refusal of consent is the opposite side of the 
same coin, this does not mean that a refusal of consent is sufficient to prohibit a breach of 
bodily integrity. 
When A gives B consent to perform an intervention A waives his or her right to bodily 
integrity. This means that the subsequent intervention is not a breach of bodily integrity. 
If B intervenes without A's consent then B will be breaching A's right to bodily integrity. 
However, unless a right is absolute, consent will not be the only justification for 
performing the intervention. For example, imagine that A has a highly contagious disease 
that threatens the health of other members of the community. Although it would be 
respectful of the individual to seek consent to intervene to isolate and treat A, it may still 
be justified - because of the risk of harm to others - to intervene even if A refuses to give 
consent. In this case the justification comes from the rights of the other members of the 
community. If the intervention is non-consensual then A's right to bodily integrity has 
been breached, but it is a justified breach. Some authors would say that his right has been 
601 infringed but not violated. 
604 Whitney, S. 'A New Model of Medical Decisions: Exploring the Limits of Shared Decision 
Making' (200-3)) 23 Medical Decision Making 275. 
605 Op cit n. 51,358. 
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What this means is that there will be occasions when, despite a refusal (or lack) of 
consent, an intervention will be legitimate even though it breaches the primary right of 
bodily integrity. This argument perhaps provides some insight into Lord Donaldson MR's 
judgments in Re R and Re W. 606 In Re R, Lord Donaldson MR adopted the analogy of a 
key-holder to explain that even where a child is capable of giving consent their refusal 
may be overridden by someone with parental responsibility. The relevance of my 
argument here is that, providing the law allows two or more individuals the right of 
consent, then a refusal of either of those parties will be insufficient to prohibit the 
intervention. This does not claim that the law is right in allowing two parties the right of 
consent, merely that unless a right is absolute, the individual's refusal to give consent is 
607 insufficient as a veto. 
Interestingly, in Re W, Lord Donaldson withdrew his key-holder analogy and replaced it 
with one involving flakjackets . 
608 In one way, this is unfortunate since the key-holder 
analogy fits better with the concept of consent as a waiver of a right. However, it could be 
argued that the key-holder analogy tallies with the child's right to consent while the 
parents' right to consent has a different justification and is better represented by the flak 
jacket analogy. If the right to bodily integrity truly belongs to the child then the parents 
cannot legitimately waive that right. While the child is incompetent to consent, some 
other means of justifying necessary interventions is required. This comes from allowing 
the parents the power to determine whether or not a particular intervention is ajustifiable 
breach of the child's bodily integrity. Legally, this has two parts. The first is to agree that 
the intervention is necessary, the second is to waive the right to complain about the 
intervention and it is only by virtue of this latter part that the permission to intervene is 
606 Re R (A minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11, CA; Re W (, 4 Minor) 
(Consent to Medical Treatment) [ 1993 ]I FLR 1, CA. 
607 It could be argued that parental consent merely prevents the intervention from being a violation 
of the child's right to bodily integrity but, without the child's consent, the intervention remains a 
breach (or infi-ingement) - albeit -justified - 
of that right. ZD 
608 Re IV(. 4 Alinor) (Consent to Medical Treatment) [ 1993 ]I FLR 1,9. 
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legitimately called 'consent'. The consent, however, is not a waiver of the ri I ight to bodil. v 
integrity but a waiver of the right to sue. As such, it may still persist even when the child 
is competent to consent to the intervention itself In this way, the child's consent is like a 
key while the parent's consent is more like the flakjacket. 609 
Some commentators have argued that competence to consent should be assessed on the 
basis of the risk posed by the intervention . 
61 ' This would allow that someone might be 
competent to consent to a procedure, but not competent to refuse consent. I have argued 
elsewhere that competency should be based on the complexity rather than the risk of the 
decision and that the relevance of risk lies in ensuring that the competency assessment 
reaches the correct conclusion. "' This is not the place to reiterate the arguments in favour 
of that conclusion. It is, however, worth noting that if my argument here about the nature 
of consent is correct then the decision to give or withhold consent is a single decision. 
Refusal of consent may not be divorced from the giving of consent since the decision not 
to give consent is equivalent to a refusal of consent. 
Some of the difficulties over consent perhaps arise because it is easy to forget that the 
individual's consent is only one of the possible justifications for performing an 
intervention. For example, Harris asserted that: 'The idea that a child (or anyone) might 
competently consent to a treatment but not be competent to refuse it is palpable 
nonsense'. 612 This statement is only true if he means refusal of consent rather than refusal 
of treatment. A refusal of consent only means that the individual's right to bodily 
integrity has not been waived. This does not mean that it may not legitimately be 
609 This argument is entirely a legal argument and would not preclude criticism of this position on 
moral grounds. 
610 See e. g. Brock, D. W. 'Decisionmaking, competence and risk' (1991) 5 Bioethics 105; Wilks, 1. 
'Asymmetrical competence' (1999) 13 Bioethics 154. 
611 Maclean, A. 'Now You See It, Now You Don't: Consent And The legal Protection Of 
Autonomy' (2000) 17(3) Journal ofApplied Philosophy 277,281-287. See also: Wicclair, M. R. 
'The continuing debate over risk-related standards of competence' (1999) 13 Bioethics 149. 
612 Harris, J. 'Consent and end of life decisions' (2003) 29 JME 10. 
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infringed provided a suitable justification can be found. A justifiable breach is not a 
violation of the individual's right. However, the breach must be justified if it is to be a 
legitimate act. 
Consent, Power and Control 
There can be little doubt that consent is concerned with issues of power and control. "' 
The language used when discussing consent and the factors that invalidate it reflect the 
tussle between the parties for control of the relationship. Both a lack of knowledge and 
undue influence - whether coercive or not - are capable of shifting the balance of power. 
Similarly, the language of rights, the protection that rights afford against exploitation, and 
the enforcement of those rights by the law all indicate the relevance of power and 
control . 
614 Thus, consent, predicated as it is on the right to self-determination (or 
autonomy), demands that the decision to give or withhold consent is voluntary. As Strong 
noted: 
The state may have granted doctors a monopoly of practice in certain 
respects but it has given them almost no legal powers to constrain 
their patients' behaviour. It may be up to the doctor to decide whether 
or not patients should receive treatment, but the latter typically reserve 
the right to decide both whether to seek it in the first place and, if 
offered it, whether or not to accept. 
615 
The importance of consent lies in allowing individuals to control particular aspects of 
their life. It is necessary precisely because without the protection of consent and the 
underlying right individuals will lack control in all relationships in which they are the 
613 Montgomery, J. 'The Role of Law in Raising Standards of Consent', in: Alderson, P (ed. ) 
Consent to Health Treatment and Research. - Differing Perspectives (1994) London: The Social 
Science Research Unit 35. 
614 Foucault, M. 'Two Lectures', in: Gordon, C. (ed. ) Power1knowledge (1980) Brighton: The 
Harvester Press 78,93. 
615 Strong, P. M. 'Sociological Imperialism and the Profession of Medicine: A Critical Examination Z: ý 
of the Thesis of Medical Imperialism' (1979) 13A Social Science and Alfedicine 199,2 10. 
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subordinate party. This is particularly important in the healthcare setting. There are a 
number of reasons why professionals occupy the dominant position; their social position; 
their superior knowledge; their control over access to healthcare; the patient's illness... 
and the fact that the patient has come to them for help. "' Apart from the deontological 
justification for consent, it has been shown that a sense of control has valuable and 
sustainable benefits for the individual's health. 618 What consent does in this context is not 
to neutralise the power imbalance but to legitimise it. '19 Ensuring that patients have the 
ultimate control over their own body, consent prevents the professional's authority from 
being exercised in an authoritarian fashion. 620 It is precisely because the power Imbalance 
is unavoidable that consent is necessary. 
Despite the power that consent gives to the patient, it is important to realise that this does 
not emasculate the professional who remains the dominant 'partner'. This is not, 
however, a bad thing. Power is not simply repressive and the power professionals possess 
is what enables them to help their patients . 
62 ' This power allows professionals to discover 
things about their patients that they would not otherwise be allowed to know, it allows 
622 
them to advise their patients and it allows them to heal their patients . Without it 
professionals would become simply a dispenser of tablets or a technician. This power, 
however, must be exercised fairly and responsibly if it is to remain legitimate. 
616 Seeman, M. Seeman, T. E. 'Health Behavior and Personal Autonomy: A Longitudinal Study of 
the Sense of Control in Illness' (1983) 24 Journal o Health and Social Behavior 144. ýf 
617 Op cit n. 342,16-17; Haug, M. R. Lavin, B. 'Practitioner or Patient - Who's in ChargeT (198 1) 
22 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 212. 
618 Op cit n. 616. 
619 Withholding consent in the absence of any other justification for acting will, however, 
neutralize the actor's power. 
620 For the distinction between authority and authoritarianism see: Haug, M. R. Lavin, B. Op cit 
n. 617,214. 
62 1 Foucault, M. 'Body/Power' in: Gordon, C. (ed. ) Powerlknowledge (1980) Brighton: The 
Harvester Press 55,59. 
622 As Brody argues, 'the physician has the power to improve the patient's health status to the 
extent that she can alter the meaning that the patient attributes to the illness in a positive way': Op 
cit n. 342,133. 
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Even within the context of information disclosure, while consent may go some way to 
reducing its authoritarian potential, it is unable to negate completely the potential for 
repression inherent in power. This is not to argue that power is itself repressive, but 
simply to recognise that it may be exercised repressively. For example, the way in which 
professionals present the information and advice to their patients will affect the 'truth' 
that the patient accepts. While it may be argued that this manipulation would invalidate 
consent in a moral sense, it may not be susceptible to legal regulation. In practice, then, 
professionals may manipulate the timing and presentation of information in such a way as 
to gain the patient's agreement, which currently the law would deem sufficient for 
consent. Similarly, exercising power repressively during the consultation may affect the 
ability of patients truly to engage in the decision-making process and any 'consent' would 
simply involve an acceptance of the professional's advice. Interrupting patients and 
ignoring questions, whether or not done consciously, may all reduce patients' ability to 
exercise their autonomous power. 623 This is important because the realisation that 
formalised rules of consent may be unable to prevent an unethical exercise of power 
highlights the need for professionals to be sensitive to an appropriate ethical framework. 
This discussion suggests another value to be included under the Effects attribute: 
[consent has the effect ofl legitimising a beneficent exercise of the professional's power. 
The Pre-requisites for Consent 
Consent, Information, Knowledge and Risk 
It is frequently claimed that for consent to be valid it must be 'informed'. 624 The purpose 
of providing information is to help individuals to gain the knowledge necessary to allow 
623 Ainsworth-Vaughan, N. Claiming Power in Doctor-Patient Talk. (1998) New York: Oxford 
University Press, 51. 
624 See e. g. Brock, D. W. Op cit n. 200,36; Winick, B. J. 'Competency to Consent to Treatment: The 
distinction between assent and objection', in: Wexler, D. B. Winick B. J. (eds) Essays in 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence (199 1) Durham (NC): Carolina Academic Press, 4 1; Kennedy, 1. 'The 
Law and Ethics of Informed Consent and Randomized Controlled Trial', in: Treat Ate Right 
(1988) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 213; Op cit n. 40,113. 
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thein to consent to the proposed intervention. 625 It is certainly trite that in order to consent 
individuals must know something. At the very least they must know that their consent is 
required. If they must know this, then since consent is a propositional attitude (i. e. 
consent is not an abstract state of mind but always exists in relation to something), 626 theý' 
must also know that there is something for which their consent is required. This much is 
entailed by the knowledge that consent is required. The question is whether consent 
requires more than that B knows that A wishes to do something requiring B's consent? 
The crucial question, and one that may not be answerable definitively, is what must the 
patient know in order to consent to procedure X rather than to some inadequate 
conception X*9 As a general starting point it is submitted that patients have no need to 
127 know about the mechanics of the procedure. If knowledge is seen as an ability to utifise 
the information possessed then knowing about the mechanics is only necessary if one is 
128 
required to perform the procedure. For example, it is completely unnecessary for 
patients to know that a purse string suture is employed to close the defect left when an 
appendix is excised. It may even be counter-productive as it might confuse patients or 
deflect their attention from more important information. 629A second piece of infori-nation 
that could be safely omitted is details of the scientific evidence in support of the 
procedure. While patients may need to know that research has shown procedure X to be 
more effective than procedure Y, they would not need to know how the studies showed 
this to be the case. 
625 Although the meaning of knowledge is contested, for the purposes of this thesis I will accept 
Hyman's definition: 'personal prepositional knowledge is the ability to act, to refrain from acting, 
to believe, desire or doubt for reasons that are facts'; Hyman, J. 'How Knowledge Works' (1999) 
49 The Philosophical Quarterly 43 3,45 1. 
626 Op cit n. 32,43. 
627 Op cii n. 362,76. 
628 It would also be required if one was called upon to explain the mechanics of the procedure to 
someone else, i. e. in an exam. 
629 See n. 339 
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At this point it is tentatively suggested that patients need to have sufficient knowledge to 
distinguish Xftom the alternatives in terms o the risks and effects of the procedure. At ýf 
the very least this requires patients to be able to distinguish the implications of procedure 
630 X from the implications of no treatment at all. However, as I have already discussed , 
for consent - both as a waiver and as an agreement - the professional may be obliged to 
disclose alternative options and patients should therefore be able to appreciate the 
implications of accepting treatment X rather than treatment Y. 
When discussing the information disclosure aspect of consent, attention is often focused 
on the risks. This is understandable since, from a legal perspective, issues of consent 
often arise in relation to the harm caused by an undisclosed risk materialising. While risk 
is crucial to the consent decision, it is important not to ignore the relevance of other types 
of information. As suggested above, if patients are to consent to a procedure they must 
know the implications of their decision, which requires knowledge of the alternatives on 
offer. The reason for this may be explained as follows: 
Premise (P) 1: If I am to consent to X, I must know the implications, P, of 
consenting to X. 
P 2: If I consent to X this may exclude (or at least affect the 
implications of) the alternatives to 
X. 631 
630 See earlier discussion, at n. 588ff. 
631 If I consent to XI am excluding not-X. For other options, at the very least my decision will 
make those options unavailable at that time and may have implications for the future use of those 
options. For example, consider patients with an injured spleen. Assuming - for the sake of 
argument - they are sufficiently competent to consent then their options may be 'wrapping' or 
cremoval' of the spleen. If they choose 'removal' then 'wrapping' is permanently excluded and the 
implications include permanent loss of splenic function. If they choose 'wrapping' this may fail to 
halt the bleeding and they may require further surgery and more blood transfusion. Although they 
retain the option of 'removal' this will be at a later time and will require a second operation. 
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Conclusion UP 3: Since consenting to X excludes other altemat'ves, I cannot know 
P unless I know the implications of not consenting to the 
altematives. 
P 4: The implications of the alternatives to X are not-X (i. e. no 
treatment) and Z, where Z represents the implications of all other 
available treatments. 
Conclusion 2: Therefore, to consent to X, I must know that P, that Z and that 
not-X. 
What is perhaps surprising about this argument is that, in order to consent to X, I do not 
need to know that X. In other words, I do not need to know the procedure in order to 
consent to it. If accepted, this conclusion would explain the fallacy of arguing that 
'informed consent' cannot be achieved by laypersons because they lack medical training 
and so cannot possibly understand complex procedures. Instead, what is required is 
knowledge of the implications of the procedure. 
A final point is whether patients are obliged to receive the information in order to give a 
valid consent. In other words, is the professional's duty predicated on an alienable right 
possessed by the patient? This waiver of the right to information is distinct from the 
question of whether patients may waive the right to consent. 632 Unfortunately the 
distinction is not always maintained. For example, Wear stated: 
The least troublesome exception [to disclosure] would seem to occur 
when the patient voluntarily gives up his right to an informed consent. 
Various reasons may lie behind such an action, including that the 
patient does not want to be Upset by hearing the gory details, or he 
632 1 will consider this latter question in more detail later. 
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feels incapable of making decisions and would prefer that his doctor 
633 decide. 
The problem with this is it concatenates the right to information with the right to consent. 
The two are distinct, although a valid consent requires that the patient' s right to 
information has not been unjustifiably breached. As with other rights, the right to 
information may be waived, since, without the power to waive the right becomes an 
obligation and, as I will explain below, there is no reason why that should be the case in 
this context. 
Providing patients are aware that they have a right to the information, and that by waiving 
the right they are accepting risks determined by the HCP, then it is reasonable for them to 
relinquish their right to information. It is reasonable to trust experts where they have a 
duty to act in one's interests and there is no reason to suspect that they will do otherwise. 
If autonomy is the basis for consent then, as Faulder stated: 'it is equally a denial of 
autonomy to force unwanted information on those who have clearly indicated ... that they 
do not want it,. 
634 As long as patients are aware of the implications of refusing 
information and it is reasonable for them to trust the HCP's advice then they are acting 
autonomously. To argue that autonomy requires that patients actually make the clinical 
decision itself, on the basis of a 'neutral' disclosure, prioritises that decision and 
constrains patients' autonomy by preventing them from making the alternative decision to 
rely on expert advice. Thus, patients may legitimately waive their right to information. 
Consent and Voluntariness 
The primary purpose of consent is normatively to transform the legitimacy of an act. 
Following from this transformation, consent also protects the actor against complaint and 
113 Wear, S. informed Consent. - Patient Autonomy and Clinician Beneficence Within Health Care, 
(2 nd ed., 1998) Washington D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 23. 
634 Faulder, C. Whose Body Is It? The Troubling Issue ofInformed Consent (1985) London: 
Virago, 25. 
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justifies including the consenter in the allocation of outcome responsibility. All of these 
roles rely on the relationship between autonomy, control and responsibility. Autononiv is 
concerned with the idea of moral agency; that we should be free to make our own 
decisions and to take responsibility for the ensuing consequences. 635 Thus, if consent is to 
act as a permission that alters the legitimacy of an act then it must be wilfully and freely 
given. 636 As Hermeren noted: '[being] ... a moral agent, according to this ideal ... means 
637Without the freedom to give or withhold consent that consent to choose and act freely'. 
loses its moral (and legal) force and is reduced to being a normatively meaningless assent 
638 
that lacks the power to legitimise the act. 
Two possible strategies exist for coping with the interaction between consent and 
voluntariness. First, voluntarmess could be seen simply as essential to the normative force 
of consent. This would mean that an involuntary consent would still be consent but it 
would not have the power to legitimise the intervention. This is perhaps the way in which 
the courts have traditionally handled consent since judges usually talk of consent being 
4vitiated' rather than defeated ah initio. The second strategy would be to argue that a lack 
of voluntariness means that the given permission is not, in fact, 'consent'. This second 
manoeuvre would further develop consent as a 'term of art' and distance it from its 
everyday use. Which of these strategies is chosen is, to a large extent, a matter of personal 
preference. In both cases 'consent' loses its normative and legal force and the 
consequences may be broadly similar. Because the second strategy has the advantage of 
simplicity and clarity, it is the approach I will adopt. 
63' For more discussion of autonomy and agency see chapter two. 
636 McGregor, J. 'Force, consent, and the reasonable woman', in: Coleman, J. L. Buchanan, A. 
(eds. ) In harm's way. - Essays in honor ofJoel Feinberg (1994) New York: Cambridge University 
Press 23 1,242. 
637 Hermeren, G. Op cit n. 298,45. 
638 Similarly, if responsibility for outcome travels with consent then a lack of voluntariness will 
affect the balance of responsibility attributed to the consenter and consentee. See: Kemohan, A. 
'Social Power and Human Agency' (1989) 86 The Journal of Philosopki, 712. 
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It is, of course, important to determine exactly what is meant by 'voluritar, ness'. All of us 
are subject to both internal and external constraints that affect our choices and none of us 
makes choices in a vacuum. We live in a network of relationships all of which enmesh us 
in mutual obligations and expectations. It is arguable that these obligations and 
expectations ought to be considered when making our decisions and as such should be 
considered the background conditions of freedom, which emphasises the importance of 
contextualising consent within the professional-patient relationship (see chapter three). 
On top of this, our decisions may be subject to more direct and immediate pressures. It is 
these influences that may affect the voluntariness of our choices. The difficulty lies in 
distinguishing between legitimate background constraints and the illegitimate pressures 
that undermine the normative force of consent. 
Consent and Competence 
Competence is relevant whether consent is conceived of as a mental state or a signatory 
act of communication. It is relevant because consent always requires an active input. 
Clearly, persons unable to perform the necessary act - either the formation of a particular 
mental state or the requisite communicative behaviour (or both) - are also unable to 
consent. The difficulty comes when individuals have some ability but it is deficient in 
some way. One problem arises because ability is a continuous variable while competency 
is biphasic - an individual is either competent or incompetent. One way around this 
is to 
adopt the approach taken by the law, which is to make competency task or decision 
if C. 639Another problem arises where someone is capable of making and spec I 
communicating a decision but lacks the ability to make a rational autonomous one. 
First, and most importantly in this context, overriding the decision of persons lacking the 
mental capacity for autonomy should be justified. One approach to this would 
be to argue 
"' See, for example, the focus on individual decisions rather than global incompetence in: The 
Lord Chancellor, Making Decisions: The Government's proposalsfor making decisions on behaýf 
of mentally incapacitated adults (1999) Cm 4465, Chapter 1.6. 
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that if consent is to act as a morally transformative permission then the consenter must be 
a moral agent. Moral agency requires the appropriate autonomous ability and where 
individuals lack that ability their consent cannot be permissive. Legal agency is similarly 
justified on the basis of when society believes that individuals should be held legally 
responsible for their actions. This is largely derivative on the idea of moral agency, as 
indicated by the law's emphasis on autonomy. 640 Second, there is the problem of deciding 
the ability necessary to justify respect for that person's decision. I do not need to go into 
this here because it is sufficient for me to simply establish that competence is a pre- 
requisite for consent. This is achieved if it is accepted that for consent to be morally or 
legally transformative, agency is required. 
Summary of the Nature, Attributes and Function of Consent 
It is now possible to summarise a final definition of consent to medical treatment: 641 
Consent Theory: A state of mind of the patient formed with the intention of 
permitting treatment suggested by the HCP. 
A ttrib ute A: Primary right 
Value: 
1. Bodily Integrity. 
642 
Attribute B: Explicit or implicit communication between patient and HCP 
Values: 
640 See: Maclean, A. Op cit n. 61 I. It should be noted that in some circumstances the law deems 
agency even if moral agency is in fact lacking (and vice versa). The idea of legal responsibility, 
however, is derivative on the idea of moral agency. It should also be noted that, for adults, agency, 
and hence competence, are presumed. 
641 1 do not here include the sense of consent in the context of non-treatment, where consent is an 
agreement rather than a permission or waiver. 
642 Bodily integrity in this context is wider concept than the right protected by trespass as it 
includes any interference with the person's body whether it is direct or not. 
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I- The patient's attitude towards the proposed intervention. 
Attribute C: Effect 
Values: 
I- Alters obligations for: 
a. The HCP, by removing the obligation of non- 
interference; and, if Attribute D, value I is present, 
b. Both the patient and HCP by negotiation to 
establish new obligations of cooperation and 
treatment. 
2. Justifies intervention or non-Intervention through moral/legal 
transformation. 
3. Legitimises a virtuous exercise of power. 
4. Allows apportionment of outcome responsibility. 
Attribute D. - Process 
Values: 
1. Shared decision-making/negotiation culminating in consent 
as an agreement. 
2. Patient's decision. 
Attribute E. - Time Course 
Values: 
1. Until withdrawn. 
2. Until relevant circumstances change. 
Prerequisites: 
1. Competence. 
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2. Relevant knowledge 
a. Disclosure 
b. Understanding. 
3. Voluntariness. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored the concept of consent and determined the underlying 
theory and important attributes. I argued that consent should be seen as a permissive state 
of mind that waives the right to bodily integrity. Once communicated to the actor the 
permission takes effect byjustifying the intervention and legitimising the virtuous 
exercise of the doctor's power. I also suggested that consent as agreement, while not an 
essential part of the theory of consent, should be incorporated as an attribute. This reflects 
the context of the profess i onal-p atient relationship and allows patients the opportunity to 
negotiate treatment options prior to giving permission. Once the negotiation is complete it 
is arguable that patients and their professionals have entered into morally binding 
agreements that create obligations and expectations for both. I further noted the limits of 
consent in that a refusal of consent, while it may operate as a veto for certain treatment, is 
not the same as a refusal of treatment and other justifications may exist that normatively 
transform the act, Furthermore, although consent lacks the power to oblige performance 
of a particular act, in combination with the professional's duty to the patient it may be 
valid to utilise the concept of consent, particularly as agreement, when dealing with non- 
treatment decisions. "' This may be seen as a secondary function of consent, with the 
primary purpose - in this context - being the justification of an intervention. Finally, 
some acts remain forbidden, even in the presence of an otherwise valid consent. 
"' Op cit n. 593,363. 
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Addendum 
To close this first part of the thesis I will pull together the various strands of my argument 
to present a model of consent (Figure 2) to medical treatment that will forin the basis for 
critiquing the current legal regulation. I have argued that consent should be contextual ised 
within the profess i onal -patient relationship that grounds it. The context of the relationship 
establishes the mutual obligations that give practical substance to the theory and moral 
justifications underlying consent. 
Consent is the act of communicating the patient's mental attitude towards the HCP's 
proposal. It is predicated on the patient's personal autonomy but, since it is set in the 
context of the profession a]-patient relationship, it must also account for the professional's 
autonomy and his or her role responsibilities. This is achieved by Incorporating consentA 
into the model as an attribute (Figure 2). While, through consentp, patients retain control 
of what happens to them, consentAallows the professional to challenge apparently 
irrational decisions and to attempt to persuade the patient to change his or her mind and 
accept the professional's advice. The professionals' duties to the patient, of beneficence 
and respect for autonomy, mean that this power to persuade becomes an obligation. 
Furthermore, the patient's obligations, which arise from the relationship and are 
expressed through consentA, require patients to respect the professional's role within the 
relationship. They should explain their decisions, listen to the professional and be open to 
persuasion. Similarly, the professional should also be open to persuasion that the patient's 
decision is appropriate. The relationship between the HCP and the patient justifies 
imposing positive obligations on the HCP to engage the patient in a mutual dialogue 
where each party is open to persuasion. This mutual participation is a crucial part of 
consentA- 
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Figure 2: Model of Consent 
Because consent is justified by autonomy, and is an expression of autonomy, the patient 
must be competent to make the decision. The patient should also be sufficiently well 
ications of the treatment informed, which requires an understanding of the impli chosen. 
The professional has a duty to facilitate patients' autonomy by supporting them 
throughout the decision-making process. The extent of the disclosure should be 
determined through negotiation with the patient having the right to waive information, or 
even to cede the treatment decision to the professional. However, where patients choose 
to waive their right to information, or to cede the treatment decision, the professional 
should ensure that they appreciate the implications of their choice. Any decision made by 
the patient, should be made, not in the absence of any influence (both the HCP and the 
patient's loved ones may be allowed to influence the patient), but in the absence of undue 
influence that attempts to control the patient's decision by unfairly exploiting the 
patient's weaknesses or vulnerability. A consent that satisfies these criteria is valid until 
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withdrawn by the patient, or until circumstances change so as to undermine the rationale 
for the decision. 
Consentp protects the patients' right to control the underlying primary right of bodily 
integrity, which may be communicated explicitly or implicitly. However, there is no room 
for presumed consent. Nor is there any need for consentp to be obtained to non- 
intervention decisions. However, consentAdoes require that patients be involved in any 
such decision, and that they are provided with the opportunity to influence the HCP's 
decision: even if patients lack the power to require a particular treatment, a respect for 
their autonomy requires that they be engaged in the process, are informed of the reasons 
for the decision, given an opportunity to disagree and are asked for their agreement. 
Although consentp cannot independently drive the obligation to disclose alternative 
treatments to the professional's preferred option, when combined with the HCPs duty of 
care, disclosure of alternatives is required. This obligation is further justified by the 
inclusion of consentAas an attribute. 
Since not all medical interventions involve a direct infringement of bodily integrity, any 
regulatory model needs to account for those indirect interferences. These include 
treatments where the HCP prescribes and directs the treatment but it is the patient who 
performs the final act. For example, taking oral medication, applying topical creams and 
ointments or self-injecting (e. g diabetes). In all of these cases the HCP's agency is 
mediated through the patient. Although the patient acts intentionally, the HCPs 
involvement is a relevant causal factor. Given the imbalance of knowledge and power, 
and the reasonableness of relying on the expert's advice it is arguable that the HCP is 
causally responsible for the patient's act and that the patients are acting, in performing the 
final act of treatment, as the HCP's agents. Even if this argument is not accepted, these 
types of treatment may still be covered by consentA. which I argued was an important 
attribute of consent to medical treatment. Thus, any regulation of consent should be able 
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to deal with treatment where the patient performs the final act, This ensures that consent 
protects the negative aspects of individual autonomy for both direct and indirect medical 
interventions. 
Because of the importance of consentA, the dialogical process that precedes consentp 
should be accounted for in the regulation of consent to medical treatment (Figure 2). 
Given the relational nature of any communication, the law should accept that both parties 
have responsibilities, For example, although the balance of power and knowledge lies 
with the professional, patients should be responsible for letting the professional know 
how much information is wanted, what their baseline understanding is and whether they 
are happy to give consent on the basis of the information disclosed. The professional 
should do what is reasonable to facilitate autonomous decision-making. This means that 
the standard of disclosure should not be based solely on what was disclosed but should 
take account of how the two parties have conducted the process of communication that 
culminated in the particular disclosure made. 
The law must also deal with the consequences of an ineffective or absent consent. 
Perhaps the most serious failures are where the HCP has shown a complete lack of 
respect for both the welfare and the autonomy of the patient. This should be a rare 
occurrence but may nonetheless occur where an HCP coerces or deceives a patient in 
order to obtain consent to a procedure where the motivation was primarily to benefit the 
HCP (e. g. unnecessary work for personal gain). The complete failure to obtain consent is 
also a serious failing. Perhaps less serious are those cases where the consent has been 
obtained negligently, for example, by simply forgetting to disclose a relevant risk. Legal 
regulations should arguably acknowledge the differing degrees of infringement in the 
rernedies available to the claimant. 
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Because autonomy is the moral basis for consent, whether the risk materialises or whether 
the patient would have made a different decision should be irrelevant to the question of 
liability. These factors, however, may affect the amount of any damages awarded. As I 
discussed earlier, liability for consent and outcome responsibility should be determined 
independently, although a valid consent would be needed to include the patient in the 
apportionment of responsibility. This, however, does not mean that patients can only be 
held responsible when a risk materialises if that risk has actually been disclosed. Where 
patients have agreed to consent knowing that certain risks have not been disclosed then 
there is no reason why they should not be held as responsible for the undisclosed risks as 
for those that have been disclosed. 
Finally, the law must allow the competent patient's refusal of consent to act as an 
effective refusal of treatment unless to do so would directly harm others. While this 
protection should be extended to any decision, whether rational or not, the law should 
require that the HCP challenge any decision that does appear to be irrational and attempt 
to persuade the patient to change his or her mind. While the law should not force the 
patients to change their decisions, it should require the HCP to seek both reasons and 
explanations for the decision. If the patient is unwilling to engage with the HCP to 
provide these reasons and explanations, the law should allow the professional to transfer 
the patient's care to another HCP. 
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PART TWO: CONSENT AND THE LAW 
In part one I provided an analysis of the concept of consent and considered the moral 
arguments justifying the role consent plays. The importance of this role is reflected by the 
degree of protection it attracts, so I turn now to consider the legal regulation of consent. 
Consent to medical treatment, in an ethical sense, crosses two forms of civil legal action; 
battery and negligence. To avoid liability for battery professionals must obtain a 'real' 
consent from their patients. However, this does not end their duty and they must make 
further disclosure to avoid liability for negligence. In chapter five I will explore the legal 
regulation of consent. This exegesis will indicate some of the problems that beset the law, 
which will provide the material necessary for the comparison to be made in chapter six 
between legal practice and the theoretical model of consent developed in part one. 
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Chapter Five: The Legal Regulation of Consent 
The courts repeatedly proclaim the value that the law gives to the individual's right to 
self-determination. In Sv McC, - Wv W, Lord Reid stated: 'There is no doubt that a person 
of full age and capacity cannot be ordered to undergo a blood test against his will ... The 
real reason is that English law goes to great lengths to protect a person of full age and 
capacity from interference with his personal liberty'. 644 Similarly, in Nancy Bv Hotel- 
Dieu De Quebec, Dufour J quoted with approval the words of Professor Beaudoin (a 
justice of the Quebec Court of Appeal) who stated: 'For a competent person of the age of 
majority, the making of his own decisions with respect to his own body is the legal 
expression of the principle of personal autonomy and of the right to self- 
determination'. 645 This right exists regardless of the consequences for the individual. 
Thus, in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, 646 Lord Keith stated; 'Even when his or her own 
life depends on receiving medical treatment an adult of sound mind is entitled to refuse it. 
This reflects the autonomy of each individual and the right of self-determination', 647 In Re 
T (Adult. - Re)usal of Treatment), Lord Donaldson MR went so far as to proclaim: 'An 
adult patient who ... suffers from no mental incapacity 
has an absolute right to choose 
whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather than another 
of the treatments being offered'. 
648 
For the law to protect personal autonomy, it must prohibit an invasion of that right and 
provide for sanctions when a breach does occur. This protection is achieved by allowing 
individuals a personal sphere of control mediated by consent. Thus: 'Traditionally 
644 SV MCC,. WvW[ 19721 AC 24,43, HL. 
645 Nancy Bv Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (0) 3 85,3 91 (Quebec Superior Court). 
646 A iredale NHS Trust v Bland [ 199311 All ER 82 1, HL. 
647 Ibid., 860 per Lord Keith. 
648 Op cit n. 510,786. Lord Donaldson MR did consider that an woman's choice may be limited by 
the prospect of that choice resulting in the death of a viable fetus however it has since been held 
that this is not the case: Op cit n. 55; Op cit n. 53 1. See also Re B (Consent to Treatinent: Capacit. i) 
[2002] EWHC 49. 
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[consent] is deemed to be a means of protecting the right to self determination which it is 
held all people have. In other words, rules about the provision of consent are a method of 
providing for the protection of the autonomy of the individual'. 649 In this context, the 
personal sphere is the right to bodily integrity and a breach of consent renders the actor 
liable in tort law for a battery and in criminal law for at least a battery and possibly one of 
the more serious offences under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 . 
650 As Cardozo 
J famously stated: 'every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in 
damages'. 651 
This right to refuse treatment follows from the legal protection that allows individuals to 
claim a right to bodily integrity. The most expansive protection of this right is found in 
tort, and my focus is on this branch of law. Within tort law, it is battery that provides the 
most obvious protection 652 and grounds the right to refuse treatment. 653 As I suggested in 
part one, the idea of control is inherent in the concept of a right and that control is 
facilitated through consent. This protection of personal autonomy requires both the 
underlying right to bodily integrity, and the secondary right of consent. As such it is 
necessary to consider both the extent of the protection of bodily integrity and the nature 
654 
of the control allowed by consent in the law of battery . 
649 McLean, S. Maher, G. Medicine, Morals and the Law (1983) Aldershot: Gower Publishing Co. 
Ltd, 79. 
650 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871,882 per Lord 
Scarman, HL; Op cit n. 646,860 per Lord Keith. Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 135, 
Consent in the Criminal Law (1995). 
651 Schloendorff v Society offew York Hospital 211 N. Y. 125,129 (1914), 
652 In Collins v Wilcock [ 1984] 1 WLR 1172,1177, Goff U stated, 'The fundamental principle, 
plain and incontestable, is that every person's body is inviolate. It has long been established that 
any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery'. 
653 Re B, Op cit n. 648; Op cit n. 646; Op cit n. 5 10. 
654 Seabourne, G. 'The Role of the Tort of Battery in Medical Law' (1995) 24 Anglo-American 
Law Review 265. 
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Battery 
Trinidade stated that: 'A battery is a direct act of the defendant which has the effect of 
causing contact with the body of the plaintiff without the latter's consent. At the present 
time battery is usually brought only for intentional acts though actions for reckless or 
careless acts are not precluded'. 655 In the context of deliberate medical interventions it is 
only the first part of this definition that is relevant. There are two elements to examine. 
First is the restriction to 'direct act[s]' that cause 'contact with the body of the plaintiff. 
The second is the meaning and limits of consent. 
Despite the lack of clarity arising from Collins v Wilcock, 656 in which Goff LJ stated that: 
'a battery is the actual infliction of unlawful force on another person', 657 directness is still 
required for contact to be battery . 
658 According to Blackstone j, 
659 
the meaning of direct is 
'immediate' - as opposed to consequential or 'mediate'. However this is of little help. 
Surgical operations would certainly be direct, as would the physical contact required to 
examine the patient, take blood or give an injection. However, consider the situation in 
which a doctor writes a prescription for a patient who takes it to the pharmacy where it is 
filled out and then taken home before, some hours later, the patient ingests a tablet. Could 
this amount to a battery where an effective consent had not been obtained? 660 It is 
submitted that this would almost certainly not be actionable as a battery. The connection 
between the doctor's prescription and the non-consensual contact with the offending 
tablets is insufficiently direct. However, consider the same scenario except, instead of 
writing a prescription for the drug, the physician hands the patient a plastic cup 
containing the tablets, which the patient then ingests (alternatively, the doctor leaves the 
655 Trinidade, F. A. 'Intentional Torts: Some Thoughts on Assault and Battery' (1982) 2 Oxford 
Journal of legal Studies 211,216. 
656 Op cit n. 652. 
657 Ibid, 1177. 
658 Fowler v Lanning [ 1959] 1 QB 426; Letang v Cooper [ 1965] 1 QB 232, CA. 
659 SCott v Shepherd (1773) 2 W. Blackstone 892. 
660 See: Seaboume, Op cit n, 654,270. 
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cup on the side and merely indicates to the patient that she should take the tablets). Is this 
sufficiently direct to constitute a battery? 
In Mink v University of Chicago, a number of women were given di ethyl st 1 lbestrol (DES) 
as part of a medical research programme. 661 The women were not told that they were part 
of an experiment, nor were they told that the pills - administered to them during their pre- 
natal care - were DES. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendants committed 
battery by experimenting on them without their consent. The administration of DES was 
alleged to be an 'offensive invasion of their persons'. Grady, J acknowledged that most 
cases involving a lack of knowledge concerned the doctrine of 'Informed consent', which 
should be bought in negligence. However, 'The plaintiffs in this action are in a different 
position from patients who at least knew they were being given some form of drug 
[and] may bring a battery action grounded on the total lack of consent to DES drug 
treatment'. 662 In deciding that the defendants were liable for battery, Grady J stated: 
We find the administration of a drug without the patient's knowledge 
comports with the meaning of offensive contact. Had the drug been 
administered by means of a hypodermic needle, the element of 
physical contact would clearly be sufficient. We believe that causing 
the patient to physically ingest a pill is indistinguishable in 
principle. 
663 
In the US, the American Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) erased the need to show 
that, in battery, the force was direct. However it may be argued that Grady's judgment 
should be equally applicable in this jurisdiction. Grady held that a non-consensual 
injection would be a sufficiently direct application of force to constitute a battery. It 
follows, that if 'causing the patient to physically ingest a pill is indistinguishable in 
661 Mink v Universiýv of Chicago 460 F. Supp. 713 (1978). 
662 Ibid, 717. 
663 lbid, 718. 
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principle' then that action would also be a battery. It may also be feasible to draw an 
analogy between this situation and Scott v Shepherd in which the defendant threw a 
lighted firework into a crowded market place. 664 The firework was thrown onwards by 
two of the stall-holders acting in self-preservation. It finally exploded in the plaintiffs 
face causing him to lose an eye. The act was held to be sufficiently direct because the 
intermediaries were not acting under the control of their own independent rational wills. 
The onward passage of the firework was considered to be a continuous chain of events set 
in motion by the defendant. In Mink, it could equally be argued that the women, by virtue 
of their lack of knowledge and power within the doctor-patient relationship, were not free 
to act controlled only by their own rational will. As such, it is arguable that the ingestion 
665 
of the pill was simply another link in the chain initiated by the doctor. 
It is equally arguable that if Mink were heard in this jurisdiction it would have a different 
outcome. It may be significant that the drug was provided as part of a research 
programme rather than simply as therapy. Given judicial reluctance to find doctors liable 
for battery (see later), it is unlikely that, in a therapeutic context, English courts would 
accept Grady's argument that causing someone to ingest a tablet is equivalent in principle 
to injecting them with a hypodermic syringe. 666 Although it is arguable that the women 
may be acting under undue influence and hence that they are akin to a passive instrument 
in the hands of the doctor, an English court may be more likely to argue that the act of 
ingesting was distinct from the doctor's act of providing her with the tablet and that the 
connection was an indirect one. Even if the court did adopt Grady's approach it is 
664 Op cit n, 659. 
665 See the criminal law case of Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [200013 All ER 890; 
[2000] 2 Cr. App. R. 339, in which it was held that it was sufficiently direct for the force to be 
applied through a 'medium controlled by the actions of the assailant'. 
666 In one US jurisdiction that treats informed consent as an aspect of the law of batterý% rather than 
negligence, the Supreme Court even held, contrary to Grady J's opinion, that a therapeutic 
injection was insufficiently invasive to constitute a battery: Morgan v MacPhail 704 A. 2d 617 
(1997). 
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extremely unlikely that it would be extended to include prescription drugs. Rather, the 
courts would probably hold that any liability would be in negligence rather than battery. 
Consent and Battery 
Consent justifies rather than excuses the contact consented to. 667 Thus, in Freeman v 
Home Office, Sir John Donaldson MR stated: 'consent ... deprives the act of its tortious 
character', 668 and in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, Lord Mustill noted: 'The reason why 
the consent of the patient is so important is not that it furnishes a defence in itself, but 
because it is usually essential to the propriety of medical treatment'. 669 Consent functions 
as a justification because a lack of consent fonns part of the offence. 6'0 Thus, as 
McCowan J noted: 'the burden of proving absence of consent is on the plainti ff . 
671 
Although in criminal law consent does notjustify contact causing actual bodily harm, 672 it 
is likely that it would be effective in civil law, which is concerned with a private 
complaint and the correction of a wrong rather than the more public concerns of criminal 
law. In any case, in the present context of consent to medical treatment, a valid consent is 
also completely effective in the criminal law. 673 
Although consent functions as a complete justification to medical treatment, it is not the 
only justification recognised by the law. Where treatment is required to prevent a risk of 
harm to others, treatment may be justified by the public interest in preventing that harm 
materialising. Most noticeably this arises in the public health context of communicable 
667 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [ 1990] 2 AC 1,73. 
668 Freeman v Home Office [ 1984] 1 All ER 1036,1044, CA. 
669 Op cit n. 646,889, HL. 
670 Freeman v Home Office (No. 2) [1984] 1 QB 524,53 9, HC. Although the case went to appeal, 
this point was not disputed: Freeman v Home Office (No. 2) [1984] 1 QB 524, CA. That lack of 
consent forms part of the offence in English law was also noted by McHugh J in the Australian 
case Department of Health & Community Services (NT) v JWB andSMB (1992) 66 ALJR 300, 
337. 
671 Op cit n. 670,539. 
672 See Rv Brown [ 1993] 2 WLR 556, HL. 
673 Attorney General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [198 1] 1 QB 715,719. Lord Lane CJ actually 
specified 'reasonable surgical treatment', but it is likely that anything accepted as legitimate 
medical practice would be justified by the patient's consent. 
1O 
I Ö) 
diseases and where the patient poses a risk because of mental illness . 
674 It should also be 
noted that mental health law also allows non-consensual treatment of the competent 
persoWs mental health condition where there is a risk of self-harm. 6" A general exception 
to the need for consent is where the defendant's contact 'is acceptable in the ordinary 
conduct of everyday life'. 676 Finally treatment may also be justified by the doctrine of 
necessity, but only where the patient lacks the competence to give a valid consent. 677 
Competence 
Although this thesis primarily concerns the competent adult, the relevant population 
cannot be defined without determining who is competent. Furthermore, if competency is 
decision-specific and related to the complexity of the decision, it is necessarily related to 
the informational element of consent: whether someone is competent should be 
determined by reference to the complexity of the information needed for a legally valid 
consent. 678 Because of this relationship, a basic understanding of competence is relevant 
to the context of any discussion of consent. Finally, given the relationship between 
information and competence, how the law regulates these two issues is relevant to 
whether the law is coherent. For these reasons, I will consider how the law determines 
competency. 
In Re T, Lord Donaldson NIR stated: 'The right to decide one's own fate presupposes a 
capacity to do so. Every adult is presumed to have that capacity, but it is a presumption 
that can be rebutted' . 
679An early indication of the legal requirement is found in Cardozo 
Fs classic statement, which referred to a 'sound mind' . 
680 Although vague, this appears to 
674 Ss. 35-38 Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 ; ss, 3(2)(c), 58,62,63 Mental Health 
Act 1983 
675 Ss. 3(2)(c), 62 Mental Health Act 1983 
676 Op cit n. 667,73 per Lord Goff. 
677 Op cit n. 667,73-74 per Lord Goff. When the Mental Capacity Act 2005 comes into force in 
2007, medical treatment may also be justified by proxy consent (s. 9). 
679 Maclean, A. Op cit n. 61 1. 
679 Op cit n. 510,796. 
680 Op cit n. 651,129. 
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be a low level test, which suggests that those persons capable of making the decisions 
required in an ordinary adult life will be competent to make their own treatment 
decisions. In Chatterton v Gerson, Bristow J stated: 'In my judgment once the patient is 
informed in broad terms of the nature of the procedure ... and gives her consent, that 
consent is real'. 681 Since there is little point in requiring the transfer of information if the 
information will not be understood, the law must, at least, require that the patient is 
capable of understanding 'in broad tenns the nature of the procedure'. 682 This test is still 
easy to satisfy. 
In Re C, Thorpe J accepted the test of capacity proposed by one of the expert witnesses, 
683 which requires the individual: '(1) to take in and retain treatment information, (2) to 
believe it and (3) to weigh that information, balancing risks and needs'. 684 In 
Cambridgeshire CC v R, Hale J cited the Re C test and stated: 'The test of competence 
has always been the capacity to understand the nature and effect of the transaction or 
other action proposed'. 685 Unlike the Re C test, this view of competency does not require 
that the person 'believes' the information. Furthermore, although requiring an 
understanding of the 'effect', Hale Fs test avoids explicit reference to risks. However, the 
Mental Health Act Code of Practice quotes the tripartite Re C test as the appropriate test 
for competence and states that the knowledge required for consent includes: 'the purpose, 
nature, likely effects and risks of th[e] treatment including the likelihood of its success 
and any alternatives to 
it,. 686 
681 Chatterton v Gerson [ 198 1]I All ER 257,265. 
682 Gunn, M. 'The Meaning of Incapacity' (1994) 2 Medical Law Review 8; Brazier, M. 
'Competence, Consent and Proxy Consents'. In: Brazier, M., Lobjoit, M. (eds. ) Protecting the 
Vulnerable: Autonomy and Consent in Health Care (1991) Routledge: London 34,36. 
683 Re C (Adult. - Refusal of treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290; [1994] 1 All ER 819. 
684 Ibid, 292 per Thorpe J. When Thorpe J restated the test at 295, he dropped the 'balancing risks 
and needs' element. It is suggested that this has happened merely as shorthand and that Thorpe J 
accepted the need to balance 'risks and needs' since it is clear that he considered it very important 
that the risk of dying had altered from 85% to 15% following conservative treatment. 
685 Cambridgeshire CC vR[ 1995] 1 FLR 50,53. 
686 Mental Health Act Code of Practice (1999) London: HMSO, paras 15.10 and 15.13. 
185 
Following Re C, the Law Commission adopted a 'functional' approach to capacity. 
Incompetence was the inability 'to make a decision on the matter in question, or ... to 
communicate a decision' . 
68' A person is unable to make a decision if- 
he or she is unable to understand or retain the information relevant to 
the decision, including information about the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of deciding one way or another or failing to make a 
decision. 688 
The Law Commission would also require the person to 'be able to use the information 
which he or she has successfully understood in the decision-making process'. 689 It was, 
however, recommended that the 'belief requirement of the Re C test should be dropped. 
The Law Commission argued that: 'Emphasising that the person must be able to use the 
information ... deflects the complications of asking whether a person needs to 
appreciate" information as well as understand itý. 
690 The proposal to drop the 'belief 
element of the Re C test was followed by the Court of Appeal in Re MB . 
69 1 Furthermore, 
the government has taken this approach in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which comes 
into force in 2007 and makes competence subject to the ability to: understand, retain, 
weigh up and use the information and communicate the decision. 692 
In Re T, Lord Donaldson MR argued that the capacity required for a decision depended 
on the importance of that decision. He stated: 'What matters is that doctors should 
consider whether at that time he had a capacity which was commensurate with the gravity 
of the decision which he purported to make. The more serious the decision, the greater the 
68' The Law Commission, Report on Mental Incapacity No. 231 (1995) London: HMSO, para 3.14: 
Draft Bill, clause 2(l). 'Mental disability' means 'any disability or disorder of the mind or brain, 
whether permanent or temporary, which results in an impairment or disturbance of mental 
functioning' (Draft Bill, clause 2(2)). 
688 Ibid., para 3.16: Draft Bill, clause 2(2) (a). 
689 Ibid., para 3.17. 
690 Ibid., para 3.17. 
691 Op cit n. 55. 
692 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 3(l). 
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capacity required' . 
693 This suggests that capacity is task dependant and varies with the 
importance, or risk, of the decision. This sliding-scale risk-related standard of 
694 
competence has received both academic support and criticism. It has, however, 
received subsequent judicial approval from the Court of Appeal in St George's 
Healthcare NHS Trust VS , 
69' and appears to be part of English law. 
2. Voluntary Consent 
For consent to be valid it must have been freely given: consent gained by threats or fear 
of violence will be vitiated. Other, subtler, forms of pressure may also vitiate consent. 
Whether or not the pressure is overt, it must have affected the individual to such a point 
that they can no longer be held responsible for their act. Thus, in Olugboja, Dunn U 
accepted that: "'consent" ... covers a wide range of states of mind ... ranging from actual 
desire ... to reluctant acquiescence', 
696 but, as Young suggested: 
pressure may get to such a degree that the act will lose its 
voluntariness. Just where that point is a question of fact and different 
tribunals of fact will come to different answers depending on the 
decade in which they are sitting and the community standards of the 
relevant time and place. 
697 
In Latter v Braddell the plaintiff was a housemaid accused by her employer of being 
pregnant . 
698 Although protesting, she submitted to an examinatIon by the doctor 
693 Op cit n. 510,796. 
694 For arguments against a risk-related standard see: Wicclair, M. R. 'Patient decision-making 
capacity and risk' (1991) 5 Bioethics 9 1; Wicclair, M. R Op cit n. 61 1; May T. 'Assessing 
Competency Without Judging Merit' (1998) 9 The Journal of Clinical Ethics 247; Maclean, A. Op 
cit n. 611,2 8 1. For arguments in favour of a risk-related standard see: Drane, J. 'The Many Faces 
of Competency' (1985) 15 Hastings Center Report 17, Brock, D. W. Op cit n. 6 10; Wilks, 1. Op cit 
n. 6 10. 695 Op cit n. 531,693. 
696 Rv Olugboja [ 1982] QB 320 at 33 1; Gardner, S. 'Appreciating Olugboja' (1996) 16 Legal 
Studies 275,279-30. 
697 Young, P. W. The Law of Consent (1986) The Law Book Company Ltd: North Ryde (N SW), 
17. 
698 Latter v Braddell (1881) 50 LJQB 166, Common Pleas Division; (1881) 50 LJQB 448, CA. 
187 
summoned by her employer. Her case ultimately failed but the contrasting judgments 
illustrate the difficulty of determining an issue dependent on a matter of degree. 
Lopes J stated: 
I do not think it was correct to tell the jury that to maintain this action 
the plaintiff s will must have been overpowered by force or the fear of 
violence ... A submission to what is done, obtained through a belief 
that she is bound to obey her master and mistress; or a consent 
obtained through fear of evil consequences to arise to herself, induced 
by her master's or mistress's words or conduct, is not sufficient. In 
neither case would the consent be voluntarily given. It would be a 
consent in one sense, but a consent to which the will was not a 
party. 
699 
On the other hand, Lindley J stated: 
The plaintiff was not a child; she knew perfectly well what she did 
and what was being done to her by the doctor ... upon the evidence 
there is no reason whatever for supposing that any examination would 
have been made or attempted if she had told the doctor she would not 
allow herself to be examined. Under these circumstances I am of the 
opinion that there was no evidence of want of consent as distinguished 
from reluctant obedience or submission to her mistress's orders, and 
that in the absence of all evidence of coercion, as distinguished from 
an order which the plaintiff could comply with or not as she chose, the 
700 
action cannot be maintained . 
699 Latter v Braddell (1881) 50 LJQB 166,167-8. 
700 Ibid, 168. 
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When the case reached the Court of Appeal the plaintiff s case was dismissed since her 
submission was 'not through fear of violence' . 
70 1 The requirement of force or violence is 
not the current law and in this sense Latter v Braddell may 'safely be consigned to the 
archives'. 702 Lindley Fs argument, in the Common Pleas hearing, was that the housemaid 
could still have refused consent and that, had she done so, she would not have been 
compelled to submit, It is suggested that this argument, although not expilcit, is - like the 
Court of Appeal's judgment - relying on the lack of force present. However, as Lopes Fs 
argument makes clear, coercion arises where the plaintiff believes that she has little 
option but to submit. Thus, the plaintiff only consented because she feared losing herjob 
and her home if she acted otherwise. It is submitted that Lopes J's judgment would be the 
vM CC . 
703 
preferred argument today and this is supported by RI Oy 
The complainant had broken the rules of her employment as an airhostess by failing to 
use her seat belt during descent, which meant that she would either be grounded or 
dismissed. Since she was in debt and her work permit depended on her remaining in her 
current employment she was under pressure to remain on flying duty. Her boss, the 
appellant, suggested that this would be possible if she accepted a caning as an altemative 
punishment. The appellant was convicted of criminal assault and appealed. His appeal 
was dismissed partly because the caning was 'malum in se'. However, the court also 
104 
argued that her agreement was not really consent, 'but only submission under duress'. 
Taylor ACJ stated: 
To my mind the evidence makes it abundantly clear that [the] 
complainant was coerced ... Under duress she reluctantly acquiesced 
in the infliction on her of a form of punishment which was repugnant. 
'0' Latter v Braddell (1881) 50 LJQB 448 per Bramwell LJ. 
702 Grubb A. 'Consent to Treatment: The Competent Person', in: Grubb A. Laing, J (eds. ) 
Principles of Medical Law (2 nd ed., 2004) Oxford: Oxford University Press 131,202, n. 422. 
703 R i, McCoy [ 1953 ]2 SA 4. 
704 Ibid, 5. 
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She merely submitted ... submission, according to the authorities, is 
705 totally different from consent . 
Whether an external influence is 'undue' is a matter of degree. Lopes Fs argument and 
the judgment in McCoy suggest that this point is reached when the decision is no longer 
the individual's own decision: the decision was made only to avoid an unjust threat and 
the threat was irresistible. The question of what circumstances are sufficient to vitiate 
consent arose in Freeman v Home Office. 706 The plaintiff was serving a prison sentence 
and was given certain drugs to control his violent and anti-social behaviour. He brought 
an action for battery claiming, inter alla, that his consent under such circumstances could 
not be valid. His counsel submitted that the pressures and discipline of prison life meant 
that a prisoner would never be able to give a valid consent. Sir John Donaldson MR 
approved the statement made by the judge at first instance, 'O' who said: 'The right 
approach, in my judgment, is to say that where, in a prison setting, a doctor has the power 
to influence a prisoner's situation and prospects a court must be a] ive to the risk that what 
may appear, on the face of it, to be a real consent is not in fact So,. 708 This is not very 
helpful in determining when consent is vitiated by duress. All that may be taken from the 
case is that certain situations must alert the court to the possibility but, 'whatever the 
circumstances, the issue of voluntariness is an issue of fact'. "' 
Lord Donaldson returned to the issue of undue influence in Re T. 7 10 T was pregnant and 
required a caesarean section following a road traffic accident. Her mother was a 
Jehovah's Witness, and shortly after her visit, T refused any blood transfusions that may 
become necessary. After the operation she deteriorated and required ventilation on the 
705 bid, 11-12. 
706 Op cit n. 668. 
707 Jbid, 1044-5. 
711 
Freeman v Home Office [198412 WLR 130,145. 709 Op cit n. 702,203. 710 Op cii n. 5 10. 
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intensive therapy unit. While there, she required a life-saving transfusion and the court 
was asked to consider whether her prior refusal was still operative. In the Court of 
Appeal, Lord Donaldson MR argued that others could advise the patient: 
But the doctors have to consider whether the decision is really that of 
the patient. It is wholly acceptable that the patient should have been 
persuaded by the merits of such a decision and have decided 
accordingly. It matters not how strong the persuasion was, so long as 
it did not overbear the independence of the patient's decision. The real 
question in each such case is: does the patient really mean what he 
says or is he merely saying it for a quiet life, to someone else or 
because the advice and persuasion to which he has been subjected is 
such that he can no longer think and decide for himself? In other 
words, is it a decision expressed in form only, not in reality? "' 
This approach was followed by the Court of Appeal in Mrs Uv The Centrefor 
Reproductive Medicine. 712 
Real Consent 
For any consent to be valid it must relate to the act performed. Thus, consent to an 
operation on the right ear will not be sufficient to negate liability for battery if the 
surgeon operates on the left ear, even where the left ear was more diseased than the 
right. "' This is true even where the operation is beneficial to the patient. 7 14 The courts 
have held that a patient may consent to 'leave the nature and extent of the operation to be 
performed to the discretion of the surgeon'. 715 However, consent to a particular act will be 
insufficient unless it is 'real'. Bristow J laid down the elements of a 'real consent' in 
711 Op cit n. 510,797. 
712 Mrs Uv The Centrefor Reproductive Medicine [2002] EWCA Civ 565, [22]. 
713 Mohr v Williams 104 NW 2 (1905). See also: Cull v Royal Surrey County Hospital (1932) 
BMJ 1195 in which a surgeon was liable for battery when he removed the plaintiff s uterus 
(womb) even though she had only consented to an abortion. 
714 Devi v West Alidlands RHA (198 1) CA, Transcript 49 1. 
715 Breen v Baker (1956) The Times 27" January. 
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Chatterton v Gerson, ' 16 in which the plaintiffs action for batterY failed because "[she] 
had been under no illusion as to the general nature of the operations performed by the 
717 defendant'. Bristow J stated: 
In my judgment once the patient is informed in broad terms of the 
nature of the procedure which is intended, and gives her consent, that 
consent is real, and the cause of the action on which to base a claim 
for failure to go into risks and implications is negligence, not 
trespass. 
718 
This was confirmed by the House of Lords in Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal 
Hospital. 719 
Bristow J's reasoning behind his decision to deny an action in battery may be criticised 
because he made no attempt to consider the purpose of obtaining the patient's consent. 
The only case used in support of his decision was the Canadian case of Reibl v Hughes. 720 
The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the first instance decision because battery was 
inappropriate when a doctor acts in good faith. Instead of basing his decision on reasoned 
legal argument and principle Bristow J appeared to resort to policy. He claimed: '... it 
would be very much against the interests of justice if actions which are really based on a 
failure by the doctor to perform his duty adequately to inform were pleaded in 
trespass' . 
72 1 No attempt was made to relate the obligation to obtain consent with the 
patient's right to self-determination as clearly stated by Justice Cardozo more than 60 
years earlier. Bristow J ignored the issue of informed consent that had troubled the 
American CoUrtS. 722 
716 Op cit n. 681, 
717 Ibid, 258. 
718 Ibid, 264-5. 
7 19 Hills v Potter [ 1984] 1 WLR 64 1; Op cit n. 668; Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal 
Hospital [ 1985 ]I AC 87 1. 
720 Reibl v Hughes (1978) 21 OR (2d) 14. 
721 Op cit n. 681,265. 
722 Op cit n. 36,114 - 150. 
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When Bristow J gave his judgment, ReibI v Hughes had only reached the Court of 
Appeal. However, the Supreme Court's decision is compatible with Bristow J's and, since 
the issues of risk and "infon-ned consent" were considered more fully, it is instructive to 
consider that case. In Reibl the plaintiff underwent carotid artery surgery, which, although 
competently performed, resulted in a massive stroke leaving him with a right-sided 
113 
paralysis. The plaintiff had formally consented but alleged that he had not been 
adequately informed of the risks (estimated at 10% risk of a stroke and a 4% risk of 
death). At first instance the trial judge held that the risks involved were material rather 
than collateral and that the defendant was liable in battery. In the Supreme Court, Laskin 
CJC - giving the judgment of the court - stated that: 'In my opinion, these findings do 
724 
notjustify the imposition of liability for battery' . 
The Supreme Court considered Morden J's test - described in Kelly v 
Hazlett725 
- 
for 
determining whether a failure to disclose risks would support liability in battery or 
negligence. 726 Morden J distinguished 'the matter of consequential or collateral risks from 
the basic nature and character of the operation or procedure'. 727 He argued that a failure to 
disclose 'collateral risks' was more properly considered in negligence. However: 
The more probable the risk the more it could be said to be an integral 
feature of the nature and character of the operation. Further, even if a 
risk is truly collateral, but still material, it could be said that its 
disclosure is so essential to an informed decision to undergo the 
operation that lack of such disclosure should vitiate the consent. 728 
Laskin CJC rejected this distinction. He stated: 
723 Reibl v Hughes (19 81) 114 DLR (3d) 1. 
724 Ibid, 8-9. 
7" Kelly v Hazlett (1977) 75 DLR (3d) 536. 
726 This test was adopted by Haines J, the trial judge in Reibl. 
727 OP cit n. 725,558-559. 
728 Ibid, 559. 
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can appreciate the temptation to say that the genuineness of 
consent to medical treatment depends on proper disclosure of the 
risks which it entails, but in my view, unless there has been 
misrepresentation or fraud to secure consent to the treatment, a 
failure to disclose the attendant risks, however serious, should go 
to negligence rather than battery. Although such a failure relates to 
an informed choice of submitting to or refusing recommended and 
appropriate treatment, it arises as the breach of the anterior duty of 
due care, comparable in legal obligation to the duty of due care in 
carrying out the particular treatment to which the patient has 
129 
consented. It is not a test of the validity of the consent. 
The nature of a procedure also includes its purpose. Thus, in Appleton v Garrett the 
defendant performed unnecessary dental work on the plaintiffs for purely financial gain 
and the judge held that the plaintiffs' consents were not 'real' . 
730 Furthermore, the patient 
must know the identity of the treating professional. In Rv Richardson the appellant 
dentist continued treating her patients even though she had been suspended from the 
General Dental Council's register. 731 She was charged with assault and the judge ruled 
that her patients' apparent consents were vitiated because she allowed them to think she 
was still registered. She changed her plea to guilty and then appealed against the judge's 
ruling. 
The Court of Appeal allowed her application. Otton LJ stated: 
the Crown contended that the concept of the "identity of the person" 
should be extended to cover the qualifications or attributes of the 
dentist on the basis that the patients consented to treatment by a 
729 Op cit n. 723,10-11. 
730 
, 
4ppleton v Garrett [ 1997] 8 Med LR 75. 
731 Rv Richardson (1998) 43 BMLR 2 1, CA. 
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qualified dentist and not a suspended one. We must reject that 
submission ... the complainants were fully aware of the identity of the 
appellant. To accede to the submission would be to strain or distort the 
everyday meaning of the word "identity", the dictionary definition of 
which is "the condition of being the same 1ý . 
732 
Effectively the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the consent was to <dental 
treatment by a registered dentist> in favour of <dental treatment by Ms Richardson>. 
Although the head-note states that: 'a person's professional status or qualifications did 
not constitute part of their identity', "' Otton LJ rejected the Crown's argument that 'there 
was no distinction between an unqualified dentist and one who is suspended' . 
734 It may, 
therefore, have been important that she was a qualified dentist even though she was not 
registered at the time. 
135 Richardson may be compared with Rv Tabassum. Three women consented to be 
shown how to perform a breast examination by the accused, who was preparing a 
computer software package on breast cancer. The women all stated that they only 
consented to the examination because they believed the accused to be medically qualified. 
However, no sexual motive was alleged. The Court of Appeal held that the women had 
not given a true consent since, although they understood the nature of the act, they had 
not consented to the quality of the act. The women knew that the act was a breast 
examination and that it was for the purpose of preparing the software package. Thus, the 
Court of Appeal considered that the women's consent was to <breast examination for the 
purposes of preparing a medical software package by a medically qualified person> rather 
than simply <breast examination for the purposes of preparing a medical software 
package>. Although Richardson was distinguished because the decision concerned the 
732 Ibid, 26. 
133 Ibid. 
7" Ibid, 26. 
735 Rv Tabassum [20001 Lloyd's LR Med 404, CA. 
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identity of the actor rather than the nature or quality of the act it is arguable that the only 
136 
relevant factor in Tabassum was that the accused was not medically qualified, which 
emphasises the courts' reluctance to find doctors liable for battery. 
The Legal Regulation of Consent in Negligence 
Legal liability in negligence requires three things: a duty of care; a breach of that duty-, 
and a legally recognised form of damage caused by the breach. Since the duty of care is 
established by the professional-patient relationship it is only the latter two elements that 
require examination. A suitable starting point is the leading case of Sidcrway v Governors 
of Bethlam Royal Hospital, in which the issue of consent and the standard of information 
disclosure reached the House of Lords for the first (and only) time. 737 
Sidaway and the Standard of Disclosure 
The Facts and Judgments 
The plaintiff underwent an operation to relieve recurrent neck pain. It was perfon-ned 
competently but the small risk (<I%) of paraplegia associated with the operation 
materialised and the plaintiff was left partially paralysed. She sued in negligence alleging 
that the defendant had failed to inform her of this risk. At first instance Skinner J held 
that, while the defendant had informed the plaintiff of the risk of damaging the nerve 
roots (approximately I%), he had failed to inform her of the possible damage to her 
spinal cord (with the attendant risk of paralysis). Applying the Bolam test, however, 
Skinner J held that the plaintiff s claim failed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision 
and the plaintiff appealed to the House of Lords. 
It was unanimously held that the plaintiff s appeal failed because she had been unable to 
prove that the surgeon had breached his duty of care. Their Lordships took the 
... See also the Canadian case: Rv Bolduc andBird [1976] 3 CCC 294, SCC. 
737 Sidaway i, Governors of Bethlam Royal Hospital [ 1985] 1 AC 87 1. 
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opportunity to consider the standard of risk disclosure expected of the doctor. Broadly 
speaking: 'There are three distinct strands' detectable in their Lordships' judgments, 738 
although Lord Templeman's speech might be considered sufficiently distinct to be a 
fourth approach. 
739 
Lord Scarman began with the premise that it is the patient's right to accept or reject the 
proffered treatment. 740 He argued that: 'a doctor's duty of care extends not onlY to the 
health and well-being of his patient but also to a proper respect for his patient's rights 
[thus], the duty to warn can be seen to be a part of the doctor's duty of care' . 
74 ' He then 
went on to rightly and importantly recognise that factors other than the patient's health 
might be relevant and this: 'may lead him to a different decision from that suggested by a 
142 
purely medical opinion'. Thus, the doctor's duty is to both advise a particular medical 
treatment and to provide sufficient information to allow the patient to make the 
decision . 
14' As to the substance of this duty, Lord Scarman rejected the Bolam principle 
144 
and opted instead for the 'prudent patient' standard adopted in Canterbury v Spence. 
This requires disclosure of 'material' risks and, 'a risk is ... material when a reasonable 
person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would 
be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to 
745 forego the proposed therapy'. This limits the role of the medical experts to detennining 
the probability and seriousness of a risk materialising and also the 'character of the 
risk'. 746 The judgment of whether the risk should have been disclosed, however, is for the 
court to make based on the 'prudent patient' test. There was one caveat to this test: the 
738 Op cit n. 702,184. 
739 Montgomery, J. Health Care Law (2 nd ed., 2003) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 243. 
740 Op cit n. 737,882. 
741 Ibid, 885. 
742 Ibid, 886. 
743 Ibid, 886. 
744 Op cit n. 582. 
745 lbid, 787; emphasis added by Lord Scarman. 
746 Op cit n. 737,889. 
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risk need not be disclosed: 'if upon a reasonable assessment of his patient's condition he 
takes the view that a warning would be detrimental to his patient's health'. 747 
Lord Diplock argued that the doctor's duty of care was indivisible and included risk 
disclosure . 
74' His Lordship considered that the Bolam test was simply a modern 
restatement of the ancient rule of common law . 
749Thus, he stated: 'no convincing reason 
has in my view been advanced ... that would justify treating the Bolam test as doing 
anything less than laying down a principle of English law that is comprehensive and 
applicable to every aspect of the duty of care owed by a doctor to his patient'. 750 
Lord Diplock's judgment contained two other notable points. First, he argued that: 
the kind of training and experience that a judge will have undergone at 
the Bar makes it natural for him to say (correctly) it is my right to 
decide whether any particular thing is done to my body, and I want to 
be fully informed of any risks there may be involved of which I am 
not already aware from my general knowledge as a highly educated 
man of experience, so that I may form my own judgment as to 
whether to refuse the advised treatment or not. 751 
He then distinguished the patient who asked questions, in which case 'the doctor would 
tell him whatever it was the patient wanted to know', from unenquiring patients who must 
rely on the doctor's skill and judgment to define what they are told. Second, he suggested 
that the only possible effect of risk disclosure would be to deter patients 'from 
undergoing the treatment which in the expert opinion of the doctor is in the patient's 
interest to undergo' . 
752 The implication of this statement, followed - as it is - by 
747 
Ibid, 889-890. 
748 
Ibid, 893-895. 
749 
Ibid., 892. 
750 
Ibid, 893. 
751 Ibid, 895. 
752 Ibid, 895. 
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endorsement of the Bolam standard, is that doctors are under no obligation to Inform 
patients of a risk if they reasonably believe that knowledge will deter them from giving 
consent. 
Lord Bridge, with whom Lord Keith agreed, also held that the Bolam test was the 
appropriate standar . 
753 He examined the role of medical expertise in risk disclosure and 
noted that, in Reibl, Laskin CJC argued that medical experts are necessary to determine 
what risks are associated with a particular procedure but that the materiality of risk should 
not be determined by expert medical evidence alone. In a somewhat confused and self- 
contradictory discussion Lord Bridge stated: 
I fully appreciate the force of this reasoning, but can only accept it 
subject to the important qualification that a decision what degree of 
disclosure of risks is best calculated to assist a particular patient to 
make a rational choice must primarily be a matter of clinical 
judgment. 754 
In other words, Lord Bridge accepted it was the patient's right to know but only if rubber- 
stamped by 'clinical judgment'. However, while the force of Laskin's reasoning had not 
convinced him that the professional standard was inappropriate, it was enough for Lord 
Bridge to hold that adopting the Bolam test did not hand the matter over entirely to the 
medical profession. Thus, where 'disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously 
necessary to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent 
medical man would fail to make it ... for example, the ten per cent. risk of a stroke 
from 
the operation which was the subject of ... Reihl', it would not 
be reasonable for a body of 
755 
medical opinion to hold that the risk should not be disclosed. 
753 lbid, 896. 
754 Ibid, 900, 
755 Jbid, goo, 
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Although not specifically mentioning the Bolam test, Lord Templeman'sjudgment %ý as 
arguably closer to Lord Bridge's than Lord Scarman's or Lord Diplock's judgment. Thus, 
while it was the patient's right to decide and the doctor's duty to provide adequate 
information: 'At the end of the day, the doctor, bearing in mind the best interests of the 
patient ... must decide what information should be given to the patient and in what terms 
that information should be couched'. 756 Lord Templeman distinguished 'general' from 
4specific' risks: 757 for a general risk it is sufficient that patients are aware 'that a major 
758 
operation may entail serious consequences' . 
If patients want more information this 
must be specifically asked for. Lord Templeman's argument relied on the view that too 
much information may be just as harmful as too little information. In addition, patients' 
medical conditions may make them ill prepared to cope with detailed information, which 
doctors should not thrust upon them. It is sufficient if patients are aware that the 
procedure is risky, but still in their best interests unless they specifically request further 
information or the risk is of a 'special nature'. 
Unfortunately, Lord Templeman did not provide a clear explanation of the distinction 
between a 'general' and a 'specific' risk. At one point his argument suggests that for a 
general risk the patient simply needs to know that the operation carries the risk of 'serious 
consequences' . 
759Later, however, he stated that: 'In the case of a general danger the court 
must decide whether the information afforded to the patient was sufficient to alert the 
patient to the possibility of serious harm of the kind in fact suffered' . 
760 This is 
inconsistent with previous statement, since to be aware of the 'kind of harm' requires 
information of a different order to that needed to know that 'serious consequences' might 
follow. Like Lord Bridge, Lord Templeman tumed to the ten per cent risk of stroke in 
ReibI for an illustration of what would count as a special risk. However, he also made a 
756 
Ibid, 905. 
757 
Ibid, 902-903, 
758 Ibid., 902. 
759 Ibid, 902. 
760 Ibid, 903. 
NO 
point of including the four per cent risk of death as a 'specific risk'. Since death can occur 
as a consequence of any operation, especially where a general anaesthetic is involved, 
Lord Templeman must have placed a great weight on the probability of a particular harm 
in determining whether it is specific to the operation. 
Echoes of the Bolam test are discernable in Lord Templeman's argument that if doctors 
fail to disclose a risk, for which disclosure was the accepted medical practice, then the 
court will find them I iable unless they can justify their actions. However, where medical 
practice 
is divided or does not include express mention, it will be for the court 
to deten-nine whether the harm suffered is an example of a general 
danger inherent in the nature of the operation and if so whether the 
explanation ... was sufficient to alert the patient to the general dangers 
161 
of which the harm suffered is an example. 
This, less ambiguously than Lord Bridge's argument, reserved for the court the right to 
choose between two opposing schools of thought within the medical profession. 
However, Lord Templeman tempered this statement by deciding that the court should be 
slow to hold a conscientious doctor liable for failing to disclose a 'specific item of 
762 information' 
. 
The general tenor, therefore, of Lord Templeman's judgment is that, 
while the court has the final word, doctors are acting conscientiously in the patient's best 
interests and - unless the patient has specifically requested the infon-nation in question - 
will only be found liable where they have unjustifiably acted independently of medical 
practice. 
761 lbid, 903. 
762 Ibid, 903. 
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2. Sidaway and the Standard of Care 
Given the variance between the judgments it is not surprising that commentators 
disagreed on the interpretation and implications of the case. Kennedy and Grubb argued 
that Lord Diplock was in the minority and that the majority rejected the Bolam teSt. 763 
Kennedy went so far as to claim that: 'The message of Sidaway is clear. Those who 
advise doctors already know it. Medical paternalism has had it day'. 764 At the other end of 
the scale, Brazier concluded that: 'the House of Lords in Sidcrway set the standard by 
which the adequacy of disclosure would be judged by reference to professional custom 
765 
and practice' . Williams argued that Sidawcry qualified the Bolam test but, by rejecting 
the prudent patient test, the House of Lords had undermined the law's declared 
766 
commitment to autonomy and left it in an 'unsatisfactory state' . 
Giesen and Hayes also 
considered that Sidaway qualified the Bolam test and thus may be greeted with cautious 
optimism. 
767Teff 
suggested that, while Sidaway diverged only slightly from the Bolam 
test, the judgment 'provides some basis for further development' . 
168Newdick, argued that 
any distinction between Lord Diplock and the 'majority' was a 'matter of semantics', 
merely serving to clarify rather than change or reject Bolam . 
769 Newdick, however, unlike 
most of the other commentators, plausibly suggested that the Bolam test remained the 
most appropriate test provided the courts developed a set of principles that 'give 
763 Kennedy, 1. 'The Patient on the Clapham Omnibus'. In: Treat Me Right. - Essays in Medical 
Law and Ethics (198 8) Oxford: Clarendon Press 175; Grubb, A. 'Contraceptive Advice and 
Doctors -A Law Unto Themselves' (1988) 47 The Cambridge Law Journal 12,13. See also, Lee, 
S. 'Towards a Jurisprudence of Consent', in: Eekelaar, J., Bell, J. (eds) Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence (1997) Oxford: Oxford University Press 199,216: Lee, S. 'Operating Under 
Informed Consent' (1985) 101 Law Quarterly Review 316. 
764 Kennedy, 1. Ibid, 2 10. 
765 Brazier, M. 'Patient autonomy and consent to treatment: the role of the lawT (1987) 7 Legal 
Studies 169,182. 
766 Williams, K. 'Pre-operative Consent and Medical Negligence' (1985) 15 Anglo-American Law 
Review 169,179-180. 
767 Giesen, D., Hayes, J. 'The Patient's Right to Know -A Comparative View' (1992) 21 Anglo- 
American Law Review 10 1,103. 
768 Op cit n. 523,450. 
769 Newdick, C. 'The Doctor's Duties of Care Under Sidaway' (1985) 36 Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 243,247 and 249-250. 
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expression to the standards of conduct rightly required of doctors by the medical 
770 
profession itself . 
It is submitted that these disparate views resulted from the inherent ambiguity of the 
Bolam test. It is possible to interpret the test either to leave the standard of care entirely 
within the hands of the medical profession, or to retain for the court the right to determine 
that the relevant common practice is not reasonable. 771 If this latter view is adopted then 
Lord Diplock's and Lord Bridge's converge. Although Lord Templeman did not discuss 
the standard in terms of the Bolam test, the general gist of his argument, despite its lack of 
clarity, 772 is compatible with the latter view of that standard. 773 If, however, the Bolam 
test is given Lord Scarman's interpretation, then the judgments diverge and, as 
Montgomery noted: 'it is impossible to find a majority view'. "' 
3. Answering Questions 
While the issue was obiter, the doctor's response to questioning and his obligation to tell 
the truth was considered in Sidaway. Although not specifically addressing the issue, Lord 
Scarman implied that a doctor should respond truthfully to any direct questions. He 
argued that the moral ideal would be to disclose what that particular patient subjectively 
needed to know but the law was constrained by practical considerations to an objective 
obligation . 
775 Since it was for simply evidentiary difficulties that he accepted the 'prudent 
patient' test, it follows that if patients, through direct questioning, alerts the doctor to their 
776 
own particular needs, then the doctor would be obliged to meet them . 
770 Ibid., 250 (emphasis added). 
771 See, Lord Woolf. 'Are the Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical Profession? ' (2001) 9 
Medical Law Review 1,6. 
772 Jones, M. A. Medical Negligence (1996) London: Sweet & Maxwell, 34 1. 
773 See e. g.: Teff, H. Op cit n. 523,449. 774 Op cit n. 739,245. 775 Op cit n. 737,888. 
776 Except possibly when covered by the therapeutic privilege. 
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Lord Diplock commented that: 'No doubt if the patient in fact manifested this attitude [of 
wanting to be fully informed] by means of direct questioning, the doctor would tell him 
whatever it was the patient wanted to know'. 777 This was unqualified but was stated as if 
in the alternative to the Bolam test, which implies that direct questioning creates an 
exception to the Bolam test and the doctor's duty becomes to provide whatever 
information is requested. The difficulty with this is that questioning can be more or less 
specific and the extent of the response may be similarly varied. It is submitted that, given 
his otherwise wholehearted support of Bolam, Lord Diplock would also gauge the 
appropriateness of the doctor's response to direct questions by the Bolam test unless the 
questions were so precise as to require a particular answer. 
Lord Bridge stated: 'when questioned specifically by a patient of apparently sound mind 
about risks involved in a particular treatment proposed, the doctors duty must, in my 
778 
opinion, be to answer both truthfully and as fully as the questioner requires' . 
Again, 
this seems fairly explicit in relation to precise questions but Lord Bridge's statement also 
leaves the vague or general question at the mercy of the Bolam test. Similarly, Lord 
Templeman allowed that a direct question creates a greater duty of disclosure: 'If she had 
[asked questions]... she could and should have been informed that there was an aggregate 
risk of between one per cent and two per cent risk of some damage either to the spinal 
cord or to a nerve root'. 779 However, for Lord Templeman: 'this further information 
would only have reinforced the obvious'. '80 The conclusion that may be drawn from their 
Lordships'judgments is that direct questioning requires a truthful and complete response. 
Thus, precise questions should be given precise answers. 
777 Op cit n. 737,895. 
778 lbid, 898. 
719 Ibid, 902. 
780 lbid, 902. 
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In respect of more general questions, it is submitted that their Lordships' statements are 
ambiguous. Take Lord Bridge's dictum that the answer must be as lull' as the questioner 
requires. The problem here is that the doctor must try and determine fTom the question 
what it is that the patient wishes to know. Questions may be quite general and the doctor 
is left with discretion to determine the exact response. In these circumstances their 
Lordships have not ruled out the Bolam test as a guide to the standard expected. Even 
where the question appears to be specific, it may be that the patient had something more 
general in mind. For example, the question: 'What are the risks of this procedureT has 
more than one possible interpretation. It might mean any one of the following: 
1. What risks do you think are significant: 
2. What risks do you think I need to know about: 
3. What are all the risks: 
4. What are the common risks: 
5. What are the most serious risks? 
The third option is the only one of these five possibilities that denies the doctor any 
discretion and even here the situation is not clear-cut. Are doctors obliged to disclose 
every adverse consequence ever recorded, or only those recorded in major textbooks, or 
those recorded in academic journals, or only those that they are - or ought to be - aware 
of? It is submitted that they would only be expected to disclose those risks that they ought 
to be aware of and this would be judged in relation to their fellow professionals . 
781 The 
Bolam test creeps back in. 
Developments in the Standard of Care Since Sidaway 
1. Pre-Bolitho 
Because these cases are now largely historical in significance I will deal with them 
briefly. There are two relevant Court of Appeal cases and both interpreted Sidaway 
"' See: Crawford v Board of Governors of Charing Cross Hospital (195 3) The Times, 8 
December, CA. Also, see later discussion of Blyth v Bloomsbury HA [ 199314 Med LR 15 1, CA 
(decided 1987). 
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restrictively, In Blyth v Bloomsbury, the Bolam test was applied to deten-nine the doctor's 
782 duty to disclose in response to general questions . In Gold v Haringey the Court of 
Appeal applied Bolam to disclosure of information regarding non-therapeutic 
783 interventions 
.A widely held view amongst academics at the time was that Bolam 
provided a carte blanche for common practice and some saw Sidaway as removing that 
privilege. 784 With that in mind, it is not surprising that these judgments received heavy 
criticism. 
785 
One of the problems with the Bolam test is that the courts may apply it uncritically 
allowing the standard of care to be set by the medical profession. This view, which is 
reflected in Lord Scarman's judgment (see above), is supported by the judgments in both 
non-disclosure and other cases of clinical negligence. 786 However, the courts, albeit 
4comparatively rare[ly] "78' have exercised their right to reject expert medical evidence. 
788 
In McAllister v Lewisham and North Southwark HA '789Rougier J accepted that the Bolam 
test was the appropriate standard for determining disclosure. However, following Lord 
Bridge's judgment in Sidaway, he noted the caveat that there were certain risks that ought 
782 Blyth v Bloomsbury HA [ 1993 ]4 Med LR 15 1, CA (decided 19 87). 
783 Gold v Haringey HA [ 1988] 1 QB 48 1, CA. 
784 Lord Woolf recently commented, extra judicially, that far from removing the privilege, 
Sidaway: 'In practice ... has come to mean that the patients are entitled to 
know only what their 
doctor thinks they should': Op cit n. 771,8. 
785 Montgomery, J. 'Power/Knowledge/Consent: Medical Decisionmaking' (198 8) 51 Modern Law 
Review 245,248; Kennedy, 1. 'Consent to Treatment: The Capable Person'. In: Dyer, C. (ed) 
Doctors, Patients and the Law (1992) Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications 44,68-69; Healy, 
J. Medical Negligence. - Common Law Perspectives (1999) London: Sweet & Maxwell, 152,16 1; 
Grubb, A. Op cit n. 763; and Lee, S. 'A Reversible Decision on Consent to Sterilisation' (1987) 
103 Law Quarterly Review 513. Lee argued: 'the Court of Appeal's approach in Gold ... 
represents a distorted view of Sidaway'(at 514); Op cit n. 765,183; Op cit n. 767,104 
786 Op cit n. 771; Brazier, M., Miola, J. 'Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? ' (2000) 8 
Medical Law Review 85; Maclean, A. 'Beyond Bolam and Bolitho' (2002) 5 Medical Law 
International 205. 
787 Jones, M. A. 'Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories' (1999) 7 Medical Law Review 103, 
116. 
788 This is true of both non-disclosure and ordinary negligence cases. For examples of the latter, 
see: Bowers v Harrow HA [ 1995] 6 Med LR 16; Roch LJ's judgment in: Joyce v Merton, Sutton 
and Wandsworth HA [ 1996] 7 Med LR 1,13-14; Djemal v Bexley HA [ 199516 Med LR 269,277; 
Sharpe v Southend H. 4 [1997] 8 Med LR 299,303; and Turner J's judgment in Rv Family Health 
Service, 4ppeals Unit ex parte Singh (1995) Unreported Transcript: John Larking 21" January. 
789 Mc, 41lister v Lewisham and North Southwark HA [ 1994] 5 Med LR 343. 
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to be disclosed regardless of common practice, 790 since: 'within certain limitations, a 
patient is entitled to be given sufficient information on the risks of an operation to allow 
him or her to exercise a balanced judgment: after all it is their life that is going to be 
affected'. 791 
Although the courts of first instance have been willing to challenge the opinion of expert 
witnesses the Court of Appeal has arguably been more deferential. 792 Eyre v Measeday (a 
case in contract) concerned an unsuccessful sterilisation. '9' One of the plaintiff's 
allegations was that the surgeon had not warned her of the risk of failure and thus there 
was an implied collateral warranty that she would be rendered irreversibly sterile. In 
rejecting her claim for breach of contract, Purchas U stated that: 'in withholding this 
information the defendant was following a practice acceptable to current professional 
794 
standards and was acting in the best interests of the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff did 
not pursue a claim in negligence, it is clear from this statement, that she would have been 
unsuccessful. 
795 
The dichotomy seen in the courts' judgments is, at least in some cases, arguably caused 
by the court focusing on the status of the experts, 796 while in other cases it focuses on the 
opinion expressed by the expert witnesses. '9' Where judges focus on the body of 
790 Unless there was a 'cogent clinical reason' to justify withholding the information: Mid, 351. 
791 lbid 35 1. See also Smith v Tunbridge Wells HA [1994] 5 Med LR 334,339; Gascoine v 
Sheridan [ 1994] 5 Med LR 43 7,441-444, in which Mitchell J was able to find a similar authority 
in Lord Diplock's judgment in Sidaway; Doughty v North Staffordshire HA [ 1992] 3 Med LR 
[1991] 81; and Newell and Newell v Goldenberg[ 1995] 6 MedLR371,374. 
792 See Gold and Blyth above. But, see Loveday v Renton [ 1990] 1 Med LR 117, CA. 
793 Eyre v Measeday [ 198611 All ER 488, CA. 794 
Ibid, 497. 
795 See also, Palmer v Eadie Lexis Transcript 18 May 1987, CA. 
796 See e. g. Abbas v Kenney [ 1996] 7 Med LR 47,57 per Gage J: 'Since Mr Shepherd is 
acknowledged to be a very experienced and distinguished surgeon, it seems to me quite impossible 
to conclude that the defendant fell below the ordinary skill of a surgeon practising in this field'. 
797 See, Judge v Huntingdon HA [ 199516 Med LR 223 at 227; Waters v West Sussex HA [ 199516 
MedLR362,366-369; Earli, vNeit, haniHA[1994]5MedLR214,216. For a rare pre-Bolitho 
example of the Court of Appeal looking beyond the expert's qualifications, see: Loveday v Renton 
[ 1990] 1 Med LR 117,12 5. Stuart-Smith Li stated: 'The mere expression of opinion or belief by a 
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professionals they almost invariably find in favour of the doctors. Where the spotlight is 
more appropriately on the opinion expressed then the judgment may go either way 
depending on the reasonableness of the opinion. That the Court of Appeal appears to have 
focused more deferentially on the body of professionals, rather than the opinion that body 
798 expresses, is demonstrated by Ratty v Haringey HA . The trial judge accepted the 
plaintiff s experts' opinion but the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment on this point. 799 
Kennedy U accepted that the Bolam test as applied in Maynard was the proper approach. 
He stated: 'it was important in the present case, once it was accepted that Mr Mann and 
Mr Addison represented a responsible and respectable body of colo-rectal opinion, to 
800 accept without qualification their formulation of the Marnham rule' . 
Prior to Bolitho, the law regarding the standard of care expected from doctors was 
noticeably inconsistent. This flowed from two sources. First was the disparate judgments 
given by their Lordships in Sidaway. Second, and perhaps of more fundamental 
importance, is the inherent ambiguity within the Bolam test. This ambiguity allowed the 
courts, particularly the Court of Appeal, to adopt a deferential attitude to medical opinion 
based on the status of the expert witness. By focusing on whether the professional body 
was responsible rather than applying the normative question to the proffered opinion the 
courts have arguably been too quick to accept the common practice as reasonable. In 
doing so, the courts have applied what should be an ethical test as if it were a sociological 
one. 80 1 As Montrose argued: 'it is important to distinguish between average practices and 
witness, however eminent ... 
does not suffice. The court has to evaluate the witness and the 
soundness of his opinion'. 
798 Ratty v Haringey HA [1994] 5 Med LR 413, CA. See also De Freitas v O'Brien [1995] 6 Med 
LR 108, especially at 114. Although not a non-disclosure case, De Freitas is another example of 
the Court of Appeal applying the normative test to the 'body' rather than the opinion. 
799AIthough liability was upheld in relation to the plaintiffs damaged bladder and ureters. 
800 Ratty v Haringey HA [ 1994] 5 Med LR 413,416. See also: Evans U at 419 and Balcombe U at 
420. See also the first instance cases of Stobie v Central Birmingham HA (1994) 22 13MLR 13 5, 
144 per Turner J; Heath v West Berkshire HA [1992] 3 Med LR 57,59; Bancroft v Harrogate HA 
[ 1997] 8 Med LR 3 98,404 
801 Montrose, J. L. 'Is Negligence an Ethical or a Sociological Concept? ' (1958) Modern Law 
Rei, iew 259. 
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average standards, between what the ordinary man does and the ordinary man thinks 
ought to be done. His practice is not a necessary determinant of his ethics'. 802 
2. Bolitho, Beyond Bolam? 
In Bolitho v City and Hackney M the House of Lords again considered the Bolam test, 
albeit not in the context of disclosure. 803 Lord Browne-Wilkinson held: 
the court has to be satisfied that the exponents of the body of opinion 
relied upon can demonstrate that such opinion has a logical basis. In 
particular in cases involving, as they so often do, the weighing of risks 
against benefits, the judge before accepting a body of opinion as being 
responsible, reasonable or respectable, will need to be satisfied that, in 
forming their views, the experts have directed their minds to the 
question of comparative risks and benefits and have reached a 
defensible conclusion on the matter. 
804 
Lord B rowne- Wi Ikin son's argument clearly retains the court's right (and duty) to 
critically analyse the expert witnesses' evidence to ensure that the opinion, and notjust 
the body, is reasonable. However, he heavily qualified his statement by suggesting that: 
'In the vast majority of cases the fact that distinguished experts in the field are of a 
805 
particular opinion will demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion' . This again 
suggests that the status of the witness will go a long way to satisfying any test of 
reasonableness even before the expert has proffered an opinion. Thus, Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson emphasised that: 'in my view it will very seldom be right for ajudge to reach 
the conclusion that views genuinely held by a competent medical expert are 
unreasonable'. 
806 
802 Ibid., 262. 
803 Bolitho v City and Hackney HA [19981 AC 232, HL. 
804 Ibid, 241-242. 
'05 Ibid, 243. 
806 Ibid, 243. 
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The academic response following Bolitho was mixed. Grubb enthused that: 'The defences 
of Bolam have been breached. The court's role as the final arbiter of the quantum of care 
has been reasserted' . 
80' He argued that Lord Browne-W iI kin son's exclusion of risk 
disclosure from his judgment could be plausibly interpreted only to mean that: 'the duty 
to disclose was a separate issue, to which Bolam and Bolitho were not relevant' . 
808 Thus: 
the effect of Bolitho is to enable, indeed require, the courts to cast 
aside Sidaway, based as it is on a flawed interpretation of Bolam, and 
adopt the view that the content of the duty to inform is a matter for the 
court to determine, guided by but not ruled by the approach(es) to 
informing patients adopted by the medical profession. "9 
He concluded that English law will soon be unable to resist the prudent patient standard. 
Other commentators, however, have been more pessimistic: Mason and McCall Smith, 
for example, commented that, 
The House of Lords has grudgingly confirmed that, in theory at least, 
the courts retain the power to establish standards of care, but ... their 
Lordships find it acceptable to challenge medical opinion only when 
the latter has no rational basis. This attitude is taking on an 
atmosphere of stubbornness and is becoming almost unique in face of 
the now universal acceptance of a patient's right to decide on his or 
her own treatment. "O 
807 Op cit n. 702,195. 
808 Ibid., 196. Brazier and Miola in fact suggested that his proviso should be interpreted as 
meaning that Lord Browne-Wilkinson believed that Bolam had already been restrained in the 
context of information disclosure: Brazier, M., Miola, J. 'Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical 
Revolution? ' (2000) 8 Medical Law Review 85,108. 
809 Op cit n. 702,196. See also, Scott, W. Tolam and Bolitho: A new standard of care for doctorsT 
(1998) 148 New Law Journal 64. 
8 10 Mason, J. K. McCall Smith, R. A. Law and medical Ethics (5"' ed., 1999) Edinburgh: 
Butterworths, 283. In the 2002 6t" edition, by Mason, McCall Smith and Laurie, the 'atmosphere 
of stubbornness comment has been omitted. In the 2005 7 th edition the author's criticism of Bolitho 
is much more muted. 
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Keown was cautiously optimistic. While suggesting: 'Bolitho is a significant and 
welcome decision to the extent that it reins in the Bolam test', he complained that the 
judgment did not go far enough. 811 The shortcoming arose because: 
it is not clear whether medical opinion may be disregarded only if it is 
illogical. What if the logic is flawless but the premise unsound or 
unpersuasive? For another [thing], Lord Browne-Wilkinson limits his 
comments to diagnosis and treatment and does not include the 
disclosure of risks. 
812 
Thus: 'Bolitho is a step in the right direction, but the road is long'. 813 Teff similarly 
suggested that the court's scrutiny of expert evidence is a willingness to assess the 
ý internal consistency' of their arguments rather than 'a readiness to override responsible 
medical opinion 1.814 This restricts the court to an assessment of witness credibility 'rather 
than a more extensive pragmatic assessment of what the court deems reasonable'. Thus, 
although he welcomed: 'Reassertion at the highest level of the court's role in scrutinizing 
professioDal practice' 8 15 he concluded that because of the partisan nature of expert 
witnesses: 'A "hard look at the evidence" may in fact prove necessary more often than 
816 Bolitho intimates'. 
Healy argued that, following Bolitho, 
the model for considering professional practice is whether the 
opinions of the 'defence's experts are "truthfully expressed", 
"honestly held", or supported by "distinguished medical men"... That 
this in fact never affects how the professional standard test is seen to 
apply is obvious by the complete absence of case examples of any 
81 1 Keown J. 'Reining in the Bolam test' (1998) 57 The Cambridge Law Journal 248,249. 
812 Ibid., 249. 
"' Ibid., 249. 
814 Teff, H. 'The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence - Moving on from Bolam? ' (1998) 18 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 473,479. 
815 Ibid., 48 1. 
816 Ibid., 483. 
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such enquiry. In real terms, it enables the court in all but extreme 
cases to assume a less hands-on approach to the malpractice claim. 
81' 
Thus, he claimed: 'The professional standard model, by its terms and wording, is 
constructed to restrict the court's freedom to critically evaluate the defendant .s conduct 
beyond the context of professional approved practice'. 818 This view of the Bolam test and 
its application in practice is cynical but not indefensible. The judgment in Bolitho is 
certainly capable of being interpreted as placing too great an emphasis on the status of the 
expert witnesses and, given the inherent ambiguity of the Bolam test, it is arguable that 
Bolitho has changed nothing especially as far as risk-disclosure is concerned. As 
Montgomery noted: 'The crucial point to be made about these statements is that they are 
really nothing new. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson himself pointed out, the opportunity to 
impose judicial standards has always been stressed by the courts'. 819 
Some academics have considered Bolitho's impact with the benefit of subsequent case 
law. Brazier and Miola argued that Bolitho will make a difference to malpractice 
litigation because it was decided 'amidst a host of other relevant developments affecting 
the provision of health care' . 
820 These changes include: more demanding guidelines 
issued by a number of medical bodies, including the General Medical Council (GMC) 
and the Royal Colleges; The government's intention to establish national standards; the 
attitude of the Law Commission; and the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 
1998 . 
82 1 Thus, although Bolitho alone would be unlikely to have a huge impact, in 
conjunction with these other developments thejudiciary will come under increasing 
pressure to scrutinise professional practice. The effects of Bolitho, they claimed, can 
817 Healy, J. Op cit n. 785,66. 
818 Ibid., 67. 
"' Montgomery, J- Op cit n. 297,375. 
820 Brazier, M., Miola, J. 'Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? ' (2000) 8 Afedical Law Review 
85,112. 
821 lbid., I 10- 113,114. 
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822 
already be seen in the Court of Appeal decision in Marriott v West Midlands HA. 
Further, in the context of information disclosure they noted the combined effects of 
Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust, 
823 
and Smith v Tunbridge Wells HA. 
824 
which signalled 'that announcements of the stillbirth of 'Informed consent' In England 
were premature . 
825 
Lord Woolf has since commented, extra judicially, that he was 'attracted' by the Brazier 
and Miola article, which supported his belief 'that the courts are going to take Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson's injunction to review the logical basis of the expert medical 
126 
testimony seriously' . 
Other commentators, however, were more cautious. Thus, 
Montgomery, Skegg and Jones all argued that it was too early to determine the impact of 
Bolitho. 827 In a survey of 64 cases carried out in 2001,4 years after Bolitho, I found that 
Bolam and Bolitho were inconsistently applied and that there was little evidence to 
828 
support Brazier and Miola's position . 
Even cases, such as Marriott, which they 
strongly relied on, are open to more critical analysis that reveals much less support for 
their opinion than they claimed. 829That survey, however, was not specific to disclosure 
cases and it is to those cases that I now tum. 
In Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust, the Court of Appeal was asked to 
consider the standard of risk disclosure required to enable the claimant to decide whether 
to accept the defendant's advice to follow a conservative non-interventional approach. 
830 
The claimant, who was pregnant, had gone past the expected date of delivery and was 
822 Marriott v West Midlands HA [ 1999] Lloyd's Law Reports Medical 23, CA. 
823 Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1998)48 BMLR 118, CA. 
824 Sm ith v Tunbridge Wells HA [ 199415 Med LR 334. 
825 Op cit n. 820,113. 
82' The quote is from Lord Woolf, Op cit n. 77 1,10. 
827 Op cit n. 297,375; Skegg, P. D. G. 'English Medical Law and "Informed Consent": An 
Antipodean Assessment and Alternative' (1999) 7 Medical Law Review 13 5,145-146; Op cit 
n. 787,117-118. 
828 Maclean, A. R. 'Beyond Bolarn and Bolitho' (2002) 5(3) Medical Low International 205, 
829 Ibid., 212-213. 
830 Op cit n. 8233. 
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extremely concerned for the safety of her fetus. She saw the consultant obstetrician, ýN ho 
counselled her that the safest course was to allow labour to begin naturally. He did not 
disclose that there was a small (0.1-0.2%) risk of stillbirth, which unfortunately 
materialised. The woman brought a claim for failure to disclose the risk, which was 
rejected both at first instance and by the Court of Appeal. This is an important case 
because the Master of the Rolls held that Bolitho applied to risk disclosure and he 
considered the impact of that judgment on the doctor's duty to disclose. 
Despite the fact that the claimant lost her case, Lord Woolf MR's judgment does appear, 
at first glance, to advance the cause of patient autonomy. He argued that: 
if there is a significant risk which would affect thejudgment of a 
reasonable patient, then in the normal course it is the responsibility of 
a doctor to inform the patient of that significant risk, if the information 
is needed so that the patient can determine for him or herself as to 
what course he or she should adopt. 
831 
However, the appellant's case was dismissed, which weakens the strength of any support 
the judge's words may imply. Speaking the right words is far easier than putting those 
words into practice and it is only when that happens that the words are likely to achieve 
their maximum practical impact. 
Another weakness of the case, however, is the implication that the duty to disclose a risk 
'which would affect the judgment of a reasonable patient' only applies where that risk Is 
obviously and objectively significant. Although reluctant to discuss the meaning of 
4significant' in terms of 'precise percentages', Lord Woolf MR appeared to focus on 
10%, which had been presented by one of the experts as the level of risk that would incur 
a duty of disclosure. He then argued that the 0.1-0.2% risk in this case was not 
significant. Lord Woolf MR was correct to suggest that 'precise percentages' have little 
831 fbid, 124. 
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to do with the significance of a risk. However, his judgment was somewhat confused in 
that he then did exactly that which he had counselled against. 
The main difficulties with his approach are that it ignored the nature of the risk and 
related the relevance of the risk to an objectively reasonable patient without requiring that 
the subjective position of the patient be taken into account. These difficulties are 
compounded by Lord Woolf MR's apparent reliance on the expert medical witnesses to 
determine that the risk was not significant. Since the judgment of sIgn1ficance preceded 
the assessment of whether disclosure would have affected the reasonable patient's 
decision it acts as a filtering device, which, being placed in the medical profession's 
hands, undermines the apparent weight given to patient autonomy: before the reasonable 
patient test is engaged the medical expert acts as gatekeeper determining the significance 
of the risk and 'insignificant' risks are excluded from further consideration 832 
The nature of the risk is crucial to its significance. In Pearce the risk was of a stillbirth. If 
it was suggested to someone that they should consent to a course of action that would 
result in death in 1: 500 - 1: 1000 occasions it is arguable that they would consider the risk 
to be significant if not common. The supposed lack of significance of the risk of stillbirth 
seems ridiculous when contrasted to the lesser (0.05%) risk of vasectomy failure and yet 
it is accepted that it is negligent to fail to disclose that risk. 833 A frequency of 1: 10 is such 
a high cut-off that, in the world of modem medicine, it excludes most of the risks of 
serious permanent harm. A 1: 100 risk of permanent paralysis, for example, may be seen 
as a very significant risk but, on the basis of Lord Woolf MR's judgment, disclosure 
would be left to the doctor's discretion. This apparently exclusive reliance on percentages 
also excludes the very relevant factors of the risks associated with alternative courses of 
832 Op cif n. 828,213-214; Maclean, A. R. 'The doctrine of informed consent: does it exist and has 
it crossed the Atlantic? ' (2004) 24(3) Legal Studies 3 86,408-409. 
833 See the Family Planning Association website at: 
http: //www. fpa. org. uk/guide/contracep/steril. htm#eff (accessed 4 th February 2005). The rate for 
failure of female sterilization is quoted as: 0.5-0.2% 
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action. In this case, the risks associated with a caesarean should have been compared voth 
the risks associated with non- intervention in order to determine whether the risk of 
stillbirth from non-intervention was significant. Finally, the significance of a risk also 
depends on how it will impact on the patient's life should it materialise. While it may be 
appropriate to objectify this assessment, Lord Woolf MR's argument does not explicitly 
include any scope for the patient's circumstances to be considered. 834 As I have argued 
elsewhere, if the prudent patient standard is relevant then: 'The question should not be 
whether the doctor thinks the risk is significant but whether the reasonable person, 
pregnant, post term and concerned to deliver a healthy baby, would find the risk 
significant'. 
835 
Brazier and Miola suggested that: 
Even the cynic must concede that, whatever the outcome on the facts, 
the 'reasonable doctor' test received a body blow in Pearce. It 
survives only if the 'reasonable doctor' understands that he must offer 
the patient what the 'reasonable patient' would be likely to need to 
exercise his right to make infonned decisions about his care. 
836 
While it is true that this argument does reduce the test to that of the 'reasonable patient' it 
is subject to the crucial caveat of who decides what counts as 'a significant risk which 
837 
would affect the judgment of a reasonable patient'. Following Lord Woolf MR's 
approach, the courts would still rely on the experts to determine the significance of a 
particular risk. 838 As I have noted elsewhere: 
This approach turns the Brazier and Miola argument back on its 
head. The standard becomes: the doctor must disclose those risks 
... Other than the patient's ability to comprehend and utilise the information. 
835 Maclean, Op cit n. 832,409. 
836 Op cit n. 820, I 10. See also, Grubb, A. 'Medical Negligence: Duty to Disclose after Bolitho 
(1999) 7(l) Medical Law Review 61,63. 
837 Op cit n. 823,124. 
83 8 The expert opinion would still be subject to the Bolitho caveat. 
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that the reasonable doctor believes the reasonable patient ought to 
find significant to a decision. This view may be cynical, but the 
judgment in Pearce, and the court's apparent reliance on 
percentages and expert assessment of significance, does nothing to 
dispel that cynicism. 
839 
The practical impact of Pearce remains to be seen. In theory it has inched towards a 
standard marginally more respectful of patient autonomy than Bolam simpliciter. 
However, as I have argued, Lord Woolf MR's judgment is not wholly consistent or 
coherent and leaves the standard open to divergent interpretations. It would be speculative 
to try and second guess the direction the courts will take, although if the previous trend is 
continued the law will, in fits and starts, stumble towards the doctrine of informed 
consent as espoused in Canterbury v Spence. This continued trend towards the prudent 
patient standard is confirmed by Wyatt v Curtis, which concerned the duty to disclose the 
risks of chicken pox to a pregnant woman. 840 Sedley U generously interpreted Lord 
Woolf's test to recognise the patient's subjective appreciation of the risks, which was 
conspicuously absent from Lord Woolf s judgment. Sedley U stated: 
Lord Woolf s formulation refines Lord Bridge's test by 
recognising that what is substantial and what is grave are questions 
on which the doctor's and the patient's perception may differ, and 
in relation to which the doctor must therefore have regard to what 
841 
may be the patient's perception . 
Thus, what may not be significant to the doctor may well be relevant to the patient's 
decision and ought to be disclosed. 
839 Op cit n. 828,214. 
840 Wyatt v Curtis [2003] EWCA Civ 1779, CA. 
841 lbid, [ 161 
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This goes further than what Lord Woolf actually said - or did - in Pearce (see above), 
and appears to reflect the Brazier and Miola interpretation of the judgment. Hoýý ever, 
although a Court of Appeal judgment, it was obiter to the decision as the appeal 
concerned one doctor trying to join a second doctor in liability. Since the first doctor had 
been found liable for the failure to disclose, and the appeal concerned the liability of the 
second doctor, it was not a case of doctor against patient but doctor against doctor. These 
particular circumstances may allow the court the luxury of a more generous interpretation 
of the duty to disclose and means that their words do not have to be backed by action. 
Lord Woolf s test is capable of Sedley LJ's interpretation, but the meaning of a test lies in 
both the words and its application. Since the Court of Appeal in Wyatt did not need to 
apply the test, it remains uncertain how sensitive to the patient's subjective appreciation it 
will be in practice. 
3. Information Disclosure and Understanding 
It would be too onerous to insist on ensuring actual understanding, 842 however, the courts 
843 have held that the professional's duty does not end with simple disclosure. In Smith v 
Tunbridge Wells HA, 844 Moorland J argued that the doctor's duty to inforrn included the 
use of appropriately simple language, 'which the doctor perceives ... will be understood 
by the patient so that the patient can make an informed decision as to whether or not to 
consent to the recommended surgery or treatment'. Thus, the doctor's duty is to: 'take 
reasonable care to ensure that his explanation of the risks is intelligible to his particular 
patient'. 845 This duty requires the doctor to have some regard to the patient's condition 
and, where a patient is less receptive, for example because of illness or the after-effects of 
842 See: Somerville, M. A. 'Structuring the Issues in Informed Consent' (1981) 26 McGill Lmv 
Journal 740,778. 
843 Lvbert v lVarrington HA (1995) 25 BMLR 9 1; [ 1996] 7 Med LR 7 1, CA; Williams. K. 
'Comprehending Disclosure: Must Patients Understand The Risks they Run' (2000) 4 Medical 
Law International 97. 
844 Op cit n. 824. 
845 Ibid., 339. 
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medication or treatment, the onus lies with the doctor to adapt his practice of disclosure 
accordingly, which may require repetition of the information on a subsequent occasion. "' 
Deriche v Ealing Hospital NHS Trust847 concerned a doctor who was aware that the 
patient had already been counselled regarding the risks of chicken pox infection to the 
patient's fetus. Buckley J decided in favour of the claimant because the defendant failed 
'to ensure that she [the claimant] fully understood the nature of the risks under 
discussion'. 848 This decision, while only first instance, appears to require that the doctor 
does indeed ensure understanding. As suggested earlier, this is an onerous duty and one 
that the courts have generally shied away from. In Deriche, Buckley J relied on the expert 
witness' evidence, which he took to say that the defendant should have ensured his 
patient 'fully understood the nature of the risks and should not simply have taken Dr 
Adedze's notes as read' . 
849 It iS submitted that the gist of th Is is that the defendant should 
have made certain that she was aware of the risks and that they were potentially serious 
for the fetus. This is a lesser duty than ensuring 'understanding', which would require the 
doctor to enquire into the patient's appreciation of the risk, rather than simply whether 
she understood enough to recite the risks back to the doctor. However, since it was not 
fully explained, the extent of the duty is uncertain and will only be clarified by 
subsequent case law. 
There may also be a duty to ensure that a misunderstanding does not occur. This duty is 
limited to reasonable misunderstandings where patients have already indicated their 
concern to their physician . 
850 In Cooper v Royal United Hospital Both NHS Trust, 851 the 
poor communication and lack of coordination between the doctors caring for the claimant 
846 Smith vSa4fordHA [1994] 5 Med LR321; (1994)23 BMLR 137,149. See also: Lybertv 
Warrington, Op cit n. 843. 
847 Deriche v Ealing Hospital NHS Trust [20031 EWHC 3104. 
848 [bid, [44]. 
849 Ibid, [42]. 
850 Crouchman v Burke (1997) 40 BMLR 163,176. 
851 Cooper v Royal United Hospital Bath NHS Trust [2005] EWHC 
3381. 
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meant that she was understandably confused about her options. It also meant the hospital 
'team' made erroneous assumptions about her wishes, which resulted in the claimant 
being presented with a management plan that led to the failure to detect a recurrence of 
her breast cancer. Butterfield J held that the defendants were liable in negligence for 
misleading the claimant and depriving her of 'her right to choose the treatment she would 
prefer and address the risks that she ... not Dr Goddard was facing 
5.852 
In Cooper the misunderstanding clearly arose from the doctors' failure to communicate 
effectively, both with each other and with the patient. The approach in that case may be 
contrasted with Al Hamwi v Johnston, in which the origin of the misunderstanding was 
unclear and the doctor had provided the patient with factually correct information. In 
finding for the defendant, Simon J concluded that there was no duty to ensure 
understanding and misunderstandings were inevitable in clinical practice. 853 Thus, 
'clinicians should take reasonable and appropriate steps to satisfy themselves that the 
patient has understood the information which has been provided', 854 but this was satisfied 
by the provision of accurate information and required nothing more than a superficial 
enquiry as to whether the patient understood the information. The restricted nature of the 
duty is indicated by Simon J's acceptance that the defendant's approach was appropriate 
when she stated: 
I understand it is alleged that in response to the fact that (the 
Claimant) changed her mind in the course of the consultation I should 
have asked her why she had changed her mind. I would never ask a 
patient to explain or justify the decision they have made. I would not 
851 lbid, [58]. 
853 Al Hamwi v Johnston, The North West London Hospitals NHS Trust [2005] EWHC 206; [2005] 
Lloyd's Rep Med 309, [691. 
854 Ibid, [69]. 
220 
do so because I would be concerned that by doing so the patient may 
interpret this as criticism of their choice. 855 
This limited approach to ensuring that patients understand the information and are truly 
exercising their autonomy may be affected by the context of the counselling. Al Hainivi 
concerned the advice given to the claimant about having amniocentesis to detect fetal 
chromosomal abnormality. It is perfectly correct, as the judge noted, that clinicians 
should not allow their religious beliefs to colour their advice. 856 However, a distinction 
can be made between directive advice based on personal religious or moral views and 
directive advice based on clinical and social factors. Given the emphasis on the fact that 
the patient was provided with written information, Miola suggested that: 'the impression 
given is that what is important is the imparting of information and that its effective 
communication - actual understanding on the part of the patient - is less critical'. "' 
Simon Js judgment, which allowed the clinician to simply accept the patient's decision 
without question, implies that any duty to ensure understanding is limited to the way in 
which information is presented and does not include a requirement to challenge a 
decision. It may, of course, be relevant that the decision was not wholly irrational. It 
remains open whether the clinician has a duty to enquire into the patient's understanding 
where the decision appears to be objectively irrational. 
4. The Professional's Duty to Persuade 
Apart from the limited duty to facilitate understanding, Simon J's judgment in Al Hamwi 
indicates that clinicians are not under a duty to persuade, or attempt to persuade patients 
to change their minds if their decisions seem unwise. This follows from Simon Fs 
acceptance that 'Counselling should be non-directive, avoiding influencing or dictating 
855 lbid, [73]. 
856 lbid, [64]. 
857 Miola, J. 'Autonomy Rued OKT (2006) 14 Medical Lmi, Review 108,111-112. 
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the parents' decision and allowing them a sense of control over the pregnalley, . 
858 It also 
follows from his approval of the defendant's approach to accepting the patient's decision 
without question (see above). That there is currently no legal duty to (attempt to) 
persuade is confirmed more explicitly by the judgment in Attwell v McPartlin, 859 in ývhich 
the judge argued: 
It is for the patient, not the doctor, to decide whether the risks of any 
particular treatment or procedure are acceptable. It would, in my 
opinion, be a novel and serious departure for established practice 
throughout a wide range of professional relationships ... to 
hold that a 
doctor is under a legal duty, notjust to advise and warn fairly and 
appropriately but to persuade or ... to express his wishes in such a 
way as to secure compliance. Some doctors may wish to make an 
effort to persuade a reluctant patient to act in what the doctor sees as 
the patient's best interests; some doctors may even feel the need to 
adopt an overbearing or bullying attitude in order to secure 
compliance. But, in the end, in the ordinary case it is for the 
professional to advise and for the patient ... to 
decide. There is no 
scope for a duty to "push"'. 860 
Although there is no duty to attempt to persuade the patient, the High Court has held that 
there is a duty not to present the information in such a way that patients' right to make 
their own decisions is usurped. In Thompson v Bradford, the parents of a young boy with 
an unusual perianal abscess that required surgery were told that they could proceed with 
immunising their child . 
86 1 This resulted in him contracting polio. Wilkie J held that, while 
the defendant had not acted negligently in advising the parents to proceed with 
858 Op cit n. 853, [44]. The quote is from an Obstetrics textbook. See also Enright v Kwun [2003] 
EWHC 1000. 
859 Att-well v McPartlin [2004] EWHC 829. 
860 Ibid, [60]. 
86 1 Thompson v Bradford [2004] EWHC 2424. 
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862 immunisation, he was negligent 'for the way in which he gave advice'. Thedefendant 
had been 'unnecessarily dismissive' of the parents' concerns and had 'failed to inform 
them that the recurrent perianal abscess was unique in his experience and extremely 
unusual', 863 which caused the parents to passively accept 'his confident advice'. 864 
However, the decision was reversed on appeal on the grounds that contracting polio 
following immunisation was an unforeseeable consequence that undermined any possible 
duty to advise postponing immunisation. 865 The Court of Appeal rejected the argument 
that the unusual presentation of the abscess should have put the doctor on alert that the 
risks of vaccination may be affected and the reasonable general practitioner was entitled 
to rely on the information in the "Green Book", which advised that '[m]lnor infections 
without fever or systemic upset are not reasons to postpone immunisation'. 866 This 
essentially factual reason for allowing the appeal allowed the Court of Appeal to avoid 
dealing with Wilkie J's criticism of the defendant for his dismissively paternal approach 
to advising the claimants. 
These cases appear to indicate that the courts have accepted that counselling should be 
non-directive although it is acceptable for doctors to indicate what they recommend. "' 
Information should be presented as factual numerical risks and the patients left to make 
their own decision . 
86' There is no duty to attempt to persuade the patient. In Attwell, the 
judge appears to have accepted that doctors may attempt to persuade patients and may 
even do so in an 'overbearing or bullying' way. In Thompson, the High Court appears to 
have rejected that approach as unden-nining patient autonomy. However, when Thompson 
reached the Court of Appeal, the relevance of the doctor's manner was side-stepped. 
962 Ibid, [271. 
863 [bid, [27]. 
864 Jbid, [321. 
865 Thompson v Bradford [2005] EWCA Civ 1439; [2006] Lloyd's LR Med 95. 
866 Ibid, [I I]. For information on the "Green Book" see: 
http: //www. dh. gov. uk/PolicyAndGuidancefflealthAndSocialCareTopics/GreenBook/fs/en. 
867 Op cit n. 576, para 51 per Lord Phillips MR. 868 Enright v Kwun [20031 EWHC 1000, [56]. 
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Arguably, this leaves the legal rules in a confused state, making it difficult for HCPs to 
know what is allowed and what is expected of them. This is particularly so as the judge in 
Atwell appears to have failed to appreciate the distinction between rational persuasion and 
other methods of getting the patient to make the desired decision. While rational 
persuasion respects, and is arguably required to respect, autonomy, "bullying" is 
unacceptable and is an example of undue influence. 
5. Non-Treatment Decisions 
While there is an obligation to disclose information about the alternative treatments 
available, 869 there is no obligation to provide particular treatments. Consent is the 
expression of the negative right to self-determination and it affords no positive claims to a 
right to treatment. This was made clear by the Court of Appeal in R(Burke) v GMC. 
"' 
Lord Phillips MR stated: 
The doctor will describe the treatment that he recommends or, if there 
are a number of alternative treatments that he would be prepared to 
administer in the interests of the patient, the choices available, their 
implications and his recommended option. In such circumstances the 
right to refuse a proposed treatment gives the patient what appears to 
be a positive option to choose an alternative. In truth the right to 
choose is no more than a reflection of the fact that it is the doctor's 
duty to provide a treatment that he considers to be in the Interests of 
the patient and that the patient is prepared to accept. 
871 
Although there is no right to particular treatments, 872 it is at least arguable that Article 8 
of the ECHR - incorporated into domestic law by the 
Human Rights Act 1988 - allows 
869 Smith vSaIfbrdHA (1994)23 BMLR 137,148. 
870 OP cit n. 576. 
871 lbid, para 5 1. 
872North lVest Lancashire HA v A, D&G [1999] Lloyd's Rep Med 399, CA. 
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patients the right to be involved in, or at least to be informed of, decisions not to offer 
treatment. In Glass v UK, 
873 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtH-R) held that the 
claimant's rights under Article 8 had been breached by doctors who failed to seek the 
court's authorisation when their management plan differed from what Mrs Glass believed 
to be in her son's best interests. In Wv UK, which involved decisions regarding children 
who had been taken into care, the ECtl4R stated: 
In the Court's view, what therefore has to be determined is whether, 
having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, and notably 
the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents have been 
involved in the decision-making process ... to a degree sufficient to 
provide them with the requisite protection of their interests. 874 
If parents have an article 8 right to be involved in the decision-making process regarding 
their children then, given that Article 8 protects individual autonomy, 875 it is arguable that 
individuals should also be involved in the decision-making process about their medical 
treatment. While such a right is not traditionally available through either battery or 
negligence, and thus is not protected by the legal regulation of consent to medical 
treatment, it is arguably a right that the courts should protect. 
6. The Therapeutic Privilege 
Although the doctrine is generally associated with 'informed consent' and the 'prudent 
patient' standard of information disclosure, a similar doctrine operates in English law as a 
876 
component of the professional standard of disclosure . As Grubb suggested: 
'The need 
for a "therapeutic privilege"... is at the heart of the ma ority view in Sidaway that at least i 
877 
primafacie, Bolam should apply'. Thus, if a reasonable body of physicians would 
withhold the information because it might 'harm' the patient then the requisite standard of 
873 Glass v UK [2004] 1 FLR 10 19, ECtHR 
874 Op cif n. 595,50. 
875 Pretry v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1,17, ECtHR. 
976 Op cit n. 787,113. 
877 Op cit n. 763,13. 
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care would be satisfied. That the principle is part of English law is shown by Lord 
Templeman's judgment in Sidaway. He stated: 'the doctor impliedly contracts to provide 
information which is adequate to enable the patient to reach a balanced judgment, subject 
always to the doctor's own obligation to say or do nothing which the doctor is satisfied 
will be harmful to the patient'. 878 In McAllister v Lewisham, Rougier J referred to this: 'as 
"the therapeutic privilege", as was stated in a recent Australian case, a phrase descriptive 
of the situation where a doctor may be genuinely and reasonably so convinced that a 
particular operation is in the patient's best interests that he is justified in being somewhat 
economical with the truth where recital of dangers is concerned' . 
879This, he argued, was 
wholly in keeping with the principle of the Bolam test. 
Disclosure and Causation 
In order to succeed in negligence, the claimant must prove that the damage suffered was 
caused by the defendant's negligence. In non-disclosure cases the risk itself is not caused 
by the defendant's negligence. Instead, the defendant's negligence must have caused the 
claimant to be exposed to this non-negligent risk. This means that, to complete the causal 
association between the defendant's negligence and the damage, claimants must show 
that, but for the negligent failure to disclose the risk, they would have adopted a different 
course of action and so avoided harm. Thus, in Bolam v Friern, 
"O McNair J directed the 
jury: 
If you do come to the conclusion that proper practice requires some warning 
to be given, the second question which you have to decide is: If a warning 
had been given, would it have made any difference? The only man who 
really can tell you the answer to that question is the plaintiff, and he was 
881 
never asked the question. 
178 Op cit n. 737,904. 879 Op cit n. 789,352. 
180 Bolam v Friern [ 195711 WLR 582. 
881 lbid, 590. 
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This raises two issues: first, should the test be subjectively based on what this patient 
would have done or should it be objectively based on the 'reasonable patient', second, 
what counts as a different course of action? Both of these raise questions about the 
protection of patient autonomy. If the test is subjective and the second question 
interpreted broadly then patient autonomy is protected far more than it is by an objective 
test and an insistence that the patient must have completely rejected the proffered 
intervention. 882 
1. The Nature of the Test 
In Bolam, McNair J treated causation as subjective. He stated: 'At any rate ... you might 
well take the view that unless the plaintiff has satisfied you that he would not have taken 
883 
the treatment if he had been warned, there is really nothing in this point'. On this 
limited evidence the issue is treated as a straightforward causation problem with 
claimants having to prove on the balance of probabilities that they would have refused the 
treatment had they been in possession of all the facts. This subjective teSt884 was affirmed 
by Bristow J in Chatterton v Gerson: 'When the claim is based on negligence the plaintiff 
must prove ... that 
had the duty not been broken she would not have chosen to have the 
885 
operation' . Although the test 
is overtly subjective, Bristow J later appeared to introduce 
an objective element. 886 He stated: 'I should add that ... I would not 
have been satisfied 
that if property informed Miss Chatterton would have chosen not to have [the operation]. 
The whole picture on the evidence is of a lady desperate for pain relief, who has just been 
advised by Mr Crymble to let Dr Gerson try again' . 
88' Thus, as Grubb noted: 
882 The very requirement of causation arguably undermines autonomy. I will deal with this in the 
following chapter. 
883 Op cit n. 880,591. 884 Op cit n. 772,364. 885 Op cit n. 681,265. 886 Healy, J. Op cit n. 785,208. 
887 Op cit n. 681,267. For other evidence of a mixed approach see: Hills v Potter 
[ 1984] 1 WLR 
64 1; Smith v Barking, Havering andBrentwoodHA [1994] 5 Med LR 285,289 (Decided 
1988); 
Moyes v Lothian HB [ 1990] 1 Med LR 463,468, OH. 
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The net effect of Bristow J's approach, therefore, appears to be a 
hybrid test of causation. The starting point is subjective: what the 
particular patient would have chosen to do, if informed. The patient's 
expressed view, then, undergoes an objective appraisal as to whether it 
is reasonably believable. In other words, the particular patient is 
expected to behave as, and will be judged as if he were, a reasonable 
patient (unless the contrary can be explicitly proved). 888 
This mixed approach to causation has subsequently been applied (obiter) by the Court of 
Appeal in Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust. '" 
Sometimes the objective element of the test can work for the claimant but this will 
generally be where the procedure is an elective life-style choice or where it is particularly 
risky and medical opinion is divided as to its appropriateness. In McAllister v LewiSham 
and Southwark I-M, 890 the plaintiff succeeded in establishing liability for a failure to warn 
her of the risks associated with surgery to correct a cerebral arterio-venous malformation. 
In allowing her claim, Rougier J applied a complex test involving both subjective and 
objective elements. The main subjective elements were the plaintiff s 'own personality' 
and the fact that she thought she would have sought a second opinion . 
89 ' The objective 
elements included the expert evidence that the decision to operate was by no means 
straightforward and there would have been divided medical opinion. Thus, Rougier J 
argued that: 
[aý second opinion would have been much more keenly aware of the 
dangers of operating and would, in whatever way it was expressed, 
have not been in favour of operation. That I feel would have tipped the 
888 Op cit n. 702,197. 
889 Op cit n. 823. The objective approach is underscored by Lord Woolf MR's argument (at 125) 
that: 'if Mrs Pearce had been able to understand what she had been told about the increased risk, 
her decision would still have been to follow, reluctantly, the advice of the doctor'. 
890 Op cit n. 789. 
891 Ibid, 353. 
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balance in Mrs McAllister's mind. After all, few would want to 
undergo surgery of this magnitude and risk unless they felt that the 
arguments in favour were, if not compelling, at least very much more 
powerful than those against. 
892 
This clearly objective standard was arguably also relevant in Rougier J's acceptance that 
the plaintiffs employment situation was such that at least she would have delayed the 
surgery. 893 Finally, the objective component is most clearly seen in Rougler J's argument 
that the judge can make a decision regarding the plaintiff s hypothetical decision even 
where the plaintiff herself was 'reluctant to hypothesise ... provided there exists 
sufficient material upon which he can properly act'. 894 
The case law suggests that the English courts, while purporting to adopt a subjective 
standard, subject the plaintiff s evidence to objective scrutiny so that it will only be 
accepted if it accords with what the judge believes is objectively reasonable. The 
rationale behind this is the risk of hindsight and self-serving testimony, which accords 
with the reasoning in the United States and Canada that led to their courts more openly 
adopting an objective standard. 895 Robinson CJ explained that a subjective test would be 
4purely hypothetical ... hardly ... more than a guess, perhaps tinged by the circumstances 
892 Ibid, 353-354. 
893 See also Smith v Tunbridge Wells HA, Op cit n. 824, in which Morland J clearly sympathized 
with the plaintiff, a sexually active young man who had not been warned of the risk of impotence 
following an operation for a rectal prolapse (at 34 1). 
894 Op cit n. 789,353. See also: Gowton v Wolverhampton HA [1994] 5 Med LR 432,435-436. It is 
arguable that, for 'elective' treatment such as family planning or cosmetic surgery, it will be far 
easier to convince the court that the plaintiffs subjective assertions are objectively reasonable. 
This follows because refusing treatment (or seeking alternatives) does not have the same 
implications for the individual's long-term health. Where treatment is 'necessary', as opposed to a 
lifestyle-choice, claimants will face a much harder task in convincing the court that they would 
have refused consent if properly informed of the risk. See: Robertson, G. 'Informed Consent Ten 
Years Later: The Impact of Reibl v Hughes' (1991) 70 The Canadian Bar Review 423. 
895 Op cit n. 582,791 per Robinson CJ (delivering the judgment of the court); OP cit n. 723,14-17; 
Earle, M. 'The Future of Informed Consent in British Common Law' (1999) 6 European Journal 
of Health Law 235,241. 
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that the uncommunicated hazard has in fact materialized'. 896 This would place 'the 
physician in jeopardy of the patient's hindsight and bitterness'. '9' 
Although the English courts have retained the subjective standard of causation, the 
application of that standard in practice has been strongly constrained by the use of 
objective criteria to determine the credibility of the plaintiff s assertions. The use of these 
objective criteria means that it is improbably difficult for patients to succeed unless theý, 
are claiming a course that the judge accepts as 'reasonable'. As, Jones suggested: 
Generally speaking, where objectively a reasonable patient would 
have accepted the risk and proceeded with the treatment, it is 
extremely difficult for the plaintiff to demonstrate that she would not 
also have acted in that way, unless there is something peculiar to the 
plaintiffs circumstances which might explain why she would have 
acted differently- 
898 
Skegg also noted the difficulties for plaintiffs and concluded: 
In practice, health care practitioners can take it upon themselves to 
expose patients to risks, wIthout the patients having consented to run 
those risks, with little likelihood of their being answerable to their 
patients if the patients discover what has been done. 899 
Although the subjective test is the most respecting of the patient's self-determination, it 
may be difficult to apply it in practice without allowing the concept of reasonableness to 
creep in. As Healy stated: 'it seems likely that, whether in name or not, the courts will in 
most cases consider an assortment of subjective and objective factors before reaching its 
896 Op cit n. 582,790 per Robinson CJ. 
897 Ibid, 790-79 1. 
898 Op cit n. 787,120. 
899 Skegg, P. D. G. 'English Medical Law and "Informed Consent": An Antipodean Assessment and 
Alternative' (1999) 7 Medical Law Review 135,149. 
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decision'. 900 Giesen and Hayes suggested that a wholly subjective test is possible and that 
German law has found a way of dealing with the problem of hindsight. They argued that 
the Federal Supreme Court of Germany in a 1984 ruling took the 'correct' approach in 
requiring the plaintiff to give a 'plausible reason' in the face of a 'real conflict' to explain 
why he would have refused consent. 901 While this may be preferable to a purely objective 
test, it would be difficult to accept arguments as plausible unless the reason provided by 
the claimant is at least credible, and the most credible reasons are those that are 
objectively 'reasonable' based on the knowledge that the judge possesses of the patient's 
circumstances. This does not mean that the reasoning must be rati I ionally logical but that 
the process of reasoning is one that would make sense to a 'reasonable man' as perceived 
by the judge. As such, the 'plausible reason' test is unlikely to be any less objective than 
the mixed test applied in England. 
Even if the courts were able to adopt a purely subjective standard this would still fall 
short of the right to give or refuse consent that the patient possesses since the patient may 
give or refuse consent for no reason whatsoever. 902 The postcedent requirement for 
reasons, whether subjective, credible or wholly objective, undermines the antecedent right 
to decide irrespective of having a reason for the decision. The very requirement to prove 
the causal link, while a necessary element of negligence liability undermines the patient's 
right to irrational self-determination. I will return to this in the following chapter. 
2. The Content of the Test 
The test in Chatterton appears to imply that, in order to prove causation, claimants must 
show that they would have undertaken a different course of action. Although this test 
describes the basic position subsequent developments have made it easier to recover 
damages. As mentioned earlier, in McAllister Rougler J allowed causation because he 
900 Healy, J. Op cit n. 785,211. 
901 Op cit n. 767,121-122. 
902 Op cit n. 55,553. 
231 
accepted that, at the very least, the patient would have delayed surgery. More recentIN', 
this very issue came before the Court of Appeal in Chester v Afshar. 903 The claimant was 
a51 -year-old journalist who suffered severe back pain. Although she was reluctant to 
undergo surgery, Mr Afshar reassured her sufficiently for the claimant to give consent. 
Unfortunately, following the surgery she was left with severe neurological deficit. At 
trial, the court accepted that Mr Afshar had failed to disclose the risk of nerve damage or 
paralysis and that, had he done so, she would at least have sought second and third 
opinions before deciding whether to undergo the operation. The trial judge awarded 
damages for the failure to disclose and Mr Afshar appealed against the decision, 
Following the majority decision in the Australian case of Chappel v Hart, 904 and basing 
the judgment on the individual's right to self-determination, the Court of Appeal held 
that: 
The object is to enable the patient to decide whether or not to run the 
risks of having that operation at that time. If the doctor's failure to 
take that care results in her consenting to an operation to which she 
would not otherwise have given her consent, the purpose of that rule 
would be thwarted if he were not to be held responsible when the very 
risk about which he failed to warn her materialises and causes her an 
injury which she would not have suffered then and there ... It would 
in our judgment be unjust to hold that the effective cause of the 
claimant's injury was the random occurrence of the I to 2% risk 
referred to above rather than the defendant's failure to bring such risk 
to her attention. 
905 
903 Chester v Afshar [2002] EWCA Civ 724. 
904 Chappel v Hart [ 1998] HCA 55; [ 1999] Lloyds Law Reports Medical 223; (1998) 72 ALJR 
1344, HCA. 
905 Op cit n. 903, [47]. 
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The House of Lords subsequently upheld the Court of Appeal decision. Their Lordships 
in the majority justified what they saw as 'a narrow and modest departure from traditional 
causation principles 
006 by arguing that, because of the patient's right to autonomy, 
907 to 
do otherwise would strip the duty to disclose 'of all practical force' and render it 'devoid 
908 
of all content'. Following Chester, the current test for causation appears to be that 
claimants will succeed if they can show that disclosure of the risk would simply have 
altered their decision, Claimants no longer need to show that they would have refused 
consent to the proffered treatment. 
As a final point, damages may sometimes be awarded even though the claimant has been 
unable to prove causation in relation to the materialised risk. These cases are where the 
materialised risk had additional consequences that might have been avoided had the 
claimant been forewarned. In Newell and Newell v Goldenberg, for example, the 
omission to mention the risk that the man's sterilisation might fail put strain on the 
marriage when his wife became pregnant. 909 The judge sympathised with the claimant in 
the worry that his wife may have been unfaithful and he awarded damages to compensate 
for the distress caused. 9'0 
Legally Recognised Damage 
The final aspect of legal liability is the type of harm that the courts are prepared to 
recognise. Traditionally the courts have accepted that damages may be awarded to 
compensate for physical harm, or - in more limited circumstances - psychiatric harm or 
econornic loss. Where the damage arises as a result of an undisclosed risk materialising 
the situation is relatively unproblernatic since the han-n is obvious. However, where the 
claim is simply that consent was invalid and the procedure was a battery, the situation is 
906 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 [24] per Lord Steyn. 
907 Ibid., [ 18-24] per Lord Steyn; [77] per Lord Hope; [92-93] per Lord Walker. 
908 Ibid, [86-87], per Lord Hope. See also Lord Walker at [ 10 1 
90' Newell and Newell v Goldenberg [ 1995] 6 Med LR 371. 
9'0 See also the Scottish case Goorkani v Tm, side HB 1991 SLT 94. 
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less straightforward. Where the procedure is medically indicated, then it is arguable that 
the patient has benefited from its performance. 911 This is particularly problematic where 
the treatment was life-preserving since the courts generally consider life to be a benefit. 912 
Although in Mallette v Shulman, a Jehovah's Witness was awarded $20,000 following a 
blood transfusion contrary to an advance directive, the English approach may be 
different. 913 Thus, commenting on Mallette in Re T, Butler-Sloss U stated: 'I do not 
believe an English court would give damages in those particular circumstances . 
914 
A similar problem arose in negligence with the wrongful pregnancy cases, in which an 
unwanted pregnancy results from the defendant's negligence leaving the claimants with 
the cost of raising an unplanned child. In MacFarlane v Tayside HB, "'5 the House of 
Lords held that the birth of a healthy child was an unquantifiable blessing that could not 
be offset against the economic loss arising from the maintenance costs associated with 
raising the child. Subsequently, in Rees v Darlington HA, 916 the House of Lords 
acknowledged that the mother's autonomy had been infringed. With a majority of 4: 3, 
their Lordships awarded the conventional sum of E 15,000 in recognition of the harm 
done. 
It would be possible for the courts to award a similar amount in other cases where the 
harm was primarily to the claimant's autonomy. Mason and Brodie in fact criticised the 
decision in Chester because, they argued, the harm was to the patient's autonomy rather 
than the physical consequences of the risk materialising. 
917 Thus, they suggested that an 
award of a conventional sum, as in Rees, would have been more appropriate. Given that 
911 Gavaghan, C. 'Anticipatory Refusals and the Action of "Wrongful Living"' (2000) 5 Medical 
Law International 67,72-75. 
912 Ibid.; McKay v Essex AHA [198211 QB 1166, CA; Op cit n. 263; 72-75. 
9" Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (0) 32 1. 
914 Op cit n. 510,800. See also, Staughton LJ's similar comment at 805. 
915 Op cit n. 263. 
916 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [20031 UKHL 52, HL. 
917 Mason, K. Brodie, D. 'Bolarn, Bolam - wherefore art thou Bolam"' (2005) 9(2) Edinburgh 
Law Review 298,305. 
234 
Article 8 of the ECHR, 9 18 protects the right to personal autonomy, 9'9 it is arguable that an 
infringement of this right should be acknowledged by an appropriate award of damages. 
In Cornelius v De Taranto, for example, the court made an award of E3000 for tile mental 
distress caused by a breach of confidence in order to recognise the seriousness of 
breaching a protected human right . 
920 However, in the wrongful pregnancy cases the 
award may reflectjudicial sympathy for the harshness of a law that precludes any 
recovery at all for the maintenance costs associated with the unplanned child. The award 
of damages in these cases may simply be a way of mitigating that harshness and thus the 
courts may be less inclined to make a similar award in other cases. 
Summary 
In this chapter I have described the current legal regulation of consent. I noted that battery 
law regulates direct invasions of bodily integrity but all other interventions fall within the 
penumbra of the law of negligence. It is battery law that allows the patient the right to 
refuse treatment, regardless of the reason, and it is this branch of law that requires the 
patient to be competent and for consent to be given without undue influence. While 
battery law has the advantage of focusing on the right to bodily integrity, which allows 
patients to exercise their autonomy by giving or withholding consent, it is readily 
satisfied by minimal disclosure of the nature and purpose of the procedure in broad terins. 
Further disclosure is required to satisfy the HCP's duty under negligence law. 
The duty to disclose in negligence law most importantly covers risks and alternative 
treatments. Currently the duty is determined by the professional standard but phrased in 
such a way as to approach the prudent patient standard. Incorporated within this standard 
is the therapeutic privilege, which retains for the HCP a degree of paternalistic control 
918 The right to private and family life. 
919 Op cit n. 875,17. 
9" Cornelius v De Taranto [2001 ] EMLR 12, [65-69]. The case went to appeal, but this aspect was 
not overruled by the Court of Appeal: (2002) 68 BMLR 62. 
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over the infon-nation disclosed. The law requires disclosure of information in a way that is 
sensitive to the need to support patient understanding. However, there is no requirement 
to ensure understanding. Furthermore, there is no duty to make more than a cursory 
enquiry of whether the patient has understood and there is certainly no duty to challenge 
an irrational decision or try to persuade patients to change their minds. Like the duty to 
disclose, the rules regarding causation have become more sensitive to individual 
autonomy. The law now allows that causation is satisfied if claimants can show that they 
would simply have made a different decision had the risk been disclosed. While this is 
more sensitive to autonomy than a rule that required claimants to prove that they would 
have refused consent, it still requires that the change of decision is credible. This means 
that it must be objectively reasonable, which is arguably inconsistent with the antecedent 
right to refuse treatment (which can be for irrational or no reason). 
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Chapter Six: Rationalising the Law and Ethics of Consent 
In this chapter I wil I compare the current legal regulation of consent against the model 
developed in part one and I will argue that the current regulation of consent falls short. 
However, this is not to suggest that the shortfall must be met by direct legal regulation. 
There are a number of alternative responses, which include allowing further development 
of the common law, legislation with or without a code of practice and a regulatory body, 
an enhanced role for professional regulation, or some combination of these. Ultimately 
the decision is a political one that will be guided by the cost, the support of the various 
lobbies and the vision of the type of healthcare system that the Government wants to 
develop: a market approach to healthcare would support a very different regulatory model 
of consent than would more social, welfare or communitarian visions. 
The model I have developed might be categorised as socio-liberal: respect for individual 
autonomy is seen as the guiding principle but that autonomy is situated in the 
professional-patient relationship, which is in turn part of the wider network of 
relationships that constitutes the community. This allowed me to argue for a model of 
consent that incorporates both consent as a permission and consent as agreement. It also 
justifies a clear distinction between harm caused by an infringement of the right to 
consent and the harm caused by the materialisation of a risk. Furthermore, the relational 
aspect of both autonomy and consent requires that the obligations arising from the 
profess ional-patient relationship fall on both parties and notjust the professional. 
The Split Between Battery and Negligence 
Perhaps the first thing to note about the legal regulation of consent is the distribution of 
the rules between the two distinct torts of battery and negligence. In principle my model 
of consent might support this approach with battery governing consent as permission 
while negligence regulates consent as agreement. Since battery makes unjustified contact 
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unlawful, the individual is granted a legally protected right to bodily integrity. In allowing 
the individual to waive this right, by granting consent, the tort focuses the law's attention 
on the wrong done to the victim rather than on the behaviour of the actor. This makes the 
tort conceptually attractive because it is consistent with the central theory of consent as 
permission. Negligence, on the other hand, focuses on the duty of the professional while 
allowing the patient's behaviour to be taken into account through the defence of 
contributory negligence. Since there is no need for bodily contact, negligence 
encompasses both treatment decisions - including those not involving direct contact - 
and non-treatment decisions. Thus, negligence is better situated than battery to regulate 
consent as agreement. 
The major problem with this view is that the current legal regulation arose not for 
conceptual reasons but because the judiciary were reluctant to hold doctors liable for 
battery. 92 1 As Brazier noted: 
Save in the area of police powers, trespass as a means for the 
vindication of civil liberties seem sadly to be regarded with suspicion 
by our courts ... A judgment 
in trespass for a failure in 
communication, an over-zealous desire to make the right decision for 
a patient, may be seen as putting the doctor on a par with a police 
officer who beats up a suspect. And this is not simply an emotional 
response. The overlap between the tort of battery and the crime of 
assault cannot be ignored. 
922 
This reluctance was given practical effect when risk disclosure was divorced from the 
requirements of consent in battery and made a duty in negligence. 
923 
92 1 Harrington, J. A. 'Privileging the medical norm: liberalism, self-determination and refusal of 
treatment' (1996) 16 Legal Studies 348,3 52; Giesen, D. Op cit n. 598,22. Such reluctance may be 
seen in Davis v Barking, Havering andBrentwood Health Authority 
[1993] 4 Medical Law 
Reports 85,90 per McCullough J. Also, see: Sidaway, Op cit n. 737,885 per Lord Scarman. 
922 Op cit n. 765,180. See also Grubb, A. Op cit n. 702,172-173. 
923 See, for example: Sidaway, Op cit n. 737,885 per Lord Scarman 
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This split between negligence and battery has a number of consequences. First, because it 
reflects ajudicial reluctance to use the tort of battery, the usefulness of that tort is 
undermined and it only becomes relevant where there has been a gross failure to obtain 
consent or where the HCP has acted in bad faith. Thus, where a dentist secured his 
patient's consent to expensive dental restorative work by convincing them it was 
clinically necessary he was liable in battery. 924 However, where an anaesthetist, acting in 
good faith and beneficently, performed a caudal (local) anaesthetic even though the 
patient had only consented to a general anaesthetic he was not liable. 925 On the one hand 
this limits its usefulness as a general means of regulating consent to medical treatment. 
On the other hand it does allow the courts to condemn a particularly serious failure to 
respect the patient's autonomy by finding the defendant liable for battery. 
A second consequence of the split is that risk disclosure is regulated in negligence rather 
than battery. This again undermines the use of battery as means of regulating consent to 
medical treatment. The split was made for largely pragmatic, rather than conceptual, 
reasons and this leads to uncertainty regarding the purpose of risk disclosure: if it is not 
necessary for consent then what is its purpose and why does causation require that the 
claimant would have made a different consent decision had the information been 
disclosed? However, if risk disclosure is necessary for consent then it ought to be 
required for the patient's consent to be real. In the Canadian case of Reibl v Hughes, 
although he acknowledged that an 'informed choice' requires knowledge of the risks, 
Laskin CJC held that the duty to disclose risks derives from a general 'anterior' duty of 
926 
care arising by virtue of the doctor's role . However, if patients require 
knowledge of 
the risks to make an 'infon-ned choice' then it is arguable that they require that knowledge 
in order to truly exercise their autonomy. If the law of battery is to protect individual 
924 Op cit n. 730. 
925 Davis v Barking, Havering and Brentwood Health Authority [ 1993] 4 Medical Law Reports 85. 
926 See n. 729. 
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autonomy then it should require disclosure of those risks that are essential to an informed 
choice. To make risk disclosure part of the doctor's general duty of care is to shift the 
emphasis away from a patient-centred right to autonomy. Thus, the patient's right to be 
informed of risks is currently a derivative right dependent on the doctor's duty of care 
rather than the individual's right to self-determination. 
A third consequence of the split is that it affects the question of competency, although 
this point does not seem to have been acknowledged in practice. In principle one need 
only be competent to understand the information necessary to make the consent 
decision. 927 Since risk information is unnecessary for a real consent then there is no need 
for the patient to understand it. However, the current Re C test includes the ability to 
928 
weigh up the risks as part of the decision-making process. In Cambridgeshire CC v R, 
Hale J. avoided explicit reference to risks. However, the Mental Health Act Code of 
Practice quotes the tripartite Re C test as the appropriate test for competence and states 
that the knowledge required for consent includes: 'the purpose, nature, I ikely effects and 
risks of th[e] treatment including the likelihood of its success and any alternatives to 
it,. 929 Although the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the draft Code of Practice do not refer 
specifically to risks (the Code talks of 'likely consequences')9'0 the test of capacity in the 
Act is similar to, and informed by, the Re C teSt'931 which may mean that the ability to 
understand the risks of the procedure will continue to be part of the test of competency. 
This is particularly likely as HCPs will be making the competency assessments and 
currently risk disclosure is widely seen as a necessary part of consent in medical ethics 
932 
and practice . 
927 Gunn, M. Op cit n. 682. 
928 Op cit n. 683,292 per Thorpe J. 
929 Op cit n. 686, paras 15.10 and 15.13. 
930 Draft Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice (2005) para 3.18. 
93 ' The Lord Chancellor. Making Decisions (1999) Cm 4465, para 1.6; Op cit n. 687, para 3.15; 
Mental Capacity Act s. 3(l). 
932 Mayberry, M. Mayberry, J. Consent in Clinical Practice (2003) Abingdon: Radcliffe Medical 
Press Ltd, 82-91. 
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Because risk disclosure is regulated by the duty of care in negligence law it is arguable 
that where the patient is unable to understand the risk information then, rather than this 
making the patient incompetent to consent, it simply negates the duty to disclose. This 
933 follows because it would be nonsensical to require a duty to do something that is ftitile . 
Thus, unless there is some reason for risk disclosure other than the need to decide 
whether or not to consent to treatment then there is no duty to disclose it where the patient 
is unable to understand it. The patient could still give a valid consent justifying medical 
treatment but would lose the right to complain about a failure to disclose the risk. That the 
duty to disclose risk relates to the treatment decision is evident In the court's approach to 
liability where the risk materialises and claimants are required to prove causation by 
showing that the information would have affected their decision. 934 
While this conceptual inconsistency may be ignored in practice it does reflect a failure of 
the law to be truly sensitive to the patient's autonomy as the principle underlying the right 
to give or withhold consent. It may also threaten the coherent development of the law. 
Unclear or inconsistent reasons underlying the rules risks divergent interpretations of 
those rules that may result in the development of an increasingly incoherent law. 
Furthermore, any development of the legal rules should relate to the reasons justifying the 
existence of the duty given substance through those rules: if the duty to disclose is related 
to consent then any change in the duty ought to be consistent with the justifications for 
requiring consent. However, if the duty is predicated on some other ground then its 
development should be sensitive to that basis. It is, therefore, problematic that the 
justification for risk disclosure in negligence is uncertain. 
933 Op cit n. 646; LCB v UK (1998) 27 EHRR 212,222 
934 See n. 880-n. 908. 
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There are four ways in which to conceptualise the negligence-based duty to disclose. "' 
First, the duty may be seen as wholly independent of consent. Second, consent in battery 
can be valid but nonetheless negligently obtained if the professional has failed to disclose 
a material risk. Third, there are two 'consents': one a legal consent required by the law of 
battery, the other an ethical consent predicated on the patient's right to autonomy, which 
must be obtained if the professional is to avoid liability in negligence. The fourth 
possibility is the same as third but the ethical consent, instead of being based on patient 
autonomy, is driven by the healthcare professional's duty of beneficence. Space does not 
permit an exploration of which model is most plausible and I have argued elsewhere that 
the third and fourth models are the most coherent being equated to the prudent patient and 
the reasonable doctor standards respectively. 936 The important point here is that each of 
these four models is a possible interpretation and this lack of conceptual clarity carries the 
potential for an inconsistent or incoherent development of the law. 
Currently, therefore, the legal regulation of consent is conceptually unclear and 
inconsistent. While this does not preclude a rational development of the law, it does 
increase the risk that the law will develop inconsistently with the underlying ethical 
justification for the existence of the rights that the law protects and the concomitant duties 
it imposes. Given the primary reason for the way in which the law has developed - the 
judicial reluctance to use the law of battery - it seems unlikely that the conceptual 
confusion will be clarified by the common law. Furthermore, even if the split between 
negligence and battery could be reversed and risk disclosure included as part of a 'real' 
consent, reliance on the law of battery may still not be the answer since the requirement 
for directness restricts the extent of the tort to healthcare interventions that involve some 
135 Op cit n. 832,399. 
936 Op cit n. 832,399-40 1. 
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degree of contact between the HCP and the patlent . 
93' This means that negligence would 
still be required for 'consent' to the non-contact interventions and for decisions not to 
provide a particular intervention. 938 While reserving battery law for serious Infringements 
of patient autonomy may be defensible, and - as I mentioned earlier - would fit with my 
model, it can only deal with those cases where the infringement involves direct bodily 
contact. Arguably, therefore, it may be better to acknowledge the need for a specific law 
that can be more sensitive to the context of healthcare. 
Consent and Negligence 
Although negligence may be an appropriate vehicle for regulating consent as agreement, 
it falls short of the ideal with respect to consent as penuission. The first weakness is the 
conceptual basis for negligence. While battery focuses on the wrong done to the patient, 
negligence concentrates on the behaviour of the healthcare profess ional. "9 Since 
autonomy is the primary justification for consent, patient-centred regulation is more 
appropriate than professional-centred law. 940 The role of consent Is to give the actor 
permission to do something that would otherwise be illegitimate. For patients to be able 
to give that permission they must control those things that will be affected by the act. If it 
is the patient's permission that is important then it makes sense to focus the regulation on 
whether patients are given an adequate opportunity to exercise that control. Ideally, then, 
regulation of consent should start by focusing on the conditions under which patients are 
required to make consent decisions and not whether the professional has acted reasonably 
in creating those circumstances. 
937 See Morgan, Op cit n. 666,620; Jackson, E. "'Informed Consent" to Medical Treatment and the 
impotence of Tort' in McLean, S. A. M. (ed) First Do No Harm (2006, Forthcoming) Aldershot: 
Ashgate 271,274. 
938 Op cit n. 787,105. 
939 See the related point made by Skegg, Op cit n. 899,148. 
940 Op cit n. 3 62,9 1. 
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Since it may be necessary to refer to what may be reasonably expected of the healthcare 
professional (and provider) in order to determine the extent of necessary circumstances, 
this point may be dismissed as simply a matter of emphasis. But, this emphasis may 
affect the ease with which compromises to patient autonomy are accepted. If consent is 
seen primarily as a role specific obligation the rules may be more readily tempered by the 
role specific principle of beneficence, which perhaps explains the law's readiness to 
accept the paternalistic therapeutic privilege (see below) and the apparent distinction 
between the level of risk disclosure required for non-therapeutic interventions (e. g. 
sterilisation) as opposed to therapeutic procedures (e. g. management of pregnancy and 
delivery). Despite this, if the conceptual criticism were the sole problem then it may be 
reasonable to accept the status quo. However, the law of negligence has other shortfalls 
that raise questions regarding its suitability as a vehicle for regulating consent. 
A second weakness of negligence is that traditionally it requires the claimant to 
demonstrate actual damage . 
94 ' This is easiest to show where the damage is physical 
although, under certain conditions, the claimant may also be able to recover where the 
only damage is economic loss. In cases where there is uncertainty how a third party might 
942 
have behaved, the claimant may also recover for loss of chance. The loss of chance 
claim may be characterised as the loss of an opportunity to control, as far as possible, 
one's life. It is, therefore, an autonomy-based claim. However, in cases involving the 
possibility of avoiding the materialisation of medical risks, the English courts have so far 
refused to recognise the relevance of such a claim. While the possibility of such a claim 
succeeding has not been completely ruled OUt, 
943 
the House of Lords' decision in Gregg v 
941 Op cit n. 899,149. 
942 Spring v Guardian Assurance [ 1995 ]2 AC 296; Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & 
Simmons [ 1995] 1 WLR 1602, CA. 
943 The House of Lords in Hotson v East Berkshire HA [ 1987] AC 750 refused to allow population 
statistics to be used to circumvent the balance of probabilities test for causation through the use of 
a 'loss of chance' argument. This has received both academic criticism (Stauch, M. 'Causation, 
Risk, and loss of Chance in Medical Negligence' (1997) 17 OxfordJournal of Legal Studies 205) 
and support (Hill, T. 'A Lost Chance for Compensation in the Tort of Negligence by the House of 
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Scott makes it of diminishing likelihood. 944 In Rees v Darlington, however, the House of 
Lords has recognised a breach of autonomy as a form of damage allowing recovery of a 
conventional sum. 945 The damage in that case also included the claimant's pregnancy, 
which was characterised as physical harm. It is, therefore, uncertain whether the courts 
will recognise an infringement of autonomy when it occurs in the absence of recoverable 
physical damage. Apart from the fact that the undisclosed risk may not materialise, there 
are other types of relevant information that if undisclosed 'tend not to result in physical 
injury' and are 'marginalised' by the need to show actual damage. 946 
The likelihood of the courts allowing claims where hann to autonomy is the only damage 
may be increased by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998. It is arguable under Article 8 
(the right to a private and family life) that this type of damage should be recognised by 
the courts independently of any physical harm. However, this is speculative and the 
current requirement that the breach of duty caused physical harm, exemplified by the 
House Lords decision in Chester v Afshar, remains a weakness if autonomy and consent 
are seen as important rights. It might be countered that the courts have, on occasion, 
provided compensation for the consequences of an infringement of autonomy even 
though the primary claim fell at the causation hurdle. In Newell & Newell v Goldenberg, 
Mantell J held that the plaintiffs' decisions would not have been altered by disclosure of 
the risk that the vasectomy might fail. 947 However, he was prepared to award damages for 
the distress and anxiety caused by the discovery that Mrs Newell was pregnant. Although 
this provided a small amount of compensation to the plaintiffs it still required some 
tangible damage. As such, it fails to recognise that individuals are harmed just because a 
choice that was theirs to make has been unjustly taken away from them. Thus, it remains 
Lords' (1991) 54 Modern Lcm, Review 511; Lunney, M. 'What price a chanceT (1995) 15 Legal 
Studies 1). 
944 Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2. 
94S Op cit n. 916. 
946 See, Jackson, E. Op cit n. 937,283. 
9" Op cit n. 909. See also, Goorkani, Op cit n. 91 0. 
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that, while the law espouses the importance of patient autonomy, the current rules of 
causation and damage belie the judicial rhetoric. As McLean has noted: 
Patients may be aggrieved if all information is not disclosed, on 
grounds which sit uncomfortably within the traditional negligence 
framework ... They may feel that their right to self-determination was 
shown insufficient respect where a risk was concealed, even if that 
risk does not actually occur. 
948 
Related to this problem is the inconsistency between what the law claims to be the 
patient's right and what it is prepared to compensate. The law proclaims that the patient 
can make any decision regardless of reason. 949 However, it is then only prepared to 
compensate those cases of a failure to disclose where claimants provide credible evidence 
that they would have made a different decision. To be credible, claimants must provide 
accessible reasons. This is inconsistent: there is a right to refuse treatment for irrational 
reasons (or even no reason) but in trying to show causation in a failure to disclose case a 
claimant's purported refusal of treatment must be rational. This arises because of the need 
to show that the breach of duty caused actual damage. If outcome responsibility were 
severed from the issue of consent and dealt with separately the inconsistency would be 
removed since liability for failure to consent would no longer be dependent on showing 
that a different decision would have been made and the harm from the risk materialising 
avoided. Separating consent and outcome responsibility would allow these distinct han-ns 
to be dealt with in a less blunt way, which would facilitate a more just response. 
However, because liability for negligence requires a bad outcome, it cannot entirely 
separate consent and outcome responsibility. 
948 Op cit n. 362,91. 
949 Op cit n. 510,786. 
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I have already mentioned the problem of emphasis that undermines reliance on 
negligence. This emphasis is the root cause of a third weakness: the standard of care 
required. Because negligence focuses on the actor it is understandable that the standard of 
care is expressed in terms of what the reasonable person would have done in the same 
circumstances. For professional practice the Bolam test is the standard and, tradi 
this has been interpreted to allow significant deference to the professional with the test 
being determined by expert evidence of common practice. 950 There have always been 
instances when the court has rejected such evidence but it is only since the recent House 
of Lords judgment in Bolitho that commentators have suggested that this deference 1s 
disappearing. 951 However, in a review of post-Bolitho negligence cases, I found little 
evidence for that optimism. 
952 
The consequence of the Bolam test is that the degree of disclosure is determined by 
professional practice. At its best the standard requires what can be reasonably expected of 
the professional. While this standard may initially seem fair, such a judgment is parasitic 
on the determination of reasonableness. At its worst, the standard becomes a sociological 
comparison between what the defendant did and what other doctors are doing. As Lord 
Scarman suggested in Sidaway, this places the standard wholly in the hands of the 
profession and is insensitive to the patient's needs and, as Giesen comments: 'The effect 
has been to render the informed decision-making of the patient merely a subordinate 
aspect of the therapeutic process'. 
953 
In Pearce, Lord Woolf MR delivered ajudgment hailed by some as being sufficiently 
sensitive to the patient's needs. Lord Woolf MR decided, after consideration of Sidaway 
and Bolitho, that: 
950 See, for example, Lord Scarman's statement in Sidaway, Op cit n. 737,880. 
951 See the discussion in chapter four. 
952 Op cit n. 828. 
953 Giesen, D. Op cit n. 598,23. 
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if there is a significant risk which would affect the judgment of a 
reasonable patient, then in the normal course it is the responsibility of 
a doctor to inform the patient of that significant risk, if the information 
is needed so that the patient can determine for him or herself as to 
what course he or she should adopt. 
954 
Crucially, however, before the sensitivity to the patient's need can influence the doctor's 
duty the risk must be classed as significant and it appears that this is determined by 
reliance on the medical expert. 955 Thus, following Pearce, the standard remains largely 
insensitive of the patient's needs. 
As I noted in chapter five, Sedley LJ's obiter dictum in Wyatt v Curtis provides a 
generous interpretation of Pearce that appears to be more responsive to the patient's 
subjective appreciation of risk and effectively equates the standard with the prudent 
956 
patient test . 
However, since the interpretation was obiter and Sedley U did not need to 
apply the test it remains uncertain how it will be applied in practice. If subsequent courts 
follow Lord Woolf s lead and refer the question of significance back to the medical 
expert then any sensitivity to the patient is on shaky ground unless the expert evidence is 
predicated on more than just that expert's subjective opinion or anecdotal experience. It is 
arguable that, if the reasonable patient is truly to have a voice in court, then it ought to be 
based on empirical evidence. 957 While the judges rely on their own, or the medical 
experts', intuition, the judgments risk being insensitive to the needs of the reasonable 
patient let alone the actual patient. This weakens the protection for the patient's autonomy 
and retains a degree of self-protection for the medical profession since it allows the 
medical experts a powerful voice in determining the reasonableness of their colleague's 
behaviour. 
954 Op cit n. 823,124. 
955 See the discussion in chapter four. 
956 Op cit n. 840, [16]. 
957 Maclean, A. R.. 'Giving the Reasonable Patient a Voice: Information Disclosure and Empirical 
Evidence' (2005) 7 Medical Law International 1. 
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Despite perhaps retaining too much reliance on the medical expert witness, Pearce and 
Wyatt have arguably introduced a standard of disclosure that is equivalent to that required 
by the doctrine of infon-ned consent. 958 This doctrine does appear to focus more on the 
patient, as the standard requires doctors to disclose material risks, the significance of 
which is defined by reference to the reasonable patient. In the seminal case, Robinson CJ 
articulated the appropriate test by quoting with approval from an academic commentary 
that stated: 
[a] risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what the 
physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be 
likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding 
whether or not to forgo the proposed therapy. 959 
Even this standard of disclosure is open to criticism as, by determining the duty by 
reference to the hypothetical objective reasonable patient, it fails to protect individual 
autonomy . 
96' A further problem with the doctrine of infon-ned consent, at least from the 
claimant's perspective, is that it may make little difference to the likelihood of success. 
The objective test of causation adopted in the US and Canada limits the advantages of the 
prudent patient teSt. 96 1 Given that we already have a subjective test of causation, it is 
likely that we will retain that standard and this is reinforced by Lord Woolf s approach in 
962 Pearce 
. 
In theory this should give the claimant a better chance of success but, as I 
argued earlier, it is difficult for the courts to assess credibility without importing objective 
elements into the test and so weakening the claimant's case. 
958 While it is remains predicated on the Bolam test and the expert witnesses are still relied on it 
remains distinct from the doctrine. See Maclean, Op cit n. 832. 
959 OP cit n. 582,787, quoting from: Waltz & Scheuneman 'Informed Consent to Therapy' (1970) 
64 NWUL Rev. 628,640. 
960 Giesen, D. Op cit n. 598,27-28. 96 ' Robertson, G. Op cit n. 894,435. 
962 Op cit n. 823,124. 
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If the law of negligence settled on the prudent patient standard with a subjective test of 
causation then, given that the law sets out only minimally acceptable behaviour, it ývould 
arguably have a standard that provides a reasonable degree of protection for patient 
autonomy (balancing patient autonomy against the facilitation of healthcare and the 
protection of HCPs from unjust claims). However, one of the problems with the law, even 
with this more acceptable standard, is that it focuses on the actual risks disclosed rather 
than on the process of disclosure. If the law concentrated on regulating the dialogical 
process involved in consent as agreement it might solve some of the difficulties of trying 
to determine whether a risk is significant or material to a decision. Focusing on the 
process itself, rather than the outcome of the process, would also allow the law more 
readily to acknowledge that the process engages two parties in an imperfect process of 
communication that generates and requires mutual obligations of trustworthy behaviour. 
This is not to suggest that the law should not be concerned with which risks were actually 
disclosed. Rather, by focusing on the process and the way in which the two parties 
communicated the law can achieve a more holistic understanding of whether the HCP 
respected the patient's autonomy. Looking at the way in which the two parties 
approached and engaged with the dialogue may provide an insight into whether a failure 
to disclose a particular risk was culpable. For example, if it became clear from the 
discussion between the HCP and the patient that the patient had particular concerns then 
963 
this should affect the duty to disclose . 
Lord Woolf MR genuflected towards this idea in 
Pearce when he acknowledged that precise percentages were unhelpful in determining 
whether a risk should be disclosed. However, by ignoring the evidence concerning the 
dialogue (the woman's concern for her unborn child was clearly described in the case 
report) and by asking the medical experts for their opinion on the significance of the risk, 
963 This can work both ways in that it may be clear from the dialogue that patient did not wish to 
be informed of the risks. 
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Lord Woolf MR ultimately ignored the process of communication between the claimant 
and defendant. 
An additional issue related to the standard of disclosure is how far the law recognises a 
right to waive information. This is not a question that the courts have been asked to 
adjudicate on but, while the courts may accept the patient's right to waive the HCP's duty 
to disclose, the prudent patient standard could be rigidly applied which would mean that 
all the risks that would be required by the 'reasonable' patient would need to be disclosed 
irrespective of the wishes of the particular patient. Whether patients are currently allowed 
to waive information perhaps depends on whether the law focuses on the patient's rights 
or the HCP's duties. Since the law of negligence is duty based the argument that the 
patient has no right to waive the information is stronger than it would be under a rights 
based approach. It could still be seen as negligent to fail to disclose a risk even if the 
patient does not want to know the risk. 
In the US case of Putensen v Clay Adams Inc. the California Court of Appeals appeared 
to accept that the doctor's duty to disclose was relieved by a specific request 6not to be 
told the intricacies' of the procedure. 964 The courts in England may well adopt a similar 
approach as it seems unjust to blame professionals for failing to disclose if they have been 
asked not to. 
965 It should be noted, though, that in Putensen two further factors were 
relevant. First, the plaintiff had independently looked into the procedure and 'stated she 
was aware of what was involved'. 966 Second, the Court's justification for accepting that 
the doctor was relieved of the duty to disclose relied heavily on the therapeutic privilege. 
Although it is arguable that the courts would acknowledge the right to waive information, 
964 Putensen v Clay Adams Inc. 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062,1083 (1970). See also: Cobbs v Grant 502 
P. 2d 1,12 (1972). 
965 Heywood, R. 'Excessive Risk Disclosure: The Effects of the Law on Medical Practice' (2005) 
7 Medical Lmv International 93,10 1. 
966 Putensen v Claj, Adams Inc. 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062,1083 (1970). 
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until they do, and until the rules for doing so are laid down, 967 some HCPs may be 
reluctant to accept a waiver in practice. Heywood, for example, argues that the current 
law is confusing and may lead to doctors acting defensively and 'taking upon themselves 
[to] disclose excessive information about risks, which the patient may not need or 
actually want'. 968 Quasi legal guidance would help, but the easiest way to resolve the 
issue would be through legislation. 
The fourth problem with negligence is crucially related to the question of how far the 
courts protect patient autonomy. It is the question of which conception of autonomy are 
the courts relying on when deten-nining these cases, and are they consistent in their 
application? If tort law is fundamentally a system of corrective justice, which associates 
responsibility with the desert-based principle of fault, it is arguable that it reflects a liberal 
conception of autonomy. The liberal approach sees autonomy as essential for 
responsibility and as integral to the construction of identity (see chapter one). On this 
view, freedom to choose is necessary for responsibility and where that freedom has been 
unjustly infringed responsibility for any loss transfers to the wrongdoer. This approach is 
perhaps evident in the majority judgments in the House of Lords hearing of Chester v 
Afshar (see chapter five) . 
969However, the minority judgments are, if still predicated on 
autonomy, explicable only by taking a more socially embedded view of autonomy. 970 
Similarly, in the wrongful birth case of McFarlane v Tcryside, 9" the House of Lords 
I im ited the consequences of corrective j ustice by relying on distributive j ustice arguments 
that may be justified either by lessening the importance of autonomy or by adopting a less 
individualistic conception that weakens, or even severs, the association between 
967 Berg, J. W. 'Understanding Waiver' (2003) 40 Houston Law Review 281,334. 
969 Op cit n. 965,95,96. 
969 Op cit n. 906. 
970 Maclean, A. 'Risk, consent and responsibility for outcome' (2005) 14(l) Nottingham Law 
Journal 57,61,64. 
971 Op cit n. 263. 
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autonomy and responsibility for outcome. 972 Given the primacy that the law gives 
autonomy in other medico-legal cases, such as those involving the right to refuse 
treatment, it is arguable that the better view is to explain the court's approach as based on 
a more social ly-embedded view of autonomy. This, however, is inconsistent with the 
majority's approach in Chester. If the law is to be consistent, coherent and predictable 
then it should be clear which conception of autonomy is relevant, and that conception 
should be applied universally rather than utilised in a pick-and-mix fashion to suit judicial 
intuition or bias. 
A fifth problem with negligence is that, if disclosure is predicated on the professional's 
973 duty it risks being restricted by his or her duty of care to provide reasonable treatment. 
What this means is that, if the treatment is not something that the professional would 
recommend, and it is reasonable, under the Bolam test, to take this stance, then there 
arguably may be no duty to disclose the treatment even if another doctor would have 
recommended it. Although the duty to disclose probably encompasses the disclosure of 
alternative treatments there are no UK cases directly on this point. The cases have been 
universally concerned with the disclosure of risks, again emphasising the link between 
consent and outcome responsibi 
lity. 974 Because of the lack of English authority on this 
point, it is necessary to look to other jurisdictions. In Hicks v Ghaphery, 915 the Supreme 
Court of West Virginia held that the informed consent duty to disclose was limited by 
ordinary negligence principles. Giving the majority opinion, Maynard J quoted from the 
Californian Court of Appeal case of Vandi v Permanente Medical Group: 
[I]t would be anomalous to create a legally imposed duty which would 
require a physician to disclose and offer to a patient a medical 
procedure which, in the exercise of his or her medical judgment, the 
972 Op cit n. 264,27-30; Op cit n. 970,64-65. 
973 See, Jackson, E. Op cit n. 937,277. 
974 Op cit n. 899,149. 
975 Hicks v Ghaphei-v 571 SE. 2d 317,335 (2002). 
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physician does not believe to be medically indicated ... 
if the 
procedure is one which should have been recommended it would be 
negligence under ordinary medical negligence principles and there is 
no need to consider an additional duty of disclosure. 976 
What this means is that where a responsible school of thought would not recommend a 
treatment then there would be no duty to disclose it as an alternative treatment. 
In Matthies v Mastromonaco, 977 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, while 
'Choosing among reasonable treatment alternatives is a shared responsibility of 
physicians and patients', doctors only had a duty to disclose those 'courses of treatment 
that are medically reasonable'. 978 Although this means that: 'physicians do not adequately 
discharge their responsibility by disclosing only treatment alternatives that they 
recommend', 979 the need to disclose alternatives is governed by the professional standard 
rather than the prudent patient standard (or, at least, the prudent patient standard is 
necessarily derivative on the professional standard) and this limits patient autonomy. If a 
similar limit were placed on disclosure in England then the doctor would only need to 
find an expert witness to support his view that a particular treatment need not be 
recommended and, unless his position was illogical, it would not help the patient to find a 
countervailing opinion. 
The duty may protect the patient from a doctor recommending a somewhat controversial 
treatment, as in Matthies, but it may limit disclosure the other way: if a more 
controversial, or perhaps outdated, treatment would be more attractive to the patient - for 
whatever reason - the doctor would not be obliged to disclose it to the patient. It also 
restricts the patient's ability to act in accordance with his or her character. The patient 
976 Vandi v Permanente Medical Group 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463,467 (1992). 
977 Afatthies v Mastromonaco 733 A. 2d 456 (1999). 
978 Ibid, 460. 
979 Ibid., 462. 
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may be risk averse and feel that it is better to be safe than sorry. The doctor's decision, on 
the other hand may be influenced by a cost-benefit analysis in deciding that an 
investigation is not medically indicated. Deciding that the likelihood of detecting an 
abnormality or preventing a risk materialising is not worth the cost of the procedure may 
be reasonable from the physician's perspective but the physician is not the one who will 
have to live with the consequences. In Hicks, for example, the doctor decided against 
inserting a vena cava filter in a patient at risk of a deep vein thrombosis. The Supreme 
Court held that, although the filter would have prevented the patient's death it was a 
medically reasonable decision not to insert the filter and therefore the doctor was not 
negligent for failing to disclose the intervention to the patient. 980 
There are three other problems associated with the standard of care required by the duty 
to disclose. First, is the failure of the courts to develop a duty to challenge an apparently 
irrational decision and attempt to persuade the patient to change his or her mind. If 
anything, as I noted in chapter five, the law has followed the lead of the medical 
profession and has accepted that, at least in some circumstances, the professional's duty is 
to be non-directive and any disclosure must be neutral. While this stance may be 
appropriate in relation to the professional's personal moral values, it reflects a barren 
view of autonomy as isolated independence if it is applied to decisions that risk the 
patient's health or well-being. As I argued in chapter three, part of the professional's role 
is to advise and to recommend treatment, which, by definition, cannot be a neutral 
endeavour. It is debatable whether any act of infon-nation disclosure by a human can be 
neutral since even the order of disclosure may affect the way the listener interprets the 
information. Furthermore, insistence on neutrality sterilises the dialogue and, while it 
formally respects consent as permission, it undermines consent as agreement. As a final 
comment on persuasion, I noted earlier that the courts' approach to persuasion is 
980 Op cit n. 975. 
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confused and inconsistent. As such it currently fails to provide adequate guidance for 
HCPs. 
The second problem is the therapeutic privilege. Kennedy argued that the doctrine 'allows 
the doctor proper discretion in the exercise of his duty to disclose'. 981 Provided that the 
court determines the 'general circumstances in which the privilege may be invoked' then 
the law will be 'sensitive to the interests of both patient and doctor'. 982 Professional 
judgment could then determine whether the patient fell within one of these categories. 
Kennedy noted that the risk of paternalism lies just beneath the surface of the privilege. 
Thus, he stated: 'if the balance is struck in favour of therapeutic privilege, not as a 
defence but as a rule, by making disclosure a matter for the medical profession, this 
inevitably means that a doctrine developed for exceptional circumstances will result in 
913 diminishing respect for the patient as a person in the majority of cases'. For Kennedy, 
'the principle behind the doctrine is the same as thatjustifying informed consent: namely 
respect for the patient'. 984 If this is the case, then it is submitted that the patient should 
still be allowed the right to decide whether or not to be given the relevant information 
regardless of any 'harm' that may be caused by that information. Providing the patient is 
aware that the doctor believes the information might be detrimental the choice should 
remain with the patient. The only exception which might be justified is where the 
information will significantly impair that patient's autonomous capacity to use the 
information and even this exception depends on whether the emphasis of respect is placed 
on the patient's future autonomy rather than their present autonomy. 
If respect for the person is equated with the individual's present autonomy then the 
therapeutic privilege cannot be justified. For Kennedy, however, respecting the patient - 
981 Op cit n. 763,187. 
982 Ibid., 187. 
981 Ibid., 187. 
984 Ibid., 187. 
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at least as far as the therapeutic privilege is concerned - also engages beneficence. In 
discussing the issue of consent to clinical research he argued: 
it may follow that the ... doctrine of the 'therapeutic privilege' ... 
which extends to doctors the discretion not to fully inform patients if 
the information would so alarm the patient as to cause him unwisely to 
refuse a particular treatment, even when ordinarily the doctor is 
obliged to give that information which a reasonable patient would 
wish to have, should not apply to the conduct of trials ... There may 
be some justification for making inroads into the principle of 
autonomy when treatment is in question. There seems no justification 
for it when the patient is being asked to volunteer for, and may be 
exposed to, that which is not directly in his interests. 985 
The acceptance that respect for the patient involves beneficence allows the doctor to 
make 'inroads into the principle of autonomy' and withhold information that may not be 
in the patient's best interests. For Kennedy, the patient is sufficiently protected because 
the onus of proof lies with the doctor. 9" If, however, the right to give or withhold consent 
is based solely on the right to self-determination or on the right to autonomy the doctrine 
of 'therapeutic privilege' is an unjustified exception . 
987 It is hypocritical for the law to 
state that individuals can make whatever decision they like, even if it is harmful, and then 
deny the individual the very information necessary to make the decision. 
Brazier suggested that the 'prudent patient' test combined with the 'therapeutic privilege' 
defence may be seen simply as reversing the burden of proof. Thus, 'Doctors may still 
rely on custom and practice to withhold information but they must prove the custom and 
985 Kennedy, 1. 'Consent and Randomized Controlled Trials', in: TreatAfe Right. - Essays in 
Afcdical Lam, andEthics (1988) Oxford: Clarendon Press 213,216. 
986 Op cif n. 763,205. 
987 Op cit n. 575,187. 
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practice'. 988 However, she went on to argue that this first impression of the doctrine is 
blinkered since: 
the medical judgment relied on to invoke therapeutic privilege must be 
specific to that patient. It at least requires that the doctor explore his 
relationship with that individual and probe to discover the potential 
effect on him of disclosure. It is not dependent on a general 
assumption that disclosure equals harm to the patient. 989 
This is an insightful and important point. Since the professional standard reflects general 
practice it is not patient specific. The 'prudent patient' combined with the doctrine of 
'therapeutic privilege' focuses attention on the individual patient. However, it is arguable 
that this advantage arises from the different linguistic emphasis of the two tests. If both 
tests are interpreted in a spirit of respect for the autonomy of the particular patient then 
the two tests do begin to approach each other and the difference in burden of proof again 
becomes the distinguishing feature. 
The advantage of the prudent patient test is not that it requires the doctor to focus on the 
individual in front of him. This should also be required under the professional standard. 
Rather, the advantage is that the prudent patient test makes it harder for the doctor to hide 
behind professional practice. Under both standards the particular patient should be the 
focus of what information ought to be disclosed. Thus, the professional standard should 
be: would a responsible body of doctors consider as reasonable the information disclosed 
to the particular patient in relation to the procedure. It should not be: would a responsible 
body of doctors consider as reasonable the infori-nation disclosed in relation to the 
procedure. The problem with the professional standard is that there is no linguistic 
pressure to consider the individual patient and it is therefore too easy to decide the issue 
988 Op cit n. 765,188. 
989 Ibid., 188. 
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generically. The true advantage of the prudent patient standard, then, is that it 
linguistically pressures one into considering the particular patient. 
Healy argued that the doctrine of 'therapeutic privilege' relies 'on the presumption that 
the typical patient would wish to be cured and healed, and ... may be seen to provide a 
necessary outlet for the discharge by doctors of their primary ethical duty to lieal the 
ill'. 990 Healy analysed the doctrine as discussed in Canterbury and suggested that it: 
'distils down to a privilege justified by the doctor's opinion that his patient would be 
unable to make a rational decision grounded on the information in question'. 991 To 
support his argument he quoted from Canterbury: 'It is recognized that patients 
occasionally become so III or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a 
rational decision'. 992 He went on to point out, however, that the patient's right to 
information should not be compromised by the possibility of a decision deemed irrational 
by the medical staff. This bivalent attitude to the privilege has, Healy noted: 'enabled 
other American courts to tamper with the privilege to the extent that in some states, what 
993 
resulted differed little from the professional standard model'. 
Robertson suggested that there are four reasons why information likely to cause 
psychological distress should arguably be withheld from the patient: 
the information may be counterproductive in that the resulting psychological 
distress might prevent rational decision making; 
2. where the patient is being treated for emotional or psychological problems the 
added distress may compromise that treatment; 
990 Healy, J. Op cit n. 785,115. 
991 Ibid., 119. 
992 Op cit n. 582,789. 
993 Healy, J. Op cit n. 785,119. For an example of an expansive interpretation of the therapeutic 
privilege, see: Nishi v Hartwell 473 P. 2d 116 (1970). 
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3. 'if disclosure would be likely to cause serious distress or psychological harm, it 
would be in the best interests of the patient that the information should not be 
disclosed'; 
4. where the doctor believes that the treatment is in the patient's best interests and 
994 the patient might refuse consent if told of the risks. 
As Robertson noted: 'It is the fourth possible reason for withholding information on the 
basis of the "best interests of the patient" principle that gives cause for concern ... This is 
a clear example of ... patemalism'. 
99' The danger of this paternalism is particularly great: 
'Given that the duty to disclose is regarded as part of the overall duty of care' . 
996 It is also 
arguable that the third reason is unduly paternalistic. If self-determination forms the basis 
for consent then the patient should be given the option of waiver where the doctor 
believes a particular piece of information may be distressing. Furthermore, it may be 
argued that the patient has the right to be distressed if that is appropriate and the distress - 
providing it is not incapacitating - may focus the patient's mind more closely on the 
decision at hand. This may even result in a more appropriate decision. The first reason is 
also interesting in that it again raises the issue of present and future autonomy as well as 
997 the question of whether autonomy requires rationality . Even on the second point 
(assuming competency) the choice, as to whether to exercise or waive their right to the 
information, should be put to the patients. Arguably, then, the doctrine should only apply 
where the information is likely to cause such distress that the patient is rendered 
incompetent to make the decision. 998 In this situation it is in patients' best interests not to 
be informed since they are then encouraged to exercise the maximum amount of 
994 Robertson, G. 'Informed Consent to Medical Treatment' (1981) 97 Law Quarterly Review 102, 
121. 
995 
Ibid., 12 1. 
996 
Ibid., 122. 
997 See chapter one. 
998 See: Stauch, M. Wheat, K. Tingle, J. Sourcebook on Medical Law (2"d ed., 2002) London: 
Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 162. 
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autonomy as is possible in the circumstances. Were they to be given the information their 
competence would be compromised and their autonomy neutered. 
Berg et al argued that: 
In practice, it is likely that the [therapeutic] privilege serves to lend 
false legitimacy to the natural aversion of physicians to disclosing 
information to patients ... if the scope of the privilege is not severely 
circumscribed, it contains the potential to swallow the general 
obligation of disclosure ... [and] in effect permit physicians to 
substitute their judgment for patients' in every instance of medical 
decision making. 999 
They went on to note that, because of the overlap between the privilege and the two 
exceptions to consent of waiver and incompetence, the doctrine could be abolished. '000 
The argument is persuasive: if the patient is infon-ned of the potentially distressing nature 
of the information then a waiver would allow the patient the right to decide 'that they 
prefer to risk being harmed by being infon-ned than be harmed by having to make choices 
in the dark of nondisclosure'. 1001 The doctrine of therapeutic privilege means that it is the 
doctor that makes this decision and the patient is presented with a fait accompli. In fact, it 
is arguable that the position in favour of waiver is stronger since choosing to receive the 
information only risks harm whereas not being given the choice actually does hann the 
patient by infringing his or her autonomy. Thus, as Berg et al suggested: 'to require this 
minimal preparatory disclosure does not seem an unreasonable compromise between the 
competing interests of patients' rights to disclosure and consent, and physicians' ethical 
obligations to do no harm'. 
1002 
999 Berg, J. W. Appelbaum, P. S. Lidz, C. W. Parker, L. S. Informed Consent. - Legal Theory and 
Clinical Practice (2 d ed., 2001) New York: Oxford University Press, 80. 
1000 Ibid, 83. 
1001 Ibid, 83. 
1002 Ibid., 83-84. 
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The overlap with competence falls, as previously discussed, where the disclosure would 
so affect the individual's ability to use that information that it impedes rather than 
furthers their autonomy. In this circumstance it might be argued that the patient is not 
competent to be given that piece of information. 1003 Thus, in most circumstances a waiver 
is preferable to invoking the doctrine and, for the remainder, the situation may be covered 
by competence. It seems, therefore, that there may be little need for the doctrine 
especially as it is insufficiently substantiated by empirical evidence. 1004 Furthermore, as 
Berg et al suggested: 'The abolition of the therapeutic privilege might have another 
salutary effect on the physician-patient relationship ... 
[since t1he affirmative act of 
abolishing the privilege might be viewed as a withdrawal of the legitimation of 
physicians' natural reticence to disclose information'. 1005 
Despite the fact that the doctrine appears to be encompassed by the Bolam test (see 
chapter five), it is submitted that it should rarely, if ever, be allowed as a justification for 
withholding information. The doctrine suffers from ambiguity, "0' lack of any justified 
basis - either empirical or philosophical 1007 - and there are arguably sufficient exceptions 
to disclosure that achieve a more coherent and justifiable balance between respecting 
patient autonomy and improving health. '00' 
The third problem is that the standard of care required in urgent and emergency situations 
remains to be determined. There have been no English cases looking at whether the duty 
to disclose information and obtain the patient's consent is affected by the urgency of the 
situation. "09 Logically, one would expect that the duty would be less demanding simply 
1003 Ibid, 83-84. 
1004 
Ibid, 84. 
1005 Ibid, 84. 
1006 Op cit n. 633,22; Op cit n. 36, '37. 
1007 Op cit n. 999,834; Bok, S. Lying. - Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (1978) New York: 
Vintage Books, 232-255. 
1008 Op cit n. 999,83-84; Op cit n. 633,166-169. 
1009 In Re F, Op cit n. 667,74, Lord Goff indicated, in an obiter dictum, that non-consensual 
treatment would be justified by an emergency where there was no 'opportunity to communicate' 
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because the time constraints may make it impossible to counsel the patient adequatel-y. In 
the US it has been held that the doctor's duty to obtain the patient's informed consent is 
relieved by the emergency. 10" Clearly, the greater the urgency the less emphasis should 
be placed on disclosure - there is little point in respecting the patient's autonomy if the 
patient dies before having the opportunity to exercise that right. But while this may lessen 
the duty to disclose, it should not relieve the professional of the duty to ask for the 
patient's permission to treat. 1011 This can be done relatively quickly and it is only where 
the patient is rendered incompetent by the emergency that the duty should be wholly 
relieved. 1012 Because of the unpredictable, and highly variable nature of emergencies it 
would be impossible to set precise standards of disclosure and any duty must, therefore, 
be subject to the reasonableness standard. 
As a final point, since negligence applies both to a failure to disclose and to careless 
treatment or diagnosis, a finding of negligence may be seen as implying a general 
carelessness not warranted by what some may see as less blameworthy than the careless 
performance of an operation. When a doctor, or other healthcare professional, is sued in 
negligence this may have both personal and professional consequences: some doctors 
suffer something akin to a grief reaction; a finding of negligence may be unfairly equated 
1013 
with incompetence and a finding of negligence may have career consequences . 
Whether or not this is something that should be of concern is, no doubt, a matter of 
opinion. However, if relevant, it supports an argument for establishing a distinct liability 
with the patient. However, there are few emergencies where the patient is competent and no 
communication at all is possible. In Re R (A minor) (Wardship. - Consent to Treatment) [1992] 
Fam 11,22, Lord Donaldson MR equated the emergency exception with circumstances where 'the 
patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of giving or refusing consent'. 
1010 Shine v Vega 709 NE. 2d 58,63-64 (1999); Ketler, S. K. 'The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A 
Cultural Analysis of the Informed Consent Doctrine after Schreiber v Physicians Insurance Co. of 
Wisconsin' (2001) 95 Northwestern University Law Review 1029,1035. 
loll Shine v Vega 709 NE. 2d 58,64 (1999). 1012 Op cit n. 582,788-789. 
1013 See: Merry, A. McCall Smith, A. Errors Medicine and the Law, (200 1) Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 246; Mulcahy, L. 'Threatening Behaviour? The Challenge Posed by 
Medical Negligence Claims', in: Freeman, M. Lewis, A. (eds. ), Law and Medicine. - Current Legal 
Issues l'olume 3 (2000) Oxford: Oxford University Press 81,82,85. 
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for 'breach of consent to medical treatment'. While better education of doctors and other 
healthcare professionals may lead to a better understanding of the meaning of negligence 
liability it may still be appropriate to more clearly distinguish errors of communication 
from errors of medical treatment or diagnosis, 
The Problem of Treatment Refusal 
I noted earlier that, in principle, the law protects the individual's right to refuse treatment 
regardless of the consequences for that individual (unless the person is mentally 111). The 
problem I want to highlight here is the gap between principle and practice. There have 
been a number of cases where an apparently autonomous person has been denied the right 
to refuse treatment. In most cases this is achieved by finding the person incompetent. 
Thus, in Rochdale Healthcare NHS Trust v C, a pregnant woman was held to be 
incompetent when she refused a caesarean section because her reasoning seemed 
irrational to the judge. This was despite the consultant obstetrician believing she was 
competent to decide and despite the fact that the judge had not actually met or spoken to 
the woman. 
1014 Interestingly, in none of the eight caesarean section cases was the 
woman's decision respected while there were lives at risk. 
1015 Two of the women were 
clearly competent, 
1016 
and a third was arguably So. 
1017 Thorpe LJ commented extra- 
judicially: 
Whatever emphasis legal principle may place upon adult autonomy 
with the consequent right to choose between treatments, at some level 
the judicial outcome will be influenced by the expert evidence as to 
'0" Op cit n. 361. 
1015 Re S[1992] 4AJ I ER. 671; Tameside and Glossop Acute Services TrustvCH[1996] I FLR 
762; Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W[1996] 2 FLR613; Opcitn. 361; Re LAn 
A dult: Non-consensual Treatment) [ 1997] 1 FCR 609; Op cit n. 5 5; St Georges Healthcare NHS 
Trust, Op cit n. 53 1; Bolton Hospitals NHS Trust v0 [2002] EWHC 287 1. In St Georges 
Healthcare NHS Trust, the Court of Appeal held that here refusal of treatment should have been 
, 
Tected but this case was heard after the caesarean had been performed. res 
101 ReS[l992]4A11ER. 67lOpcitn. 53I. 
1017 Op cit n. 36 1. 
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which treatment affords the best chance of the happy announcement 
that both mother and baby are doing well. 
1018 
A sceptical analysis of the treatment refusal cases would suggest that a refusal is unlik-ek 
to be respected where there is a "socially valuable" life at risk. 1019 Thus, in Re E, a 15 
year old Jehovah's Witness was deemed incompetent to refuse a blood transfusion despite 
the judge stating: 'I find that A is a boy of sufficient intelligence to be able to take 
1020 decisions about his own well-being'. Similarly, in Re T, a young woman's refusal of 
blood transfusions was held to be invalid because it was inapplicable in the 
circumstances, misinformed and made as a result of undue influence. 1021 Other advance 
refusals have also been rejected even where made with the knowledge of the person's 
doctor and with the assistance of a solicitor. 
1022 
In some instances the courts have upheld the individual's right to refuse, but these are 
where there is no life at risk, or the life at risk is arguably of limited "social value", or 
where the individual's decision is seen as rational by the judge because continued life 
would be painful or pointless. Thus, in Re AK, a patient with advanced motor neurone 
disease was held to have made a valid advance directive refusing further treatment after 
his ability to communicate was lost despite the fact that his competency could not be 
properly assessed. 1021 Without the ability to communicate or use his body in any way his 
life could be seen as lacking any further point. In the Ms B case, the claimant's refusal 
was upheld as competent because the judge arguably accepted that the life of a paraplegic 
was of little value if not valued by the individual herself. 1024 If Ms B had seen the point in 
1018 Thorpe LJ. 'The Caesarean Section Debate' [1997] 27 Fam. Law 663,663-664. 
1019 It is not suggested that this is the only explanation for the outcome of the cases; merely that It 
is a possible one. 
1020 Re E (4 Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386,391. 
1021 Op cit n. 5 10. 
1022 The NHS Trust v Ms T [2004] EWHC 1279. 
1023 ReA K (Medical Treatment: Consent) [200 1]I FLR 129,13 3. 
1024 Re B, Op cit n. 648. 
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continuing her life and undergoing rehabilitation she would have been a role model of 
courage in the face of adversity. As Dame Butler-Sloss stated: 'I hope she will forgive me 
for saying, diffidently, that if she did reconsider her decision, she would have a lot to 
offer the community at large'. 1025 However, there is no dignity in being forced to continue 
life as a paraplegic against one's wishes. 
In Re C, a 68 year old chronic paranoid schizophrenic, confined to Broadmoor after he 
had stabbed his girlfriend, was held to be competent to refuse surgical amputation of a 
gangrenous leg despite having the delusion that he was a world famous vascular surgeon 
who had never lost a patient. 1026 Arguably, it was of little social concern whether or not 
his decision resulted in his death, which would have been of little, if any loss to the 
community. As a final case to help make the point, consider Ian Brady's attempt to go on 
hunger strike to object to the way he had been treated in prison. Hunger strikes have been 
allowed where the prisoners were political. However, the court held that Brady was 
incompetent to refuse and that the refusal was a consequence of his personality disorder, 
which meant that he could be force fed under the Mental Health Act 1983.1027 It might be 
argued that this is an example of a person's refusal being disallowed despite the apparent 
lack of social value in keeping him alive. However, the social value of Ian Brady's life 
arises from the need to ensure that the heinous "moors murderer" was being seen to suffer 
his punishment for the evil he committed in torturing and murdering children. 
The point of this discussion is to note the fragility of patient autonomy in the common 
law. It may be that legislation with a strict code of practice could bolster the protection of 
patient autonomy to a degree. Emphasising the right to refuse treatment and providing 
1025 Ibid., [951. 
1021 Op cit n. 683. 
1027 Rv Collins, ex p Braaý, (2000) 58 BMLR 173 
-166 
guidelines through a code of practice might limit the cases that are brought to court. 1028 
However, the vagueness of the competency criteria allows the court huge leeývay and 
would still permit the judges to manipulate the outcomes of cases to continue to preserve 
"socially valuable" lives. Legislation could introduce a more robust system of 
competency assessment but that is beyond the scope of this dissertation and would be 
unlikely given the recent passage of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. A further possibility 
that might have a small, but possibly significant, effect would be to emphasise tile need 
for HCPs to challenge apparently irrational decisions. This may either allow patients to 
acknowledge their errors and change their decisions or it may allow HCPs to understand 
the patient's reasoning and accept the rationality of the decision. 
The Problems of the Common Law 
The first difficulty to note here is that the common law is reactive rather than proactive. 
This means that it can only develop in response to an actual case. If an issue is not 
brought before the courts then the judges cannot address that issue and determine the 
law's stance. While it may be argued that this means that the law only deals with the most 
important questions this is not necessarily the case. The driving force is more likely to be 
money rather than an important point of principle. On top of this, cases that do reach 
court must be decided within the common law institutional constraints of precedent and 
legal policy. ' 029 Furthermore, any development is likely to be piecemeal and 
decisions 
may be inconsistent with each other. 
1030 All of this leads to a law that may be out of synch 
with ethical mores, uncertainty and a lack of predictability, which makes 
life more 
difficult for practitioners trying to decide what the law requires of them. 
103 1 As Jones 
'0" Given that no further caesarean section case have been brought since the Court of Appeal 
in St 
George's Healthcare NHS Trust vS (Op cit n. 53 1) set down guidelines there is some support for 
this position. While the same result appears possible through the common law the effect of the 
guidelines appears to have been limited to the refusal of a caesarean section. 1029 Op cit n. 994,126 1030 Op cit n. 899,150. 
1031 See, e. g. Worthington, R. 'Ethical dichotomies and methods of seeking consent' (2004) 
59 
Anaesthesia 525,526. 
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suggested: 'Although the case law can gradually fill in some areas of doubt it can never 
be a comprehensive framework'. 1032 Similarly, Wear argued in relation to the laýý's 
protection of individual autonomy: 'Unfortunately, the law's specific focus has come to 
be on torts; and it thus provides little clear specific guidance regarding how inforined 
consent should actually pursue such self-determination'. 1033 One example of this 
uncertainty lies in the amount of information that need be disclosed and whether patients 
can waive their right to information. 
1034 
Related to this, the law of tort is limited in the flexibility of its remedies. 1035 The NAO 
report found that disgruntled patients often want an explanation, an apology or an 
indication that steps will be taken to prevent the problem recurring. 1036 For the most part 
the patient only has the option of damages and the remedies of an explanation or an 
apology are not available. Similarly, the courts have no power to ensure that adequate 
measures are taken to remedy the situation, whether through changes in the system or 
through retraining, education or referral to the relevant professional regulatory body. It is 
arguable that these issues are not the law's concern and that the profession is capable of 
managing them through bodies such as the GMC without the court's involvement- There 
is certainly strength in the argument that it should not be necessary to go to court to get an 
apology or an explanation. However, the complaints system does not always work, and 
the threat of litigation, in what may be seen as a counterproductive manner, may cause the 
doctor to maintain silence rather than risk an apology being misconstrued as an admission 
of liability. However, it is precisely because the court and the common law are unable to 
deal with this that legislation ought to be considered: providing an alternative to the 
courts with a wider and more flexible range of remedies is an option that is closed to the 
common law. 
1032 Op cil n. 787,106. 
1033 Op cit n. 633,66. 
1034 For further discussion see, Op cit n-965. 
1035 Op cit n. 899,150. 
1036 NAO. Op cit n. 3, paras 3.22-3.24. 
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A further problem with the common law approach to consent is that regulation is, as I 
suggested earlier, focused more on the outcome of the process that culminates in consent 
rather than on the process itself. This results in the law devaluing the relational aspect of 
the profess] onal-patient relationship and establishes a number of dichotomies that treat 
autonomy as an all-or-nothing concept (consent or no consent; voluntary or involuntary; 
competent or incompetent) rather than as a variable characteristic, which is capable of 
degrees of existence. 1037 This is partly to do with liability, at least in negligence, 
depending on the materialisation of a risk. If outcome responsibility and consent are 
distinguished, the law could develop a more sensitive approach to regulating the iterative 
dialogical process between the HCP and the patient. However consent is regulated, the 
law would be unable to escape the use of thresholds to establish liability, but either 
through legislation or the development of professional regulation, the law could engage 
with the variable nature of autonomy and establish a number of thresholds that would 
allow for different remedies or differing amounts of compensation. 
The penultimate problem with common law regulation is that, while it is presently 
developing in a way that seeks to provide an increased protection for individual 
autonomy, it could equally well shift in the opposite direction . 
1038The law of negligence 
has previously seen such oscillations, for example, in the development of the rules used to 
determine whether a novel claim should be recognised, "'9 and in cases of indeterminate 
04 
causation. ' 0 The law also tends to follow the dominant ethical arguments, although with 
an extensive lag period. What this means is that just as the law reacts to the ethical and 
1037 See Part One; Roter. D. 'The medical visit context of treatment decision-making and the 
therapeutic relationship' (2000) 3 Health Expectations 17,18. 
1038 See the discussion of the Australian case Rosenberg v Percival [2001] 178 ALR 577 in 
Heywood, R. 'Re-thinking the Decision in Pearce' [2005] Contemporary Issues in Law 264,273- 
274. 
1039 See Anns v Merton London Borough [ 1978] AC 728; Junior Books v 1eitchi [ 1983] 1 AC 520; 
and Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [ 1990] 2 AC 605. 
1040 Rules of causation relaxed in Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] 1 AC 32, but tightened up in 
Corus (UK) plc v St Gobain Pipelines plc [2006] UKHL 20. 
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social mores so those mores change. The present developments are leading to increased 
protection for a liberal conception of the autonomous person. There is now., however, a 
noticeable movement to constrain that approach by highlighting the relational nature of 
autonomy, the obligations of patients and the relevance of other communitarian concerns. 
In addition, there is currently concern regarding the 'compensation culture' to the point 
that a Bill has been introduced to reverse, or at least slow down the rise in negligence 
claims. 104 1 The effects of these developments may be that the law will pull on the reins of 
'infon-ned consent' and reverse the expansion of liability seen in cases such as Chester v 
Afshar. While this is not necessarily inappropriate the problem is that the piecemeal 
development of the common law will mean that any such reversal of judicial policy wil I 
inevitably cause confusion and a lack of certainty regarding the current rules of disclosure 
and consent. 
A final point is the inability of tort law to engage with or develop a coherent philosophy 
for the community's system of healthcare. This is something that is properly the purview 
of the Government, which has both the authority and the tools to develop such a 
philosophy. Although the courts may be influenced by Government policy and may be 
able to fine tune liability they are constrained by precedent and the institution of law. 1112 
The courts are often reluctant to rely on policy arguments and when they do attend to the 
wider implications of ajudgment it creates the types of problems exemplified by the 
somewhat arbitrary appeal to distributive justice in the recent series of wrongful 
pregnancy cases . 
1043 It is submitted that the extent of the requirements for a valid and 
effective consent are - or ought to be - inextricably linked to the whole philosophy of 
104 1 The Compensation Bill, available at: http: //www. parliament. the-stationery- 
office. co. uk/pa/ld2OO506/ldbiIls/035/2006035. htm. See the prime minister's speech on the 
compensation culture delivered to the Institute of Public Policy Research on 26h May 2005, 
available at: http: //www. number 10. gov. uk/output/Page75 62. asp. 
1042 Meaning legal principle and policy 
1043 Op cit n. 263; Parkinson v. St James andSeacroft University Hospital [2001] EWCA Civ 530, 
[2001] 3 All ER 97; Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 88, 
[2003] QB 20; Op cit n. 916. 
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healthcare in the context of its delivery within the particular community. 10" As such, it 
may be better to legislate for consent in a way that would be compatible with the values 
and pragmatic concerns of healthcare as well as being sensitive to the needs of the 
patients served by the institution of healthcare. 
Addressing the Gap between Practice and Principle 
There are broadly three alternative approaches. First, the common law could be allowed 
to continue to develop, guided by criticism and debate. However, as I have suggested, this 
is a haphazard and uncertain process that could take the protection of patient autonomy 
into the depths of libertarian isolation or revert to a more protectionist paradigm of 
limited paternalism through the reliance on medical experts and the development of the 
therapeutic privilege. It currently seems unwilling or unable to develop the law creatively 
in a way that is sensitive to a more nuanced and mature view of patient autonomy in the 
context of the professional-patient relationship. Furthermore, after some thirty years of 
developing the law in this area we are still left with a situation in which the realities of 
'informed consent' may be described as a 'fairy story', with medical practice falling short 
of both legal and ethical expectations. 1045 It is, therefore, arguable that any amount of 
'tinkering' with the common law will inevitably be inadequate and that a more radical 
approach is required. 
1046 
A second approach would be to start from first principle and legislate on the issue. This 
would have the advantage of allowing the development of a conceptually coherent law, 
with well defined guidance that reflects the political approach to healthcare and provides 
secure protection for patient autonomy balanced by the recognition that the right to 
autonomy is not free floating but is grounded in relationships and the obligations inherent 
to those relationships. Although Heywood's suggestion that: 'The law can never be 
1044 Op cit n. 297,369. 
1045 Op cit n. 787,129-130. 
1046 See, Jackson, E. Op cit n. 937,272. 
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viewed as a proactive mechanism protecting patients' rights"O" is a fair criticism of the 
common law, it is less accurate In relation to new legislation. This is especially so if the 
legislative process is accompanied by a consultation process, which serves to enhance the 
consciousness-raising effect of new legislation. Furthermore, if a code of practice and ail 
independent regulator are part of the new legislation, the law can be both proactive and 
flexible. Added to which, passing new legislation has an important symbolic effect, XN 11 ich 
would serve to emphasise the relative value the community places in autonomy, self- 
determination and health. 1048 Thus, legislation could be a positive influence on medical 
practice both at the level of the individual practitioner and at the level of the profession as 
a whole. 
1149 
The final option is to develop professional regulation so as to allow a more proactive role 
for the professional regulatory bodies. It is likely that some form of professional 
regulation will always play an important role in encouraging the virtue of 
professionalism: regulating the HCP's character dispositions requires an active 
supervision that falls outside the courts' role. However, there is still the question of 
whether professional regulation could be developed sufficiently to negate the need for a 
direct legislative response. 
In recent years the GMC, for example, has been active in producing guidelines, which 
should improve practice and are likely to indirectly influence legal standards. 'O" In 
addition to this they could also be given the power to provide limited remedies, such as a 
small amount of compensation for the harm done to the patient's autonomy, an 
explanation, a formal apology and assurance that something will be done to prevent the 
same thing happening to others. The main problem with that approach is the possible 
1047 /-)_ 
Op cit n. 965,105. 1048 Bordieu, P. 'The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field' (1986-1987) 38 
Hastings Law Journal 814,840. 
1049 Op cit n. 787,108. 
1050 Op cit n. 820,110; Ibid., 133. 
272 
perception that the professional regulatory bodies are insufficiently independent of the 
practitioners and are biased in their favour. The GMC, for example, has over recent vears 
been subject to much criticism 1051 and, while it has engaged more openly with the public 
in recent consultation exercises, ' 112 there may be insufficient public confidence in these 
bodies at present to support an expanded role. However, given the time and support to 
develop and become more proactive and independent, professional regulation may gain a 
new lease of life. Any reliance on professional regulation would need to address the 
problem of coordinating the different regulatory bodies, such as the GMC and the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC), to ensure consistent and coherent regulation of 
healthcare practice. If that can be addressed, professional regulation may be able to paper 
over the deficiencies in the common law. 
Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, and this part of the thesis, I will briefly summarise my 
argument. I have analysed the regulation of consent and information disclosure in the 
torts of battery and negligence. I have tried to show that both of these torts have their 
deficiencies, which include both conceptual and practical flaws. Battery, for example, has 
connotations of criminality and fails to deal with non-interventional management or non- 
contact treatment. Negligence, on the other hand, is constrained by the need to show that 
the failure to disclose caused legally recognised damage, and carries the baggage of 
reliance on medical experts and deference to the profession. The standard of care 
expected is inadequately defined at present and the reluctance of the courts to require a 
duty to persuade underlines the barren nature of the legal conception of autonomy. 
Further, while lacking the criminal associations of battery it does perhaps imply that the 
1051 See: Smith, R. 'GMC under the cosh' (1998) 316 British Medical Journal 945; Smith, R. 
'GMC: expediency before principle' (2005) 330 British Medical Journal 1; Smith, J. The 5th 
Shipman Report, Safeguarding Patients. - Lessonsftom the Past - Proposalsfor the Future (2004) 
-p I cm6394, 
Chapter 15. Available at: http: //www. the-shipman-inquiry. org. uk/5r age. aspý Irvine, D. 
The Doctors' Tale. - Professionalism and Public Trust (2003) Oxford: Radcliffe Medical Press. 
1052 In 2005 the GNIC held five public seminars entitled 'What is Good Medical Practice? ' 
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doctor is generally negligent rather than that the error was confined to a failure of 
communication. 
Just as there are problems with either tort, so there are difficulties with the combined 
regulation, which is the current approach taken by the law. Conceptually it makes little 
sense to distinguish risk information from the 'nature' of the procedure and this 
association of risk disclosure and negligence creates a particular link between consent and 
responsibility for outcome. 'O" While this may be appropriate, I argued earlier that it was 
not necessary and legislating for consent would provide an opportunity to rethink that 
association. Furthermore, the common law's focus on the end product of the duty to 
disclose, rather than on the process of dialogue that precedes consent as permission, 
restricts its sensitivity to individual autonomy. Finally, I also briefly raised some of the 
problems of regulating consent to medical treatment within the common law system, 
which includes its reactive rather than proactive approach, its costs and the inflexibility of 
remedies available. 
While none of these problems is fatal on its own, together they add up to a powerful 
argument in favour of at least considering the value of legislating or developing more 
extensive professional regulation. This approach is given additional support by three 
further weaknesses of current English Law. First, the legal requirements remain vague, 
contested and perhaps not well known by healthcare professionals, 1054 although this may 
have been ameliorated to some extent by the publication of the Department of Health's 
guidance. 10" Second, the law has been developed in relation to doctors and it is unclear 
1053 Although negligence allows the judges a greater control over liability then does battery, the 
requirement for physical damage weakens the protection of autonomy. It also presupposes a 
particular philosophy towards consent and outcome responsibility that is not intrinsic to the 
concept of consent. 
1054 OP Cit n. 899,148,159. 
1055 DH. Op cit n. 514. 
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1056 
whether the same obligations apply to other healthcare professionals. Third, and 
finally, as Skegg notes, 'litigation has often been prohibitively expensive'. 10" This rnaý 
unjustly preclude patients receiving, at least, the recognition that they have been wrongly 
treated. All of these criticisms are unlikely to be addressed by tinkering with the common 
taW. 1058 
1056 Op cit n. 899,148. 
1057 Ibid., 150. 
1058 Ibid., 165 Skegg's argument is that the New Zealand Code of Health and Disability .. I. IT7--L- 
Consumers' Rights 1996 goes some way to addressing tnese weaKnesses. r1owever, nt: 
acknowledges (at 164) that while the Code warrants examination, 
it unlikely to be directly 
'transplantable' into English Law. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
In this thesis I have examined the legal regulation of consent to medical treatment and the 
competent adult. This necessarily involved a consideration of the Interaction between 
various competing ends or values, including: patient autonomy, patient well-being, 
professional autonomy, beneficence, and justice. I began by exploring the moral basis for 
consent. I then went on to consider the other moral influences that shape the boundaries 
arising out of the primary justification. These abstract moral arguments were then situated 
within the context of the professional-patient relationship. Using this textured moral 
landscape I then developed a model of consent that became the comparator enabling a 
critique of the current law. 
In chapter one I considered the meaning, value and implications of personal autonomy, 
which is the primary rationale for protecting the individual's right to consent. Because the 
capacity and liberty to be autonomous are essential to moral agency, personal 
responsibility and the integrity of the individual, autonomy is intrinsically valuable and, 
in any democracy, it deserves legal protection. Without agency, and hence autonomy, 
reactive attitudes are meaningless - except as training tools - and humanity is lost to 
automatism. Since the main reasons for valuing autonomy all require a conception of 
autonomy that at least includes rationality as an integral part, I argued that it is 
meaningful to distinguish the autonomous person from the autonomous act. This then 
raised tile question of how society should respond to irrational decisions that risk serious, 
and possibly catastrophic, harm to the decision-maker. 
Despite the fact that a bad decision could significantly harm the patient's future 
autonomy, I argued that a society in which all such important decisions were scrutinised 
and overridden if made badly would be too high a price to pay since, if that approach 
were adopted consistently the whole concept of autonomy would be eroded to the point 
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that its very essence was destroyed. We would have the same freedom to be autonomous 
as Henry Ford's customers. ' 059 However, while autonomy may be integral to the 
humanity of mankind, it is necessarily relational not isolationist and respect for that 
autonomy does not mean that the individual should be abandoned to his or her fate. As 
Mill argued, in his discussion of liberty, the principle at least requires that an apparently 
irrational decision be challenged. 
1060 
Autonomy is not the sole value to guide our interactions and in chapter two I explored 
some of the other values, principles and moral approaches that define the contours of 
autonomy. I argued that beneficence is best understood as being shaped by the 
individual's autonomy. The duty of beneficence requires that the beneficiary's autonomy 
is supported and enhanced. Although irrational decisions may not be overridden, they do 
not reflect the individual's autonomy and beneficence requires the HCP's intervention to 
persuade the patient to reconsider his or her decision. 
In chapter two I also considered the relevance of justice and virtue to the principle of 
respect for autonomy. Justice is relevant in three ways. First, it requires that if respect for 
autonomy is required then that respect should be given equally to all moral agents unless 
there is some morally relevant reason why any particular agent or group of agents should 
be treated differently. Second, because respect for autonomy requires the use of scarce 
resources, justice is relevant to ensuring that those resources are fairly distributed. Third, 
the distribution of outcome responsibility should also be justly determined. Attention to 
virtue is important because the indeterminacy of rules generated from the even more 
abstract principles necessitates interpretation. A virtuous individual is more likely to 
interpret the rules within the spirit of the principle giving due accord to the values 
protected by the rule. 
1059 Henry Ford famously said that the customer can have any colour of car as long as it was black. 
1060 Op cit n. 49,84. 
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In chapter three I examined the professional -patient relationship as the context for the 
application for these moral approaches. Rather than draw analogy to other relationship 
models, as other authors have done, I discussed the interaction between HCP and patient 
as a unique relationship characterised by specific needs and obligations. While both 
parties are autonomous persons, that autonomy is constrained by the other's autonomy 
and also by the obligations that arise from the relationship. The HCP's autonorny is also 
constrained by the professional obligations thatjustify the social mandate to practise the 
profession. 
The profess ional-patient relationship should be one of mutual trust and respect, which 
requires that both parties are trustworthy. Because the power within the relationship lies 
mostly, although by no means exclusively, with the professional, and because of the 
professional's role-specific obligations, HCPs should foster and support the patient's 
autonomy. Thus, the relationship context of the various healthcare interactions, 
exemplified by consent, requires the HCP to sensitively inform patients of any relevant 
information, assist them in understanding the information, advise them and if necessary 
persuade them to reconsider any apparently irrational decisions. 
In chapter four, taking the prior discussions into account, I analysed the concept of 
consent. I argued that consent should not be restricted to beingjust an actively pen-nissive 
state of mind. Communication to the HCP is crucial to justify any interaction. Although 
consent as permission justifies an action, it is necessary but insufficient to determine 
outcome responsibility for any action performed as a consequence of that consent. Rather, 
as I discussed in chapter two, outcome responsibility is a matter of distributive justice 
with agency simply being one factor to be taken into account. 
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Relying on a theory-based approach to concepts, 1061 1 argued that the basic theory is 
satisfied by consent as permission. However, a context sensitive conception of consent, 
situated in the professional-patient relationship as discussed in chapter three, also engages 
with consent as agreement. Consent as agreement requires a process of negotiation and 
shared-decision making that precedes and culminates in the final consent decision. 
Consent as agreement also forms the basis of the professional's obligation to discuss 
reasonable alternatives with the patient and to engage the patient in any non-treatment 
decisions. However, neither consent as permission nor consent as agreement actually 
requires the HCP to offer or provide any particular treatment. Any such obligation arises 
from the professional's duty of care rather than from the duty to respect the patient's 
autonomy. 
As an addendum to chapter four I described a model of consent that I subsequently used 
as a basis for critiquing the current legal regulation of consent to medical treatment. In 
that model, consent as permission was a secondary right derivative on the underlying 
right to bodily integrity. Once consent has been given an intervention becomes a justified 
breach of bodily integrity. Thus, consent is the act of communicating to the HCP the 
patient's permissive propositional attitude towards the proposed procedure. It lasts until it 
is either withdrawn or circumstances change to mean that the permission no longer 
applies. Consent as agreement is a process of negotiation and persuasion, which requires 
mutual trust and the virtuous engagement of both parties. It allows the professional to 
advise and persuade the patient to consent to a particular course of action, However, it 
also crucially requires the professional to be open to persuasion. 
This approach relies on the assumption that both parties come to the relationship with a 
cornmon goal, which is to determine the best course of action for the patient, within the 
1061 Medin, D. L. 'Concepts and Conceptual Structure' (1989) 44.4merican Psychologist 1469; 
Murphy, G. L., Medin, D. L. 'The role of theories in conceptual coherence' (1985) 92 
Psychological Review 289; 
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constraints of available resources. Thus, it allows the professional to challenge apparently 
irrational decisions. The HCP's duty of beneficence and respect for autonomy makes the 
power to persuade (and be open to persuasion) an obligation, but one that must be 
exercised with sensitivity to the patient's condition. However, because patients should 
retain their right to be wrong, which is an essential aspect of autonomy, any attempts to 
persuade should be limited to rational argument. Bullying and coercion are unacceptable 
and are not permitted in this model. 
Because consent is predicated on autonomy, the patient must be competent, the decision 
must be made voluntarily and the patient should have sufficient knowledge to enable a 
rational decision. This requires that the professional both makes adequate disclosure and 
takes reasonable steps to help the patient to understand the information enough to use it to 
make a reasonable decision. Ordinarily this will involve disclosing information that 
relates to the implications of the proposed course of action, which includes the 
implications of rejecting any alternatives. However, patients may waive their right to this 
information, either in full or in part. In this regard, it is one of the patient's obligations to 
assist the HCP in determining what information should be disclosed. Where all treatment 
related information is refused, this does not end the HCP's obligation. Where all 
information is waived, the HCP must ensure that the patient understands the legal 
implications of that waiver. 
Just as patients may waive their right to infon-nation, so they may waive their right to 
consent. As with the informational waiver, they should be informed of the legal 
consequences of the waiver. Because patients must actively waive their right, they must 
exercise their autonomy. In this minimal sense autonomy is mandatory, but consent to 
medical treatment is not an inalienable right. 
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The model recognises that the competent patient should have a primafacie right to 
consent or refuse consent to any proffered treatment. The right Is not absolute because 
other justifications, such as where non-treatment poses a risk of serious harm to others, 
may permit non-consensual treatment, There may also be occasions, where an act harms 
the community, when consent is ineffective to justify intervention. Barring these 
exceptions, a refusal of consent should ultimately be accepted. However, as I noted 
above, where the refusal is irrational, temporary infringement of the right to refuse is 
justified, and indeed required, while the HCP attempts to persuade the patient to 
reconsider the decision. This allows HCPs to fulfil their obligations to the patient (see 
earlier). The patient, in entering into a relationship with the professional, should accept 
the obligation to allow the professional to fulfil those duties. Thus, patients should be 
willing to explain their decision and be reasonably open to persuasion. 
Finally, the model recognises a distinction between responsibility for the treatment 
decision and responsibility for the outcome of treatment. Because consent is based on 
autonomy and is seen as a right, the patient is harmed by any unjustified failure to obtain 
an effective consent. The model allows this harm to be recognised independently of the 
outcome of treatment. Whether or not a risk materialises is irrelevant to the wrong. How 
far the damage caused by a materialised risk should be compensated for may be 
dependent on the interaction between the HCP and the patient in making the treatment 
decision, but responsibility for outcome should be a distinct judgment that takes into 
account, but is not determined by, the adequacy of any consent. 
In chapter five I explored the legal regulation of consent to medical treatment. I noted that 
the courts had distinguished certain elements of the duty to disclose, most notably 
information about risks and alternative options. The primary reason for this was to avoid 
the associations of criminality inherent to battery liability. It also allows the judges much 
greater control over liability than would have been possible in battery IaNý. However, in 
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